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The world economy is going through major economic and geopolitical 
shifts, fostering tensions in the global economic governance structure 
centered on the IMF, World Bank and the WTO. The impacts of 
globalization are being questioned while disruptive technologies continue 
to change the economic landscape. Populist politicians advocating for 
greater sovereignty and policy autonomy are attracting increasing shares 
of the vote in many OECD countries. The election of Donald Trump on 
a protectionist platform and the UK referendum in favor of Brexit may 
signal that the peak of globalization has been reached. 
This collection of papers focuses on one of the pillars of global governance: 
the multilateral trade system, anchored by the WTO. Membership of 
the WTO is now close to universal, with the accession of China in 2001 
representing a landmark achievement. While the organization plays a 
major role in enhancing the transparency of trade policies and enforcing 
the rules of the game that have been agreed by members, it has not been 
successful at negotiating new rules. The private sector is frustrated with 
the WTO, as are civil society groups seeking to address issues of interest 
to them. There is a general perception that WTO disciplines and modus 
operandi are outdated and have not kept pace with globalization. 
The chapters in this volume focus on key critical issues that confront 
the WTO membership. They review developments in trade policy and 
technology and regulation. They make clear there is an important global 
governance gap. The “internet of things”, e-commerce, cross-border 
services, digital trade and data flows all call for global rules of the road. 
They also make clear that pressures for old-fashioned protectionism are 
rising in some parts of the world. The future of the WTO is under serious 
threat. Safeguarding and bolstering the rules-based trading system is 
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Foreword
Multilateralism is under threat. In recent years, the inability of  WTO members 
to conclude the Doha Round has led many to question the effectiveness of  one 
of  the major pillars of  global governance and the commitment of  governments 
to the multilateral trade order. Matters were compounded in 2016 by the 
election of  a US president who espouses a strong preference for bilateral trade 
agreements and questions the benefits of  multilateral cooperation, and the 
referendum in the UK in favor of  Brexit. 
As argued in the contributions to this volume, the performance of  the 
international trade order is better than it is perceived to be, but confronts 
major challenges.  The WTO has enhanced the rule of  law in commercial 
policy, as exemplified by its effective and unique dispute settlement mechanism 
and the accession of  large new trading nations, most notably China. But major 
shifts in economic power balances since its creation in 1995 have made it 
more difficult to negotiate new rules of  the game and led countries to turn to 
preferential trade agreements. These increasingly address areas of  policy that 
are not, or are only tangentially, covered by the WTO, and raise important 
questions regarding the future of  the world trade order. 
The contributors to this book make a strong case that it is past time that WTO 
members move away from a business as usual approach, but also demonstrate 
that there are strong incentives for multilateral cooperation to both address 
longstanding policy concerns – such as agricultural support policies – and to fill 
global governance gaps in new areas, such as regulation of  the digital economy. 
The original idea for this book came from debates about the future of  the 
WTO in which the editors and contributors have been engaged.  The book was 
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on globalization, prospects for US trade policy and competition policy and 
the global trade regime. Comments and suggestions from Stuart Harbinson, 
Abdel-Hamid Mamdouh, and Victor do Prado, among many others, were 
extremely helpful. Funding from Philip Morris International, and support 
from Fundação Dom Cabral and IMD’s Research Department, are gratefully 
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Future of the Global Trade Order
Carlos A. Primo Braga and Bernard Hoekman
IMD and Fundação Dom Cabral;  
European University Institute
The global economy is going through major economic and geopolitical shifts. 
The balance of  economic power between the established powers of  the North 
and the emerging “new” ones of  the South has changed, not only fostering 
tensions in the global governance structure that has characterized the post- 
World War II era – centered around the Bretton Woods institutions (the IMF 
and the World Bank), the GATT/WTO and the Security Council of  the 
United Nations – but also leading to new alliances among emerging economies.
The typical narrative for economic and geopolitical trends in the 21st century 
involves considerations about the impact of  globalization, the role of  disruptive 
technologies in changing the economic landscape, as well as the terms of  
international competition, and the growing economic relevance of  emerging 
economies. These economic considerations are often complemented by 
geopolitical considerations focusing on the relative “decline” of  the United 
States and the rapid economic ascendancy of  China.
This collection of  papers looks into one of  the main pillars of  global 
governance: the multilateral trade system, anchored by the World Trade 
Organization (WTO). Membership at the WTO requires credible market- 
oriented economic policy credentials – it’s tough to get in and accession by new 
Members invariably requires significant reforms. In 2016, the WTO reached 
164 Members with the accession of  Afghanistan. Another 21 countries have 
requested accession and are in different stages of  the accession process. The 
WTO is therefore close to reaching universal coverage of  trading nations – a 
stark contrast to the original 23 GATT contracting parties in 1948. 
The accession of  China to the WTO in 2001 will probably remain as one of  
the landmark trade developments of  the 21st century. The year China acceded 
to the WTO is the same year the Doha Development Agenda (DDA) – the 
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first round of  multilateral trade negotiations in the WTO era – was launched, 
following eight earlier rounds conducted under the GATT. More than 15 
years later negotiations are formally still ongoing, but the conclusion of  the 
negotiations remains a distant goal. The 2015 Nairobi Ministerial Declaration 
underscored the deep divisions that exist between WTO Members with respect 
to the DDA. Its Article 30 states that “many Members reaffirm the Doha 
Development Agenda, and the Declarations and Decisions adopted at Doha 
and at the Ministerial Conferences held since then, and reaffirm their full 
commitment to conclude the DDA on that basis. Other Members do not 
reaffirm the Doha mandates, as they believe new approaches are necessary 
to achieve meaningful outcomes in multilateral negotiations.”
The long-dragging DDA had a negative effect on the reputation of  the 
WTO. The private sector in particular became increasingly frustrated with 
the multilateral trade system, but civil society groups were also disenchanted 
with lack of  progress in addressing issues of  interest to them. There is a general 
perception that WTO disciplines and modus operandi are outdated and have not 
kept pace with globalization. Unsurprisingly, some observers are even asking 
whether the WTO is worth “saving.”
This is the wrong question. Multilateral negotiations are just the tip of  the 
“iceberg” that encompasses a much broader set of  WTO functions. Even 
without successful conclusion of  the DDA – and as indicated above, many 
WTO Members take the view that it has failed – the WTO continues to play an 
important role in fostering transparency in trade practices, monitoring of  trade 
policies and implementation of  existing multilateral rules and agreements, and 
providing dispute settlement services. Notwithstanding the difficulties of  the 
DDA, following the 2008 global financial crisis the WTO made a contribution 
to the world economy by disciplining trade protectionism and helping prevent 
the Great Recession morphing into a Great Depression à la 1930s. The efficacy 
of  – and challenges confronting – the transparency and enforcement pillars 
of  the WTO are the subject of  Chapter 8 by Simon Evenett and Johannes 
Fritz, and Chapter 6 by Giorgio Sacerdoti. 
One consequence of  the DDA deadlock has been that trade liberalization and 
new trade rules are increasingly being negotiated in the context of  preferential 
trade agreements (PTAs). As discussed at greater length by Clem Boonekamp 
in Chapter 9, in 1990 there were roughly 70 active PTAs; today there are 
more than 300. The interest in PTAs is not limited to the market access issues 
on which the DDA was not able to make progress. Many of  the matters 
that are on the table in PTAs are driven by deeper integration objectives 
that often have WTO-plus or WTO-extra characteristics. This is the case for 
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many policy areas, including protection of  intellectual property rights (IPRs), 
mutual recognition or harmonization of  “behind-the-border” regulations, 
liberalization of  investment flows and provisions on investor protection, to 
name just a few. 
The PTAs that have been pursued by major OECD member countries, notably 
the mega-regional initiatives centered on the US – the Trans-Pacific Partnership 
(TPP) and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) – in 
principle are better attuned to the needs of  transnational corporations and 
the dynamics of  international trade in the 21st century than is the WTO (see 
Chapter 9 by Clem Boonekamp).1 Their launch reflected not just the inability 
to move forward in the WTO but also geo-political considerations, in particular 
a desire to demonstrate the ability of  the countries involved to establish new 
rules of  the road in areas that are resisted in the WTO by many developing 
countries. Both the TPP and TTIP were in part motivated by the economic 
rise of  China – an effort to deepen integration among like-minded, democratic 
market-based countries and through joint action set rules that would help 
retain Western (more specifically, US) hegemony over global trade governance. 
However, domestic opposition in the United States by civil society groups to 
provisions of  the TPP – especially on protection of  intellectual property and 
the inclusion of  investor–state dispute settlement – and a perception that the 
TPP did not address sufficiently practices and policies that were deemed to 
adversely affect the balance of  trade between the United States and TPP 
members with current account surpluses led President Trump to withdraw 
the United States from the agreement that was ultimately concluded in early 
2016 and signed by President Obama, after five years of  negotiation. 
In parallel and in response to the mega-regional trade and investment 
negotiations launched by the United States and its partners, China pursued 
its own strategy. This is centered on the Belt and Road initiative, the creation 
of  the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and participation in the 
Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership – an effort to establish a 
traditional free trade agreement among Asian economies. The withdrawal of  
the United States from the TPP and the decision by the Trump administration 
to put TTIP talks on hold may turn out to be transitory decisions. Whatever 
the case may be regarding US trade policy looking forward – see the discussion 
by Craig VanGrasstek on this topic in Chapter 3 – the recent actions by the 
United States have resulted in a weakening of  its influence vis-à-vis China and 
its capacity to set the rules of  game for the global trade order. 
1 The TPP included Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, 
the United States and Vietnam.  The TTIP negotiations between the European Union and the United States were 
launched in 2013 and have yet to be concluded.
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This collection of  essays looks into possible future scenarios for a multilateral 
trade system in which the United States is no longer the hegemon and is 
pursuing actions that erode its soft power and ability to influence global 
trade governance. It is important to consider that while the United States 
remains a major economic and political force, other WTO Members have a 
strong interest in maintaining the rules-based trading regime. There is much 
that can and should be done in this regard by the Membership as a whole 
and by subsets of  WTO Members working together. The chapters focus on 
some of  the major critical issues that confront the WTO Membership and 
the stakeholders in the multilateral trading system. As mentioned by Miguel 
Rodriguez in Chapter 4, one could argue that the WTO is currently facing an 
“adaptability” crisis. This is nothing new in the history of  the multilateral trade 
system. Actually, a similar crisis occurred in the 1980s during the Uruguay 
Round negotiations (1986-1994), which led to the GATT morphing into the 
WTO with an associated increase in the number of  policy areas covered by 
multilateral rules of  the game.
In a nutshell, the creation of  the WTO was made possible by a bargain 
that involved the inclusion of  two new agreements under the multilateral 
system of  trade governance (GATS and TRIPS), a priority for industrialized 
nation negotiators, in exchange for new disciplines for agricultural trade and 
the dismantling of  the system of  quotas that governed textile and clothing 
trade (the MFA), priorities for most developing countries. The history of  the 
“marriage of  convenience” between traditional trade policies and the inclusion 
of  new policy areas such as services and protection of  IPRs illustrates the 
capacity of  the multilateral trade system to adapt over time and to reflect the 
changing constellations of  interests at national level – a topic that is the subject 
of  Chapter 5 by Alejandro Jara. 
IPRs are territorial by nature (i.e. the rights are awarded and enforced at the 
national level) and attempts to promote harmonization and coordination across 
countries can be traced back to the 19th century.2 International conventions 
(the Paris Convention in 1883, the Berne Convention in 1886, and so on) in 
this area typically adopted national treatment provisions as the basic standard 
for international harmonization. As international trade in knowledge products 
and foreign direct investment (FDI) flows expanded significantly in the post- 
World War II era, conflicts between innovators (at the level of  countries and 
enterprises) and imitators began to increase.
2 This section on IPRs relies on Primo Braga (2016).
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Already in the 1970s, the United States began to push for the adoption of  an 
Anti-Counterfeiting Code at the level of  the GATT. This effort – launched 
in the final stages of  the Tokyo Round (1973-1979) of  multilateral trade 
negotiations – was driven by the lobbying of  trademark-holding companies, 
which were trying to limit counterfeited products in international trade. This 
attempt did not succeed, but it signaled the way of  the future for innovation- 
leading nations – in particular, the United States. When the eighth round of  
multilateral trade negotiations (the Uruguay Round) under the GATT started 
in 1986, the strategy was refined to go beyond anti-counterfeiting with a view 
to establishing minimum standards of  protection and enforcement across a 
broad array of  IPRs instruments. The appeal of  this approach was to connect 
the strengthening of  IPRs protection to the broader trade agenda and to 
provide access to the dispute settlement mechanism of  the multilateral trade 
system. Most developing countries, in turn, preferred the World Intellectual 
Property Organization (WIPO) as the institutional locus for IPRs discussions. 
The lack of  effective enforcement powers in the WIPO conventions, however, 
is often presented as the reason behind the US efforts in favor of  a GATT-
related solution.3 This time the strategy succeeded, leading to the Agreement 
on Trade-Related Aspects of  Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS).
A similar dynamic occurred with services. As was true for IPRs, there were 
no multilateral disciplines on trade in services in the GATT. Services were 
put on the GATT agenda in the early 1980s by the United States, which had 
a significant surplus in its balance of  trade in services, as opposed to running 
a deficit for trade in merchandise. This led to a process of  reflection and the 
preparation of  a series of  national studies on the state of  play for trade in 
services and the possible benefits of  developing rules for services trade. The 
suggestion to expand the coverage of  the trading system to encompass services 
was controversial, however, and many developing countries, including Brazil 
and India, were initially of  the view that the Uruguay Round should not 
address services. At the ministerial meeting that launched the Uruguay Round 
negotiations, it was agreed – based on a compromise proposed by Colombia 
and Switzerland – that services negotiations would proceed on a parallel track.
The agreement that was eventually negotiated was innovative in defining 
trade in services very broadly, including FDI and provision of  services through 
temporary movement of  natural persons, and permitting countries to make 
(or not make) specific commitments for sectors and the different modes of  
supplying services across borders. The main result was to establish a framework 
for future rule-making and liberalization. Few commitments were made by 
3 See Kastenmeier and Beier (1989) and Primo Braga (1990, 1996).
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countries to open their services markets – the main result was to expand the 
coverage of  the trading system but to do so in a way that allowed for great 
flexibility by countries as to how much to do in the way of  making market 
access opening commitments. This was left to future negotiations, which were 
to start within five years of  the entry into force of  the WTO. In the event, new 
services negotiations became an element of  the DDA.
The relative success of  those advocating stronger protection of  IPRs at the 
global level via the negotiation of  trade agreements, and the expansion of  
the WTO to include trade in services, however, did lead to reactions from 
affected countries. This was particularly the case with respect to the impact 
of  TRIPS on access to medicines amid public health crises, as underscored by 
the HIV/AIDS epidemic. This reaction, in turn, led to some adjustments at 
the multilateral level as illustrated by the Doha Ministerial Declaration (2001), 
the related Declaration on the TRIPS agreement and public health, and 
subsequent decisions/waivers on compulsory licensing with special emphasis 
on the needs of  least developed countries.
Industry groups from innovation-led countries, however, continued to lobby for 
the inclusion of  IPRs chapters in trade agreements, focusing on preferential 
trade negotiations. As discussed in detail by Fink (2012), the new generation 
of  PTAs negotiated by the United States – starting with NAFTA – typically 
included “TRIPS-plus” provisions.  The European Union also followed 
a similar track. Moreover, IPRs provisions became standard in bilateral 
investment treaties entered both by the United States and the European Union 
with other nations.
The latest major development in this area was the Trans-Pacific Partnership 
agreement that was originally signed in early 2016 by 12 countries in the 
Pacific Rim. Although its fate remains unclear following the withdrawal of  
the United States, the TPP is important in indicating the potential direction 
of  trade governance – whether through PTAs or the WTO. Not surprisingly, 
one of  the most controversial chapters of  the TPP was its IPRs provisions. 
The United States put emphasis on longer terms of  copyright protection, 
regulatory changes that would effectively translate into longer patent terms and 
constrain the entry of  generic drugs into these markets, as well as additional 
rules for biologic medicines (pharmaceutical products developed from living 
organisms), including minimum standards for data protection.
The final terms of  the TPP agreement did not deliver on all the demands 
of  the US negotiators. Still, several of  these “TRIPS-plus” measures were 
initially adopted. Some noteworthy measures in the original TPP agreement 
included: trademark terms of  protection of  no less than ten years (TRIPS 
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requirement is of  seven years) and the removal of  barriers for the protection 
of  sound marks; a minimum copyright term of  protection of  at least 70 years 
(TRIPS minimum standard is 50 years) and stronger copyright enforcement 
(including the possibility of  criminal prosecution against acts of  removal of  
rights management information and the requirement that TPP countries be 
signatories of  WIPO “Internet treaties”); requirement of  enforceable legal 
means for the protection of  trade secrets (TRIPS does not specify these means); 
protection of  undisclosed test data submitted for marketing approvals for at 
least ten years in the case of  agricultural chemicals and five to eight years 
in the case of  pharmaceuticals (TRIPS does not have such a requirement); 
the explicit protection of  new pharmaceutical products that are or contain a 
biologic (the TPP is the first trade agreement to do this);4 and adjustment for 
patent office delays in the granting of  patents that will promote harmonization 
of  patent granting practices among TPP parties.
Some of  these provisions go beyond the “TRIPS-plus” aspects that the United 
States had already negotiated on a bilateral basis in the context of  its FTA 
treaties with countries such as Australia, Chile and Peru, reflecting existing 
US law.5 Several provisions generated significant controversy, even among 
like-minded countries. One concern was that the TPP could “export” to other 
countries the flaws of  the US IPRs system with its emphasis on litigation – as 
illustrated by the growing role of  non-practicing entities, or NPEs (i.e. entities 
that focus on licensing and litigation of  IPRs rather than production and 
innovation) – and strategic behavior to block the introduction of  generic drugs.6
On 11 November 2017, 11 of  the original 12 TPP signatories announced that 
they would be willing to go ahead with a new agreement – the Comprehensive 
and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) – that builds 
upon the TPP text. There was also a decision to suspend 20 sensitive provisions 
of  the original agreement on topics such as express shipments, investor rights, 
and IPRs. Eleven of  the suspended provisions are in fact related to IPRs, 
reflecting the controversial character of  some of  the rules of  the original TPP 
4 In the United States, a biological product is defined as a “virus, therapeutic serum, toxin, antitoxin, vaccine, 
blood, blood component or derivative, allergenic product, protein (except any chemically synthesized polypeptide), 
or analogous product, or arsphenamine or derivative of  arsphenamine (or any other trivalent organic arsenic 
compound), applicable to the prevention, treatment, or cure of  a disease or condition of  human beings.” See BIO 
(2013) for further details.
5 One major exception – reflecting resistance from other TPP parties – was the term of  regulatory data protection for 
biologics. In the United States, this term is of  at least 12 years from the date of  approval. Article 18.52 of  the TPP 
provides only for an eight-year term of  protection. For further details see ITAC-15 (2015).
6 For an excellent discussion of  NPEs and strategic manipulation to delay the introduction of  generic drugs in the 
United States, see Feldman (2016).
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as discussed above. The suspension of  these provisions, rather than their simple 
elimination, suggests that the CPTPP partners want to keep the door open to 
an eventual return of  the United States to the agreement in the future. 
IPRs are just one subject that are controversial. Other topics that contribute 
to the “sense of  malaise” that currently characterizes the multilateral trade 
system include the lack of  progress in services negotiations at the multilateral 
level and the perception that the WTO is not well equipped to deal with new 
themes such as policies affecting the operation of  GVCs, digital trade and 
e-commerce, and environmental issues, to name just a few.
Services figured much less prominently in the DDA than in the Uruguay 
Round, reflecting a decision by negotiators to first determine what the contours 
of  a possible DDA deal could be for trade in agricultural and industrial 
products. This, in turn, can be explained in part by the fact that international 
businesses were less active in pushing for making the services agenda a priority. 
The inclusion of  services on the Uruguay Round agenda owed much to the 
proactive efforts of  services providers, including large transnational companies 
such as American Express. Such firms were much less engaged in the DDA. 
Whatever the reason, services talks made little progress, and at the 8th WTO 
Ministerial Conference in December 2011 it was agreed that WTO Members 
should pursue talks in parallel to the DDA with the aim of  reaching “provisional 
or definitive agreements based on consensus earlier than the full conclusion 
of  the single undertaking.” This led to the launch of  negotiations in 2012 on 
an agreement on trade in services (TiSA) outside the WTO.7 Thus, services – 
which represent 60-70% or more of  the GDP of  many economies and are the 
most dynamic category of  global trade growth (and trade growth potential) 
– were essentially taken off the WTO table. 
Services trade and investment policies now figure mainly on the agenda of  
PTAs and the TiSA negotiations. The status of  the latter is unclear at the 
time of  writing, as this is another initiative in which the United States played 
a major role in launching and which the Trump administration needs to decide 
whether it wants to pursue. These plurilateral efforts do not include most of  
the major emerging and developing economies, who have the most to gain 
from services policy reforms and that offer the greatest prospects to generate 
an increase in trade flows. For the global trading system, much will depend 
on whether participants in the TiSA decide to make the outcome a PTA or, 
instead, inscribe the results of  the negotiations into their GATS schedules of  
7 The TiSA includes Australia, Canada, Chile, Chinese Taipei, Colombia, Costa Rica, Hong Kong China, Iceland, 
Israel, Japan, the Republic of  Korea, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Pakistan, Peru, Switzerland, 
Turkey and the United States.
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commitments and make the TiSA a “critical mass agreement.” From a trading 
system perspective, the latter would be an important boost; making the TiSA 
a PTA would, in contrast, be a major blow.
Challenges Looking Forward
The most immediate challenge confronting the WTO as an institution is to 
move on from the failed DDA negotiations. This has proven difficult as a result 
of  the changing balance of  power – the rise of  China and other emerging 
economies – and the working practices of  the institution. Practices such as 
consensus and special and differential treatment for developing countries have 
impeded progress in addressing new areas of  policy for which rules are needed 
to allow business to compete internationally on a level playing field – examples 
include policies impacting on the growth of  the digital economy, regulation 
of  data protection and privacy, and establishing disciplines on the ability of  
governments to support domestic firms in ways that distort competition. 
The shift to a PTA-centered trade strategy by many countries is not just a result 
of  the difficulties that have been experienced in getting to “yes” on the DDA, it 
also reflects the increasing complexity of  dealing with the spillover effects of  a 
broad set of  policies affecting global value chain (GVC) trade, and the changing 
composition of  trade as technology supports a rapid increase in trade in services 
and associated cross-border data flows. The structure of  international trade 
has changed in recent decades as a result of  the increasing fragmentation of  
global production that is associated with GVCs. A GVC involves a collection of  
firms (plants) located in different countries jointly forming a “production line,” 
with different parts of  the production process undertaken by firms (plants) in 
different countries. Depending on the location of  a firm (country) in a GVC, 
participation may either involve forward linkages (where an activity produces 
an output that is used in production for export in another nation) or backward 
linkages (where a firm uses imported parts and components that are inputs for 
production that is exported). An example is country A producing hides from 
cattle that are tanned and dyed in a neighboring country B using chemicals 
imported from a third country C, with the leather produced in B used in the 
production of  a car seat cover in country D that is used by a car plant located 
in country E that exports the cars to country F.
GVCs permit enterprises in different countries to concentrate on (specialize in) 
specific tasks and activities without having to source required inputs locally or 
to vertically integrate to produce and market the end product. GVCs increase 
interdependence – each link in a chain relies on the upstream producers 
22    Future of the Global Trade Order
delivering their output on time and meeting the required quality and safety 
standards, while upstream firms are dependent on the downstream segments 
working efficiently, as stoppages or distribution problems there will affect the 
demand for inputs. The growth in GVCs has been accompanied by greater 
cross-border movement of  capital and knowledge, as well as workers.
GVCs span a huge variety of  firms, ranging from small and medium-sized 
enterprises (SMEs) that provide a variety of  inputs, to logistics providers, 
processors, manufacturers and service suppliers. While large multinational 
lead firms decide where to locate plants, where to invest and who to source 
from and how, these lead firms source inputs and buy services from numerous 
local suppliers and subcontractors that provide a range of  goods and services. 
Much of  the value added that is embedded in a product reflects the payments 
for intermediate goods and services. Thus, a wide range of  firms and sectors, 
including companies providing services to firms in other sectors, benefit from 
and are affected by GVC-based trade and investment decisions. Available data 
indicate that about one-third of  the value of  all traded manufactured goods 
reflect the value of  embodied services, and that, overall, if  account is taken 
of  sales of  services by foreign affiliates, services account for more than 50% 
of  world trade (Francois and Hoekman, 2010).
The structure and volume of  GVC trade is very sensitive to operating and 
transactions costs. This makes a wide range of  policies relevant – both policies 
that impact directly on financial and operating costs and policies that affect 
the reliability and predictability of  flows within GVC networks. Uncertainty 
and (risks of) delays associated with unpredictable operating environments 
give rise to a need to maintain higher stocks and other forms of  hedging and 
insurance, the costs of  which may preclude supply chain-related investments.8
An open trade regime matters for GVCs, but equally important are actions to 
minimize trade frictions, such as delays in border clearance and low- quality 
transport and logistics that lead to physical losses, and to facilitate investment 
in operating or distribution facilities. Connectivity – including the quality 
of  transport and logistics services and information and communications 
technology (ICT) networks and related services – is often critical. The policy 
agenda becomes more complex, spanning many areas that may not be covered 
by the WTO, or only partially. For example, very specific types of  government 
intervention may be needed to address coordination failures that negatively 
affect GVCs, but at the same time such measures may have negative spillover 
effects on other countries.
8 See Hoekman (2104) for an extensive discussion.
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Other areas that could benefit from multilateral disciplines – such as competition 
policy – are now hostages to the DDA impasse, since WTO Members are 
unlikely to negotiate on new themes until the fate of  the DDA is agreed upon. 
But, as discussed in Chapter 11 by Pérez Motta and Murra, a multilateral 
solution (maybe in the context of  a plurilateral agreement under the WTO) 
could better harness the complementarity between trade and competition rules.
The way forward is likely to entail greater reliance on variable geometry – 
cooperation between subsets of  WTO members (“clubs”). Numerous observers 
have argued that cooperation on regulatory “behind-the-border” policies 
cannot occur between 164+ countries.9 An implication is that the WTO 
Membership may need to accept greater small group cooperation inside the 
organization as opposed to leaving the field to PTAs. The expanding number 
of  PTAs illustrates that club-type cooperation is the preference of  many 
countries. Movement in this direction has already been occurring, and indeed, 
has always been an element of  cooperation in the GATT/WTO. Recent 
examples of  agreements between only a subset of  the WTO Membership 
include the Information Technology Agreement (ITA), ongoing negotiations 
on an agreement on environmental goods, and past agreements on basic 
telecommunications and financial services that were incorporated into the 
GATS. As noted above, it is possible (and desirable) that the TiSA will become 
another example. A key feature of  these agreements is that benefits extend to all 
countries, not just those that sign them – they are “critical mass agreements.”
The task for the WTO is to channel more of  the energy that currently is 
invested in PTAs towards rule-making under the WTO umbrella. Necessary 
conditions for this to occur are deliberation on both old and new policy 
areas that generate negative externalities and call for concerted action and 
cooperation, and more collective learning about the experiences of  PTAs in 
dealing with these policy areas. As discussed by Bernard Hoekman in Chapter 
7, the 21st century agenda confronting the WTO centers on “behind-the-
border” regulatory policies as well as “legacy” 20th century (or indeed, 19th 
century) issues such as remaining tariffs. Reducing the market-segmenting 
effects of  differences in regulations is difficult because of  concerns that it may 
compromise the attainment of  regulatory objectives (a “race to the bottom”). 
Identifying areas of  regulation that could be the focus of  cooperation in the 
9 Baldwin (2016), for example, suggests that world trade governance is likely to evolve into a two-pillar system, with the 
WTO focusing on traditional trade issues and mega-PTAs dealing with disciplines for GVCs, capital flows, enhanced 
protection of  IPRs, and so on. The difficulties in negotiating and ratifying such agreements suggests this may prove 
more difficult than envisaged.
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WTO requires discussion and deliberation, with active participation of  the 
business community, policy research institutes and international regulatory 
networks.
In addition to the forward-looking agenda, another important challenge is 
to address the complaints by some WTO Members regarding the operation 
of  the institution. Of  particular urgency at the time of  writing is the refusal 
of  the United States to approve new Appellate Body members, reflecting its 
view that changes need to be made to the mandates and modus operandi of  
the Appellate Body. As noted by Giorgio Sacerdoti in Chapter 6, the dispute 
settlement mechanism of  the WTO, long considered by most WTO Members 
and observers to be the crown jewel of  the trade order, is being actively 
questioned by the United States. Unless this matter is addressed, there is a 
threat that dispute settlement will go the way of  the negotiation function of  
the WTO – spelling the effective demise of  the system. 
Another challenge for the WTO as an organization concerns the need to 
establish and deepen partnerships and harness complementarities with other 
international organizations dealing with trade policy, and the international 
business community.  Greater engagement with business organizations is 
necessary for better economic governance, not least because of  GVCs, which 
increase the interface between private and public international law, are giving 
rise to transnational initiatives among firms to agree on norms and standards, 
are an element of  corporate social responsibility initiatives, and are a focal 
point for public and private capacity-building programs (to name just a few 
dimensions of  the governance dimensions associated with GVCs). Public-
private partnerships are now commonplace when it comes to investment 
projects and the operation of  (segments of) GVCs. The purely state-to-state 
nature of  WTO operations is increasingly outdated.
Many international organizations, regulatory networks and standards-setting 
bodies play a role in creating the governance frameworks for policy areas 
that impact on trade and investment. The WTO is in many respects a weak 
organization in comparison with the multilateral development banks, the IMF, 
the OECD, and so forth when it comes to its mandate and financial resources 
to undertake monitoring, research and analysis, engage in policy dialogue and 
advisory services, capacity-building, etc. There are many “linkages” between 
the domain of  the WTO and the areas of  activity of  other institutions. 
Examples include sectoral regulation and associated international efforts and 
networks through which regulatory cooperation is pursued; governance of  
(multinational) business and associated GVC-based production and trade 
(including private product and production standards, labeling and traceability 
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requirements, etc.); PTA-based initiatives in areas of  direct relevance to the 
trade order (e.g. the decision by the European Union to establish permanent 
investment courts in new agreements that cover investment); as well as the 
regimes governing international financial flows and exchange rate policies.
Mention should be made here of  the UN system as well, in particular as it 
relates to the achievement of  the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). 
Trade is mentioned as an instrument to achieve some of  the SDGs, including 
by correcting distortions in world agricultural markets, improving Aid for Trade 
support for developing countries, regional and trans-border infrastructure 
investments, and increasing the integration of  small-scale enterprises into 
GVCs. An open, rules-based, non-discriminatory multilateral trading system 
and doubling the LDC share of  global exports – in part through the timely 
implementation on a lasting basis of  duty-free, quota-free market access – are 
other instruments identified in the document presenting the SDGs (United 
Nations, 2015).
Hoekman (2015) suggests the adoption of  a trade cost reduction goal would 
help to leverage trade to achieve the SDGs. Reducing trade costs benefits both 
exporters and importers as well as households in developing countries. A trade 
cost reduction target would also encourage governments to identify actions that 
will do the most to facilitate trade, including in areas that are not covered by 
the WTO. There are many reasons why costs may be high, including own trade 
policies of  developing economies, a lack of  trade facilitation and weaknesses 
in transport and logistics services. A trade cost reduction target leaves it to 
governments to work with stakeholders to identify how best to reduce prevailing 
excess costs – thus encouraging the type of  public-private partnerships and 
cooperation with other organizations discussed above.
Conclusion
The inability to get to “yes” in the DDA does not imply a lack of  relevance 
of  the WTO. Indeed, the recent questioning and re-opening of  PTAs by 
the United States under the Trump administration and the opposition of  
many citizens in Europe to agreements such as CETA and TTIP imply 
that the WTO may become more salient in the coming years. Multilateral 
negotiations have become more complex because developing countries are 
more active and engaged in pursuing their objectives – and have greater 
market power as a result of  their expanding share in world trade. PTAs 
may well be more effective mechanisms to address matters of  a regulatory 
nature, or that involve the liberalization of  politically sensitive areas such as 
26    Future of the Global Trade Order
the movement of  people. It is noteworthy that PTAs increasingly address 
matters such as labor and environmental standards and include a focus on 
human rights, rule of  law and other dimensions of  public governance. These 
are areas of  policy that are not covered, or are covered only tangentially, by 
the WTO. In other regulatory policy domains there is already a substantial 
interface between the WTO and other international regimes – one example 
is in the area of  product standards (health and safety norms for food and 
animal products), another is the protection of  IPRs. In these various areas, 
other institutions take the lead in setting substantive norms (ISO, FAO/Codex 
Alimentarius for product standards; WIPO for intellectual property). The same 
is true for development assistance, where the WTO today interacts more with 
international development agencies than it did in the past under the umbrella 
of  the Aid for Trade initiative.10
These are all areas where PTAs have little role. PTAs also generally do 
not address subjects that have been the source of  disagreement in WTO 
negotiations such as agricultural support policies, which are important to 
developing countries. As discussed by Nick Ashton-Hart in Chapter 10, as 
the world economy becomes even more interconnected as a result of  the 
“Internet of  things”, e-commerce and the associated increase in cross-border 
service flows, policies that limit or raise the cost of  digital trade and data flows 
will become ever more important. Mega-PTAs may result in agreements on 
how to address such matters, but from a global efficiency perspective what is 
needed are rules of  the game for digital commerce and cross-border data flows 
that span all major economies. The difficulties that have been experienced 
in establishing mega-PTAs suggest that these are not a panacea and that 
governments may see greater value in redirecting their efforts in cooperating on 
new matters towards the WTO – even if  this is initially limited to plurilateral 
initiatives. In short, as discussed in greater depth by Primo Braga in Chapter 
2, the future of  the WTO is an important topic not only for the institution 
itself, but also for the health and expansion of  global trade in the 21st century. 
At present, the danger of  economic disintegration is a real threat to the world 
economy.
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The Threat of Economic 
Disintegration
Carlos A. Primo Braga
IMD and Fundação Dom Cabral
There are moments in history that herald the beginning of  a new era in 
terms of  economic, social, and international relations. The new millennium 
has brought many of  these dates to our attention.  September 11, 2001 will 
always be remembered as the moment that terrorism became a global player. 
Thomas Friedman argues that technological innovations (the iPhone platform, 
IBM’s Watson and progress in cognitive computing, as well as advances in 
the architecture for microchips, developments in clean technologies and in 
DNA sequencing techniques, and so on) clustered around 2007 launched 
the “age of  accelerations,” characterized by a high speed of  social change, 
as well as growing interdependence and complexity of  economic relations 
(Friedman, 2016: Chapter 2). September 15, 2008 and the bankruptcy of  
Lehman Brothers, in turn, will be remembered as the moment when the global 
financial crisis became a global threat and the benefits of  financial deregulation 
were called into question.  
The focus of  this chapter, however, is the year 2016. That is the year when 
the growing appeal of  populist messages and doubts about the benefits of  
globalization materialized into two major developments: the referendum 
that led to decision of  the United Kingdom to leave the European Union 
(“Brexit”), and the election of  Donald Trump in the United States. These 
developments add to concerns about the future of  the liberal trade order and, 
in particular, of  its institutional underpinnings associated with the World Trade 
Organization (WTO). In what follows, this chapter discusses the concept of  
“peak globalization,” the renewed appeal of  protectionist policies, as well as 
recent political developments in the United States and in the United Kingdom 
(the original pillars of  the liberal trade order), and the implications of  these 
developments for the future of  the WTO.   
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Globalization: Retreat, Pause or Reset?
Globalization is an old process that can be traced back to the origins of  human 
civilization. Its hallmark is the growing interdependence of  different societies 
fostered by trade, migration, knowledge, and capital flows. Although analysts 
typically emphasize the modernity of  the concept, it is worth noting that 
more than 2,000 years ago, the perception of  growing interdependence across 
economies was already part of  the intellectual discourse. Polybius, a Greek 
historian, noted that “[b]efore, the events that took place in the world were 
not linked. Now, they are all dependent on each other” in the 2nd century BC.1
It is true, as pointed out by Wolf  (2004), that the term only became widely 
used in the second half  of  the 20th century. In practice, it provides a kind 
of  Rorschach test for analysts – i.e. it means different things to different 
researchers. In what follows, an economic approach is adopted, focusing on 
the process of  growing economic integration driven by trade (of  goods and 
services), capital, people and information/knowledge flows across borders. 
Needless to say, there are many other relevant dimensions to this process (such 
as cultural globalization). 
Independently of  the focus adopted, however, this is a process that remains 
quite controversial. In 2014, a PEW survey covering 44 countries, for example, 
found that a strong majority (a median of  81%) of  the respondents believed that 
international trade is good for their country and a majority (a median of  74%) 
also saw foreign direct investment (in the context of  greenfield investments) as 
positive for their economies (PEW, 2014). But perceptions about the impact of  
globalization on wages and prices were typically much more skeptical about its 
benefits. Ironically, the level of  skepticism about the benefits of  globalization 
was higher in the United States (and other advanced economies) than in most 
developing countries. These negative reactions have been confirmed by more 
recent international surveys.  A recent YouGov survey (Smith, 2016) found that 
the highest levels of  skepticism about globalization are nowadays observed 
in countries such as France and the United States, where only 37% and 40% 
of  the population surveyed, respectively, answered that globalization was “a 
force for good”, in contrast to 91% in Vietnam and 85% in the Philippines.   
Such attitudes are often associated with the impact of  the global financial 
crisis and the rise of  populist parties/leaderships that blame international 
trade for job destruction and rising income inequality.  There is historical 
evidence that in the aftermath of  financial crises, populist messages tend to 
gain support. Funk et al. (2015) document the history of  general elections in 
1 For further details, see Huwart and Verdier (2013).
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20 advanced economies after financial crises over 140 years. Their findings 
suggest that voters tend to be attracted by populist rhetoric after such crises, 
blaming minorities/immigrants or foreigners for the crises.    
It is not surprising to note that, in the aftermath of  the recent global financial 
crisis, the process of  financial globalization slowed down significantly. In 
response to the financial crisis, many countries imposed new regulatory 
restrictions on capital account transactions or tightened existing regulations. 
Financial globalization (that is, international flows associated with equity 
markets, corporate and government bonds, and loans) expanded at an annual 
rate of  8.1% from 2000 to 2007. Since 2008, it has lost most of  its dynamism 
(growing at less than 2% per year in the first five years after the crisis), even 
though the depth of  financial integration today remains at a multiple of  the 
levels observed in the 1990s.2  By 2016, global cross-border capital flows had 
declined roughly 65% vis-à-vis the peak (of  US$12.4 trillion) reached in 2007.3 
Most of  this dramatic adjustment, however, was associated with the retreat 
of  Eurozone banks that significantly reduced their foreign exposure amid the 
Eurozone crisis.  Investment flows have also declined from their peak ($1.83 
trillion) in 2007. Foreign direct investment (defined as investment that leads 
to at least a 10% stake in a foreign entity) fluctuated significantly over the last 
few years, and it only recovered to levels similar to those reached at the eve of  
the crisis by 2016, when they amounted to $1.75 trillion (UNCTAD, 2017).
The performance of  international trade flows is of  particular interest for the 
discussion of  the future of  the global trade order. Merchandise trade had 
been growing on average 7% per year before the onset of  the global financial 
crisis. Since 2008, however, trade growth has been anemic and in some years 
below the expansion of  world output (e.g. 2.3% at market exchange rates for 
global GDP versus 1.3% for global trade volume in 2016).4 All of  these trends 
raise the question: has globalization reached its peak and is it now retreating?5
If  one focuses on international trade flows, there are cyclical factors that help 
explain the slowdown. Weak aggregate demand and uncertainty (dragging 
down business investment, which tends to be trade-intensive) are often 
characterized as the main culprits in this context. But there seems to be more 
2 See Lund et al. (2013) for a detailed analysis.
3 See Lund et al. (2017) for recent data on financial flows.
4 For a review of  recent analyses on the global trade slowdown, see Hoekman (2015) and WTO (2017).
5 It is worth noting that the relative popularity of  the term “globalization” has declined significantly over the last 
decade, as illustrated by trends in Google searches; see Goldin and Kutarna (2016).
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structural forces at work.6 The long-run elasticity of  trade with respect to 
world GDP, for example, which used to be above 2 in the 1990s, is estimated 
to be much lower now (around 1.31 for the period 2001–2013), suggesting that 
trade has become less responsive to GDP growth.7 The shortening of  supply 
chains to better cope with environmental and geopolitical risks, increased 
recourse to trade protectionism in some markets, the domestic integration 
of  the Chinese market leading to increased local content in exports, and the 
evolving shift toward services in the world economy are some of  the usual 
suspects identified in this context. Timmer et al. (2016) note that since 2011, 
both demand and supply factors have impacted the dynamism of  international 
trade.  Global demand has continued to shift, particularly in China, towards 
services, which are less trade-intensive.  Moreover, the process of  product 
fragmentation associated with global value chains (GVCs) seems to have stalled 
and even reversed in recent years.
As discussed in Primo Braga (2015a), the debate on the future of  globalization 
is considered by some as a waste of  time. According to this perspective, 
growing economic integration and interdependence is inevitable, driven by 
technology (as illustrated by technological change impacting transportation 
and communication costs), and the breaking down of  barriers to trade, 
capital flows, and movement of  information/knowledge, as well as people, 
in the context of  unilateral trade liberalization and economic reforms, or via 
negotiated trade agreements. 
Technological determinism is an influential “ideology” in promoting the 
view that growing economic integration is inevitable. There is no doubt that 
innovation in all spheres of  human knowledge – from the introduction of  the 
alphabet to the invention of  the wheel, from technological progress in shipping 
to new communication technologies – has been a major driver of  the process 
of  globalization. And distinct cycles of  technological innovation have not only 
driven, but also shaped this process in modern times. The telegraph and the 
steam engine were key forces behind international economic integration in the 
19th century. In the same vein, the container and information communication 
technologies (ICT) revolutionized the way that companies and nations have 
engaged in international trade in the last five decades. Moreover, digitization 
is currently transforming many industries and significantly increasing the 
tradability of  services as ICT networks expand internationally. 
6 For those who believe in “secular stagnation” (the proposition that long-term potential growth for the world economy 
has declined, driven by lower rates of  technological progress and productivity growth, demographic trends, growing 
inequality, excessive debt overhang, and instability associated with low real interest rates), the trade slowdown is part 
of  a new normal for the world economy.
7 See Constantinescu et al. (2015) for recent estimates of  the long-run elasticity of  world trade with respect to world 
GDP.
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All these considerations, however, should not be interpreted in a vacuum. 
Although technological progress increases the costs of  resisting globalization, 
this does not mean that policies and regulations at the national level have 
necessarily always evolved in a way to facilitate this process. Actually, as already 
mentioned in the context of  financial regulations, government reactions – 
and sometimes technology itself  (as illustrated by the impact of  advanced 
robotics fostering reshoring decisions by multinational corporations) – can 
move in an opposite direction. In other words, policy matters, and those who 
profess a certainty on the inevitability of  economic integration, even if  proven 
right in terms of  long-term trends, may be disappointed in the near future.8 
Moreover, as discussed by Evenett and Fritz in Chapter 8 of  this book, the 
conventional wisdom that WTO disciplines “succeeded in preventing the 
widespread resort to protectionism since the onset of  the global economic 
crisis” needs further scrutiny. As described in detail in the Global Trade Alert 
reports,9 there is evidence that discrimination against foreign commercial 
interests has increased significantly in the post-crisis era. Subsidies, localization 
requirements, and trade finance have been playing an important role in this 
new wave of  protectionist actions that often evade multilateral disciplines. It 
is difficult to quantify the exact impact of  these actions on global trade flows, 
but there is no doubt that, even though we have not witnessed a trade collapse 
similar to that observed in the 1930s, these measures are contributing to the 
trade slowdown.  
It may be too early to announce that we have reached a “peak” in the 
globalization process. One could even argue that we are in a moment of  
resetting global structures of  production and that opportunities associated 
with “e-commerce” and lower transaction costs for small and medium-sized 
enterprises to engage in international trade may soon reverse these trends. 
Moreover, as the global economy regains strength – as illustrated by the latest 
IMF forecasts for 2018 (IMF, 2017) – and demand for consumer and capital 
goods recover, we should expect a recovery of  global trade flows. In short, 
declarations that we have entered a phase of  retreating globalization may be 
exaggerated. 
8 One should not forget that the “optimism” about the geopolitical implications of  globalization also influenced the 
intellectual debate at the beginning of  the 20th century. In 1909, Norman Angell (a Nobel Peace Prize winner in 
1933) published a pamphlet that later became a popular book (The Great Illusion), in which he argued that economic 
interdependence had become so pervasive in Europe, that war was very unlikely. Two world wars, and policy mistakes 
around the Great Depression, underscored the fact that predictions about an ever-growing international economic 
integration are not necessarily correct. 
9 Available at www.globaltradealert.org.
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It is clear, however, that unless political will to continue to pursue economic 
liberalization – either unilaterally or in the context of  trade negotiations – is 
rekindled, the specter of  a less integrated world economy may become a 
self-fulfilling prophecy in the medium term. After all, even if  one espouses 
a technologically driven rationale to explain globalization, it is important to 
recognize that the environment for the required supporting policies is not a 
favorable one in moments of  shifting economic and geopolitical power. Recent 
political developments (such as the above-mentioned 2016 “shocks”) suggest 
that the potential for economic disintegration cannot be ignored. In particular, 
“peak trade” (the proposition that we should not expect international trade 
to continue to grow faster than global GDP) qualifies the appeal of  trade-led 
development strategies and it may further impact the support for a liberal 
trade order (BIS, 2017).
The Liberal Trade Order Under Attack
For much of  the first half  of  the last century, especially during the 1930s, 
the world economy and business were affected by predatory trade wars. 
The architects of  the post-war edifice of  global economic governance were 
committed to repairing the system and ensuring that it should be robust, fair, 
and sustainable. Trade especially was recognized as a critical foundation for 
peace and prosperity. An attempt to complement the Bretton Woods institutions 
(the IMF and the World Bank) with the creation of  the International Trade 
Organization (ITO) failed because, among other factors, the US Congress 
refused to ratify US participation in a multilateral trade organization.  The 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) became a second-best 
solution for this institutional vacuum, reflecting the negotiations for tariff 
reductions that had been conducted in 1947, before the conclusion of  the 
ITO talks. Originally, the basic objective of  the GATT was to avoid that 
negotiated tariff concessions were withdrawn before the ITO Charter became 
a reality.10 The GATT entered into force in 1948 as an inter-governmental 
treaty – expected to be an interim agreement on the road to the ITO.  Its 
spirit and letter, however, provided the multilateral framework that saw trade 
and economic growth among its members flourish in the ensuing 50+ years. 
Indeed, the GATT was so successful that during the Uruguay Round of  
multilateral trade negotiations (1986-94), GATT contracting parties agreed 
to establish an international organization to administer multilateral trade 
10 For details see Irwin et al. (2008).
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agreements (including the GATT) – the World Trade Organization (WTO). 
Since then, virtually every nation, with a very small handful of  exceptions, 
came knocking at its door to seek membership.11 
It is ironic to note, amid the latest developments in trade policy under the Trump 
administration, that the leadership of  the United States was fundamental in 
establishing the pillars of  the liberal trade order in the post-World War II era. 
The United Kingdom also played an important role in this process since the 
multilateral trade rules emerged from initial negotiations at a bilateral level 
between the United States and the United Kingdom, designed to restrict 
the adoption of  protectionist measures and to set the parameters for trade 
liberalization. 
History, however, suggests that the United States could be characterized 
as a “reluctant” hegemon. As Kagan (2013) points out, its engagement in 
international affairs has typically followed a cyclical path characterized by 
initial reluctance, followed by “aggressive” intervention, with the cycle often 
ending in withdrawal or indifference. But its influence in the context of  
major geopolitical developments in the 20th century, as well as in shaping the 
current global governance structure, has been profound. Definitions of  what 
global governance means vary, but typically they emphasize the following key 
objectives for the network of  institutions involved in such an undertaking: (i) 
to avoid “great power” wars; (ii) to sustain global economic prosperity; and 
(iii) to constrain tyranny and extra-territorial interventions.12 It can be argued 
that US power has also been influential in adding the spread of  democracy 
and market-oriented economic policies as additional objectives of  its foreign 
policy goals. 
There is no doubt that the “world” that the United States helped build in 
the post-World War II era has been quite successful in advancing economic 
prosperity and constraining “great power” conflict. The Cold War tensions 
with the Soviet Union also fostered a strategy of  engagement on economic (e.g. 
the Marshall Plan) and military terms (e.g. North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
and the Treaty of  Mutual Cooperation and Security between the US and 
Japan) that facilitated the re-orientation of  two of  the major military powers of  
the past (Germany and Japan) toward a pacifist path. The US-driven “liberal” 
world order achieved its pinnacle in the 1990s with the disintegration of  the 
former Soviet Union and the collapse of  communism as a serious alternative 
socioeconomic order. The euphoria of  the moment even led some to announce 
11 By the end of  2017, the WTO had 164 members, covering more than 98% of  global trade flows, and 21 additional 
countries were engaged in accession procedures.
12 See, for example, Kissinger (2014) and Jones (2014).
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the “end of  history” in the sense that liberal market democracies had become 
the universal evolutionary goal of  societies around the world and ideological 
tensions would become a thing of  the past.13
This “triumphalism” did not resist the harsh realities of  economic and political 
developments in the 21st century. Moreover, the benefits of  a liberal trade 
order also begin to be disputed amid the populist wave of  the last few years. 
The Inaugural Address of  President Trump makes explicit this new attitude 
towards trade as illustrated by the following excerpt:
“Every decision on trade, on taxes, on immigration, on foreign affairs, 
will be made to benefit American workers and American families. We 
must protect our borders from the ravages of  other countries making our 
products, stealing our companies, and destroying our jobs. Protection 
will lead to great prosperity and strength.”
Donald J. Trump, Inaugural Address, January 20, 2017.
Initial measures of  the Trump administration and its rhetoric – including 
the withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), the proposed 
renegotiation of  NAFTA, the renewed interest in pursuing trade-remedy 
investigations, the emphasis on the trade–security nexus, and so on – which 
are discussed in detail by Craig VanGrasstek in Chapter 3 of  this book, seem 
to confirm its intention to implement a protectionist strategy. To a certain 
extent, this policy trend would be consistent with the cyclical pattern identified 
by Kagan and one could argue that the US “retreat” will not last for too long. 
Its institutional implications in terms of  global governance, however, could be 
quite significant in the coming years.
The strategy of  the Trump administration emphasizes reciprocity and a 
preference for bilateral trade deals vis-à-vis multilateral engagements. It is 
also characterized by a “fetish” about the negative implications of  trade 
deficits. The emphasis on reciprocity has historical precedent in the context 
of  previous strategies adopted to frame US trade policies. The 1934 Reciprocal 
Trade Agreement Act (RTAA), adopted by the Roosevelt administration, for 
example, relied on this concept as the guiding principle for trade negotiations 
and reduction of  tariff barriers. As discussed in Bown et al. (2017), the RTAA 
guided the negotiations of  29 bilateral agreements by the United States 
between 1934 and 1947. 
13 See Fukuyama (1989) for the original articulation of  the concept, and Glaser (2014) for an updated critique. 
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The concept of  reciprocity, however, was applied in a pragmatic manner – that 
is, tariff cuts were negotiated to achieve “a balance of  perceived advantages 
at the margin” (what Bhagwati characterizes as “first-difference reciprocity”) 
rather than equality of  market access for the trade partners.14 This approach 
was complemented with adherence to the unconditional most-favored nation 
(MFN) principle, which guaranteed to trading partners that if  eventual future 
tariff cuts were negotiated they would also be applied to them, as long as the 
same unconditional principle was adopted by the trading partner. In other 
words, tariff cuts negotiated under the RTAA were extended to all third 
countries to which the United States had accorded MFN status. This approach 
to reciprocity combined with MFN treatment would become one of  the pillars 
of  the multilateral trade system in the GATT era.
The current approach to reciprocity, however, seems to be driven by the 
concept of  a “level playing field.” The rhetoric of  the Trump administration 
sounds like an attempt to derive full equality (instead of  equality at the margin) 
of  market access in its bilateral negotiations.15 This may be simply a negotiating 
ploy, but it will make more difficult for trading partners to engage in view of  
their own domestic political constraints, raising the danger of  trade conflicts. 
Moreover, the approach adopted so far in announcements about renegotiation 
of  existing agreements suggests that reversible preferences are now a possibility, 
as illustrated by the idea of  a “sunset clause” raised by US negotiators in the 
context of  the NAFTA review. In other words, trade policy uncertainty is 
bound to increase if  such an approach is fully implemented.16
Another characteristic of  Trump’s trade agenda is its emphasis on reducing 
balance-of-trade deficits. China ($347 billion), Japan ($68.9 billion), Germany 
($64.9 billion), and Mexico ($63.2 billion) were the countries with the largest 
bilateral trade merchandise surpluses vis-à-vis the United States in 2016.17 
It is not surprising that these countries have been frequent targets for trade 
threats in the Trump era. These tensions are also impacting the NAFTA 
renegotiation and discussions on amendments to the Korea–United States 
Free Trade Agreement (KORUS). Needless to say, attempts to reduce trade 
imbalances via trade protectionism is a “fool’s errand” to the extent that 
these imbalances mainly reflect savings and investment macro relations and 
14 For a more detailed discussion of  the concept, see Bhagwati (1989).
15 In a speech delivered in Vietnam (November 10, 2017) ahead of  the APEC Summit, Donald Trump noted that: 
“We expect that markets will be open to an equal degree on both sides and that private investment, not government 
planners, will direct investment.”; see Holland and Tostevin (2017).
16 See Handley and Limão (2017) for an analysis of  the impact of  Trump’s policies on indicators of  trade policy 
uncertainty.
17 The US Treasury Department considers countries with a bilateral trade surplus of  at least $20 billion (roughly 0.1% 
of  US GDP) as having a significant trade surplus. In 2016, Italy, South Korea, and India – in addition to the four 
countries mentioned above – reached that threshold. For details, see US Department of  Treasury (2017).
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comparative advantages. Protectionist measures may affect these macro 
variables at the margin, but they are unlikely to significantly change the overall 
trade balance of  a country.18 In practice, these actions are more likely to shift 
the profile of  bilateral imbalances across countries and to exacerbate the 
danger of  trade wars.
The main message of  the Trump presidential campaign was his appeal to 
the US voters to consider “how much better our future can be if  we declare 
independence from the elites who’ve led us to one financial and foreign policy 
disaster after another”. In this context, he mentioned that “[o]ur friends in 
Britain recently voted to take back control of  their economy, politics and 
borders,” pointing out that he had been on the right side of  this debate (i.e. 
supporting Brexit) (Trump, 2016). Many analysts have pointed out that the 
“Brexit” vote and Trump’s election were driven by similar factors, including 
working-class anxiety about trade deals and the impact of  immigration.  
The result of  the Brexit referendum on June 23, 2016, caught the British 
establishment by surprise. The populist rhetoric of  those in favor of  Brexit –
notably that of  Nigel Farage, the leader of  the UK Independence Party – had 
many similarities with the arguments of  the Trump campaign. To point out 
that those who felt left behind were attracted by populist messages does not 
necessarily imply, however, that their appeal to voters was grounded on similar 
motivations. In the case of  the United States, trade protectionism was appealing 
to the extent that it was expected to shield disgruntled voters from international 
competition. In the case of  Brexit, according to Sampson (2017), economics 
and self-interest played less of  a role. In his view, the main motivations were 
concerns about the erosion of  UK’s sovereignty (for example, EU membership 
limiting the United Kingdom’s capacity to control immigration and implying 
the supremacy of  EU laws and regulations); and blaming the European Union 
for a feeling of  being left behind by modern life, even if  the causes of  discontent 
were driven by other factors (the “scapegoating” hypothesis).
Independently of  the motivations behind the support for Brexit, its potential 
impact may mimic trade protectionism in the medium term.19 It is difficult 
to predict at this stage its precise impact since the withdrawal negotiations, 
triggered by the United Kingdom’s notification to the European Union of  its 
intent to leave on March 29, 2017, are still ongoing. In theory, these negotiations 
18 In theory, the impact of  trade protection on the current account of  a country will depend on the magnitude of  the 
Laursen-Metzler effect – that is, the extent to which it will generate an improvement in the terms of  trade leading to 
an increase in savings. Empirical efforts to document such an effect have not been successful, however (Eichengreen, 
2017).  
19 For example, George Osborne, the former Chancellor of  the Exchequer, declared Brexit to be “the greatest act of  
protectionism” in the United Kingdom’s history in a TV interview in December 2016.
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may last up to two years, as codified by Article 50 of  the Lisbon Treaty. In 
practice, the experience with trade negotiations suggests that this timetable is 
unlikely to be respected, but in order for negotiations to be extended this will 
require consensus among all 27 EU states.       
The format of  Brexit is also an open question. Options being considered 
encompass a whole array of  scenarios from the United Kingdom joining 
the European Economic Area (EEA) (often characterized as the “Norway 
solution”) to the United Kingdom negotiating either an FTA (like the EU–
Canada Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement) or a customs union 
agreement (like that negotiated between the European Union and Turkey) 
with the European Union, or simply falling back on WTO terms (the “hard 
Brexit” option).20 It is clear that in view of  the importance of  trade relations 
with the European Union (which accounts for more than 40% of  UK exports 
and more than 50% of  UK imports), there are strong incentives for both sides 
to enter a new trade agreement. But the possibility of  a “hard Brexit” cannot 
be ignored. It is true that the European Union’s MFN tariffs average only 
4.4%, but one should not forget that there are significant tariff peaks (such as 
in the case of  road vehicles and agricultural products), not to mention non-
tariff barriers and eventual future discrepancies on regulations. In the case of  
autos, for example, UK exports to the European Union would face a 9.7% 
MFN tariff. The implications for services could be even more significant as UK 
financial firms are likely to lose their “passporting” rights in such a scenario. 
It is important to recognize that in contrast to the Trump administration, the 
current UK government does not seem intent on pursuing explicit protectionist 
policies. Actually, some of  the arguments in favor of  Brexit tend to emphasize 
the opportunities for the United Kingdom to pursue its own brand of  FTAs 
with non-EU countries and to advance a deregulation agenda at home that 
will foster new trade opportunities. It is quite clear, however, that at least 
until the terms of  the Brexit “divorce” are formally agreed upon, it will be 
difficult to implement such a strategy. In short, the unintended consequences 
of  Brexit (in terms of  potential business disruptions and negative impacts 
on trade flows) add to the fears that we have entered an era of  international 
economic disintegration.  
20 For a more detailed discussion see Chapter 4 in this book by Miguel Rodríguez Mendoza.
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Wither the WTO?
There is broad consensus that the WTO is facing major challenges. Some 
have characterized it as an “adaptability” crisis to a new world of  trade 
relations driven by GVCs, the difficulties in coping with the growing economic 
influence of  emerging economies, and the proliferation of  preferential trade 
agreements.21 The most obvious evidence of  these problems concerns the 
unfinished business of  the Doha Development Agenda (DDA) of  multilateral 
trade negotiations. When the DDA was launched in 2001, there was hope 
that it would rekindle interest in multilateralism amid a global environment 
characterized by growing dissent about the benefits of  globalization. This 
optimism was quickly debunked by a series of  crises (Cancun in 2003, Geneva 
in 2008…) and delays in the completion of  the negotiations that underscored 
the deep divisions among the WTO membership on how to implement the 
DDA mandate.
Writing in 2005, I characterized the dangers to the multilateral trade system 
as a combination of  complacency (some analysts would argue that delays 
in concluding trade negotiations were nothing new), a mismatch between 
expectations and reality (no consensus on what a Development Round really 
meant, with many developing countries arguing that it should be equated with 
more degrees of  freedom for the protection of  infant industries rather than a 
trade-liberalizing agenda), and systemic challenges (the revealed preference for 
FTAs, the complexity of  applying mercantilist calculations to non-traditional 
trade themes, and so on).22
Sixteen years later, it is clear that the DDA is in a terminal coma. Some 
countries, driven by their exasperation with the never-ending negotiations 
and with the obstructionist behavior of  some participants, gave up hope of  
concluding this round. At the Nairobi Ministerial in December 2015, the divide 
between the United States (with the support of  some other developed countries) 
and the majority of  developing WTO members with respect to the fate of  
the DDA became evident.  In the end, in the best tradition of  constructive 
ambiguity, the Ministerial Declaration in its Article 30 states that “many 
Members reaffirm the Doha Development Agenda, and the Declarations and 
Decisions adopted at Doha and at the Ministerial Conferences held since then, 
and reaffirm their full commitment to conclude the DDA on that basis. Other 
21 See Chapter 4 in this book by Rodriguez in this book, and Baldwin (2016).
22 For details, see Primo Braga and Grainger-Jones (2006). 
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Members do not reaffirm the Doha mandates, as they believe new approaches 
are necessary to achieve meaningful outcomes in multilateral negotiations” 
(WTO, 2015).
It has been pointed out that these protracted negotiations against the background 
of  fast-moving developments in international trade (GVCs, e-commerce, etc.) 
did not help the system. Moreover, the transformation of  China into a mega-
trader over the period in question contributed to eroding the relevance of  the 
“great bargain” between developed and developing nations that was the basis 
for the multilateral deals under the Uruguay Round – that is, services, trade-
related intellectual property rights (TRIPs) and non-agricultural market access 
(NAMA) liberalization, priorities for developed countries, in exchange for 
disciplines for agricultural trade and the end of  the Multi-Fiber Arrangement, 
MFA, priorities for many developing countries. It is now much more difficult to 
build effective coalitions willing to compromise and to reach acceptable deals 
along the North–South divide. The growing importance of  non-trade concerns 
in a multipolar world has added to the complexities of  the negotiations.23   
It is important to recognize that the negotiations did achieve some relevant results 
(such as the Trade Facilitation Agreement), but it is evident that the credibility 
of  one of  the main roles of  the WTO (the promotion of  comprehensive trade 
liberalization via multilateral negotiations) is now in question. Needless to 
say, the WTO has many other important functions as discussed in this book 
(including its dispute settlement system, the monitoring and implementation 
of  its agreements and disciplines, and its functions in promoting transparency 
in trade practices via the Trade Policy Review Mechanism and aid for trade). 
Hence, its overall relevance is not in question. But as Robert Gilpin once 
observed: “A liberal international economy cannot come into existence and 
be maintained  unless it has behind it the most powerful state(s) in the system” 
(Gilpin, 1975: 85, emphasis added). In the current environment, one could 
translate this proposition into the following question: does the United States 
still believe in the importance of  preserving the multilateral trade system and 
its institutional underpinnings?
Recent actions of  the Trump administration (as discussed in detail in the 
chapters by Craig VanGrasstek and Giorgio Sacerdoti in this book), as well 
as US Trade Representative documents, suggest that the answer is now open 
to debate.24 A pertinent follow up question would be: if  not the United States, 
who? The obvious next candidate, the European Union, is now focused on its 
23 See, for example, Martin and Messerlin (2007).
24 For a good discussion of  the legal system governing US international trade policy, see Wolff (2017).  
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own disintegration threat, namely, Brexit. It is unlikely that it would be willing 
to allocate significant political capital and negotiating assets to re-energizing 
the multilateral trade system in the near future.
These considerations inevitably take us to the other mega-trade power – China. 
In 1990, China’s share of  global trade stood at 4%; by 2010 it had risen to 20%, 
while global trade itself  had expanded from $3.5 trillion to $15.5 trillion, with 
China’s total trade (exports + imports) growing from $138 billion to $3,122 
billion. As recently as 2000, China was the first- or second-largest trading 
partner for only 13 countries, accounting for 15% of  global GDP, whereas 
by 2010 it was the first- or second-largest trading partner for 78 countries, 
accounting for 55% of  global GDP.25  
The accession of  China to the WTO in 2001 will probably remain one of  
the landmark trade developments of  the 21st century. In order to preserve 
the predictability of  market-access conditions, an important variable for the 
sustainability of  its outward-oriented development strategy, China agreed to 
implement major economic reforms in the context of  its WTO accession. Not 
surprisingly, it has a vested interest in the health of  the multilateral trading 
system. Actually, it is ironic to note that an autocratic regime, which is formally 
a communist country, has now become the main voice in favor of  globalization 
in international fora like the G20 and APEC Summits.26
Would China be willing to exert leadership in supporting the multilateral trade 
system? As pointed out by Thakur (2017), China does not necessarily see the 
provision of  regional or global public goods, based on institutions created by 
Western powers, as a priority in terms of  Chinese interests.27 Although China 
has become a vocal support of  the globalization process, it has played a less 
assertive role at the WTO, relying on its position as a recently acceded member 
to claim that it was in no position to make significant additional liberalization 
offers or to take a leadership role in the DDA. 
25 See Hille and Jacob (2012). It is worth noting that this expansion was not confined to international trade. Between 
1978 and 1990, the Chinese economy by a factor of  26, albeit from a very low base. In 1990, it was the tenth biggest 
world economy; by 2001, it was in sixth place; and in 2010 it overtook Japan to become the world’s second biggest 
economy. It has become the world’s biggest economy in purchasing-power parity (PPP) terms, overtaking the United 
States in 2014 (PwC, 2015). While economic forecasts are notoriously risky, it seems reasonably safe to predict that 
the Chinese economy will overtake the US economy at market exchange rates GDP in the coming decade or so. 
The velocity and dimensions of  these changes in the case of  China have no parallel in the history of  economic 
development. 
26 There is some evidence that political regimes do influence the chances of  international cooperation. Mansfield et 
al. (2002), for example, find that more democratic countries are more likely to engage in trade agreements than 
autocracies.
27 Some analysts note that the OBOR is simply a pragmatic response to the Chinese needs to address its over-capacity 
in steel and cement production; see French (2017). 
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If  history is to provide any guidance, China will first try to cement its regional 
hegemony focusing on Asia – as the United States did with respect to the 
Western Hemisphere in the 19th century.28 The efforts of  China in championing 
the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) agreement in the 
region are consistent with such an interpretation.29  In the same vein, the “One 
Belt, One Road” (OBOR) initiative, with its emphasis on the development of  
physical infrastructure connecting more than 60 countries across Asia, Africa, 
and Europe, seems to be the centerpiece of  China’s geostrategic objectives. 
In sum, it is unlikely that China would be willing to take a proactive role in 
replacing the United States as a pillar of  the multilateral trade system. 
There are no other serious candidates to exert the required leadership.30 As 
discussed in Primo Braga (2015b), one of  the main assets of  the United States 
in the post-World War II era has been its capacity to explore diverse political 
and economic coalitions in exercising global leadership. No other country 
can match these capabilities at this stage. Large emerging economies, for 
example, are ready to fight for their individual agendas in the trade arena, but 
seem unwilling (or unable) to exert positive leadership in advancing effective 
multilateral solutions. Existing alternative coalitions – such as the BRICS and 
its related institutions – remain at best work in progress.31 In short, the chances 
of  a systemic crisis are real.
Concluding Remarks
International institutions can foster the ability of  nation states to cooperate. 
The prevailing trend toward “multipolarity” in economic power, however, 
does not facilitate multilateral solutions (as illustrated by the difficulties in 
finalizing the DDA). The threat of  economic disintegration has been further 
magnified by the leadership vacuum generated by the populist wave that led 
to the political shocks of  2016. History has shown that in the absence of  clear 
28 For an analysis of  the likely geopolitical implications of  the Chinese ascent and the potential for conflict, see 
Mearsheimer (2014).
29 RCEP negotiations, focusing on trade and investment preferential liberalization, involve Australia, Brunei, 
Cambodia, China, India, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Laos, Myanmar, New Zealand, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, 
and Vietnam. For a discussion of  the implications of  power shifts for the trading system, see Baru and Dogra (2015).
30 For a detailed discussion of  the role of  emerging economic powers in the WTO, see Michalopoulos (2014).
31 The term “BRICS” is a Western construct. It was originally coined by Jim O'Neill, then chief  economist of  Goldman 
Sachs, as a convenient tag for the new phenomenon of  emerging large economies. Initially the acronym “BRICs” 
encompassed Brazil, Russia, India and China with the lower case "s" at the end to serve as a plural. The BRICs began 
to engage in formal meetings in 2006, and in 2010 South Africa joined the group, hence the elevation of  the "s" from 
lower to upper case. It is worth noting that in 2012, O’Neill observed that “in economic terms, South Africa joining 
the BRIC economies makes little sense” (O'Neill, 2012).
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leadership and support from major economic powers, multilateral institutions 
are unlikely to succeed, as illustrated by the experience of  the League of  
Nations (VanGrasstek, 2016). 
Some analysts (such as Dani Rodrik) argue that the collapse of  global rule-
making (and the devaluation of  the cosmopolitan ideal as a driver for economic 
policy) will not necessarily spell economic disaster. In this perspective, policy 
failures and the resurgence of  protectionism “reflect poor domestic governance, 
not a lack of  cosmopolitanism” (Rodrik, 2017). Be that as it may, the current 
situation is not a good omen for the future of  the international order in the 
21st century. 
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CHAPTER 3
Back to the Future: US Trade Policy 




No other developed democracy has ever changed its trade policy as rapidly and 
as thoroughly, and with as great a potential impact on the trading system, as 
has the United States since the inauguration of  Donald Trump. His priorities 
are not entirely dissociated from those of  his predecessors, as there are a few 
strands of  continuity – neglect of  the Doha Round and a sharp focus on China 
offer two cases in point. In most respects, however, this administration seems 
intent upon undoing much of  what has been accomplished since the second 
term of  the Reagan administration (1985–1988), especially the many bilateral, 
regional and multilateral trade agreements reached by Presidents Reagan 
through Obama. And while there are some ways in which the current trade 
policy environment resembles the first Reagan term (1981–1984), which was 
marked by several high-profile episodes of  protectionism and retaliation-based 
negotiations, to find its true predecessor we should look not to past decades, 
but to past centuries. Trump’s trade policy is reminiscent not merely of  
simple protectionism, but instead of  that dangerous cocktail of  mercantilism, 
nationalism and militarism that was so prevalent before the nineteenth century. 
This analysis proceeds in three steps. It starts by reviewing our path to this 
juncture, chronicling how the recent history of  US trade politics presaged the 
advent of  Donald Trump. That review stresses how this amateur politician 
perceived and catered to demands that the professionals seemed to have ignored 
when they downgraded trade policy from a top-tier to a tertiary issue. One of  
the chief  reasons that Trump won the Republican nomination, and then the 
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presidency, was that he recognized and exploited not just the economic loss 
but also the social alienation and political disenfranchisement felt by those on 
the losing side of  globalization.
The protectionist promises that Trump made on the road to the White House 
set the direction for the second part of  the analysis. There, I examine what has 
been done in the first nine months of  the Trump presidency, and also speculate 
on developments in the near term, to consider how the broad principles of  
campaign rhetoric are being translated into concrete policy. This review stresses 
that the administration has already taken several steps, and threatens to take 
still more, that may radically change the means and ends of  US trade policy. 
The final section considers what may come in the medium to long terms. Much 
will depend on how long Trump remains in power, and whether Trumpism 
survives Trump – especially if  other Republican officeholders decide that 
the message is more enduring than the man. The section also considers 
where this leaves the trading system. There is every reason to expect that the 
fragmentation that was already underway before the 2016 election will now 
accelerate, and that the cross-contamination between trade and security issues 
will grow ever worse.
Looking Backward: How We Got Here
In 2016, the trading system received three shocks in quick succession. The first 
came around May, by which time it was clear that Donald Trump had executed 
a hostile takeover of  the Republican Party; the second came a month later, 
when the British electorate confounded expectations by approving a “Brexit” 
from the European Union; and the third came in November, when Trump 
won an even greater upset victory in the general election. All three events 
showed that the depth of  trade skepticism is more profound than pundits and 
politicians had appreciated, even in the two countries that successively led the 
system for the past two centuries. With the benefit of  hindsight, however, the 
triumph of  protectionist demagoguery puts one in mind of  what de Tocqueville 
said of  the French Revolution: it was both unforeseeable and inevitable. No 
less than in the ancien régime, the build-up of  resentment at the bottom, coupled 
with complacency at the top, made a cataclysmic eruption seem inescapable.
Before Trump came on the scene, an analyst might reasonably have supposed 
that trade policy – and especially protectionism – was an issue that had passed 
its prime in the United States. It had been a top-tier issue a generation ago, 
when several US industries faced a competitive challenge. Some of  them 
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saw globalization as a threat and demanded protection, while others saw an 
opportunity and favored further liberalization, but either way they elevated 
the political profile of  this subject. Politicians responded by making trade 
a leading issue from the mid-1980s until the dawn of  the new millennium. 
Between the elections of  2000 and 2016, however, the salience of  this topic 
had fallen considerably. By salience I mean the revealed preference of  elected 
officials to invest their political capital in an issue. A rational politician may be 
assumed to concentrate on topics that are electorally rewarding, but to take a 
pass on issues that do not contribute to the overarching objective of  re-election. 
Presidents and members of  Congress found it profitable to concentrate on 
trade during the more intense phase of  the post-industrial transition, but most 
of  them subsequently made their peace with globalization. This apparent 
consensus proved to be remarkably fragile, cracking in the space of  a single 
presidential election. 
The Rising Merchandise Trade Deficit and the Decline of 
Manufacturing
In a time when the US merchandise trade deficit seems like a permanent 
feature of  the global economic landscape, it can be difficult to remember that 
for most of  the twentieth century the United States quite consistently ran a 
trade surplus. It therefore came as a shock when the first trade deficit appeared 
in 1971, and the ink only got redder as the decade progressed. Between 1980 
and 2000, the merchandise trade deficit rose from 0.6% to 4.1% of  GDP. 
Since then it has hovered in the 4–6% range.
The rising and persistent trade deficit is not solely responsible for the secular 
decline in manufacturing jobs, but it is the cause that is most visible to the 
general public. The losses have been especially steep in those labor-intensive 
industries that will by definition face a competitive challenge from lower-wage 
countries. Chief  among them are the six industries shown in Figure 1. As 
of  1977, nearly one out of  every 18 persons employed in the United States 
worked in apparel, steel, or one of  the four other vulnerable sectors. By 2015, 
these industries collectively provided less than one in 130 jobs. They did not 
go quietly, at least not initially, as they fought a series of  battles for protection 
from import competition; some of  the remaining firms are still fighting. They 
did score some short-term victories, winning import relief  through a variety 
of  means. Protection could slow the decline, but not reverse it. By the dawn of  
the millennium, the economy had undergone a transition in which numerous 
industries either figured out how to ride the global tiger or were swallowed 
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by it. The one thing that the winning and losing firms had in common was 
that they tended to shed jobs in the process, whether incrementally through 
automation and outsourcing or altogether through relocation or bankruptcy.
Figure 1: Employment in the principal protection-seeking industries, 1977–2015
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Notes: The comparability of data for the periods before and after 1997 is complicated by the transition 
that year from the Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) to the North American Industry Classification 
(NAIC) nomenclature. While the categories appear to cover the same territory, it is possible that some 
SIC categories may be slightly broader or narrower than some of the corresponding NAIC categories. 
Data for apparel are based on SIC 23 and NAIC 315; data for primary metals are based on SIC 33 and 
NAIC 331; data for textiles are based on SIC 22 and NAIC 313 and 314; data for paper are based on SIC 
26 and NAIC 322; data for leather are based on SIC 31 and NAIC 316; and data for glass are based on 
SIC 321-323 and NAIC 3272.
Sources: Calculated from the Census of Manufactures (for employment by industry in 1977-2007), the 
Annual Survey of Manufactures (for employment by industry in 2015), and Bureau of Labor Statistics 
(total non-farm jobs) data.
Economic leaders gradually grew less interested in demanding protection 
not despite the rise in import penetration, but indeed because of  it. That option 
appears more threatening than enticing once a firm is globalized in its 
investments, ownership, sources and sales. The economic transition, and the 
concurrent arc of  protectionist demands, are reflected in the attention that 
elected officials pay to trade. The profile of  this topic rose in the early stages 
of  the debate over globalization, but declined as the political center of  gravity 
among corporate leaders and other elites shifted towards acceptance of  open 
markets and competition. 
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The Declining Salience of Trade for US Elected Officials
Perhaps the best way to gauge political interest in a topic is to look at the bills 
that legislators introduce (as seen in Figure 2). 
Figure 2: The salience of trade policy by US administration, 1977–2016
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Presidential Attention Bills in Congress
Notes: “Presidential Attention” is the share of transcripts, press releases, executive orders, fact sheets, 
and other White House documents for which the title or description included (1) the word “trade” 
(excluding cases in which it had a meaning other than “international commerce,” such as references to 
the Federal Trade Commission, the building trades, etc.) and/or (2) one or more of the words “import” 
(or “importation”), “export,” “tariff,” or “safeguard” (when used in a trade-related sense). The values 
represent averages for each presidency, whether it lasted four years or eight. “Bills in Congress” are 
the average for all public bills introduced in the House and Senate bills that included at least one of 
the following keywords and phrases in the text: “African Growth and Opportunity Act,” “Andean trade,” 
“antidumping,” “Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act,” “fair trade,” “free trade agreement,” “GATT,” 
“General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade,” “Generalized System of Preferences,” “most favored nation,” 
“NAFTA,” “normal trade relations,” “Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act,” “Tariff Act of 1930,” “trade 
act,” “trade adjustment assistance,” “Trade and Tariff Act,” “Trade Expansion Act,” “trade preferences,” 
“unfair trade,” or “World Trade Organization.” These values were first calculated for each chamber in 
each two-year Congress, then averaged for the congresses that comprised a given four- or eight-year 
presidential term (giving equal weight to each chamber).
Source: Calculated from data on the Library of Congress website and from documents posted by the 
American Presidency Project.
Unlike many of  its foreign counterparts, where most or all bills originate in 
either the executive branch or the parliamentary majority, the US Congress 
allows all members to sponsor any number of  bills on any matter they wish. 
The result is that thousands of  bills are introduced in each two-year congress, 
and while only a few become law they all offer evidence of  legislators’ interest 
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in associating themselves with specific issues.1 The share of  bills devoted to a 
topic tells us a lot about whether lawmakers think that subject is worth their 
while, even if  they do not necessarily expect their bills to clear every hurdle 
in the legislative process. 
The high point for trade came in the 103rd Congress (1993–1994), when 366 
bills introduced in the House of  Representatives (or nearly 7% of  the 5,310 
total) dealt with this issue. The numbers were higher still in the Senate, where 
over 9% of  all bills introduced in the 103rd Congress related to this issue. It is 
not surprising that those two years proved to be the peak, considering all that 
was then happening: the conclusion and approval of  both the North American 
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the Uruguay Round agreements, the 
launch of  mega-regional negotiations in the Americas and the Asia-Pacific 
region (both of  which ultimately failed), and continued concerns over US 
competitiveness and the trade deficit. Trade had also been a hot topic in the 
1992 presidential election, which was the first time — but not the last — that 
an unorthodox billionaire without prior political experience would run for the 
presidency on a protectionist platform. Third-party candidate H. Ross Perot 
managed to capture 18.9% of  the popular vote, and while that was not nearly 
enough to win, his showing seemed to inspire emulation on Capitol Hill. 
Trade’s heyday passed as quickly as it arrived. By the 114th Congress (2015–
2016), trade accounted for just 2.2% of  all House bills and 2.6% of  Senate 
bills. The data thus imply that dealing with trade was less than one-third as 
attractive to the median legislator in the two years that Donald Trump ran 
for the presidency as it was in the first two years of  Bill Clinton’s presidency.
Presidents followed the same path, as shown in the share of  events and 
documents that they generate on trade policy. The salience of  trade hit its 
peak in the George H.W. Bush administration (1989–1992), when it accounted 
for 4.4% of  the presidential paper trail. The high point for the White House 
thus came just before the same thing happened on Capitol Hill. The political 
profile of  trade then declined, and the drop accelerated with the inauguration 
of  Barack Obama. That trend may initially be seen as a simple function of  
decreased activity – neither the executive nor Congress showed more than 
cursory interest in trade during Obama’s first two years in office. The issue got 
a major upgrade in his second term, especially in mega-regional negotiations 
across both the Atlantic and the Pacific, but even then there was no discernible 
rise in its political profile. Trade accounted for just 1% of  the documents and 
1  For example, in the 114th Congress (2015–2016) there were 6,536 bills introduced in the House of  Representatives 
and 3,548 in the Senate. Only 329 of  the bills made it all the way through the legislative process to become public 
laws, amounting to just 3.3% of  the combined House and Senate bills (calculated from data at https://congress.gov/
browse/114th-congress).
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events in both the first and second Obama administrations, an observation 
that speaks volumes about the low political saliency of  trade at the very end of  
what future historians may label as the pre-Trump period of  US trade politics.
The Declining Salience of Trade in Presidential Elections
While the high profile of  trade policy in the 2016 presidential election 
might seem unprecedented, it actually hearkened back to an earlier time. 
Neither party had nominated a committed protectionist since the 1930s, but 
presidential candidates have sometimes engaged in selective backsliding. That 
was especially notable in the final decades of  the twentieth century, offering 
yet another example of  how the political salience of  trade rose and then fell. 
In four of  the six presidential elections from 1980 through 2000, one of  the 
candidates – always a Republican – promised major protection for one of  the 
two largest import-challenged industries. Ronald Reagan pledged to protect 
the textile and apparel industry in 1980 (thus appealing to voters in the South) 
and made a similar promise to the steel industry in 1984 (thus appealing to 
voters in the industrial Midwest), and the two Bushes also offered protection to 
the steel industry in their respective 1988 and 2000 campaigns. No candidate 
in either party made similar promises for this type of  “big ticket” protection 
in any election from 2004 through 2012. 
The disappearance of  major, product-specific protectionism reflects three 
tectonic shifts in political geography. The first shift, as already reviewed, is the 
declining level of  employment in protectionist industries. Second, many of  the 
states in which these industries are concentrated have themselves experienced 
relative declines in population, meaning that after each decennial census they 
have lost votes in both the House of  Representatives and the Electoral College. 
Michigan, Ohio and Pennsylvania collectively controlled 73 electoral votes 
in the 1980 presidential election, so that a candidate who won all three was 
27% of  the way towards racking up the 270 electoral votes needed to win. 
By 2012 they had been reduced to 54 votes, thus providing just 20% of  that 
magic number. The third change is in the contestability of  states, with more 
states becoming firmly aligned with one or the other party. In 1980 there were 
27 contested states controlling 336 electoral votes (62% of  the available 538), 
but by 2008 there were just 18 states in play with 181 electoral votes (34% of  
the total). Several former “swing states” used to host troubled industries, and 
thus offered tempting targets for protectionist appeals, but have lately turned 
so darkly Republican red or Democratic blue that the veteran politicians saw 
no incentive to contest them. 
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Figure 3: Electoral votes in swing states associated with protection-seeking 
industries 
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Iron & Steel States States with Both Sectors
Textiles & Apparel States
Notes: A state is associated with an industry if employment in that industry accounted for at least 0.25% 
of the state’s population in the election year. Swing State = A state that split its vote in the four most 
recent elections, including the year in question. For example, a state was in play in 2008 if there was 
at least one election during 1996, 2000, 2004, and 2008 in which that state went Democratic and at 
least one election in that same period in which it went Republican, but was out of play if it went for 
Republicans all four times or for Democrats all four times. Election years prior to 2008 in which the 
major-party candidates made no significant promises to protect major industries (i.e., 1992, 1996, and 
2004) not shown.
Sources: States in play determined on the basis of election results posted by the National Archives. Data 
for iron and steel are based on SIC 331 and 332 for 1977-1992 and on NAIC 331111 for 1997-2007; data 
for textiles and apparel are based on SIC 22 and 23 for 1977-1992 and on NAIC 313-315 for 1997-2008. 
In each year the calculations of industry size for states are based on the Census of Manufactures that 
was conducted closest to that election.
The data in Figure 3 illustrate the electoral stakes in four elections, showing 
the number of  electoral votes associated with states that were (a) not firmly in 
either camp and (b) tied to the steel or textile industries.2 The aggregate data 
demonstrate how thoroughly the political economy of  protection has changed. 
Back in 1980, when Reagan promised to protect textiles and apparel, that 
industry was associated with nineteen swing states that collectively controlled 
235 electoral votes (87.0% of  the needed 270). Four years later, when Reagan 
ran for reelection and promised to protect steel, that industry was associated 
with nine of  the states in play and 128 electoral votes (47.4% of  270). By 2008, 
however, the protectionist pool had all but emptied. Obama won both the sole 
remaining steel swing state (Indiana) and its counterpart among the textile 
2  This criterion requires that the industry employ at least 0.25% of  the state’s total population. This number comports 
with the decision that the G.W. Bush campaign made to offer protection to the steel industry in the very final days of  
the 2000 campaign. The Bush pledge was reportedly made in order to sway voters in West Virginia, where jobs in 
the iron and steel industry accounted for just 0.27% of  the state’s population. 
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and apparel states (North Carolina), doing so without resort to protectionist 
appeals. And while trade policy played a role in both of  the two presidential 
elections that followed, none of  the four major-party nominees made any 
sector-specific promises like those in the 1980–2000 races.
The Issue that Workers Forgot to Forget
The process outlined above may look like a virtuous circle from the free-
trader’s perspective, with the initially negative response to globalization 
gradually giving way to a more favorable political climate. The picture looks 
quite different, however, for those workers who see globalization not as a rising 
and benevolent tide that lifts all boats, but instead as a malevolent wave that 
threatens to inundate their way of  life. 
Workers have fewer options than firms. Because moving to Monterrey or 
Shanghai is not as easy for apparel workers as it is for apparel companies, it 
will almost always be in labor’s interest to demand that import competition 
be restricted. Employees are typically less able than employers to make these 
demands effectively, as they lack the resources that firms enjoy. Many are 
unorganized, with the share of  unionized labor having fallen from 23.3% in 
1983 to 12.3% in 2015,3 and few can afford the hefty expense of  filing petitions 
under the antidumping or other trade-remedy laws. The only way that most 
workers can benefit from that option is if  their employers prefer protection 
to off-shoring. 
One might also suppose that workers’ demands for protection will lose 
potency after their jobs are definitively lost. Today’s steelworker who fears 
the competitive challenge of  imports might represent a potentially powerful 
force, but the same cannot be said for the ex-steelworker who was pushed 
out of  that industry years ago. That is how things appear if  we start from 
the assumption that voters’ preferences are rooted in their present sectoral 
affiliations, but what if  something else is at work? What if  the working class 
defines its interests precisely as a class, rather than in narrowly industrial terms, 
and what if  the resentment against globalization long outlasts employment in 
a dying industry? These are questions that only a few politicians – least of  all 
the Republicans – seemed interested in addressing before Trump ran for office. 
His answer thoroughly scrambled partisan voting patterns that had seemed 
immutable, breaking down the “blue wall” of  reliably Democratic states.
3 Bureau of  Labor Statistics data at https://data.bls.gov/pdq/SurveyOutputServlet.
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Income inequality is one of  the defining themes of  the zeitgeist, having 
captivated the chattering classes for the last few years. They have variously 
taken on this issue by way of  economics (e.g. Thomas Piketty’s (2014) Capital 
in the Twenty-First Century), moral philosophy (e.g. Pope Francis’ 2015 speech to 
a joint session of  Congress), and biography (e.g. J.D. Vance’s (2016) Hillbilly 
Elegy: A Memoir of  a Family and Culture in Crisis). A paper by economists Pierce 
and Schott did not receive anything like that same level of  attention, but 
did speak directly to the concerns of  an industrial underclass. They found 
“higher rates of  suicide and related causes of  death, concentrated among 
whites, especially white males” in communities with greater exposure to the 
consequences of  trade liberalization (Pierce and Schott, 2016: 1). Their data 
suggested that the costs of  the trade deficit can be counted not just in lost jobs 
and lower wages, but also in mental anguish, social isolation, addiction and 
self-destruction. Put another way, Trump engaged in severe hyperbole when 
he declared that “China is raping this country” via trade,4 yet there was a 
more literal (if  indirect) sense in which imports actually killed some Americans. 
In short, where professional politicians saw a dead issue, Trump instead 
perceived an underserved political market. A large pool of  displaced workers 
could be rallied to support a man who spoke their language, acknowledged 
their pain, and promised to relieve it. The protectionist positions that Trump 
adopted were closely aligned with a substantial minority of  the Republican 
electorate, together with sizeable numbers of  independents, disgruntled 
Democrats and people so estranged from the process that they had no prior 
party affiliations or voting records. In both phases of  the election, this political 
neophyte put together winning coalitions by appealing to groups who had 
been economically and politically marginalized for decades. 
Looking Forward: Where We May Be Headed
Donald Trump thus managed to harness a political force that other contenders 
had neglected, and he has shown no inclination as president to back away 
from the trade-skeptical rhetoric that helped him win the election. The extent 
to which that rhetoric is translated into actual policy, however, is still under 
development. The only complete and irrevocable step that he has thus far taken 
was repudiation of  the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP). Most of  his other steps 
have only created the potential for wholesale policy revision. These include 
the launch of  negotiations (under threat of  abrogation) to revise NAFTA, 
4 Quoted at http://www.cnn.com/2016/05/01/politics/donald-trump-china-rape/index.html.
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directives mandating the implementation of  Buy American and hire American 
policies, targeted investigations of  bilateral trade deficits that may lead to 
retaliation-based consultations, an apparent revival of  the “reciprocity” laws, 
and the initiation of  cases under a national-security law that could result in 
unilateral restrictions on imports of  steel and aluminum. It remains to be seen 
whether these moves ultimately erect new barriers, or were instead engineered 
to create leverage.
The analysis below starts by painting the bigger picture of  this administration’s 
approach, which entails a major shift in the style, substance and even the 
vocabulary of  trade policymaking. It then turns to how the Trump team is 
handling four key issues: the renegotiation of  existing trade agreements, the 
use of  safeguards and other trade-remedy laws, the conduct of  trade disputes 
inside or outside the WTO, and the relationship between trade and national 
security. 
When Monarchical Style Meets Mercantilist Substance
Trump’s approach to trade policymaking can most concisely be described 
as monarchy in style and mercantilism in substance. These are two of  the 
numerous ways in which Trump bears a closer resemblance to King George 
III than he does to the 44 men who preceded him as president.
There are four aspects of  pre-modern monarchies that find disturbing parallels 
in this administration. Chief  among these is a highly centralized approach 
to decision-making, including impatience with bureaucratic or legislative 
processes and a proclivity to treat government officials like unruly servants. 
This administration has already been roiled by an unprecedented number of  
firings and resignations at the top level, and Trump even seems to consider 
members of  Congress to be his employees. Monarchies are also marked by a 
close association between the person of  the sovereign and the nation as a whole, 
and may treat any slight to that monarch as a casus belli. Trump’s foreign policy 
is marked by the very personal nature of  his relations with other leaders, a 
sense that the state of  US relations with any given country will be determined 
primarily by the tone of  those personal contacts, and a perplexing preference 
for autocrats. A third characteristic of  monarchies is the blurring of  the lines 
between the public and private business, such that national policy might be 
determined as much by its impact on the monarch’s personal fortunes as it is 
by concerns over the commonweal. Trump famously did not divest himself  of  
his business interests upon taking office, and rarely passes on an opportunity to 
promote his family brand. That relates to a fourth characteristic of  monarchies, 
namely, a dynastic approach to governance. Concerns over nepotism seemed 
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to fly out the window as soon as Trump walked through the door of  the White 
House, and the court gossip of  this administration often centers on the tensions 
between the hired help and those family members whose tender years and 
slender preparation are no bar to power. 
It is difficult to dissociate the monarchical bent of  this administration from 
the character of  this man who would be king, as this is where style and 
substance become indistinguishable. More than any other administration in 
living memory, the ability of  this White House to deliver on its promises may 
depend upon the personal involvement of  the president – often in a negative 
way. Here the world has come to know just how thoroughly this man’s habits 
differ from those of  nearly all his predecessors, including a severe lack of  
self-control, a seemingly insatiable hunger for adulation, and a tendency to 
treat political contests at home or abroad as phallometric exercises. While 
these personal traits may not be specifically monarchical – indeed, the most 
admired and effective monarchs of  the past behaved much better – their 
impact on policymaking is magnified by the extreme deference that Trump 
demands from sycophantic subordinates. This administration’s conduct of  
disputes and negotiations is heavily influenced not only by Trump’s instinct 
to overturn whatever bargains may have been struck by his predecessors, but 
also to undermine his own team and to second-guess any bargains that they 
might reach. 
This monarchical style is wedded in the Trump administration to a mercantilist 
approach to international economic relations. Modern analysts tend to use 
the term “mercantilism” crudely, as if  it merely connoted a preference for 
exports over imports or represented an especially severe form of  protectionism. 
I refer instead to the classical mercantilism practiced in most European states 
in the centuries that preceded the Pax Britannica. Classical mercantilism was 
a comprehensive doctrine in which the high politics of  war and peace were 
not isolated from what we have come to consider the low politics of  trade 
and investment, but instead treated these as intimately related components 
of  unified statecraft. Its essentials can be reduced to the following syllogism:
• Major premise: All political and economic relations are hierarchical 
dealings in which one must either dominate or be subordinate. The state 
is the dominant domestic institution, and in international relations the 
stronger states are dominant over weaker states. 
• Minor premise: Power and wealth are inextricably linked, being both 
interchangeable and roughly equal in importance. Each of  these desiderata 
are zero-sum, such that any state’s gains in either power or wealth must 
necessarily come at the expense of  other states.
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• Conclusion: Trade is an essential component in the power relations 
between states. Governments should use their power to intervene in 
domestic and international markets in order to maximize exports, minimize 
imports and promote a positive trade balance, and the state should not 
restrict its freedom of  action via agreements that limit its sovereignty. 
Contemporary free-traders are often comforted by the mistaken belief  that this 
form of  reasoning died long ago. Adam Smith established the philosophical 
foundations of  the modern system by arguing that the gains from trade can 
be shared, and David Ricardo put that argument on a sounder mathematical 
footing, allowing their successors to build an impressive and persuasive structure 
of  ideas and ideals that eventually inspired today’s network of  agreements and 
institutions. We may all too easily forget that real-world economic practitioners 
typically have a greater affinity for the zero-sum thinking of  the past than 
they do for the positive-sum inclinations of  economic theorists. It is no mere 
coincidence that the only two businessmen to make credible runs for the 
presidency in recent history5 – H. Ross Perot in 1992 and Donald Trump in 
2016 – were also the most protectionist candidates since Herbert Hoover left 
office in 1933. Men who have lived in the rough-and-tumble world of  economic 
competition may be naturally inclined to see these relations in transactional 
terms, and to count each transaction as either a win or a loss. It should not 
surprise us when they take a similar approach when setting the goals of  foreign 
policy (economic and otherwise).
The Revised Terms of Trade
In order to understand what this president and his policies are all about, we 
need to learn the new meanings that his administration assigns to old words. 
This goes beyond their revised understanding of  what the words “presidential” 
and “normal” mean. For practitioners of  trade policy, the most important 
new dictionary entries are for “protection,” “trade deal,” “bilateral,” and 
“multilateral.”
The president’s first foray into defining the terms of  his trade doctrine came 
in the inaugural address, when the new chief  executive declared that the 
principle of  “America First” would guide everything that his administration 
does. Deliberately eschewing the rhetoric of  every predecessor since Franklin 
D. Roosevelt, all of  whom used the terms “protection” and “protectionism” 
5 These are the only two men who ran credible presidential campaigns without ever having had military experience 
or held another elective office, a point that distinguishes them from those candidates who had substantial experience 
in both business and politics (e.g. Mitt Romney in 2012). The closest historical parallel to Perot and Trump would be 
publisher Horace Greeley, who served just one term in Congress. This protectionist ran as a Democrat in 1872, losing 
to Ulysses Grant.
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only in a pejorative sense, Trump insisted that the United States “must protect 
our borders from the ravages of  other countries making our products, stealing 
our companies, and destroying our jobs.” He reversed generations of  policy 
by clearly portraying protection in a positive light, declaring that it “will lead 
to great prosperity and strength.”6
The doctrine acquired a little more detail three days later, when Trump signed 
the presidential memorandum withdrawing the United States from TPP. That 
order began with the following statement of  principle:
It is the policy of  my Administration to represent the American people 
and their financial well-being in all negotations [sic], particularly the 
American worker, and to create fair and economically beneficial trade 
deals that serve their interests. Additionally, in order to ensure these 
outcomes, it is the intention of  my Administration to deal directly with 
individual countries on a one-on-one (or bilateral) basis in negotiating 
future trade deals.7
Two terms in that statement merit close examination. While most trade 
professionals believe they know what someone means by the words “bilateral” 
and “trade deal,” these terms carry different connotations for the Trump team. 
“Bilateral” to them does not merely imply the ordinary English meaning of  
something “affecting reciprocally two nations or parties [as in] ‘a bilateral trade 
agreement,’”8 but instead carries the same policy implications now that it did 
in the decade preceding the Second World War. In those days, a “bilateral” 
approach meant striving in each relationship for a trade balance or (preferably) 
a surplus, and to that end countries were prepared to intervene with tariffs, 
quotas, or other instruments. It was, in short, a synonym for the more narrow 
meaning of  mercantilism.
The new administration’s emphasis on bilateral balances was evident in its 31 
March 2017 Presidential Executive Order Regarding the Omnibus Report on 
Significant Trade Deficits. In a move reminiscent of  the “reciprocity” debates 
from the mid-1980s to the mid-1990s, it initiated an investigation that could 
lead to the threat or imposition of  restrictions on imports from “those foreign 
trading partners with which the United States had a significant trade deficit 







Back to the Future: US Trade Policy under the Trump Administration   63
the report that it was given three months to prepare. The order was thus 
emblematic not just of  the administration’s mercantilist leanings, but also its 
predilection for bluster. 
The new team’s use of  the term “trade deal” is also notable. Any other president 
from Reagan to Obama used these words to mean a formal agreement to 
remove or reduce barriers, after which the government would get out of  the 
way and let the market sort out the actual results. The priorities seem to be 
reversed in the Trump administration, for which those results – as measured by 
investment, exports, and above all jobs – matter more than the rules by which 
they are reached. The Trump team sees a “trade deal” to be any agreement 
with governments or firms that either saves existing jobs or generates new ones, 
and they will not consider government’s job to be done after the ink has dried 
on a treaty. Trump’s readiness to intervene at the level of  specific firms and 
their transactions was already clear during the post-election transition, when 
he used threats and inducements to convince the heating and cooling company 
Carrier to revise its plans for off-shoring production to Mexico. That bit of  
jawboning was vastly outweighed ten months later by a deal under which the 
state of  Wisconsin will provide $3 billion in incentives for the Taiwanese firm 
Foxconn to establish an LCD plant. This factory, for which the White House 
took credit, will be set up in the district of  Speaker of  the House Paul Ryan 
(Republican of  Wisconsin). 
A final term with a new meaning is “multilateral,” a word that the Trump 
people treat almost as an epithet.10 The administration’s deep-seated dislike for 
multilateralism appears be based on the expectation that the United States will 
always have more leverage when it faces one rather than many partners on the 
other side of  the table. As used by most trade practitioners, this term connotes 
agreements that are reached within the WTO, and especially the formal list of  
“Multilateral Agreements on Trade in Goods” that is enumerated in Annex 
1 of  the Agreement Establishing the WTO. As used by the Trump team, this 
term appears to mean any agreement involving more than two parties. In 
fairness, we should note that here they are in fact abiding by the ordinary 
English meaning of  the term. In the world at large, “multilateral” does indeed 
mean something “involving or participated in by more than two nations or 
parties [as in] ‘multilateral agreements.’”11 The administration’s departure 
10 It is worth noting that Trump and his subordinates are not the first U.S. policymakers to show an aversion to this 
term. The World Trade Organization was originally supposed to be called the Multilateral Trade Organization, but 
the late Senator Patrick Moynihan (Democrat of  New York) objected to the sound of  the word (VanGrasstek, 2013). 
The Trump administration’s objections are more to the substance than to the style of  multilateralism.
11 See https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/multilateral. 
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from the specialized meaning given to this term in trade policy, however, will 
carry unwelcome implications for anyone who wants to invite the United 
States to participate in an initiative that is either regional or global in scope. 
The Negotiation, Renegotiation and Abrogation of Trade Agreements
TPP certainly falls within the Trump team’s definition of  a multilateral 
agreement, as would both the European Union itself  and the proposed 
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) between the United 
States and that “multilateral” European entity. And while the White House 
has not yet given a definitive indication as to its plans for TTIP, its disdain for 
the multilateral character of  both the negotiating partner and the intended 
agreement would appear to suggest that the negotiations for this agreement 
are as dead as TPP. 
The first opportunity that the Trump administration has to redefine US 
negotiating objectives in trade agreements comes in the renegotiation of  
NAFTA. This agreement with Canada and Mexico is the first free trade 
agreement (FTA) to be targeted for revision, but not the last. We can expect 
the US negotiators to use these talks to establish new principles and rules 
that might then be applied to other agreements, starting with the US-Korea 
FTA. A 17 July 2017 paper outlines the Trump administration’s objectives in 
the renegotiation (Office of  the US Trade Representative, 2017). Viewed in 
isolation, many of  the specific goals appear consistent with what the United 
States has often sought from its trading partners. Taken as a whole and put in 
context, however, the overall effect of  these proposals is to shift the purpose 
of  an agreement from free (if  preferential) trade to targeted, managed trade. 
These are the key points:
• The improvement of  the US trade balance is made the chief  objective of  
trade agreements, such that the focus of  negotiators (and policymakers 
who implement the agreement) would be on actual outcomes rather than 
the opportunities that the agreement creates.
• The agreement’s rules of  origin are to be revised so as to encourage the use 
of  US inputs and to discourage the incorporation of  inputs from outside 
North America, along with a strengthening of  Buy American rules. 
• The agreement would no longer allow for Canada and Mexico to be 
exempted when the United States imposes any import restrictions under 
the global safeguards law. 
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• The limited concessions that the United States made to Canada and 
Mexico on antidumping and countervailing duty rules would likewise be 
removed.
The last two points are especially ironic for anyone familiar with the genesis 
of  the US-Canada FTA. That agreement had been principally inspired by 
Canadian concerns that in the Reagan era the United States was beginning to 
employ the trade-remedy laws with a vengeance — as data presented below 
confirm — and Ottawa’s main objective in the bilateral negotiations of  1986–
1988 was to win an exemption from this form of  protectionism. Washington 
made very limited concessions to that demand. There is even a resemblance 
between a contretemps that attended the launch of  the US-Canada negotiations 
and a comparable dispute in the current renegotiation of  NAFTA. Back in 
1986, there was some doubt as to whether the Congress would consent to a 
grant of  fast-track negotiating authority when the Reagan administration 
launched the bilateral talks, with legislators conditioning their approval on the 
executive’s agreement to employ the “correct” approach in a countervailing 
duty (CVD) investigation that was then pending against Canadian softwood 
lumber. Today, a spate of  CVD and antidumping (AD) investigations against 
Canadian products once more adds a wild card to the NAFTA renegotiation, 
and a softwood lumber CVD case is again part of  the mix. Together with 
another high-profile case involving aircraft, and a less notable one against 
paper, that perennial dispute threatens once again to roil US-Canadian talks. 
For old hands in this field, it feels like the 1985 film Back to the Future.
Where Trade Agreements Meet Trade Remedies: Safeguards
Safeguards may offer the best exemplar of  trade policy under the Trump 
administration. Here, we see an instrument that past generations of  
policymakers came to abuse for protectionist purposes, and later seemed to 
be outlawed, but may now be raised from the dead. In so doing, the Trump 
administration may simultaneously demonstrate its affinity for protectionism, 
its proclivity to play hardball with negotiating partners, and its contempt for 
multilateral rules.    
The United States and Mexico struck a deal in 1942 that offered an important 
innovation. Article XI of  that reciprocal trade agreement allowed either 
government to withdraw any tariff concession if  it found that “as a result of  
unforeseen developments” the product in question was “being imported in 
such increased quantities and under such conditions as to cause or threaten 
serious injury to domestic producers of  like or similar articles.” This first-ever 
appearance of  a safeguard clause proved to be so popular in Congress that 
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legislators extracted a promise that it would be replicated in all future trade 
agreements. This is how safeguards became a core provision of  the GATT. Nor 
did the precedent stop there. In 1951, Congress enacted a law requiring that 
the United States retroactively insert similar clauses in any bilateral agreement 
that did not already include a safeguard. Several US partners were given 
a stark choice: if  they did not agree to amend their agreements to provide 
for safeguards, the United States would abrogate the pact. Much the same 
thing could happen in our own time, with the Trump administration using 
the NAFTA renegotiation as a testing ground for the development of  new 
provisions that it will then seek to retrofit into agreements with other partners. 
Figure 4: Activity under the trade-remedy laws in presidential administrations, 
1975–2017
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Notes: All data are for the full calendar years shown, including presidents’ first year in office (when they 
are sworn in on January 20). Data for the Ford administration begin with the entry into force of the Trade 
Act of 1974 (January 3, 1975). Data for the Trump administration are annualized, based on activity during 
January-September, 2017. Data for antidumping and countervailing duties are based on products rather 
than partners (e.g. if simultaneous petitions are filed against imports of a given product from three 
countries that is counted as one petition rather than three).
Sources: Compiled from U.S. Department of Commerce, U.S. International Trade Commission and 
World Bank. 
To understand the significance of  this development it is important to review 
how safeguards – also known as the escape clause – rose and fell as an 
instrument of  US trade policy. The data in Figure 4 hint at this arc, showing 
the average annual number of  cases considered by the Ford through Trump 
administrations under this and other trade-remedy laws. The data for the 
Trump administration are an extrapolation, based on the pace set in the first 
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nine months of  2017. The parallel to the Reagan administration is immediately 
apparent, as shown in the sheer quantity of  cases. The more important point 
concerns the qualitative issue of  which laws are in play.
The data show that there was a flood of  safeguard petitions immediately 
after the Trade Act of  1974 took effect in 1975, but that torrent subsided to 
a trickle in subsequent administrations. Two factors account for the declining 
use of  this law, the first being that petitions were often denied. The law may 
be invoked if  (1) the US International Trade Commission (USITC) finds 
that increasing imports are a substantial cause of  serious injury to the US 
injury, and then (2) the president opts to provide import relief  through tariffs, 
quotas, or other means. Early petitioners under this law were disappointed 
when several of  their cases failed at the USITC stage, and many of  those 
that cleared this hurdle were then defeated by an adverse decision in the 
White House. Troubled industries increasingly decided that the CVD and 
especially the AD laws offered a surer path to protection, and the rate of  
safeguard filings dropped with each subsequent administration. The second 
reason for the evaporation of  safeguard petitions is that this instrument has 
been essentially outlawed in the WTO. That was not the explicit intent of  
those Uruguay Round negotiators who drafted the Agreement on Safeguards, 
but dispute-settlement panels have interpreted their handiwork in a way that 
makes it all but impossible for any country’s safeguard measures to pass legal 
muster. Nearly all such measures have been challenged, and every challenge 
thus far has been effective. For all practical purposes, the Bush administration’s 
decision to impose safeguards on steel products in 2001 – which was inevitably 
overturned by a WTO panel – appeared to be the last time that the United 
States would ever resort to this law.12
Two petitioners tested this proposition in early 2017, seeking safeguards against 
imports of  photovoltaic cells and residential washing machines. The USITC 
reached affirmative injury determinations in these cases in September and 
October, and will recommend the appropriate remedies soon. The president 
will then have two months to decide whether to accept, reject or modify 
whatever actions the commission has recommended. The first of  these cases 
could therefore result in the imposition of  tariffs, quotas, or other import 
restrictions within a year of  Trump’s inauguration, with the second coming 
shortly thereafter. 
12 There was an abortive attempt made in April, 2016 when the United Steelworkers requested protection from imports 
of  primary, unwrought aluminum, but the union suspended this effort four days after it filed the safeguard petition.
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The data in Figure 4 show that this potential revival of  the safeguards law is 
part of  a broader trend whereby both government and industry are increasingly 
turning to the trade-remedy laws. This is a category that also includes the AD 
and CVD laws, a national-security law known as Section 232 (for its place 
in the Trade Expansion Act of  1962), and other, more arcane instruments 
of  trade law.13 It is notable that apart from the Section 232 cases (which are 
discussed in the next session), this return to Reagan-level petitioning is due 
entirely to the petitioners’ expectations about how the Trump administration 
may handle their complaints. There have been no changes in the statutes or 
the regulations since Trump’s inauguration.
Multilateral Dispute-Settlement Procedures versus Unilateral 
Enforcement
This resurgence of  trade-remedy investigations poses two distinct threats. One 
is the obvious risk that they may lead to the imposition of  new restrictions 
on US imports. The other danger is less direct but more severe: they could 
eventually hasten the threat, and perhaps even the reality, of  a US withdrawal 
from the WTO. There is every reason to expect the affected trading partners 
to challenge these measures in the WTO’s Dispute Settlement Body (DSB), 
and it is virtually as certain that some of  these challenges will be successful 
(especially for any measures that might be imposed via safeguards). This implies 
that by early 2019, and perhaps sooner, the Trump administration will need to 
decide whether to come into compliance with international judicial rulings that 
find fault with some of  its most cherished policy objectives. It is not difficult 
to imagine how this White House – which prides itself  on counter-punching 
any criticisms or opposition – might respond to such a challenge.
There are four distinct, but not mutually exclusive, dangers that arise in the 
Trump administration’s conduct of  trade disputes. One is that the United 
States might spark a tremendous growth in the docket of  the DSB, both by 
taking actions that provoke complaints from US partners and by bringing 
tit-for-tat cases against those partners. At the opposite extreme, it would be a 
worrisome development if  the United States were to bring no complaints at all 
to the DSB; that might confirm the fears that Washington no longer sees any 
value in the WTO. A third danger is that the United States may revert to the 
use of  unilateral pressure under the “reciprocity” laws or other instruments, 
sidestepping the DSB in order to deal more directly and aggressively with its 
13 They include Section 406 of  the Trade Act of  1974 (in cases where imports from a Communist country are alleged 
to cause market disruption), Section 122 of  the Trade Act of  1974 (which allows the president to impose tariffs and/
or quotas for up to 150 days against countries with large balance of  payments surpluses), the Trading with the Enemy 
Act of  1917, and the International Emergency Economic Powers Act of  1977. 
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partners. The fourth and most serious danger is that unfavorable rulings in the 
DSB, especially those affecting important White House initiatives, might lead 
to explicit threats – and perhaps even the reality – that the United States will 
do the same thing to the WTO that it has already done to the United Nations 
Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization.14 
The only one of  these risks that we might safely dismiss, at least for the time 
being, is the concern that the United States no longer sees any value in the 
WTO as a forum for the settlement of  disputes. That cloud lifted on 28 
September 2017, when the United States brought a formal complaint against 
Canada to the DSB. This case concerns that contention that wine-sales rules in 
the province of  British Columbia violate the principle of  national treatment. 
What is so extraordinary about this filing is just how ordinary it is: the pace 
of  complaints set so far by this administration is similar to what we saw in the 
recent past (both the G.W. Bush and Obama administrations each brought 
just one new complaint to the DSB during the president’s first year of  office), it 
involves an industry on whose behalf  the United States has previously pursued 
complaints (and in fact reiterates the final complaint brought by the Obama 
administration),15 and there is nothing unusual about the target country 
(Canada is, after China and the European Union, the third most frequent 
subject of  US complaints). 
We might thus put a positive spin on this filing, but could still see too much of  a 
good thing in the DSB. While there has as yet been only one new filing against 
the United States since Trump’s inauguration (a Turkish complaint against 
US countervailing measures on pipe and tube products), the number and the 
significance of  these cases may soon rise. Any challenges to the administration’s 
actions in the aforementioned safeguard cases may raise hackles in the White 
House (see above), and that could be doubly true for any adverse rulings related 
to the national-security claims of  this administration (see below).
It would be a mistake to assume that the Trump administration sees the DSB 
as the only forum in which to pursue complaints against other countries. 
One of  the pre-WTO laws that seemed to have gone permanently dark was 
Section 301 of  the Trade Act of  1974, also known as the “reciprocity” statute. 
This law, which gives the US Trade Representative (USTR) the authority 
to retaliate against foreign countries’ practices that violate (self-defined) US 
rights, had been employed in many high-profile disputes in the 1980s and 
14 On 12 October 2017, the White House announced that it was withdrawing the United States from UNESCO; see 
https://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2017/10/274748.htm.
15 The United States originally brought a complaint on this matter two days before Trump was inaugurated. The 
latest filing amounts to a reactivation of  that complaint, without substantive changes. The details of  this case are at 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds531_e.htm. 
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early 1990s. It was one of  many statutes that appeared to have been defanged 
by the Uruguay Round, which not only “reformed” safeguard actions out of  
existence but also replaced unilateral action with stronger dispute-settlement 
rules. The president cast severe doubt on that conclusion when on 14 August 
2017 he signed a memorandum directing the USTR to “to investigate any 
of  China’s laws, policies, practices, or actions that may be unreasonable or 
discriminatory and that may be harming American intellectual property rights, 
innovation, or technology development.”16 The resulting investigation, which 
the USTR promptly announced,17 has not yet produced either a conclusion or 
the threat of  retaliation. It has nevertheless revealed one more way in which 
this administration is prepared to send US trade policymaking back to a pre-
WTO pattern.
The Special Danger Posed by the Trade-Security Nexus
Section 232 of  the Trade Expansion Act of  1962, which grants the president 
broad authority to impose import restrictions on goods that threaten to 
impair the national security, is yet another long-dormant law that the Trump 
administration is intent on reviving. The statute was invoked several times 
during the GATT era, when imports of  energy and strategic goods (e.g. 
machine tools) raised concerns over dependence on foreign sources. The 
profile and the perils of  the newest cases are higher than in the “ordinary” 
trade-remedy laws discussed above, insofar as it is the White House itself  that 
set these investigations in motion (i.e. it did not wait for an industry to take 
the initiative), and it raised the stakes by citing national security. That latter 
point changes not only the domestic political profile of  the issue, but also its 
international legal repercussions. 
On 20 April 2017, President Trump mandated a Section 232 investigation 
of  US steel imports. He directed the secretary of  commerce to consider such 
factors as “the domestic production of  steel needed for projected national 
defense requirements” and “the existing and anticipated availabilities of  the 
human resources, products, raw materials, and other supplies and services 
essential to the national defense.”18 One week later, the White House followed 
up by directing a similar investigation of  aluminum. While both of  those 
investigations might ordinarily have been concluded by the time of  this writing, 
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will prove to be another example of  bluster, and that the cases will quietly 
disappear. If  they instead lead to import restrictions, however, they may pose 
a greater risk to the integrity of  the WTO system than anything else that the 
Trump administration does.
The founders of  the post-war economic and diplomatic order devised a series 
of  barriers to separate the high politics of  war and peace from the low politics 
of  trade and investment. In the first instance, we hope that when countries 
do have political or security conflicts, they do not use trade restrictions as an 
instrument of  leverage. Failing that, if  countries do use trade as a political 
tool, we hope that the injured party brings its complaints to other legal fora 
that are more suitable than the GATT/WTO (especially the International 
Court of  Justice). And as a final line of  defense – as much for the regime 
itself  as for the disputants – countries can make security-related complaints 
disappear by invoking GATT Article XXI.19 This article allows each country 
to take actions that might otherwise be inconsistent with its GATT and WTO 
obligations when that country declares that the deviations are in its essential 
security interests. It is a well-established norm, though not a formal rule, that 
an invocation of  Article XXI is not reviewable by dispute-settlement panels. 
In the WTO era, that same rule applies to the Appellate Body. Unlike the 
general exceptions provided under GATT Article XX, for which panels often 
demand a high level of  proof  on the part of  the invoking country, GATT 
Article XXI has thus far been treated virtually like the “Get Out of  Jail Free” 
cards familiar to anyone who has ever played the game Monopoly. 
The near-automatic acceptance of  countries’ invocations of  Article XXI is 
a politically necessary norm, founded upon recognition that countries might 
prefer to leave the system altogether if  the actions that they take in pursuit of  
national security are subject to review by trade lawyers. It is also supported by 
the expectation that countries will not abuse this privilege by casually using 
security claims as an excuse for blatantly protectionist measures. Even a cursory 
examination of  the history of  Article XXI invocations shows the wisdom and 
efficacy of  this norm, confirming that the article is very rarely invoked and even 
more rarely abused. There have been only a handful of  known instances in 
19 Note that in some instances a political issue might alternatively be isolated via the “non-application” clause. Originally 
provided under GATT Article XXXV, which has since been superseded by WTO Article XIII, this provision allows 
one WTO member to act as if  another member were not in the organization. The utility of  this article as an isolation 
device is limited by the fact that it can be invoked only upon the accession of  a country. That rule has the effect 
of  restricting invocations of  Article XIII to cases in which a pair of  countries are divided by deep and apparently 
permanent animosities, and preventing countries from employing it in disputes that are more transitory.
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which a country has formally resorted to the national-security defense,20 most 
of  which came at the end of  the GATT period and involved declared wars (e.g. 
the Falklands/Malvinas conflict of  1982), undeclared wars (e.g. U.S. sanctions 
on Nicaragua in 1985), or other police actions (e.g. international sanctions on 
Serbia and Montenegro in 1991). Only one of  these cases appeared abusive, 
with Sweden claiming in 1975 that it needed to protect the domestic footwear 
industry in order to have the capacity to produce boots for soldiers in wartime. 
The rest of  the trade community shamed Sweden into removing the offending 
measures within two years, yet did so without obliging Stockholm to provide 
a legal justification for its invocation of  Article XXI.
From the perspective of  the trading system and its political sustainability, the 
imposition of  economic sanctions for reasons of  security is less objectionable 
than using security as an excuse for protectionist restrictions. The old Swedish 
footwear case was almost comical, but the challenge to the system would be 
far more grave if  the world’s largest importer abused the security exception 
to impose restrictions on a sector as significant as steel and/or aluminum. 
Assuming that these Section 232 cases do not simply disappear, there is a 
serious danger that one of  three things may happen in the near future:
• Contrary to the rule outlawing such arrangements,21 the United States and 
other steel- and/or aluminum-exporting countries might negotiate market-
sharing arrangements. This may indeed be what the Trump administration 
has intended all along, using the Section 232 case as leverage, but if  so 
that amounts to contempt for the letter of  the law. It could inspire similar 
transgressions in other sectors, thus reviving the 1980s-era practice of  
resorting to “grey-area measures.” 
• If  the United States does impose unilateral measures under Section 232, 
it might get away with it simply by invoking GATT Article XXI (assuming 
that the DSB adheres to precedent and does not demand that the United 
States justify its claim). This would amount to contempt for the spirit of  
the law, and could encourage other countries to follow suit in other sectors 
that they wish to protect under the guise of  national security.
20 It should be acknowledged that many observers believe that in addition to these formal invocations there have 
been many more instances in which countries have informally made it known that they were prepared to invoke 
Article XXI if  a complaint were brought against one of  their measures. This point does not invalidate the general 
proposition, however, because what is most at issue here is not the quantity but the quality of  the cases. The author 
is not aware of  any “informal” invocations of  the article that concerned laws or policies that appeared prima facie to 
bear a closer resemblance to the Swedish footwear case than to other, more legitimate episodes.
21 See Article 11.1(b) of  the WTO Agreement Safeguards, which bans negotiated quotas and the like by providing that 
“a Member shall not seek, take or maintain any voluntary export restraints, orderly marketing arrangements or any 
other similar measures on the export or the import side.”
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• Alternatively, there is a chance that a DSB panel and/or the Appellate Body 
might decide to toss precedent aside and pass judgment on a prima facie 
abuse of  GATT Article XXI. Such a challenge could be very provocative 
to the Trump administration. Should the United States treat this as a 
pretext for desertion of  the WTO, it would send the system back not just 
to the 1980s but indeed to the 1930s.
Here we have the precise nature of  a dilemma, forcing us to choose just how 
we prefer to undo the WTO. Is it better for countries to stay nominally in the 
organization while cynically flouting its rules and norms, or to abandon the 
project altogether and go back to a self-help system?
Looking over the Horizon: What Will Come in the 
Medium and Long Terms?
As should be apparent from the number of  unknowns identified in the 
preceding analysis, we are still at a point in the Trump administration where 
the questions outnumber the answers. We may nevertheless synthesize three 
sets of  meta-questions from what has been reviewed above. First, how long 
will Trump remain in office? That relates to the second question of  just how 
much damage he can do to the trading system and to US’ standing in it. Or to 
restate that question in terms used throughout this analysis, how far back into 
the past will this experiment push us? The third meta-question concerns the 
implications that all of  this holds for the international trading system. How best 
can that system cope with a United States that has at least cast doubt on the 
permanence of  its commitments, and may actually be prepared to undo those 
commitments altogether? These are not questions that the present analysis 
can hope to answer, but they can be put in some context.
How Long Will Donald Trump Remain in Power?
It is unusually difficult to make a confident forecast regarding the longevity 
of  Trump’s presidency. Only two scenarios would come to mind in almost 
any other administration: either he joins the ranks of  single-term presidents 
and is out on 20 January 2021, or he gets re-elected in 2020 to another four-
year term. The latter scenario would normally appear more likely than the 
former, considering the fact that nine of  the last 12 presidents who sought 
re-election won this prize. That outcome is less certain for a man who has 
been remarkably efficient in alienating leaders of  the party that he hijacked, 
has made little effort to broaden his appeal beyond a narrow but (thus far) 
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loyal base, and has yet to score a single legislative victory of  any significance. 
Moreover, both Congress and a special counsel are investigating the conduct 
of  the 2016 election, including possible collusion between Trump’s associates 
and Russia. Those investigations may extend into the president’s own business 
dealings and possible obstruction of  justice, and could ultimately lead to calls 
for his resignation or impeachment (especially if  Democrats do well in the 
2018 congressional elections). Consider also that Trump was the oldest man 
ever to take the oath of  office, and that pundits, politicians and mental health 
professionals are now openly discussing their concerns over his cognition and 
stability. If  Congress does not have the grounds or the courage to remove him 
through impeachment, according to one whispering campaign, members of  
his own administration may need to consider their powers of  removal under 
the 25th Amendment of  the Constitution.22 Taking into account all of  the 
political, legal and even health challenges that he might face, Trump may be 
more likely to depart before 2021 than to stick around until 2025. 
Assuming that he does serve out a full term, it is clear that Trump’s influence 
during its latter half  will be greatly affected by the November 6, 2018 
congressional elections. Depending on the outcome, Trump could be reduced 
to a position of  reigning while not ruling, and perhaps being preoccupied by a 
lengthy battle over impeachment. Republicans currently hold a 24-seat majority 
in the 435-seat House of  Representatives, as well as a two-seat majority in the 
100-seat Senate. At the time that he took office, many analysts expected that 
in 2018 Trump’s party would stand a strong chance of  retaining its majority 
in the House (where the “gerrymandering” of  districts has made Republican 
incumbents more secure), and was all but certain to do the same in the Senate 
(where only eight of  the 33 seats up for grabs in 2018 are currently held by 
Republicans). Since that time, the Republican position has been eroded by 
Trump’s unpopularity and the prospects for severe internal struggles between 
the party’s pro- and anti-Trump factions. The odds that Democrats will retake 
the House now seem roughly even, and while their chances of  recapturing the 
Senate remain long they no longer look hopeless. 
Even if  Democrats do not control either or both chambers in the 116th Congress 
(2019–2020), chances are that they will fill significantly more seats than they 
do today. And while that may make for an even more chaotic policymaking 
environment on most issues, trade policy could offer a key exception to the 
22 This amendment provides in relevant part, “Whenever the Vice President and a majority of  either the principal 
officers of  the executive departments or of  such other body as Congress may by law provide, transmit to the President 
pro tempore of  the Senate and the Speaker of  the House of  Representatives their written declaration that the 
President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of  his office, the Vice President shall immediately assume the 
powers and duties of  the office as Acting President.”
Back to the Future: US Trade Policy under the Trump Administration   75
general rule of  inter-branch conflict. This is the only important issue on 
which Trump’s position is more closely aligned with Democrats than it is with 
Republicans, and it is possible that some of  the initiatives that are currently 
under development – including the negotiation or negotiation of  FTAs and US 
responses to adverse rulings in the DSB – might not reach fruition until 2019. 
The question then is whether the Republican president and the Democratic 
leaders in Congress will be willing and able to overcome their general animosity 
for the sake of  this one issue. From the perspective of  the trading system, it 
would be better if  they did not.
How Much Damage Will the Trump Administration Actually Do?
One perennial feature of  the trading system is the uncertainty that foreigners 
feel in interpreting the threats of  US policymakers, especially when those 
threats emerge from different quarters. This is all quite deliberate, both by 
philosophical design – the US Constitution intentionally fragments authority 
by pitting the branches against one another – and for reasons of  negotiating 
strategy. Leaders in the executive and legislative branches know that they 
can jointly squeeze more concessions from their foreign counterparts if  they 
play an effective game of  “good cop, bad cop,” and that game may be all the 
more successful if  even the good cop is not always sure when the bad cop is 
merely play-acting. What is new about the Trump administration is that the 
roles have now been reversed, such that it is the president who poses the most 
extreme menace, and it is Congress that feels compelled to speak with a more 
reasonable voice. Or to use a slightly different image, Donald Trump has 
never made any secret of  his belief  in the “madman theory” of  negotiations. 
According to this notion, playing the madman can work to one’s advantage 
by keeping adversaries guessing, dissuading them from making provocative 
moves, and encouraging them to settle quickly and on the best terms they 
think they can obtain.
There are at least two problems with this approach to governance. One is that 
it may have disastrous consequences when the other fellow is equally mad, or at 
least equally committed to making himself  appear so. That problem is especially 
notable in fields where more is at stake than tariff rates or antidumping rules 
(see, for example, the confrontation between the United States and North 
Korea). Another problem that is more relevant to trade is the importance that 
governments and businesses attach to the commitments that countries make. 
They may not be very willing to conclude treaties or make major investments 
in a country that has a reputation for negotiating in bad faith or abrogating 
old agreements whenever government changes hands. 
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That reasoning has not deterred the Trump administration from reveling 
in a policymaking style that is marked by bombastic threats, a disregard for 
established procedures and protocol, and a general sense of  making it all up 
as one goes along. The administration took several steps during its first nine 
months in office that might – and yet might not – lead to huge changes in 
US policy. Chief  among these are the aforementioned Section 232 cases, 
the revival of  Section 301, and a threat to take action against countries with 
which the United States has large trade deficits; they are also complemented 
by a sharp rise in petitioning under the trade-remedy laws. To what extent will 
these various threats actually be carried out? As has been stressed throughout 
this analysis, the administration’s underlying intention may not be to impose 
restrictions, but instead to use the threat of  restrictions as a means of  leveraging 
other concessions from foreign governments. And the beauty of  the strategy, 
from the perspective of  the ones perpetuating it, is that the countries that feel 
obliged to make these concessions – even if  they are quite damaging – may 
count themselves lucky for having dodged an even greater hit.23
Over the long term, the greatest damage that Trump does may be to the role 
of  the Republican Party. This has not always been the party of  free trade – 
indeed, it was the party of  protection from the 1860s through the 1960s – but 
it has reliably played that role for the past generation. Perhaps the main reason 
that Trump wrested the presidential nomination is that he was the only one of  
the 17 Republican contenders in 2016 to challenge the established orthodoxy 
on trade. But no matter what happens to Trump in the coming months and 
years, other Republican office-holders and hopefuls cannot unsee what they 
saw in that election. Many may now perceive protectionism to be a winning 
issue, and will want to stake out the same territory that he did. If  Trumpian 
policies outlive Trump, especially in the party that used to offer reliable support 
for market-opening initiatives, the damage could be irreversible.
What Does this Mean for the International Trading System?
It is important here to speak not of  the multilateral trading system that centers 
on the WTO, but of  the broader international trading system. In addition to 
its multilateral component, that international system encompasses a wider 
universe of  bilateral, plurilateral, regional and mega-regional agreements on 
trade, investment and other topics. There had been a time when the practice 
of  “competitive liberalization” was in vogue, with its advocates arguing 
that negotiations at each level were complementary exercises that would set 
precedents and encourage deeper liberalization at the levels above them. 
23 For a fuller discussion of  this strategy, sometimes known as the “goat in the living room,” see VanGrasstek (2016).
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Bilateral negotiations would promote regional arrangements, and the bargains 
struck at the regional level could then be multilateralized in the WTO. Those 
notions already appeared quaint before the events of  2016, and even a casual 
observer could see that the many negotiations then underway were more 
fragmented than integrated. There is every reason to expect that this process 
of  fragmentation will only accelerate in the Trump era, and that the role of  
the WTO may be further marginalized.
FTAs and other discriminatory agreements have become far more common 
than they ever were in the GATT period, and we should expect that trend to 
continue under Trump. There still exist a great many countries that are eager to 
reduce or remove the barriers between their economies, both in the developed 
and the developing world. Ironically, the United Kingdom’s “Brexit” from the 
European Union will lead to ever more such negotiations as London seeks new 
agreements to cement its relations with economic and political partners. What 
is less certain is when, with whom and on what terms the United States may 
do the same. There has been much talk about a US–UK agreement, but real 
progress towards that end will likely have to wait until Brexit is fully underway. 
In the meantime, some members of  the Trump administration have pointed 
to Japan as an FTA negotiating partner. Beyond those two major economies, 
it is unclear to what extent any future US initiatives would be directed by the 
commercial attractions of  a partner’s size or by the political benefits of  dealing 
with like-minded governments. 
From the perspective of  the trading system as a whole, it is the quality and not 
the quantity of  US trade agreements that may matter most. Whether we are 
considering the revision of  existing FTAs or negotiations over new ones, and 
whether the partners involved are large or small, the most important question 
is how greatly the terms of  these agreements may deviate from the established 
US template. Is the Trump administration really hoping to transform the 
goals of  trade agreements from market-opening to market-management? To 
be more precise, should we see the mercantilist posture that it has struck 
on NAFTA renegotiation as an effort to stake out an extreme position, but 
may then reshape into something more familiar during the course of  the 
negotiations, or does that position truly represent what the United States 
will expect from all FTA partners? We may not know the answer to that 
question until this specific negotiation is completed. The world may draw 
different conclusions depending on whether NAFTA ends up being tweaked 
at the margins, systematically revised, or abrogated altogether. It will also be 
instructive to see how these results are received by Congress, the US business 
community and the electorate at large.
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Where will the WTO be in this process? We may expect for the time being that 
this forum will continue to be more active in dispute-settlement than in the 
negotiation of  new agreements. As long as Washington views multilateralism 
in a negative light, and reads “MFN” as a synonym for “concessions to China,” 
it is difficult to imagine the Trump administration making any effort to revive 
or replace the Doha Round. Its appreciation of  this institution’s value may 
depend critically upon its own record of  wins and losses in the DSB. It will 
be some time before we know just how many challenges are brought by and 
against the United States in the DSB, how many of  those cases go the US 
way, and – most important – how the White House responds to any rulings 
that go against the United States.
The aforementioned nexus between trade and security issues could prove to be 
an endemic problem. While the focus of  this analysis is on trade policy in the 
United States, it should be noted that this issue poses a broader challenge for the 
WTO than it ever did for the GATT. This is a simple function of  the fact that 
effective participation in the GATT was, for most of  its history, largely confined 
to those developed countries that also joined with the United States in NATO 
and other alliances. The WTO, by contrast, is a virtually universal institution 
in which a more diverse and expanded membership necessarily implies a 
greater potential for cross-contamination between trade and political disputes. 
This is demonstrated by the emergence in 2017 of  two other security-related 
disputes among some of  the WTO’s newer members, in which Ukraine and 
Russia have brought a matched pair of  complaints against one another24 and 
Qatar brought complaints against three of  its neighbors.25 What distinguishes 
those cases from the US steel and aluminum investigations, however, is that the 
underlying issues stem from real and present security concerns. No one could 
seriously contest the fact that for both the Russia–Ukraine and Qatar cases, 
the contending parties are engaged in actual conflicts that have already, or 
might soon, lead to the use of  force. The same cannot be said for the grounds 
on which the Trump administration might base any unilateral restriction of  
steel or aluminum imports.
24 On February 9, 2017 Ukraine brought a complaint “concerning multiple restrictions on traffic in transit from the 
territory of  Ukraine through the territory of  the Russian Federation to third countries.” On June 1, 2017 Russia 
countered with a complaint that “the effect of  [Ukraine’s policies] is discrimination of  persons, goods and services 
of  the Russian Federation and drastic restriction of  bilateral trade as well as transit.” The particulars of  these cases 
are reported at https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds512_e.htm and https://www.wto.org/
english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds525_e.htm.
25  On July 31, 2017 Qatar requested WTO a series of  dispute consultations with the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, 
and Saudi Arabia concerning measures that it characterizes as “coercive attempts at economic isolation” that inter alia 
restrict “the import, export, sale, purchase, license, transfer, receipt and shipment of  goods originating in, transiting 
through, towards or from, or with the destination of  Qatar.” The particulars of  these cases are reported at https://
www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds526_e.htm, https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/
cases_e/ds527_e.htm, and https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds528_e.htm.
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In brief, the Trump administration’s trade policy is a work in progress that stacks 
questions upon questions. What is most troubling about this administration 
is that some of  these are questions that knowledgeable observers might never 
have thought they would have to ask with respect to the United States. We 
may need to brace ourselves for the answers.
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The World Trade Organization (WTO) is currently facing an “adaptability” 
crisis. The world economy has changed significantly since the WTO was created 
back in the mid-1990s, and new challenges are quickly piling on top of  the old 
ones. The rise of  emerging countries and the relative decline of  traditional 
economic powers; the negotiating requests, demands and approaches from 
different member countries; the proliferation of  regional trade pacts and the 
need to deal with complex new issues, such as climate change and food security, 
are – in different ways and intensity – shaking the foundations on which the 
WTO was built some 20 years ago.
To these has been added recently the impact of  the new US administration 
on international trade issues and, in particular, the views of  President Donald 
Trump on trade and trade agreements, as well as the possible consequences 
of  the Brexit negotiations, through which the United Kingdom is defining 
the conditions of  its withdrawal from the European Union. Two of  the main 
largest trade partners are thus evolving in ways that will impact the functioning 
of  the world economy, and in particular the WTO, even if  we do not yet fully 
know or understand their implications.
Nevertheless, a key question continues to be whether the WTO is capable of  
facing these new and complex issues, or whether there is instead a need to 
revise the institution in some fundamental ways. Should the WTO’s current 
negotiating mandate and structure be expanded? Would it be better or 
necessary to complete the unfinished business of  the Doha negotiations before 
taking up new negotiating initiatives? What should be done to strengthen the 
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multilateral trading system and to ensure the future success of  the WTO? Will 
the results and/or limited agreements reached at the last WTO Ministerial 
in Nairobi or the new ones to be agreed upon at the coming Buenos Aires 
Ministerial make a difference to the rather negative perception developed 
recently about the “negotiating” function of  the WTO?
Strengthening the multilateral trading system is especially important from a 
sustainable development perspective. Over the past six decades, the system has 
provided an unprecedented level of  stability and predictability in the way WTO 
members conduct their trade operations. It has also provided – particularly 
since the establishment of  the WTO – a credible and solid mechanism to 
adjudicate trade disputes, one that is guided by law rather than power.
Developing countries, most of  which steered clear of  the system during the 
GATT years, have for the most part joined the WTO, making the multilateral 
trading system a truly universally accepted set of  values and rules, and not the 
rather limited “club” that it used to be. These developing countries are now 
using the system to their advantage – they hold the key to forward-looking 
negotiating outcomes, and account for more than half  of  the 500-plus disputes 
dealt with so far by the WTO.1 
But the WTO is at a critical juncture. A renewed sense of  international 
cooperation among WTO members is essential for dealing, first and foremost, 
with the never-ending Doha negotiations. Completing Doha would allow the 
WTO to focus on some of  the most pressing challenges that, in my view, the 
system now faces: first, defining a new set of  negotiating modalities for the 
future; second, revisiting the traditional approach to the participation of  the 
private sector (i.e. the business community) in its activities; and third, dealing 
appropriately with the increasing number of  regional trade agreements 
entered into by its member countries, especially the so-called mega-regional 
agreements, notwithstanding the rather drastic changes that we may be 
witnessing in this area.2
1 Dispute number 532 was initiated on October 13, 2017 when Ukraine requested consultations with the Russian 
Federation on measures concerning the importation and transit of  certain Ukrainian products.
2 This chapter draws significantly on the reports and discussions that took place in the context of  the E15 Initiative, 
a program of  exchanges and analyses on the current status of  the multilateral trading system launched in 2011  by 
the International Centre on Trade and Sustainable Development (ICTSD) and a number of  partnering institutions, 
including IMD/The Evian Group, and involving an impressive number of  leading international experts; see www.
ictsd.ch for more detailed information on the E15 Initiative.
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Completing the Doha Negotiations
Trade negotiations are what the WTO was created for in the first place. 
Concluding the Doha trade talks – approaching their 15th anniversary in 2016 
– is a must if  the WTO wishes to move forward and tackle future challenges 
head on. Not delivering on Doha will damage the organization’s very core 
function, discredit its efficiency, and make it extremely difficult for the WTO 
to acquire a mandate to deal with pressing non-Doha issues (such as climate 
change and food security) and, as I mentioned before, the large number and 
complexity of  regional trade agreements. Thus, the issue is not whether the 
WTO should complete the Doha negotiations – that’s a given. The issue 
instead is how to put an end to the current deadlock and keep the negotiating 
machinery rolling on.3
Dealing with the “Single Undertaking”
Over the years, a number of  options have been suggested for moving the 
negotiations forward. However, these have run against the wall of  the “Single 
Undertaking,” a procedural device that has been elevated to the category 
of  guiding principle in WTO negotiations. Initially designed to facilitate an 
equitable global agreement during the Uruguay Round, the Single Undertaking 
is no longer a negotiating tool. Instead, it has become a way for those countries 
least willing to take on new commitments to hold the negotiations hostage.
There is a need to revisit the meaning and purpose of  the Single Undertaking. 
Does it mean that every single word in every single agreement needs to be 
agreed simultaneously by all participants to have an agreement on the whole? 
Do the negotiating issues all have the same value to all the negotiating partners? 
Are they all equally important? The common answer to these questions is, 
obviously, a rotund “no.”
If  the GATT negotiating history is to offer any lesson, it’s that every negotiating 
round has always left aside some pending issues, with the goal of  addressing 
them later on in future negotiations. In the early years of  the system, during 
the first GATT negotiations – which dealt mainly with tariff cuts – it was clear 
that further, additional cuts had to be dealt with in future negotiations. During 
the Tokyo Round – the first to deal with non-tariff issues – the concluding 
deals also left a number of  pending subjects to be resolved at a later stage.
3 Some analyst and “practitioners” are even questioning the need to “revive” a process that they see as already dead 
(see the Financial Times article of  31 December 2015 by Michael Froman, the US Trade Representative; and Carlos 
A. Primo’s article on the IMD website at http://www.imd.org/news/Doha.cfm).
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Even the Uruguay Round, despite being based on the Single Undertaking, 
was no exception to this rule, as it left aside a number of  issues in agriculture 
and trade in services – the famous “built-in agenda” – with the goal of  
addressing them later in a post-Uruguay Round environment. Thus, the Single 
Undertaking does not mean solving all negotiating issues at the same time; 
it just means finding an appropriate outcome for all of  them at a particular 
point in time, even if  occasionally some of  these issues are to be dealt with 
in the future.
Moving to a Final Doha “Deal”
At present, of  all the Doha issues, an agreement on non-agricultural market 
access (NAMA) is the one that holds the promise to move the negotiations toward 
a final deal. Even if  tariff reduction is perhaps not the most “economically” 
significant of  all the subjects included in the Doha negotiations, negotiating 
tariff cuts and consolidating them in the various country schedules is something 
that trade negotiators are used to doing, can be done relatively quickly, and 
has a very high visibility. Progress in this area may thus have a “demonstration 
effect” in the other areas of  the negotiations, and this is perhaps something 
which the Buenos Aires Ministerial could give a push to.
The situation that WTO members face today is not unlike the one faced by 
GATT members in the early rounds, i.e. a need to reach an acceptable level 
of  tariff cuts among the key trading partners – including now China and the 
other emerging economies – and to apply them on a most-favored nation 
basis. Thus, strange as it may seem, the old issue of  tariffs cuts might today 
help to unlock the paralysis in the other areas of  the negotiations and finalize 
a global pact, just as they have traditionally done.
It may seem ironic that a protectionist device that most analysts had written off 
as insignificant and outmoded could continue to play such an important role in 
today’s negotiations. However, the reason may lie not in the intrinsic value of  
tariff protection, but rather in the visibility that it would give to a negotiating 
package. In politics, reality almost always takes a back seat to perception, and 
in developed countries the perception that some countries are “free riding” 
in the negotiations has taken a strong hold.
Tariffs are not a major impediment to global trade. Existing tariff protection has 
not prevented world trade from growing significantly in the last few decades. 
Applied tariffs are now at historically low levels, due, in part, to past trade 
negotiations, WTO accessions and unilateral tariff reductions undertaken by a 
number of  countries, mainly developing countries. However, tariff protection 
in most emerging markets, which account for a growing proportion of  world 
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trade, is well above tariffs in many developed and developing countries. For 
example, average applied tariff levels in China and Brazil are 9.6% and 13.5%, 
respectively, as compared with average tariffs of  3.5% in the United States, 
3.4% in Peru, or 6.7% in Switzerland (WTO, ITC and UNCTAD, 2015).
Importantly, opening emerging economy markets is not only in the interest 
of  the industrialized countries, but also benefits developing countries, whose 
exports go increasingly to emerging markets and to other developing countries. 
According to UNCTAD, in 2013 South–South trade flows represented more 
than half  of  overall developing country trade. This share varies by region, 
ranging from above 40% in Latin America and transition economies to almost 
70% in South Asia and East Asia. Although a proportion of  South–South trade 
encompasses intraregional flows, the largest part involves trade with the East 
Asian region, and since 2008 this region has become an increasingly important 
trading partner for all other developing country regions (UNCTAD, 2015).
A solid agreement on the market access negotiations – one that requires all 
countries to make a meaningful contribution consistent with their economic 
realities and possibilities – will give the Doha Round a renewed sense of  
progress. But this alone will not be enough. A solid deal on agriculture is 
also required, as no final Doha deal will be possible in the absence of  more 
disciplined farm markets. The agreements reached at the Nairobi Ministerial 
go in this direction, and the commitment of  WTO members to eliminate 
export subsidies for agricultural exports may help the Doha negotiations to 
move to a final stage, but the “jury is still out” on this, and here again the 
coming WTO ministerial conference in Argentina, a major food exporter and 
a key participant in the agriculture negotiations could offer the opportunity 
to move on in this area. 
Negotiations on services, on antidumping rules, on intellectual property issues 
and on trade facilitation are all important, but none of  these could individually 
facilitate agreement in other areas of  the Doha trade talks in the way a market 
access deal, including agricultural reform, would.
Getting New Negotiating Modalities
As for the future, WTO negotiations should not necessarily be based on the 
Single Undertaking, at least not exclusively. They will require a different, 
complementary approach. This approach should be predicated on the need for 
a more cooperative understanding among members – one where negotiations, 
authorized by the entire WTO membership, could be undertaken by groups 
of  interested countries if  and when certain specific conditions are met, and, 
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importantly, provided the multilateral nature of  potential WTO agreements 
is preserved.
This overall approach, however, should have one important exception: 
negotiations involving only a limited number of  countries would not be 
appropriate when they include existing rules and disciplines. The WTO is a 
legal and institutional framework that requires its member countries to conduct 
their trade and trade policies in a clearly defined manner. Therefore, the 
rules of  the game cannot be modified without the agreement of  the entire 
membership, and nor can new deals be incorporated into the system without 
the acceptance of  all WTO members.
In almost all other instances, negotiations among groups of  interested countries 
could take place and their results incorporated within the WTO framework. 
In fact, we have already seen this type of  approach at work in the case of  the 
WTO’s “plurilateral” agreements. These deals – which were made possible 
via the Marrakesh Agreement – are normally entered into by groups of  “like-
minded” countries that decide to establish among themselves a common set of  
rights and obligations to deal with a particular subject matter or sector. Notably, 
these agreements create rights and obligations only among the participating 
WTO members, rather than being multilateral deals. The WTO “plurilateral” 
agreements were originally negotiated during the Tokyo Round of  trade 
negotiations (and were thus “codes”) but, unlike most Tokyo Round “codes,” 
did not become multilateral obligations. They became part of  the WTO in 
1995, and have been known since as “plurilateral” agreements. There were 
initially four “plurilateral” agreements dealing with trade in civil aircraft, 
government procurement, dairy products and bovine meat, but the latter two 
were terminated in 1997.
There is a need to move beyond “plurilateral” agreements as defined by the 
WTO agreement; if  these deals are allowed to expand much further, we 
could end up with a repeat of  the post-Tokyo Round GATT system, with a 
divided and fragmented WTO. A better alternative would be to move towards 
a “plurilateral plus” environment, where the benefits of  the agreements are 
extended to all WTO members, and not only to the participating countries. 
The Information Technology Agreement (ITA) is a perfect example of  this 
approach. This agreement was negotiated in 1996, during the first WTO 
Ministerial Conference, by a group of  29 countries. A year later, it entered 
into force with even more members, creating an agreement that would cover 
more than 90% of  the trade in that sector. Market size was an important 
consideration for the agreement to come to life – today, more than 80 WTO 
members are part of  ITA, and they have recently agreed to expand its 
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product coverage significantly. More importantly, right from the outset the 
participating countries agreed that the benefits of  the deal would be extended 
unconditionally to all WTO members, whether or not they belong to the ITA.
Thus, groups of  WTO members need to have the option of  undertaking 
negotiations among themselves on matters of  their interest. Not allowing them 
to do so will just lead these countries to take their deals elsewhere. Therefore, 
we need rules in order to create new rules. This process should include at least 
three key considerations. First, it must provide for an “opt in” and “opt out” 
approach, entitling all WTO members to participate in the negotiations at 
their own choosing, with the option of  withdrawing from the talks at any point. 
Second, the benefits of  the agreements should be extended unconditionally to 
all WTO members. And third, the final deals should be incorporated into the 
multilateral set of  rules and regulations as “plurilateral plus” agreements, 
with appropriate accession clauses (i.e. be open to all WTO members under 
certain conditions).
In short, an alternative approach to trade negotiations moving beyond the 
Single Undertaking needs to be put in place by WTO members, setting aside 
the confrontational nature of  the current Doha talks. We perhaps need to 
abandon all-encompassing “rounds” of  negotiations for more “à la carte” 
negotiations where subjects are more likely to produce more significant and 
quicker results.
Finding an Appropriate Place for the Private Sector in 
the WTO
Although the WTO is an intergovernmental organization and decisions are 
taken exclusively by its member governments acting collectively, the business 
community has an important stake in its performance. It is bound to be affected 
by WTO operations, as it is mainly business, not governments, that engages 
in international trade. In practice, business and governments interact in the 
WTO in many different ways, sometimes advancing the negotiating agenda 
and at other times ensuring that governments abide by their multilateral 
commitments.
However, defining a role for the business community in the WTO is not an easy 
task. The essence of  the WTO lies in its negotiating function, and negotiating 
trade deals is not something that can always be facilitated by the involvement of  
business interests along the lines of  negotiating teams. Thus, when considering 
the participation of  business interest in the WTO, an important distinction 
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should be made right from the outset: the presence of  business in the day to 
day activities of  the WTO (i.e. its public discussions, its research activities 
and the provision of  information specifically geared toward their economic 
concerns, among others) should not be equated with its involvement in the 
WTO trade negotiations, as these need to be conducted in private, behind 
closed doors and very often in small groups before receiving the blessing of  
the entire membership.
This has always been the case – trade negotiations are private affairs whose 
conduct are in the hand of  government officials; they are not, and cannot be, 
conducted in the open, as publicity is the last thing negotiators need to make 
deals.
This does not mean, however, that the business community should be totally 
absent from these negotiating process. There are many ways the business 
community could be made part of  negotiating processes, be informed of  
negotiating outcomes and also be allowed, even if  indirectly, to influence them.
During the NAFTA negotiations, the United States, Mexico and Canada put 
in place the “cuarto de al lado” (“room next door”) where business representatives 
from these countries regularly met their respective government’s negotiating 
teams, with the dual purpose of  being informed of  the evolution of  the 
negotiations and making their views known on the various negotiating items 
and outcomes. Over the years, this “room next door” approach was replicated 
in the negotiation of  the trade agreements that the three NAFTA partners 
conducted with other countries, particularly in the Latin American region. 
The approach was facilitated by the rather limited number of  the negotiating 
partners; it would be highly unrealistic to try to replicate it at the WTO level.
In a negotiating process – whether bilateral or multilateral – the way each 
country deals with its business community is its own responsibility. However, 
in an institution like the WTO, some mechanisms could be put in place to 
ensure the effective, even if  indirect, involvement of  business organizations 
in its activities. Although the WTO has been formally authorized to “make 
appropriate arrangements for consultation and cooperation with non- 
governmental organizations,”4 which presumably include business entities, 
currently there are no formal mechanisms and the participation of  the private 
sector is based on a series of  ad hoc practices, such as briefings and public 
seminars and symposia which the WTO hosts on the occasion of  Ministerial 
Conferences in particular. However, as pointed out in an E15 report (Elsig, 
2014),5 the business community is less involved in the WTO than in other 
4 See Article V.2 of  the Marrakesh Agreement.
5 See also Primo Braga and Kondis (2014)
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international fora such as APEC, where a Business Advisory Council has been 
established, the OECD, which has a Business and Advisory Committee, or 
the G20, with its regular B20 meetings.
Much more can be done, but it is not easy to define the appropriate or 
ideal mechanism that can ensure the effective participation of  the business 
community in an institution like the WTO, whose main functions – negotiating 
trade agreements and monitoring their effective implementation, including 
by recourse to dispute settlement – are by their very nature government led.
It would be difficult, not to say inappropriate, to give business representatives 
full participation in these two sets of  activities, since – as indicated in the E15 
report (Elsig, 2014) – in addition to logistical issues of  significant complexity, 
full participation of  business representatives in, say, trade negotiations may 
render the crafting of  trade agreements much more difficult than is currently 
the case.
At the last two WTO Ministerial Conferences, a number of  private entities, 
business organizations and non-governmental organizations took the initiative 
of  organizing a series of  debates where their particular concerns where 
examined and discussed with key government representatives. These debates 
took place for the first time during the Bali Business Forum, whose organization 
and purposes are explained in detail in Box 1, and subsequently during the 
Nairobi Ministerial Conference in 2015.
Box 1: Bali Business Forum
At the Ninth WTO Ministerial Conference, which took place in Bali, 
Indonesia from December 3rd to 7th, 2013, the International Chamber 
of  Commerce (ICC), the Evian Group@IMD and the International 
Centre on Trade and Sustainable Development (ICTSD) decided to 
jointly organize a day-long event to focus on issues of  particular interest to 
business representatives from WTO member countries. The Bali Business 
Forum (BBF) – a first event of  its type – took place on December 5th, 2013.
The BBF provided an open forum where the business community could 
examine the most critical issues in the international trade agenda and 
interact with ministers and other high-level officials to contribute towards 
a constructive outcome in Bali. The agenda of  the BBF included issues 
such as: 1) the quantitative benefits of  a Doha deal (or costs of  a non-
Doha deal); 2) the impact of  mega-preferential agreements (e.g. TPP and 
TTIP) on the WTO; 3) the complementary nature of  trade in services, 
trade facilitation and global value chains; and 4) the role of  the private 
sector in the WTO.
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Dealing with Regional Trade Agreements and 
Negotiations
For the last few years, the main issue regarding the relationship between 
regional trade agreements (RTAs) and the multilateral trading system has 
been to make sure that they reinforce each other; and the main proposal 
contained in the first version of  this chapter was that the WTO should widen 
its rule-making function by adopting (i.e. incorporating into the multilateral 
Box 1 (contd.)
An accompanying high-level luncheon focused on the topical issues at the 
intersection of  the WTO and digital economy, and a business/ministerial 
roundtable wrapped up the ambitious agenda at the end of  the day in 
a high-level setting. Throughout the panel discussions, members of  the 
private sector and government officials, including CEOs and key ministers, 
engaged in an open dialogue on the above-mentioned topics.
The ICC, the Evian Group@IMD and ICTSD acted as the core co- 
conveners of  the Bali Business Forum, in partnership with the Inter- 
American Development Bank and the International Trade Centre. The BBF 
also had the support of  relevant business organizations and associations, 
such as the Washington-based National Foreign Trade Council (NFTC), 
the Coalition of  Services Industries (CSI), the European Services Forum 
(ESF) and the Federation of  Industries of  São Paulo (FIESP).
The Forum helped to facilitate, through engagement and dialogue between 
business executives and policymakers from all over the world, a better 
understanding on the possibilities of  enhanced multilateral cooperation 
and on the need for a vibrant WTO.
Another key objective of  the BBF was the identification of  ways for the 
private sector to get more effectively engaged in WTO activities – for 
example, by setting up the institutional mechanisms that would facilitate 
engagement, such as a Business Advisory Council at the WTO, and/or 
the holding on a more permanent basis (e.g. on the occasion of  WTO 
Ministerial Conferences) of  a forum/dialogue along the lines of  the 
BBF, something which was also implemented at the Tenth Ministerial 
Conference in Nairobi in December 2015.
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legal framework the advanced trade rules contained in some regional trade 
agreements). 
This approach may no longer be applicable. Anti-free trade sentiment is 
gaining ground all over. It is not regionalism – as we have known it so far – 
that poses a challenge to multilateralism; rather it is a new nationalism that 
seems to be gaining ground.
Through the 1980s and 1990s, many developing countries embraced open 
markets and reduced the role of  government in economic policies. This 
led to an economically interdependent and more globalized world while at 
the same time paving the way for the negotiations of  new and expanding 
regional groups. Some of  these regional groups were inspired by the successful 
European economic integration process, and led to the formation of  similar 
customs unions and free trade areas – such as ASEAN, Mercosur and NAFTA 
– that facilitated trade between members through the removal of  trade and 
non-trade barriers. 
In addition to these more “classical” regional arrangements, a number of  
mega-trade agreements began to be negotiated, including the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership (TPP) and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership 
(TTIP) between the United States and the European Union, an initiative 
officially launched in 2013. China eventually entered the fray through a 
China-led mega-trade agreement, the Regional Comprehensive Economic 
Partnership (RCEP), which brought together 16 countries.6
This trend towards more and bigger regional agreements, which until recently 
seemed unstoppable, may now be drastically changing. RTAs have recently 
evolved in a most unexpected way. In June 2016, the British people voted to take 
their country out of  the European Union, setting in motion a process whose 
contours continue to divide both British and non-British European nationals, 
and is threatening to disrupt the further development of  the European Union 
itself. 
In the United States, until now the strongest supporter of  mega-regional 
agreements and/or free trade negotiations, a new approach to trade agreements 
and trade policy in general is taking root. During the US electoral debates, the 
Republican candidate Donald J. Trump made clear that should he prevail in 
the elections, his government would not continue the politics of  his predecessor 
vis-à-vis trade agreements, and his vocal criticism of  the trade agreements 
6 The Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) is a proposed free trade agreement (FTA) between the 
ten member states of  the Association of  Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the six states with which ASEAN has 
existing free trade agreements (Australia, China, India, Japan, South Korea and New Zealand). RCEP negotiations 
were formally launched in November 2012, and the agreement is scheduled to be finalized by the end of  2017.
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entered into by the United States was tacitly – and sometimes explicitly – 
supported by his Democrat opponent. Soon after taking office, President 
Trump began to honor his promises.
The “New” US Trade Policy
In one of  his first official acts, President Trump signed an executive order 
removing the United States from TPP, a 12-nation trade deal whose negotiations 
commenced under President George W. Bush and were concluded under 
President Obama. In another executive order, President Trump signaled his 
intention to re-negotiate NAFTA. Together with his approach to immigration 
– including the intention to build a “wall” along the US–Mexico border – these 
decisions represent a re-orientation of  US trade policy, moving away from 
regional and multilateral initiatives towards bilateral ones.
In fact, President Trump has made clear that he believes bilateral trade deals 
are better than regional or multilateral agreements. Abandoning regional and 
multilateral deals for a bilateral worldview could institutionalize President 
Trump’s mercantilist approach to the international trade system, in which 
countries are locked in zero-sum competition to win market shares, rather than 
cooperating to improve economic efficiency. Over the long term, the risk is 
that the rules, norms and laws that govern trade relations will erode, along with 
the effectiveness and legitimacy of  the WTO, which Mr. Trump has branded 
as another one of  “our disasters,” raising the prospect of  the United States 
pulling out of  the global body all together.
Currently, the Trump administration is focusing on the NAFTA (re)negotiation 
and is expecting to conclude this by the end of  the year or early in 2018. 
This is a rather ambitious goal given the position taken by the United States 
vis-à-vis Mexico since the beginning of  the Trump administration, and even 
before during last year’s presidential elections. On the campaign trial, Mr. 
Trump consistently called NAFTA the “worst trade deal” the United States 
had ever signed, and after notifying Congress of  its intentions to renegotiate 
the agreement, the US Trade Representative unveiled its major objectives 
(USTR, 2017) for the NAFTA renegotiation: to reduce the US trade deficit, 
which president Trump has blamed for shuttering factories and contributing 
to significant job losses in the US manufacturing sector.
NAFTA, which entered into force in January 1994, has fundamentally reshaped 
North American economic relations (Council on Foreign Relations, 2017), 
driving unprecedented integration between Canada, Mexico and the United 
States. It also ushered in a new era of  regional and bilateral FTAs, which have 
proliferated as the WTO’s global trade talks have stagnated. Indeed, NAFTA 
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was the beginning of  a new set of  regional trade agreements, the first great 
experiment in freeing trade between developed and developing countries. It 
set the basic template for many deals that followed, including the CAFTA 
with Central America and the Dominican Republic, and China’s entry into 
the WTO. 
The outcome of  the NAFTA renegotiations will be determined as much on the 
negotiating table as away from it, with President Trump constantly renewing 
calls for the US to pull out of  the agreement – a drastic course that US officials 
say he has come close to pursuing. As reported by The Wall Street Journal, on at 
least four separate occasions since mid-2017 – in speeches, on Twitter, and at 
a press conference – Mr. Trump has raised the prospect of  forcing the United 
States to withdraw from NAFTA.7 “We’re working right now on NAFTA, 
the horrible, terrible NAFTA deal that took so much business out of  your 
state and out of  your cities and towns,” he told a cheering crowd in Missouri. 
“Hopefully we can renegotiate it, but if  we can’t, we’ll terminate it and we’ll 
start all over again with a real deal.”
The NAFTA renegotiations, which were originally intended to be completed by 
the end of  2017, have recently been extended into next year due to “significant 
conceptual gaps” in how to rewrite the 1994 trade pact. In renegotiating 
NAFTA, the United States, Mexico and Canada are still far apart on a series 
of  issues, some of  which have only recently been brought into the negotiations. 
Those “dividing” issues include a five-year “sunset clause” that would cause 
NAFTA to automatically expire unless the three countries voted to continue 
it – a proposal that businesses say would inject so much uncertainty into the 
deal as to effectively nullify it.
The Trump administration is also pushing for drastic revisions to the 
mechanisms that help to resolve disputes under NAFTA. Its proposals would 
allow countries to reject the ruling of  independent panels on state-to-state 
disputes, as well as change the investor–state dispute settlement provision to an 
opt-in basis, and substantially curtail the ability of  investors to bring such cases.
The Trump administration is pushing for higher thresholds for the amount 
of  a product that must be manufactured in North America for it to qualify 
for NAFTA’s zero tariffs (for instance, 85% for automobiles, up from 62.5% 
previously. The United States has also proposed that cars manufactured in 
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There is no guarantee that the extension of  the negotiations will help bridge 
the differences on these issues, as negotiations will collide with political events 
in all three countries that will only complicate each nation’s negotiating 
positions. The NAFTA renegotiations may become a sensitive topic in the 
Mexican presidential race, which concludes with the July 1 election; provincial 
elections will take place in Canada; and in July in the United States, the Trump 
administration will lose trade promotion authority (TPA) by which it can submit 
to Congress new trade deals for a simple “up or down” vote.
The extension of  the talks until early 2018 signals the potential demise of  a 
trade pact that, while critical to North American commerce, has come under 
withering criticism from the Trump administration as a bad deal for American 
workers.9 The failure of  the NAFTA renegotiations would be a heavy blow 
to the economies of  the three member countries, as it covers reciprocal trade 
worth more than $1trillion a year.  
Moving on Brexit 
The Brexit process, for its part, is proving more complex than even its strongest 
supporters realized one and a half  years ago, when the choice was offered 
to the British people to either remain in or leave the European Union, a 
community to which they have belonged for more than half  a century. The 
Brexit controversies – “Brexit means Brexit”, a “hard” versus “soft” Brexit, 
Brexit “first” and then agreements with other countries – have dominated 
the British political debates ever since the Brexiteers won the referendum in 
June 2016.
While leaving the European Union after 44 years of  membership, the United 
Kingdom is planning to redesign its trade relationships with the rest of  the 
world. It is not going to be easy. Not only is the United Kingdom breaking 
up from its biggest trading partner, but it is doing so when it’s next largest 
partner, the United States, appears to be moving towards protectionism. Also, 
the United Kingdom is part of  a global – but above all, European – value chain 
and has a relatively weak trade position in other markets. 
As underlined by Martin Wolf  early this year in an article in the Financial 
Times, the UK wants, rightly so, an amicable divorce “to continue to trade 
with the EU as freely as possible, to co-operate to keep our countries safe, to 
promote the values the UK and EU share – respect for human rights and 
dignity, democracy and the rule of  law both within Europe and across the 
wider world, to support a strong European voice on the world stage, and to 
9 See https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/11/business/economy/nafta-trump.html.
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continue to encourage travel between the UK and EU.”10 It is not evident, 
however, that it will be able to achieve all of  this at the same time.
On 29 March 2017, Prime Minister Theresa May signed the letter that set 
in motion the negotiations for the withdrawal of  the United Kingdom from 
the European Union. This gave the British government and its European 
counterparts a period of  two years to define the terms of  their separation 
as well as the conditions on which their mutual future relationship will be 
established.
Divorce proceedings are never easy, and the Brexit process may be no exception. 
The three most conflicting and divisive issues in the Brexit negotiations are 
(i) citizens’ rights, which must cover employment, eligibility for benefits and 
conditions for permanent residence, among others; (ii) the so-called Brexit 
bill and its coverage (including Britain outstanding financial commitments to 
the European Union; and (iii) the nature of  the post-Brexit trade relationship 
between the United Kingdom and the European Union, and the timing for 
negotiating and implementing the new arrangements.
A year and a half  into the Brexit process, more questions than answers continue 
to dominate the discussions. Prime Minister May repeatedly stated that “Brexit 
means Brexit” when trying to explain the results of  the June 2016 referendum 
that set in motion the Brexit process. She has claimed that “no deal is better 
than a bad deal” when referring to the on-going Brexit negotiations. And she 
is even more vague when trying to explain what the future will hold for the 
relationship with the European Union once the Brexit process is completed, 
beyond saying that “the UK is leaving the European Union, not Europe”.
The clock is already ticking on the Brexit negotiations, however, and the United 
Kingdom and the European Union have until the end of  March 2019 to reach 
an agreement. Thus, despite Britain’s shifting politics, the schedule for the next 
two years will determine what sort of  deal, if  any, the two parties can strike.
A UK Treasury study (HM Government, 2016) published before last year’s 
referendum assessed continued UK membership of  the Union against three 
alternative scenarios: (i) membership of  the European Economic Area (EEA), 
like Norway; (ii) a negotiated bilateral agreement, such as that between 
the European Union and Switzerland, Turkey or Canada; and (iii) WTO 
membership without any form of  specific agreement with the European Union, 
like Russia or Brazil. 
10 See www.ft.com/content/6e3aeb4a-ec65-e6-930f-061b01e23655.
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Following the Norwegian model, the United Kingdom could become part of  the 
European Economic Area (EEA), which was established in 1994 to give non-
European countries the possibility to participate in the EU Single Market while 
not committing to other, non-trade aspects of  the Union. All EU countries 
plus Iceland, Lichtenstein and Norway are members of  the EEA. The non-
EU members of  the EEA are not part of  the Customs Union, and neither 
they belong to the Common Agriculture Policy (CAP). They can set their own 
external tariffs and conduct their own trade negotiations with countries outside 
the European Union. However, EEA members have to accept free movement 
of  people, rulings by the European Court of  Justice (ECJ) and payments to 
the EU budget, all of  which are anathema to Brexiteers.
Then, there is the Swiss model, which is somewhat more flexible than the Norway 
model. Switzerland has entered into a number of  bilateral treaties with the 
European Union to regulate its “bilateral” relations with the member states. 
Switzerland – together with the non-EU members of  the EEA –  belongs to 
the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), which provides for free trade 
with the European Union in non-agricultural goods. A Swiss plus model could 
be to join EFTA, an association the United Kingdom helped to found when 
in 1957 it decided to remain outside of  the European Economic Community 
EEC, the predecessor to the European Union.
Relying purely on WTO rules is another option. The UK could restructure its 
relationship with its trading partners at the WTO. The UK was an original 
member of  the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and remains 
a member of  the WTO in its own right. However, as it subsumed its trade 
policy to that of  the European Union over the years, the Union took over 
negotiations on its behalf, and the United Kingdom’s WTO membership is 
now intertwined with that of  the European Union. The job of  the UK trade 
negotiators would be to disentangle the United Kingdom from the European 
Union, and to establish the itself  as a fully independent member of  the WTO. 
Under the WTO scenario, the United Kingdom would have the possibility 
to conclude trade agreements with the countries it choses, such as the United 
States, traditionally the United Kingdom’s preferred partner.
Whatever post-Brexit scenario prevails, it seems certain that there will be a 
rather long period of  uncertainty during and after the Brexit negotiations 
that will affect the United Kingdom as well as existing and prospective UK 
trading partners, and will certainly influence the evolution of  the WTO via 
its adaptability to its new independent member (the UK), and via the shifting 
of  the focus of  EU attention to accommodating the disruptions, institutional 
or otherwise, caused by the Brexit negotiations.
A New Architecture for the WTO?   97
As put by Timothy Garton Ash in an article in The Guardian,11 Britain will 
probably end up, after a transition period during which current Single Market 
arrangements are maintained, with some novel variant of  Norway’s European 
Economic Area deal, Switzerland’s customized free-trade package with the 
European Union, or Turkey’s membership of  the Customs Union. 
He adds that this will effectively mean that the United Kingdom will have 
second-class membership of  the Common Market, that it will have to abide 
by rules it will have no say in making, that it will continue to pay into the 
EU coffers, that immigration from the European Union will be only slightly 
reduced, and that it will have to accept legally binding arrangements in which 
the European Court of  Justice still plays a significant role (along with a British 
court, and perhaps a third-party court or tribunal).
But things are not settled until they are final, and the above scenarios are not 
inevitable. So Garton Ash calls for British Europeans to “gather all our strength 
to say, at the moment when the half-baked negotiation result is presented to 
parliament: ‘This is the worst of  both worlds, neither having our cake nor 
eating it. Why settle for second-best, associate membership, with many clear 
disadvantages and few advantages, when you could just stay and have the 
real thing?’”
As the Brexit negotiations approach their second and final year, the situation 
is even more confusing than it was at the beginning, and people are starting 
to wonder whether there will ever be an outcome to the negotiations and are 
asking whether completing the Brexit process makes any sense at all. Thus, the 
assertiveness of  the “Leave” campaign is being replaced by a more nuanced 
approach to the whole idea of  leaving the European Union.
As Vince Cable, the leader of  the Liberal Democratic party, said, there is 
more than a possibility that Brexit may never happen due to tensions among 
the Labour and Conservative parties, and there is probably a need for a 
second referendum to let the people decide, based on the facts, whether this 
is something they want to go ahead with. This is perhaps an extreme view 
expressed by someone who was elected to lead the pro-EU Liberal Democrats 
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Conclusions
Although it is too early to reach definitive conclusions from these rather recent 
decisions and processes, countries need to start seriously considering not only 
how to react to them, but also the alternative options that can be put in place to 
keep and consolidate their development strategies, and to continue fomenting 
their reciprocal trade arrangements. 
Also, after years neglecting the value of  the WTO, it is time to reconsider the 
important function the institution could play under the current circumstances. 
As stressed recently by Arvind Subramanian, the time may have come for 
“emerging” countries to revalue the role of  the WTO as the place where 
their development options, which include open markets and liberal economic 
policies, can be fostered and, indeed, promoted (Subramanian, 2017). 
But a revival of  the WTO will not happen automatically. Willing stakeholders 
must actively pursue it and the most obvious candidates for the job, in the 
view of  Subramanian, are the mid-size economies that have been the greatest 
beneficiaries of  globalization, Thus, the champions of  multilateralism should 
include countries such as Australia, Brazil, India, Indonesia, Mexico, New 
Zealand and South Africa, among others. Because none of  them is large 
enough on its own, they must work collectively to defend open markets and 
multilateral deals.
One of  the reasons why countries moved to regional negotiations is often said to 
be the long-lasting deadlock in the Doha negotiations. Yet, the WTO continues 
to play a critical role in today’s global economy. It ensures the transparency 
of  the trade practices of  its members, enforces existing multilateral rules 
and disciplines, and adjudicates trade disputes in case of  breach of  WTO 
obligations by any of  its members.
And it is precisely because of  these important functions that delays in 
completing the Doha negotiations and the focus on preferential trade initiatives 
are challenges that the WTO cannot ignore or underestimate. And this should 
certainly be the preferred approach by developing countries, most of  which 
are outsiders to regional and/or bilateral deals, including mega-regional 
negotiations.
Summing up, none of  the issues examined in this chapter is new – they have 
been discussed by policymakers, academics and practitioners, both within and 
outside of  the WTO, for a long time. The suggestions for reform put forward 
are also well known to most trade practitioners and, to varying degrees, could 
be accepted by most of  them. However, no action has been taken so far to 
put them in place, and no process is envisaged to collectively discuss them, 
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as WTO members and trade negotiators seem too busy escaping the current 
stalemate to engage in discussions on the future of  the WTO.
Yet, something needs to be done, and done quickly, to keep a vigorous 
multilateral trading system from stagnation. And if  governments are too busy 
to engage collectively in a reform process, perhaps the WTO leadership (i.e. 
its Director-General and its Deputy Directors-General) or a group of  like-
minded governments could take the initiative and, with the help and support 
of  interested institutions from civil society and the business world, engage in 
a collective, open and effective discussion of  the kind of  multilateral trading 
system that would be best suited to the trade and economic challenges of  the 
21st century.
This suggestion, which seemed quite obvious when the first version of  this 
chapter went into print some two years ago, may be more relevant today due to 
the disruptive impact of  the new US trade policy and the effect of  Brexit on the 
European Union (the largest and most significant of  all regional agreements). 
All these changes may bring the opportunity to revisit the place of  the WTO 
in trade negotiations and to revalue its role as the key international body with 
responsibilities in the trade field – hardly a bagatelle.
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CHAPTER 5
Why Engage in Trade Negotiations 
and the Relevance of the WTO
Alejandro Jara
Trade liberalization has been a feature of  the multilateral trading system 
since 1948. However, the latest effort in this direction, the Doha Development 
Agenda (DDA) negotiations at the World Trade Organization (WTO), has 
failed.  Negotiations have been stalled since 2008.  The failure of  the WTO to 
deliver in more than 15 years calls into question the capacity of  the multilateral 
trading system to pursue deeper international cooperation. It is true that two 
agreements have delivered important results – namely, the Trade Facilitation 
Agreement (Bali, 2013) and the elimination of  agriculture export subsidies 
(Nairobi 2015) – but these are either uncontroversial or carve out certain 
exceptions. 
The reasons for this are several, but two stand out. First, the DDA was launched 
to make pursue liberalization of  trade in agriculture, which means, among 
other aspects, the elimination or reduction of  tariffs and the most trade-
distorting instruments of  domestic agriculture support. Some parties have 
lacked the political support to make concessions. Others have sought to rewrite 
the agriculture rules agreed upon in the 1994 Marrakesh Agreement. 
Second, huge and rapid changes have taken place in the world economy, such 
as the emergence of  new trading powers (the emerging economies), the spread 
of  global value chains, and the 2008-09 financial crisis.  All together, such 
changes have substantially altered the balance of  power. Since the organization 
of  the DDA negotiations reflected the realities of  the 20th century, it could no 
longer cope with the politics of  this century. 
This crisis contrasts with the increasing spiral of  trade agreements negotiated 
around the world that shows that the appetite for trade liberalization is present 
and active. We shall call these “preferential trade agreements,” or PTAs. 
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This paradox is explained by the fact that such agreements do not deal with 
agricultural support (there are other areas in this situation), and frequently 
exclude some agriculture products from liberalization. As a consequence, those 
seeking further liberalization have sought other means, PTAs being the main 
vehicle.
PTAs have made  progress to improve international cooperation – particularly 
on regulatory coherence, e-commerce, state-owned enterprises, business 
facilitation and transparency, foreign investment, and so on – thus responding 
to the diversification of  economies, global value chains and technological 
changes.  PTAs may well be the “breeding” ground where new disciplines are 
crafted that, if  successful, may become the foundations of  an updated WTO 
rulebook, when the political conditions change. 
Aside from agriculture, PTAs have shown little, if   any,  progress in areas such 
as subsidies and trade remedies. Since the 2008 crisis, several big players have 
resorted to the application of  trade-restrictive measures, which have piled 
up. Both the Global Trade Alert (GTA)1 and the WTO Secretariat2 have 
documented such measures and their impact.  This shows that the rulebook 
of  the WTO needs to be updated and tightened to limit protectionist measures 
by governments.
Consequently, PTAs remain the only feasible liberalization game, at least for 
some time. Countries that wish to liberalize their economies and/or need to 
avoid discrimination in other markets engaged in PTAs will face increasing 
pressure to conclude such arrangements. As more and larger PTAs become 
part of  the international legal and economic landscape, they have important 
economic and systemic implications.
This chapter poses some key questions that policymakers must face when 
setting up a trade policy strategy that involves negotiations of  trade agreements 
with other economies. While a seasoned trade negotiator would take for 
granted most of, if  not all, the questions and analyses that follow, that may 
not be the case for those who are at the beginning of  a career in trade policy. 
Indeed, some elements of  what follows may serve as a good basis to assess 
trade agreements after their conclusion and for those with a more inquisitive 
mind. The questions are based on the assumption that the country concerned 
is already a member of  the WTO. It is also worthwhile to raise some issues 
concerning the organization of  the negotiations and the corresponding 
allocation of  resources, as these are bound to have political impacts.
1 http://www.globaltradealert.org.
2 https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/trade_monitoring_e.htm.
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1. Why is it necessary or convenient to negotiate a trade agreement 
(bilateral, plurilateral or multilateral)? What is the purpose of  
the negotiation? Most, if  not all, trade agreements have the purpose of  
liberalizing and/or facilitating trade and investment, which implies that 
it will go beyond what it has already agreed upon in the WTO (unless, 
of  course, the country is negotiating with a non-member of  the WTO). 
Consequently, a trade agreement will no doubt result in a change in the 
country’s policies and/or in the policies of  the counterpart(s). Presumably, 
a government will decide to negotiate when it perceives that such changes 
will be to the overall benefit of  its economy, even though there may be 
adjustment costs to certain sectors.
2. Unilateral liberalization. To the extent that these changes are limited 
to domestic policies, they can also be pursued unilaterally. In other words, 
liberalization and/or facilitation can be achieved by implementing the 
corresponding measures without the intermediation of  a negotiation 
with another country. Liberalization is easier and faster to achieve if  
made unilaterally. Assuming there is no internal resistance, unilateral 
liberalization may achieve optimal outcomes, since no compromises are 
necessary with other countries. This is usually not the case, however, and 
negotiations with another country may be used to countervail domestic 
resistance. Moreover, a unilateral liberalization may be rolled back by 
an ulterior piece of  legislation or regulation, as the case may be. A trade 
agreement does not prevent this from happening but it comes at a price, 
because it is not simple to denounce or modify international agreements, 
and benefits will be foregone in the market of  the counterpart. Thus, a trade 
agreement brings greater stability to domestic changes (the “lock-in effect”) 
that, in turn, probably gives greater confidence to economic agents. Finally, 
unilateral liberalization presents some political economic limitations, since 
it imposes adjustment costs to the domestic producers without any direct 
benefits for exporters (although it may help indirectly by diminishing the 
indirect anti-export bias of  trade protection). Consequently, the resistance 
that some domestic producers may put up will only be countervailed by the 
support that may be elicited from importers and consumers, who usually 
have weaker organizations.
3. What policy changes should be pursued? In other words, what are 
the objectives of  a negotiation? Usually there is no one single reason, 
but rather a combination of  motivations that respond to the various 
interests and stakeholders that participate directly or indirectly in the 
decision-making process, that leads to a trade negotiation. The greater 
the number of  interests that are reflected in the objectives, the greater 
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the support for the negotiation. However, to define the objectives of  the 
negotiations requires the agreement of  the other party (or parties), and 
some of  those may generate resistance from particular interests in a given 
jurisdiction. Some countries elect to have the objectives to be pursued in 
the negotiations pre-stated in a public statement, sometimes worked out 
with the legislative and after consultations with stakeholders. For example, 
the United States achieves this by approval by Congress of  the Trade 
Promotion Authority (TPA). This is a vehicle whereby Congress agrees 
to not use its prerogative to amend draft laws, provided the Executive acts 
within the agreed-upon objectives to be pursued in trade negotiations.3 
Likewise, the European Commission publishes its trade policies objectives 
after extensive consultations with the European Parliament, among others 
(European Commission, 2015). The following are some objectives typically 
pursued by governments in a trade negotiation:
i. To lock-in domestic reform. For example, in the GATT Tokyo Round 
(1973-1979) Chile negotiated an across-the-board binding of  35% 
for all products (while the applied tariff across-the-board was 10%) 
to ensure there would be no rollback above the bound level.
ii. To liberalize its own trade regime. For example, throughout the 1990s 
and beyond, Chile deliberately pursued free trade agreements (FTAs) 
to further liberalize imports.
iii. To prise open other markets for its goods, services and investments. 
An FTA involves reciprocal opening of  the market of  the other 
party (or parties), which makes any adjustment cost more politically 
palatable. However, if  the negotiation is with a duty-free country 
such as Singapore or Hong Kong, China, such partners will “appear” 
to give nothing since they have virtually no tariffs. This is a mere 
appearance, since binding the duty-free is very valuable, as are other 
provisions related to services and investment that may part of  the deal.
iv. To introduce more competition and combat inflation in the domestic 
market. Trade policy is part of  an overall economic policy, and for 
the policymakers there will be welfare benefits because of  enhanced 
competition, thus limiting domestic prices from rising.
v. To prevent discrimination against its exporters and investors in 
other markets. For example, towards the end of  the 1990s under 
the leadership of  its new Trade Commissioner, Pascal Lamy, and in 
order to give priority to the Doha Round of  multilateral negotiations, 
3 https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/senate-bill/995/text.
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the European Union self-imposed a moratorium on the initiation 
of  negotiations for new FTAs, only continuing those already in the 
pipeline. However, in 2006 the moratorium was terminated as the 
European Union observed that the United States and Korea were 
starting negotiations for an FTA and invited Korea to begin talks for 
a bilateral FTA, for fear that otherwise its exporters would face less 
favorable treatment than competitors from the United States in the 
Korean market. This has become one of  the most powerful drivers 
of  negotiations; in other words, a struggle against discrimination in 
the absence of  further liberalization through the WTO.
vi. To enhance security, cooperation and bilateral relations. Examples 
include FTAs such as the one between the United States and Israel.
vii. To settle problems and prevent conditionality. For example, developing 
country beneficiaries of  benefits under mechanisms such as the 
Generalized System of  Preferences are regularly subject to pressures 
to change regulations such as environmental or labor standards, under 
the threat of  losing the preferences. An FTA will ensure duty-free 
treatment once and for all, without prejudice to challenges under the 
dispute settlement mechanism for not complying with such standards.
4. What are the advantages and disadvantages of  bilateral, 
plurilateral, regional and multilateral formats? Trade agreements 
can have different geographical coverage. Normally, the lower the number 
of  participants, the easier it will be to reach agreement and achieve a better 
result. However, three or more participants can assist in achieving a balance 
that otherwise would not be possible. This is particularly effective when 
one of  the parties is a much bigger economy than the other participants. 
NAFTA would be a good example in this regard. Also to be considered are 
the distortions that preferences introduce in the allocation of  resources. 
From this perspective, a multilateral agreement would be the optimal 
format. Except in the case of  the latter, all other formats imply a choice 
of  the parties to the negotiation. Such choice has obvious political and 
geopolitical considerations. Putting these aside, there a number of  other 
factors that could be considered in this decision.
i. The first consideration is the model to be used in the integration project. 
These are well known because Article XXIV of  GATT defines what 
is a “free trade area” and a “customs union.” An essential element 
in a customs union is that beyond the formal definition that requires 
the existence of  a common external tariff, many more common or 
harmonized policies are in fact required to ensure a proper functioning, 
106    Future of the Global Trade Order
such as competition policy, subsidization, government procurement, 
standards and trade remedies, among others. Little wonder that the 
only customs union to function effectively in the last 60 years is the 
European Union, followed by the Southern African Customs Union 
(SACU)4 (and the jury is still out on the Eurasian Economic Union).5 
The choice of  the integration model is of  course a determinant of  
the partners.
ii. Gains. A trade agreement needs support from government, business, 
politicians, unions, and so on. While the results cannot be measured 
until the text is divulged, it is nevertheless inevitable that the intention 
of  initiating a negotiation is sustained on perceived gains or benefits 
for the economy. The assessment of  gains should not be overstated to 
avoid the risk of  overselling and losing credibility. Increases in existing 
exports of  goods and services, new exports, cheaper imports, more 
and better paid jobs, and new investments are all important selling 
points. If  none of  these gains is perceived in the case of  a possible 
partner, it becomes difficult to justify a negotiation.
iii. By the same token, sensitivities are equally crucial in terms of  their 
identification and assessment. If  they outweigh the perceived benefits, 
a negotiation becomes difficult, if  not impossible. An example to 
illustrate this is the case of  New Zealand and Chile. Starting in the 
mid-1990s, officials met frequently and proposed, with the approval 
of  the respective heads of  government, to initiate negotiations for 
a bilateral FTA. They regarded it as being of  systemic long-run 
interest to establish a trans-Pacific model that could be expanded 
to other APEC economies. However, bilateral trade was small and 
the structure of  production was similar, and the initiative did not 
elicit much enthusiasm in Chile. On the contrary, New Zealand is a 
powerful exporter of  dairy products and Chile is a net importer, and 
Chilean domestic producers – who are highly sensitive to international 
prices – expressed firm opposition to the idea of  a bilateral FTA. They 
had the support of  other agricultural producers and the Ministry 
4 Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa and Swaziland. However, South Africa chose to negotiate an FTA with 
the European Union independently of  its SACU partners. The latter in practice treat EU imports duty-free, but 
their exports do not enjoy the same access as South African products to the EU market, without prejudice to the 
Everything but Arms initiative of  the European Union.
5 Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, Armenia and Kyrgyzstan.
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of  Agriculture, in effect killing the idea for a few years. It was only 
in 2003 that an expansion of  the number of  participants to include 
Singapore and Brunei made it possible to carry out the negotiation 
that concluded in 2005 giving birth to the P4, the precursor to the TPP.
iv. Size and quality of  the market. By negotiating a trade agreement, a 
country is “exchanging” access to its market for better access to other 
markets. For a small country, it would seem a very good proposition to 
negotiate with a much larger economy. But “size” can be measured in 
different ways: GDP (at market or PPP exchange rates), total imports by 
value or volume, imports of  products exported by the bigger country, 
and so on (or a combination thereof). A real example to illustrate this 
occurred in the second half  of  the 1990s, when Chilean exporters 
observed that Mexico was negotiating FTAs with several Central 
American countries and requested that their government do the same 
to avoid being discriminated against. Putting aside the maxim that 
“any market is a good market” and any political considerations, the 
decisive factor behind allocating resources to negotiate with Central 
America was the fact that, though small (measured in different ways), 
these markets imported more manufactures from Chile relative to 
other markets. In this case, the quality of  the market was a compelling 
reason.
5. Defining the agenda. In parallel with the above points, another important 
consideration is the determination of  what exactly will be the subjects of  
the negotiation. This involves an understanding of  what are the objectives 
to be pursued in each item or chapter. For example, it makes a difference 
to say that there will be a chapter on cross-border trade in services with 
the objective of  liberalizing all services, as opposed to binding the present 
status quo of  access and national treatment for services supplied from the 
negotiating partner, which implies that existing restrictions are maintained.6 
The political impacts of  the two are very different. In many cases, using 
existing agreements as a template can facilitate the determination, since 
there will a clearer view of  the possible outcomes. The more parties that are 
involved, the greater the need for this understanding and the more formal 
it becomes, to the point that multilateral agreements need a document 
to launch a negotiation, such as the Doha Ministerial Declaration. In a 
bilateral setting, this usually takes the form of  a press communiqué.
6 Usually the preservation of  existing restrictions is accompanied by the “ratcheting effect,” which implies that any 
future changes cannot increase the degree of  non-conformity with the treaty; changes can thus only be more 
liberalizing.
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6. The communication of  “red-lines” is important but not essential. 
“Red-lines” refer to limits to liberalization or other disciplines that, for 
whatever reason, a government will not agree to, even if  implies that 
an agreement will not be reached. This is a process that runs in parallel 
with the definition of  the agenda, and involves communicating to the 
counterpart what is not negotiable. However this is done – in writing or 
through verbal exchanges – it is important to avoid unpleasant surprises 
down the road that may impact key expectations and upset the balance of  
interests, and that may derail a negotiation and generate mistrust. A typical 
example would be communicating that everything will be negotiable except 
certain products (the United States typically excludes sugar from most of  
its trade agreements) or a service (most countries follow the GATS and 
exclude air transportation from PTAs). The red-lines should not be used 
to acquire bargaining chips. If  during the negotiation a red-lined issue is 
negotiated away, then all other red-lines may be regarded as negotiable, 
thus losing its effect. In the absence of  red-lines, there is less trust and 
the parties will not be willing to table their final/best offers in order to 
retain chips should red-line issues suddenly appear in the negotiation. For 
example, in the TPP negotiation, because of  internal electoral politics, 
the United States took a long time to communicate its approach and 
positioning with regards to textiles and apparel, and other sensitive areas. 
According to some negotiators, this was the cause of  unnecessary delays.
7. The political economy of  the other party (or parties). As in 
most negotiations, difficulties often arise because of  domestic political 
constraints, however beneficial a particular outcome may be. To have a 
good understanding of  what lies behind a particular position is crucial in 
order to determine what is important and what the limitations are that 
the counterpart faces. This also allows those positions that are motivated 
by a negotiating tactic of  acquiring bargaining chips, instead of  a genuine 
concern or resistance, to be weeded out. To have the necessary and 
undistorted relevant information at hand probably implies the employment 
of  law firms or other sources of  legal, economic and political analysis of  
the other party. For example, negotiating services and investment implies 
dealing with complex regulatory frameworks that are better understood 
by local lawyers, particularly when the other party does not share a similar 
legal and administrative culture.
8. The domestic consultative process with most, or all, stakeholders is an 
imperative of  modern day trade agreements. Moreover, as the agreements 
cover other areas besides tariffs (in particular, services and intellectual 
property), the number of  parties with opposing interests increases. Time 
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and resources spent on consultations before and during the negotiations 
are therefore a key element to neutralize the resistance, or at least force 
stakeholders to develop arguments with the relevant evidence. In this 
process, it is likely that many sectors that fear greater external competition 
will argue that they should be excluded from the negotiation. In other 
words, they will want to become part of  the national red-lines. Such 
positions are best dealt with when the government communicates ex ante 
that exclusions (or other exceptional treatments) will only be entertained 
when certain objective criteria are met. Once the negotiation is launched, 
this dimension becomes more difficult because a balance must be struck 
between the transparency that is required to engage domestic stakeholders 
in consultations on the one hand, and the necessary confidentiality of  the 
negotiations, particularly the texts as they are developed, on the other. 
The manner in which consultations are organized is not something 
for this chapter to dwell upon. However, it seems valuable to point out 
that some of  the best practices are those that force the stakeholders to 
organize themselves in order to bring to the table approaches that have 
already been negotiated, eliminating extreme and unrealistic positions. 
Since the stakeholders will be many, it follows that such practices will 
increase efficiency and help generate consensus. Without counting other 
ministries and governmental agencies, examples of  other stakeholders 
include: i) business; ii) politicians; iii) parliamentarians; iv) unions; v) non- 
governmental organizations (NGOs); vi) academia; and (vii) professional 
associations
9. The consultative process: The special case of  business. While all 
stakeholders are important, business is special in the sense that it bears the 
risks, and therefore has much to win or lose depending on the quality and 
size of  the markets. By the same token, business has special responsibilities 
to engage by expressing its views and, if  the case warrants, by providing 
political support. Understandably, however, business is a mix of  competing 
and sometimes contradictory interests. It follows that at a national level, 
its messages often get diluted in generalities that accommodate all sectors, 
which renders the content quite useless. In this regard, sectoral expressions 
are more valuable for a government. Having said that, business should be 
encouraged to state its views of  the type and quality of  rules it needs to 
make more investments and exchanges of  goods and services possible. This 
is at the heart of  the modern trade agreements, including the WTO. While 
business acts mostly at the national level, it should also build international 
coalitions and be active, particularly in Geneva. While the International 
Chamber of  Commerce or the Coalitions of  Services Industries in several 
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countries (and also grouped in the Global Coalition of  Services) offer good 
examples, the fact is that they are present in Geneva only two or three times 
a year, and consequently involvement in the details of  negotiations is not 
possible. A much better example is the Global Express Association, which 
groups express delivery industries, with a permanent presence in Geneva.
By the same token, governments and international agencies should do 
more to engage business, particularly by opening institutional channels for 
their participation (and that of  other stakeholders as well). This could be 
done at the WTO, for example, by opening to observers the proceedings 
of  the trade policy reviews and allowing business to pose questions directly 
to the government under review; or by allowing business to express its 
specific trade concerns to the Committees of  Technical Barriers to 
Trade and of  Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures. These are but a few 
examples of  how engagement by business can be improved. In shaping the 
future agenda of  trade negotiations, the view of  business will be crucial 
regarding content, and its support indispensable to move to higher levels 
of  international cooperation.
10. The role of  the media, including social media, is also a central 
element to be considered in pursuing a negotiation. With few exceptions, 
the professional media is not specialized and cannot be expected to 
accurately communicate to a wider public, issues relating to complex 
public policies.
11. Points 8 and 9 above have an external dimension insofar as the process 
of  consultations can also be carried out with stakeholders of the 
other party, particularly those that could be more supportive. Likewise, 
the media of  the other party should not be neglected as an important 
dimension of  the political effort to advance and conclude negotiations of  
a trade agreement.
12. The organization of  a negotiation. In the absence of  an institution 
(like the WTO), and therefore of  a Secretariat, the organization of  a 
negotiation is a time-consuming and not inexpensive affair. Consequently, 
much effort and resources are devoted to developing the institutional 
backup and efficient processes. For example:
i. Who will play the role of  secretariat?
ii. How will texts be controlled and circulated?
iii. Which are to be the negotiating groups, and who shall preside and 
report?
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iv. Who will responsible for providing background information (texts of  
other negotiations and jurisprudence)?
v. What language(s) will be used to conduct the negotiations and in the 
texts?
vi. The legal scrubbing
vii. Translation.
13. The legislative process of  incorporating international obligations 
into the domestic legal framework. While this is not part of  the 
negotiation proper, the manner in which the incorporation takes place has 
an important impact on the scope of  trade agreements. Broadly speaking, 
there are two models. As an example of  one approach, in the United States 
the Executive doesn’t seek the approval of  the treaty itself, but instead 
submits to the legislature the text of  the changes to domestic law that are 
necessary to implement the international obligations.7 This implies that, 
by and large, once this process is completed no further legislative action 
is required to implement a trade agreement. It also means that any future 
law approved by Congress can modify prior law, and thus the international 
obligation contained therein.
The other approach is approval of  the treaty itself  by the legislature, and 
under many legal systems future law cannot derogate or modify such 
treaties. However, many treaty obligations may need further legislative 
action. For example, if  a treaty provides that there will be an authority 
to carry investigations when an application of  a safeguard measure is 
requested, a separate law must designate who will be the investigating 
authority. This can be avoided if  in the treaty itself  such designation is 
made (typically in an Annex), and is thus of  the text that the legislature 
approves. It is doubtful, however, whether this technique can be used in 
more complex matters. If  ulterior legislative action is required for some 
treaty obligations, there is an element of  uncertainty over whether or not 
approval will be forthcoming after ratification of  the trade agreement. 
Other parties may require full approval not only of  the treaty, but also 
of  the implementing legislation before allowing entry into force. This 
may generate tensions because it may be perceived as an intrusion by a 
foreign government in the legislative process. A prior understanding of  
the procedures in this regard, along with the appropriate explanations, 
7 To approve trade agreements as treaties, under the US Constitution the advice and consent of  two-thirds of  the 
Senate would be required. In contrast, domestic laws can be approved by simple majority in both Houses.
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may facilitate the incorporation of  trade agreements into domestic law 
and the subsequent implementation.
The Future of WTO Trade Negotiations
Despite the failure of  the DDA negotiations, it is inconceivable that the 
multilateral trading system will cease to be a forum – and arguably the best 
forum – to negotiate trade liberalization.
However, under the present circumstances it seems unlikely that a round of  
multilateral trade negotiations encompassing several areas will take place. The 
Trump administration has stated in no uncertain terms that it will not pursue 
negotiations at the multilateral level. Instead, it has signaled its willingness 
to engage on a bilateral basis, presumably because the United States will 
have more leverage. In addition, the United States has expressed concern 
and disappointment at the functioning of  the WTO, including the dispute 
settlement mechanism. Without the participation of  the main trading nation 
no multilateral action is feasible, unless the United States were to actively seek 
reforms in the WTO to address its concerns, which for the time being looks 
unlikely.  
Other forces are coming into the play. Brexit is one, full of  uncertainties and 
costs. At least, in a post-Brexit world, the United Kingdom seems to envisage 
a proactive attitude in the WTO and elsewhere in favor of  freer trade. The 
United Kingdom has stated it will maintain the present access it grants to 
import under EU bilateral and multilateral commitments. In addition, over 
time the United Kingdom will probably review and presumably improve 
present EU trade agreements with other countries since on its own it will 
probably have fewer sensitivities than the European Union. 
The European Union, for its part, has been active in trying to finalize a free 
trade agreement with MERCOSUR, following new pro-market governments 
in Brazil and Argentina. It is also negotiating a massive PTA with Japan that will 
no doubt have economic and systemic impacts, along with other negotiations 
to strike new deals (with New Zealand and Australia) or to modernize existing 
arrangement, such as with Mexico and Chile. 
The situation in Asia is no less active, with RCEP, ASEAN and other processes. 
The Chinese “One Belt One Road” initiative is also an attractive process of  
physical integration. 
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In Latin America, the Pacific Alliance stands out and will probably engage in 
trade agreements with other extra-regional countries. MERCOSUR might 
also undertake an internal liberalizing reform and engage with other trading 
partners, following the outcome of  its negotiation with the European Union. 
Though the United States has withdrawn from pursuing the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership, the remaining members have agreed to apply the accord amongst 
themselves, with a few modifications. 
These examples are a partial illustration of  the extent to which liberalization 
continues to be pursued and expanded thematically and geographically, in spite 
of  economic and political resistance. Such processes are bound to exercise a 
strong “gravitational pull” leading to PTAs that will occupy as much room as 
is politically possible. 
In such scenarios, what are the options for smaller players who have an interest 
in improving and deepening international trade cooperation in the WTO? First 
and foremost, the system needs to be defended and protected.  Preserving the 
WTO rulebook and the machinery to carry out the functions of  administration 
of  the agreements is vital for those who have a stake in a rules-based system. 
Second, if  negotiations are not presently possible in WTO, time can used to 
prepare future action. The failures of  the past 17 years leave no doubt that 
the manner in which negotiations are conducted must change, at least to 
reflect present realities and future needs. Achieving a new understanding of  
the format and substance of  the negotiations will take time. The following 
flags some of  the most important issues that members will have to confront.
No negotiating process can continue to be organized along traditional lines 
(developed, developing and least-developed countries). By the same token, 
flexibilities like special and differential treatment will no longer work as an 
instrument for inclusiveness unless they are based on the individual needs of  
each economy, as in the approach used in the Trade Facilitation Agreement.
For example, a different basis for negotiations could be explored, such as 
binding everything at the applied level, including industrial tariffs, agricultural 
domestic support, services and government procurement. This confidence-
building approach would set the stage for effective liberalization, thus making 
any negotiations a very attractive proposition to business. 
Plurilateral negotiations have surfaced. Some of  these are based on the 
perception that a critical mass exists and thus the outcomes are made extensively 
on an MFN basis, such as the Information Technology Agreement (ITA) and 
Environmental Goods Agreement (EGA) exercises. In contrast, other processes, 
such as the Trade in Services Agreement (TiSA), envisage results that only 
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benefit the signatories (even though nothing could prevent a TiSA signatory 
from binding its individual concessions under the GATS). However, some form 
of  packaging still seems necessary to ensure that the necessary trade-offs are 
present. For example, it is difficult to foresee a stand-alone agreement to reduce 
or eliminate trade-distorting domestic support in agriculture. To what extent 
and in what format are plurilaterals an appropriate substitute to multilateral 
agreements? How can transparency in the system be ensured so other members 
can appraise the impact of  plurilaterals on their interests?
The real economy requires an expansion of  the agenda, along at least two 
dimensions. Since the financial crisis, protectionism has been on the rise, even 
though trade disciplines have undoubtedly contained some pressures. A review 
is required of  the existing disciplines on subsidies, anti-dumping measures, 
government procurement, export duties and restrictions, among other areas, to 
check the worst manifestations of  protectionism. Perhaps a good way to start 
is to value the economic impact of  measures adopted in order to determine 
what the priorities should be. 
Another dimension concerns rules in “new” areas such as investment, 
competition policy and state-owned enterprises. Special attention should be 
paid to implementing agreements reached in other multilateral fora, such as 
the elimination of  fossil-fuel subsidies agreed upon at COP21. Based on a 
common template, governments could conduct national studies to determine 
what problems these agenda pose, and what possible solutions exist.  Analysis 
and internal consultations are necessary, as well as sharing and exchanging 
information with the rest of  the interested members of  the WTO. 
In 1982, the GATT contracting parties held a conference at the ministerial 
level. The Tokyo Round had been finalized three years earlier and its results 
were under implementation in 1982. The trading system was under great strain 
due to weak disciplines. In addition, the United States, with support from other 
parties such as the European Communities, proposed to initiate negotiations 
for a framework for the liberalization of  trade in services. This met with strong 
resistance from most developing and some developed countries. Without a 
consensus and the membership deeply divided, the conference was deemed to 
be a failure. Towards the end of  the Ministerial Declaration, three paragraphs 
addressed the issue of  services.  The first recommended that each contracting 
party with an interest in services undertake a national examination of  the issues 
in this sector. The second paragraph invited contracting parties to exchange 
information on such matters.  In the final paragraph, contracting parties agree 
to review the results of  these examinations at their 1984 session and to consider 
whether any multilateral action on these matters was appropriate and desirable. 
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As a result of  these studies and exchanges, by 1986 the resistance to negotiate 
services had been reduced to eleven developing countries, and the Uruguay 
Round was launched including services. This shows how governments took 
“time out” of  trade negotiations and created the conditions for a major 
overhaul and upgrade of  the multilateral trading system. 
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Having passed its 20th anniversary in 2016, the Dispute Settlement System 
(DSS) of  the WTO continues to be considered a success story, and rightly so. 
The mechanism has been defined by a former Director General as the “jewel 
in the crown” of  the WTO, a statement which is even more justified in the 
light of  the failure of  the WTO members to conclude the Doha Development 
Round (started in 2001), notwithstanding the limited success of  the Bali (2013) 
and Nairobi (2015) Ministerial Conferences, and to reinforce other non-judicial 
mechanisms within the WTO.
It is interesting to note that the DSS, specifically the Appellate Body, is now taken 
as a model for “judicializing” other fields. Thus the European Commission 
proposed in 2017 within UNCITRAL to replace investor-state arbitration 
(ISDS) generally with a two-level Multilateral Investment Court,  after having 
succeeded in introducing an international investment tribunal in its free trade 
agreements with Canada (CETA) and Vietnam.1 At its beginning, however, the 
1 See also the similar proposal by the European Union in the (now suspended) negotiations with the United States on 
TTIP at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/november/tradoc_153955.pdf. For the final CETA text, see 
European Commission trade doc. 154329 (February 2016) and at www.international.gc.ca.
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DSS was criticized both by some WTO members and by non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) for allegedly devolving to unrepresentative international 
“faceless judges”, and moreover it has been accused of  indulging in “judicial 
activism” – that is, in disputes also affecting non-trade interest and individual 
governments’ regulatory powers.
This positive evaluation is based on:
• the high number of  cases introduced (the 531st dispute was initiated 
on 28 September 2017) and almost always (90% of  those brought to 
adjudication) resolved effectively by the removal of  restrictive measures of  
an importing country found in breach of  WTO obligations by independent 
and impartial rule-based adjudication;
• the effective functioning of  its multi-stage procedure (from consultation 
to implementation, through a double-stage adjudication phase), which is 
meant to solve specific, mostly bilateral disputes, but at the same time to 
give guidance to all the interested members and to take into account the 
multilateral dimension of  the trading system;
• the participation in it of  both major trading powers and small developing 
countries (signaling the importance of  the DSS also for small players and 
developing economies to ensure access for their products to the larger 
economies’ markets); and
• the development of  a balanced and consistent case law, sensitive to 
non-trade concerns such as environment protection and health, which 
recognizes on one hand the need to uphold market access obligations, and 
on the other hand the existence of  evolving non-trade values and policies 
– domestic and international – that need to be safeguarded as part of  the 
domestic policy space of  WTO members.
This has afforded “security and predictability” to the system (as set forth in 
Article 3.2 of  the Dispute Settlement Understanding, or DSU), including in the 
recent times of  financial crisis and economic slowdown. According to official 
documentation, opportunistic resort to protectionist measures (anti-dumping, 
subsidies, safeguards) has been contained, although independent research tends 
to challenge this claim and has a more pessimistic view.2 
2 For a relatively positive view, see the various reports submitted by the WTO to the G20 meetings pursuant to the 
latter’s request and the related data available at http://tmdb.wto.org. For a critical position, see the chapter by Simon 
Evenett and Johannes Fritz in this volume.
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Current Problems: The Issue in General 
On the other hand, the system shows signs of  stress (as a victim of  its own 
success, mainly due to the increase in the number of  disputes and their 
complexity), while multilateral negotiations in the Doha Round have de facto 
come to a halt. The following major issues have emerged which threaten its 
effectiveness and may thus diminish the trust in, and recourse to, the system:
1. The increasing number of  cases brought to panels and the increasing 
complexity of  disputes and sophistication of  arguments made is extending 
the length of  proceedings beyond reasonableness, especially at the panel 
stage, and is putting strain on the limited resources of  the Secretariat.
2. The willingness of  losing respondents to promptly comply with the 
decisions appears to be decreasing, in that effective implementation, 
while usually performed, requires on average more time. Alternatives to 
compliance (such as compensation), which appear to be on the rise, may 
tilt the system towards the protection of  the interests of  major trading 
nations, who may be able to pay off weaker members while maintaining 
their import restrictions.
3. WTO members appear unable to agree on further liberalization (notably 
in services) and on adding new rules to the multilateral system to face new 
issues (such as the green economy, environmental subsidies, electronic 
commerce, overcoming the divergence between national standards and 
regulation affecting trade).3 This may lead to an increased reliance on the 
DSS to settle conflicts
4. The parallel massive increase of  regional trade agreements (RTAs), to 
which WTO members are increasingly turning (including “mega-RTAs” 
such as TPP and TTIP), risks reducing the relevance of  the WTO rules 
through regional provisions. This has not affected however the recourse 
to the DSS.4
This chapter addresses these issues and points to possible solutions, several of  
which have already been aired in various circles in the past. These proposals fall 
into two groups. The first group addresses the most pressing problem, which 
has been repeatedly raised at the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB), namely, 
3 See Bollycky and Mavroidis (2017).
4 It has been noted that RTAs have practically never been challenged in the WTO DSS. This could be due to the 
fact that they are considered by and large to be compliant with WTO obligations. Alternatively, it is possible that 
participants in RTAs refrain from challenging other RTAs in order to avoid provoking challenges to their own 
(the compliance of  any RTA with all WTO requirements being doubtful). For the limited derogability of  WTO 
agreements through bilateral treaties see the Appellate Body report in DS457: Peru – Additional Duty on Imports of  
Certain Agricultural Products, adopted 31 July 2015.
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delays in the process at the panel stage due to the lack of  legal resources in the 
Secretariat to staff the many panels that are being established.5 The second 
set of  proposals looks at broader changes to remedy structural problems, but 
still through changes to the DSU that can be adopted within the current 
framework.
The Impact of  Delays at the Panel Stage
Notwithstanding action taken at the organizational level in 2016 to resolve (at 
least in part) the issue, due to lack of  resources and other bottlenecks, panel 
proceedings that should in theory take no more than six months (Article 12.9 
DSU), but which in practice took around one and a half  years in “normal” 
cases until recently, now may well take between two or three years from the 
formal establishment of  the panel by the DSB to the circulation of  their 
report. This is of  course not the end of  the game, since appeal is possible and 
implementation, even without any further dispute, takes considerable time 
until redress is fully obtained, not to mention the further possible proceedings 
before full implementation by the losing party.6 This time lag undermines the 
value of  any favorable decision for obtaining effective redress against domestic 
measures in breach of  WTO commitments, which is especially damaging in 
respect of  temporary measures such as anti-dumping duties.
More broadly, this dysfunctional operation of  the DSS – in disregard of  one 
of  its basic tenets and praised features, namely, its speed – may undermine 
the whole operation of  the system and recourse to it as the key instrument for 
5 A forceful complaint was that by Korea at the DSB of  August 31st, 2015. Korea complained that in DSS 488, 
where Korea challenged US anti-dumping measures, the Secretariat had notified Korea that the panel established 
on March 25th, 2015 would not begin its work until the end of  2016 at the earliest, a date some 15 months from 
the time Korea had been notified of  the delay, “not because the panelist were unavailable, but due to the constraints 
affecting the Secretariat.” Korea pointed out that this “remarkable, extraordinary, unreasonable delay” in light of  
both the DSU provisions and the economic reality, just for the case to get started, “was almost twice as long as the 
period foreseen by Art. 12.9 DSU between the establishment of  the panel and the circulation of  the report.” As of  
October 2017, this panel (in DS488, US – OCTG (Korea)) had not yet issued its report.
6 As an example, at a DSB meeting in 2015 Canada complained that four and a half  years after the establishment of  
the panel, the COOL dispute with the United States was still far from being settled. After the panel, the appeal, the 
fixing by an arbitrator of  the reasonable period of  time for the United States to comply that was not respected, a 
compliance panel (Art. 21.5 DSU) against the United States by Canada and Mexico (the other complainant) where 
the panel and the Appellate Body found that the measure taken by the United States had not brought compliance 
(but possibly even worsened the breach), the arbitration panel (Article 22.6 DSU) was just starting its work to establish 
whether the countermeasures announced by Canada and Mexico were excessive in comparison with the trade loss 
caused   to them by the COOL measure, as submitted by the United States. President Obama announced the repeal 
of  the relevant US provisions on 18 December 2015, just a few days after the arbitration panel had concluded its 
work, determining the level of  retaliation that Canada and Mexico could put in place to offset the adverse effect of  
COOL on their exports. For a realistic view, see “Torture by Tariff – Retaliating against unfair trade practices is a 
calculation in cruelty”, The Economist, 20 June 2015. As to the current situation, in DS495 the panel informed the 
parties on 29 September 2017 that the panel, established by the DSB on 28 September 2015 and composed on 8 
February 2016 would issue its report to the parties in October 2017, WT/DS495/7.
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ensuring respect of  trade-opening commitments. As stated by Korea at the 
DSB meeting of  31 August 2015:
“WTO disputes are not about abstract disagreements. Real world 
economic interests underlay every dispute. There were real people 
suffering while a dispute was pending (…) The problem would get worse 
if  left unaddressed. Long delays created perverse incentive by lowering 
the cost of  adopting and maintaining WTO-inconsistent measures, 
insisting, rightly, that they would not be subject to review by the WTO 
for years. Members could therefore expect more protectionist measures 
and more, not less disputes being brought to the WTO. These in turn, 
would cause further delays, prompting a vicious, never-ending cycle. It 
was in the interest of  everyone, the parties, the wider membership and 
the Secretariat not to let this happen.”7 
It is curious, however, that Korea itself, followed by other speakers, did 
not ask for more effective remedies – which the Director-General instead 
initiated thereafter – beyond increased transparency and information from the 
Secretariat as to the reasons for the “queue,” and as to the situation in the line 
and the outlook for “their” case being decided. The same attitude prevailed 
in the discussion that followed the Director-General’s lengthy and detailed 
statement at the DSB of  28 October 2015, where he made the point that the 
problems would not be resolved just through administrative measures and a 
shifting of  resources within the Secretariat. Several members acknowledged 
this issue and decried the negative consequences of  the current set on the 
effectiveness of  the DSS, but abstained from launching any ideas for tackling 
the problems more seriously.8 
7 Doc. WT/DSB/M/ 367, pp. 22-29. The concerns of  Korea were shared at the meeting by a number of  countries, 
starting with Guatemala (whose delegate stated aptly, “[t]he WTO dispute settlement system was one of  the most 
effective and prompt international systems of  adjudication. Victim of  its own success, the system faces the risk of  
becoming slower. If  no effective action were taken to address this unfortunate situation, the principle of  “prompt 
settlement of  disputes” in art. 3.3. DSU would become a mere ‘best effort’ provision, not more than an illusionary 
aspiration (…) long delays in the DSS mechanism may create perverse incentives for the adopting political motivated 
WTO-inconsistent measures.” Other interventions came from (in order) Chile, China (“this unprecedented situation 
would seriously undermine the effectiveness and credibility of  the WTO DSS”), Australia (“willing to consider any 
option that might help alleviate the current situation and improve the system over the long term. This included 
ensuring that the Secretariat had the resources needed to service disputes in a timely manner and also exploring ways 
for the membership to reduce the burden on the system in terms of  the length and complexity of  disputes”), Russia, 
Mexico, Pakistan, Japan, Brazil, Canada, India, (“the credibility of  the system was at stake”), the European Union 
(“manage the situation at hand” and “find solutions to the mid and long-term situation against the background of  
ever increasing pressures in the WTO DSS”), Argentina, Chinese Taipei and Norway. In contrast with the serious 
concerns voiced by most other countries, the United States was more restrained, stating briefly that “Korea has raised 
an important systemic issue (…) This raised some significant concerns, particularly in light of  the fact that the WTO 
DSS had, for many years, operated with admirable efficiency. The US shared the view that members needed a better 
understanding of  the causes behind delays so that they could develop and consider appropriate solutions.”
8 See the minutes of  the meeting at WT/DSB/M/369 of  January 20th, 2016, p. 20. DDG Brauner has been entrusted 
by the DG to follow up with the members on these issues.
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Subsequently, in 2016, the Director-General was able to increase the legal 
staff of  the Legal and Rules Divisions of  the Secretariat, both by shifting 
inside resources and by hiring, thus partially reducing the problem. Since 
2016, the chairman of  the DSB reports at each regular monthly meeting 
about the situation and these reports show that the situation is far from having 
normalized. Thus, as reported at the DSB of  20 July 2017, at that time there 
were 15 active panels that had not yet issued their report to the parties:9 
“limited staff resources currently prevented assigning dispute settlement 
officers to assist panels in three pending disputes before the autumn of  
2017…There were a further seven panel at the composition stage…
In addition five final panel reports that had been issued to the parties 
were currently being translated.”10
Issues Relating to the Appellate Body
Delays
Panel reports are subject to appeal, where the Appellate Body faces increasing 
difficulties in respecting the short 90-day period prescribed for issuing its own 
reports. This is due to the overlapping of  appeals procedures, the increased 
number of  issues appealed (even if  this remains, as currently, at around two-
thirds of  the panel reports issued), the lack of  competent staff that, for obscure 
reasons, are not made available to the Appellate Body, and the complexity of  
the cases. To this the additional problem must be added of  the Appellate Body 
operating at less than its full composition due to the DSB not filling vacancies 
promptly. Even without the current blocking of  the selection process (addressed 
below), the DSB has often not fulfilled its responsibilities in a timely manner.
The Deadlock Over the Selection Process
A new, possibly devastating deadlock that risks making a havoc of  the whole 
DSS – not just the appeal phase – and thus risks undermining the very 
functioning of  the WTO,11 is the lack of  consensus since mid-2017 on the 
launching of  the selection process to fill vacancies at the Appellate Body, 
9 Once the parties have received the (interim) report and made their comments, the final report has to be translated 
before being circulated to the membership, triggering the 60-day time for adoption by the DSB or for appeal (See 
Article 15 and 16, Dispute Settlement Understanding – DSU)
10 See WT/DSB/M/399, Minutes of  the DSB meeting of  20 July 2017, issued 29 September 2017, statement by the 
Chairman of  the DSB on the dispute settlement workload, pp.13-14.
11 See “America holds the WTO hostage – The rules-based system of  trade faces threat beyond Trump’s tariffs”, The 
Economist, 23 September 2017. More generally on this issue, see Dunnoff and Pollack (2017), specifically Section III 
“Tougher than the Rest: The Judicial Trilemma at the WTO” at page 260 ff. 
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which currently number two (as of  October 2017), but will increase to three 
in December 2017.12
This situation first arose at the DSB in spring 2017 due to the divide between 
Latin American members and the European Union over whether one selection 
process or two separate processes should be launched to fill the two vacancies 
due in 2017. Subsequently, after the abrupt resignation of  Mr. Hyun Chong 
caused an immediate further vacancy in August 2017, a new factor rendered 
the issue more worrying. The United States obstructed the launching of  the 
selection process in general at the DSB of  31 August 2017 (and thereafter). 
The United States raised objections to certain “technical” aspects of  the 
operation of  the Appellate Body,13 aiming however at a broader objective of  
changing key aspects of  the functioning and role of  the Appellate Body, and the 
binding nature of  the DSS outcomes more generally.14 US criticisms echo some 
previous complaints of  alleged “gap filling”, “judicial activism” and indulging 
in “obiter dicta.”15 By preventing consensus, the United States puts pressure 
on the system by depriving the Appellate Body of  several members, which 
hints at a future paralysis of  the DSS should the deadlock not be resolved. 
The first observation is that the launching of  timely selection processes is a 
duty of  the DSB and WTO members.16 
The linking by the United States of  the process for filling seats to a reform 
of  the Appellate Body – especially one which would run contrary to its basic 
function, such as diminishing its independence, making it more “accountable” 
to members, or reducing its powers to interpret the WTO agreements – is 
clearly unacceptable to the rest of  the membership.17 Other US statements 
12 The term of  Ricardo Ramirez Hernàndez (Mexico) expired on 30 June 2017, Hyun Chong Kim (Korea) resigned 
abruptly on 31 July 2017 (effective the following day), and the term of  Peter van den Bossche (European Union) 
expires on 11 December 2017.
13 As casus belli, the United States has used the argument that the Appellate Body would have exceeded its powers in 
allowing members who have concluded their mandate to go on deciding cases pending at their term’s expiration. 
The argument is legally not grounded because Rule 15 of  the Working Rules of  the AB allow this explicitly. In a 
situation such as the current one with many complex appeals pending at the same time and timely reappointments 
to fill vacancies increasingly uncertain, not resorting to this rule would exacerbate delay and even lead to paralysis. 
Not allowing completion would entail that Appellate Body members with only a few months of  service left would be 
unavailable to serve on a division.
14 See “Pressure rises as U.S. maintains link between Appellate seats, WTO reform”, Inside U.S. Trade, 22 September 
2017.
15 See footnote 49 for references to the reasons given by the United States in 2015 for objecting to the renewal for a 
second mandate of  Seung Wha Chang.
16 Obstruction of  such a process could be viewed as a breach of  Article 3.10 DSU according to which all members have 
to engage in dispute settlement procedures in good faith.
17 See Inside US Trade, 1 September 2017 reporting of  the positions expressed by the US at the DSB meeting of  31 
August and their rejections by all other members.
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have called into question the adherence to the basic tenet of  the rule-based 
multilateral trading system established in 1995.18  
A political divergence such as that emerging here on the very function of  the 
DSS and the role of  its ultimate umpire, its independence, impartiality, and 
the legal binding effects of  the reports once adopted by the DSB (hinting 
to a preference for the discredited GATT system) cannot be cured by small 
technical remedies, but needs rather an open clarification between all the 
participants to the multilateral trading system. Any acceptable change should 
be reached through DSU reform, or through a binding interpretation under 
Article IX.2 of  the WTO Agreement. 
Proposals
This chapter subscribes to the practical measures at the administrative level 
that the Director-General is implementing, as he has declared to the DSB.19 
At the same time, the initiatives taken by him have not been able to fix the 
problem, as evidenced by the current situation of  panel delays described above. 
Other solutions are called for that go beyond the competence of  the Director-
General.
Accordingly, the second set of  proposals below are more far reaching and 
forward looking, as they are meant to address the long-term sustainability 
of  the DSS with regards to effectiveness and outputs. While these proposals 
do not require any overhaul of  the current system and would not affect the 
basic tenets of  the original WTO DSS, in order to be adopted, they – as with 
any other proposal to this effect – would require a broad consensus of  the 
membership that is currently lacking, and not just in relation to these issues.
Due to the lack of  impulse for advancing negotiations on the DSU reform, 
a number of  members at the initiative of  Canada have explored and then 
18 In his speech at the UN General Assembly on 19 September 2017, President Trump criticized “mammoth 
multinational deals, unaccountable international tribunals and powerful global bureaucracies” as being responsible 
for millions of  jobs vanishing and thousands of  factories disappearing in the United States. See also criticisms 
of  the DSS by Robert Lighthizer, the USTR, as being “deficient” and for allegedly “changing the terms the US 
agreed to when joining the WTO” (Inside U.S. Trade, 22 September 2017, pp. 15-16). It is surprising that this critical 
statement comes at a time when the US has won a series of  cases in a row (DS 477,381,487) . As to the United States 
disengaging from the WTO and the other members having to learn to live without its leadership, see the speech by 
the American DDG Alan Wolff on 8 November 2017, as reported in Inside US Trade, 10 November 2017.
19 His first intervention on the subject was at a DSB in September 2014, when he announced the creation of  15 new 
lawyer posts in the three dispute settlement divisions: Legal Affairs, Rules, and the Appellate Body. However, the 
organization had difficulties in filling these. In his address to the DSB on 28 October 2015, the Director-General 
explained in detail the further steps he had taken and was taking to mitigate delays, consisting mostly of  reallocating 
of  personnel; hiring new legal staff; adjusting the grades and salaries to the competence of  the lawyers, taking into 
account the competition by law firms; increasing internal mobility; and pooling junior lawyers of  both divisions 
assisting panels. This should result in more efficiency and has already nearly doubled the relevant positions – from 30 
to 57 – since 2013.
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proposed practical solutions to improve the panel process, to be adopted on 
a voluntary basis by the parties involved in specific cases. These proposals, 
a kind of  second best in respect of  an agreed change in procedural rules, 
though broadly supported have not been put into operation until now, perhaps 
precisely because of  the above reasons.20 
At the Panel Stage
More substantial reforms to resolve these issues at the panel level would require 
considering more far-reaching options, such as:
1. discouraging the bringing of  complaints to the panel stage by making 
the initial phase (consultations) less of  a mere formality, possibly with 
the engagement of  the Director-General and resort to mediation and 
conciliation;
2. putting more financial resources to the service of  the legal Secretariat, 
overcoming the zero-growth budgetary constraint that tilts in favor of  first 
shifting resources within the WTO Secretariat without the possibility of  
adding new resources from the legal market place;
3. reorganizing the legal Secretariat by merging the Legal Division with the 
Rules Division, a distinction which reflects a division of  work from GATT 
times which is no longer justified;
4. enlarging the available pool of  panelists (resorting also to non-governmental 
panelists from third parties in any dispute), using more systematically 
available competent panelists (leading to the de facto creation of  a pool 
of  recurrent, semi-permanent panelists), and reducing procedural delays 
due to the “interim report” and translation. The availability of  a greater 
number of  more devoted and competent panelists could in turn make it 
possible to rely more on them also for drafting, as is the practice in both 
international courts and investment or commercial arbitration; and
5. making the disputing parties pay a share of  the costs of  the proceedings, 
which are currently charged to the whole membership.
20 As results from the minutes of  the DSB meeting of  20 July 2017, referred to in footnote 10, under the heading 
“Mechanism for developing, documenting and sharing practices and procedures in the conduct of  WTO disputes” 
these proposals relate to (i) streamlining panel composition by inviting nominations and appointments of  non-
governmental third-party nationals and suitable candidates who had not previously served on a panel; (ii) promoting 
electronic filing and service procedures in disputes; (iii) encouraging prompt responses to third parties requests to 
participate in consultation; (iv) publishing disputes’ procedural documents and preliminary rulings.
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The Appellate Body
To face the problems caused by the increased number of  appeals that are 
coming, and will come to the Appellate Body, possible remedial solutions 
include:
1. staffing the Appellate Body more adequately;
2. increasing the number of  Appellate Body members from seven to nine;
3. making their positions permanent, a status that would also better ensure the 
future selection of  competent, diverse and truly independent judges; and
4. making their reappointment for the second four-year term automatic, or 
replacing the two four-year terms with one non-renewable seven-year term.
The Implementation Phase
The monitoring role of  the DSB should be made more effective in order to 
induce more prompt compliance.21 
The procedure should be tightened so that the prospective nature of  WTO 
remedies (i.e. the obligation to comply not being retroactive from the date of  
the breach, but to be implemented only after a “reasonable period of  time” 
from the adoption of  a panel or Appellate Body report) does not reward the 
dragging of  feet by the losing party in respect of  compliance with adverse 
decisions.
The issue of  “sequencing” between compliance proceedings (Article 21.5 
DSU) and arbitration on the level of  suspension of  concessions in case of  
non- compliance (Article 22.6 DSU) should be tackled by express provisions in 
the DSU in order to avoid parallel proceedings, since the practice of  agreeing 
bilaterally on sequencing seems to lose ground.
Preliminary Considerations
Maintaining the efficiency of  the DSS and its effectiveness in ensuring 
compliance with the WTO multilateral trade rules entails broader benefits 
beyond ensuring the effectiveness of  expected trade openings from the 
commitments that WTO members have undertaken, as important as these 
are.22 
21 As advocated by Canadian Ambassador Jonathan Fried when he was chairman of  the DSB in 2013.
22 On the view that the multilateral trading system and its rules are a global common good, see Tietje and Lang 
(forthcoming).
The Future of the WTO Dispute Settlement System   127
It ensures, at the same time, the role of  the WTO as the guardian of  the 
multilateral trading system and the position of  its multilateral rules as the 
accepted global framework within which interested countries may engage in 
regional trade agreements. RTAs should be the basis for extending international 
cooperation and trade liberalization (“WTO-plus”) without endangering 
the WTO acquis. They should represent building blocks, and not stumbling 
blocks, by establishing supplemental frameworks to further facilitate trade 
through coordinated regional action, such as in the area of  standards and 
recognition and harmonization of  regulation. They should be supportive of  
the multilateral rules with a view to extending global standards and rules 
(Bollycky and Mavroidis, 2017).
It must be recognized that the possible solutions to the current problems set 
forth above do not entail just a quick fix that may be implemented without 
WTO members engaging in these issues, evaluating the most appropriate 
remedies and being open to looking for shared improvements. This of  course 
presupposes a shared view that the fundamentals of  the current rule-based 
system serve equally all parties and are worth preserving. Anyone wishing to 
go back to a power-based system such as the GATT, under which panel reports 
would not be binding and bilateral negotiations would be the only means to 
settle trade disputes, would have to show that its own interest and that of  all 
members (as required by the current context featuring a plurality of  major 
trading actors and groups) could be satisfied without leading to disruptive 
trade wars. 
If  these premises are maintained, possibly through a renewed global 
undertaking to abide by the rules and principles, with or without amendments 
or interpretations updating the existing provisions, the proposals set forth 
here do not represent an ambitious program that is out of  reach or an all-
comprising shopping list.
Rather, it is a realistic and modest agenda for fixing, within the existing 
framework, the current problems and enabling the DSS to go on serving 
the WTO membership and complying with its objectives and purpose in the 
years to come. We do not propose to transform the panels in a first instance 
tribunal or to abolish the adoption of  panel and Appellate Body reports, or 
other similarly radical overhauls.
Moreover, there is a specific instrument for members to discuss and elaborate 
on the necessary amendments to the dispute settlement rules. This is the 
DSU review negotiation framework agreed by a Ministerial Declaration 
in 1994 and extended by the Doha Ministerial Declaration in 2001, under 
which amendments to the DSU may be agreed without having to activate 
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the cumbersome WTO amendment process. This exercise should have 
been completed first by 1997/1999, and then by 2003, but it is still going on 
indefinitely at almost standing pace.
In his statement to the DSB on 28 October 2015, the Director-General 
presented the various measures he has put in place to add resources to the 
Secretariat in order to address the most pressing problems, but he warned 
members that more is needed. However, the unconcerned attitude of  most 
WTO members towards these issues, at least until recently (they see the 
problems but prefer to leave any solution to the Director-General, despite 
being conscious of  his limited capabilities to resolve them), does not bode 
well for any effective solution, even without taking into account the latest US 
challenge.
On the contrary, the DSS not being too efficient and allowing delays in 
implementation and political twisting may even accommodate some frequent 
users of  the DSS. They may view themselves more as defendants and thus 
not be in a hurry to implement changes through politically difficult domestic 
processes of  compliance, rather than as successful claimants eager to obtain 
as promptly as possible the other party’s due market opening to the benefit 
of   its producers and exporters.
Analysis and Suggestions
The Current Situation
Results Achieved, Disputes Resolved, Legal Security Provided
On 10 November 2015, the WTO website featured within its news items the 
statement of  DG Roberto Azevêdo celebrating the WTO Dispute Settlement 
System (DSS) having reached the mark of  500 disputes initiated. In the two 
years since then, 31 new disputes have been initiated.
The receipt of  the 500th trade dispute for settlement, said the Director-
General, “shows that the WTO’s dispute settlement system enjoys tremendous 
confidence among the membership, who value it as fair, effective and efficient 
mechanism to solve trade problems.” The 500th dispute was submitted when 
Pakistan filed a request for consultations with South Africa regarding the latter’s 
provisional anti-dumping duty on cement from Pakistan. The parties involved 
and the subject matter of  the dispute are also significant, because they show 
that developing countries use the system both as complainants and respondents 
in South-South relations, and that trade remedy measures feature importantly 
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in matters brought to the WTO. This trend is confirmed by a glance at the 
disputes initiated in 2017, which include disputes initiated by Ukraine against 
Kazakhstan, Indonesia against Australia, Mexico against Costa Rica, and 
Qatar against Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates.
The success is evidenced by the fact that resort to the DSS has become a normal 
feature in the operating of  the multilateral trading system, displacing resort to 
unilateral measures. Practice has confirmed what had been set forth in Article 
3.10 DSU, namely, that “requests for conciliation and the use of  the dispute 
settlement procedures should not be intended or considered as contentious 
acts.” This setting distinguishes the WTO from other international fora, where 
respondents often raise lack of  jurisdiction as a preliminary objection to escape 
the process. It makes it more business-like, as is the case in the national context.
At the time that the mark of  500 disputes notified to the WTO was reached, 
only 282 of  those had been brought to litigation. Resolution through bilateral 
negotiations, including formal withdrawal of  the request, had been notified to 
the WTO in 110 of  the cases, while the parties had not informed the WTO 
of  the status of  the other 108 (which could be considered dormant or de facto 
settled).23 As of  the end of  2016, 222 original panel reports had been issued, 
of  which 151 had been appealed (68% of  the total, on average). In 2016 there 
were 13 panel requests appealed, while the Appellate Body issued six reports, 
of  which one was a compliance report issued under DSU Article 21.5.24  
In 2017, four panel reports had been issued by mid-October covering five 
disputes and 11 had been adopted by the DSB, while the Appellate Body had 
issued appellate reports in four disputes on different subject matters.25 
A measure of  success is also the broad participation by WTO members 
in the process. By October 2017, about two-thirds of  members (105) had 
participated in dispute settlement proceedings, either as parties (claimants 
and/or respondents) or as third parties (34 members as third parties only). 
Looking at the consultation requests, developing and developed countries are 
23 This lack of  information signals the need to strengthen the obligation of  members to notify the WTO in a timely 
manner of  the status and outcome of  all disputes that have been formally filed.
24 The data provided are drawn from those provided, mostly in the form of  tables, by the Director-General in his 
statement to the DSB of  28 October 2015, those annexed to Annual Appellate Body Reports and those included 
in the news item of  12 November 2015 on the 500 mark (https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news15_e/
ds500rfc_10nov15_e.htm). Some data are not easy to compare, especially since there is a difference with regards 
to the relevant year between panel and Appellate Body reports issued and adopted by the DSB. Moreover, some 
proceedings concern several disputes brought by different claimants against the same measure of  the respondent 
State, that are examined together by a single panel. On the other hand, some appeals are formally separate (and 
counted individually) because the claimants are different but are dealt with in a single report.
25 The exact numbers do not always match because of  the different practice of  the panels and the Appellate Body 
in calculating as single or separate disputes those in which different claimants challenge the same measures of  the 
respondent state, the same panel being appointed to hear all the challenges.
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equally represented as complainants, while complaints are mostly directed 
towards developed countries.
As can be expected, the largest economies are both the most frequent initiators 
of  cases (with the United States leading with 115, followed by the European 
Union, Canada, Brazil, Mexico, India, Japan and Argentina all above the 20 
mark) and the most frequent defenders (with the United States again leading 
with 130, followed by the European Union, China, India, Argentina). Finally, 
the compliance mark is said to be about 90%. Countermeasures in the form 
of  withdrawal of  benefits – i.e. the imposition of  selective additional duties 
– have been imposed only in a handful of  cases, while no member has ever 
denied responsibility to comply with an unfavorable final decision.
Of  course, the number of  disputes is not by itself  a sign of  a healthy system; the 
ability to process them timely and according to the rules is.26 Notwithstanding 
some delays in full compliance, there is no sentiment that WTO members have 
become less inclined to respect the rules. On the other hand, a certain surge 
of  national anti-dumping measures, as monitored by the AD Committee, 
could be a sign of  increased pressure on export markets at a time of  economic 
slowdown, to the point of  being a sign of  resort to unfair competition.27 This is 
possibly a cyclical phenomenon, rather than a structural disregard for the rules.
In fact, Article 3.7 of  the DSU would discourage members from bringing 
disputes which might be resolved amicably without even resorting to the 
system, stating that “[b]efore bringing a case a Member shall exercise its 
judgment as to whether action under these procedures would be fruitful” 
and that “[a] solution mutually acceptable to the parties to the dispute and 
consistent with the covered agreement is clearly to be preferred.” In the same 
spirit of  not considering the starting of  a case to be an unfriendly act and 
encouraging at the same time parties to exercise some kind of  self-restraint 
when considering bringing a case, Article 3.10 states in its final sentence that 
“[i]t is also understood that complaints and counter-complaints in regard to 
distinct matters should not be linked.”
This notwithstanding, on several recent occasions the initiation of  a case 
by a country against another country has been immediately followed by the 
initiation of  a separate case by the respondent in the previous case against 
the first country (notably between the United States and China, and between 
Argentina and the United States and the European Union). Although there 
26 According to the AB Report for 2014, “[i]n its first 16 years the DSB has handled disputes spanning over USD 1 
trillion in trade flows” (WTO, 2015, p. 3).
27 This could be the situation in the steel market, where sources indicate overproduction in the face of  a decrease 
in demand (see https://www.steelorbis.com/steel-news/latest-news/oecd_steel_committee_calls_for_immediate_
action_to_address_excess_capacity_-909449.htm).
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is no evidence that the second case was a kind of  tit-for-tat response to the 
first, this belief  has been informally expressed as a sign of  abuse or political 
strategic use of  the DSS contrary to its purpose.28
Finally, the smooth functioning of  the DSS and the accumulation of  
consistent interpretations of  key provisions of  the WTO agreements, while 
not discouraging the bringing of  new disputes, has made reliance on those 
provisions more firm. Outcomes are more foreseeable, thanks to the role of  
the Appellate Body in providing consistent case law on which panels in turn 
can rely. The overall role of  the DSS has been expanded by the lack of  action 
by members in other capacities. Authoritative interpretations by the General 
Council acting under Article IX of  the WTO Agreement have never been 
issued and other quasi-legislative action by members, such as within WTO-
specialized committees, has been scant. Thus, the DSS has remained the only 
source of  authoritative guidance for the multilateral system at large.
The Increased Number and Complexity of  Disputes as a source of  problems
In his statement at the DSB on 28 October 2015, following that of  24 
September 26 2014 on the same issues and informing the membership of  
initial measures undertaken by him to face the problem,29 the Director-General 
presented a range of  information and figures evidencing the increased use of  
the DSS and the increased complexity of  cases that are putting a strain on 
the resources and generating delays. The number of  new panels established 
by the DSB has increased from six in 2010 to nine in 2011, to 11 in 2012, to 
13 in 2014, to 18 in 2015, reaching 16 in 2016.30
Disputes have also become more complex in that more domestic measures of  
the respondent country are being challenged. The evidentiary burden before 
panels is also more demanding – one ongoing dispute (not one of  the two 
massive Boeing-Airbus aircraft disputes, which are still before the panels under 
Article 21.5 at the compliance stage) has reached more than 1,700 exhibits at 
the initial stage alone. “On average, there are three times as many exhibits per 
panel now than in early WTO days,” noted the Director-General.
28 See Feinberg and Reynolds (2006); “European Union requests WTO Panel on Chinese Anti-Dumping duties on 
Steel Tubes,” European Commission Press Release (IP/13/772), 16 August 2013 (http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/
press/index.cfm?id=959).
29 An important initiative of  the Legal Affairs Division has been the launch of  the WTO Digital Dispute Settlement 
Registry, which will allow electronic filing of  submissions and secure access to briefs and documents by the parties, 
besides serving as an electronic repository of  all panel and Appellate Body records and providing easy online access 
to non- confidential information on cases to the public.
30 The issue of  delays at the panel level caused by resource constraints in the Secretariat had been already raised at the 
DSB in 2014, and the Director-General explained the shifts and increase in legal resources he had undertaken in a 
statement at the DSB meeting of  26 September 2014. This statement and the data provided are to be found in the 
Appellate Body report for 2014 (WTO, 2015, p. 93).
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Another complexity relates to the requests by parties for preliminary procedural 
rulings, for example, to declare some claims inadmissible because they were 
not included in the initial request for consultations. This has become almost 
a standard feature in panel proceedings, adding submissions or exhibits and 
therefore requiring more time from the Secretariat and the panelists.31 This 
is  a typical lawyers’ trick that shows how much the system has tilted – as 
have other arbitral fora – towards judicialization, while a more conciliatory 
approach originally prevailed and was assumed.
Suggestions for Tackling the Problems
Panel proceedings: Radical Remedies to the Growing Delays
As I have explained above, the first effect of  the increase in the number of  
disputes brought to panels is the delay in the effective initiation of  the work 
by panels after the DSB has established them formally at the second meeting 
in which a member has requested so, pursuant to Article 6.1 DSU. The DSU 
envisages in Article 8.7 that a panel be composed – that is, the panelists be 
appointed – 20 days thereafter, if  the parties agree on the names suggested by 
the Secretariat (Article 8.6), or within an additional ten-day period if  the DG 
appoints them due to lack of  agreement. Recently, however, the practice has 
been for several months to elapse between establishment and composition, or 
between composition and initiation of  the panel process. This is not due to 
procedurally difficulties but is a deliberate, inevitable choice by the Secretariat 
because of  a lack of  resources to staff the panels. The difficulty of  finding 
suitable panelists due to the high demand caused by the number of  panels 
operating at the same time adds an increased layer of  difficulty and possibility 
for delay.32 It must be said that the situation of  an adjudicating body to which a 
dispute has been submitted not even starting to examine the matter for several 
months is not unprecedented at the international level, where various courts 
and their member states strive to find solutions to the increasing recourse to 
adjudication.33 This is, however, not a justification for the WTO not sticking to 
31 The high number of  third parties in many proceedings (up to 36 in a recent case) adds also complexity in the 
handling of  cases by panels.
32 Besides the 15-month delay complained about by Korea at the DSB of  31 August 2015 referred to above, one of  
the most recent panel reports, on a case between the European Union and Brazil (joined to one on the same issue 
involving Japan, DS 472 and 497) was issued on 30 August 2017, more than two and a half  years after the European 
Union had obtained the establishment of  the panel.
33 For this reason, in the European Union it was decided in 2015 to double the numbers of  judges on the first level 
tribunal (the General Court) from 28 to 56. At the European Court of  Human Rights, various procedural devices 
have been introduced through the years (such as increasing the possibility of  summarily dismissing petitions for 
manifest inadmissibility) to cope with the explosion of  recourses (which, however, are essentially from private parties 
in both fora).
The Future of the WTO Dispute Settlement System   133
its short deadlines, which are one of  the most distinctive and positive features 
of  its dispute settlement system.
Recourse to the DSS has not slowed down, nor is this likely to happen in view 
of  the increased favor for litigation at the international level, the increase 
of  instances where trade obligations collide with the exercise of  domestic 
regulatory powers, and the increase in WTO members that are actively 
engaged in international trade. Innovative remedies must be devised by looking 
at and tackling the roots of  the problems.
The inability of  the current system to cope with the increase in litigation is 
due in great part to its structure, which at the panel and Secretariat levels is 
still basically patterned after the GATT model of  panels. As is well known, 
these panels were made almost exclusively of  governmental experts, picked ad 
hoc to resolve occasional specific disputes among trade diplomats in Geneva 
familiar with the system, reflecting the non-legal character of  trade disputes 
in those days.34 Even today, panelists are not professional judges or arbitrators: 
about half  of  them are trade diplomats based in Geneva who do not have a 
legal degree and normally work for their government, while the rest is made 
of  governmental experts; rarely are academics resorted to.
As a consequence, these panelists have to rely heavily on the lawyers of  the 
Secretariat assigned to each panel (one senior and one junior, as a rule) to 
perform their job – from research, to organizing hearings, to drafting. In the 
abstract, this approach appears contradictory in view of  the professionalization 
required and legalization inserted in the system. However, WTO members 
are attached to the tradition of  being judged by their peers and also value the 
assistance of  the Secretariat as a guarantee of  consistency.
Now that the flow of  cases is constant and sustained, similar to or perhaps 
even more so than in a regular court, the system will be increasingly unable 
to perform its functions effectively unless (a) the Secretariat is expanded in 
consequence, including its budget; and/or (b) panelists are more devoted to 
the task and professional, that is, are available on short notice to actively and 
exclusively perform their tasks and able to so more autonomously.35
This suggested configuration is found both in permanent international courts 
and within international commercial and investment arbitration under different 
34 Small but important efficiency innovations could also concern the composition of  panels, where parties often 
disregard the provision of  Article 8.6 that “[t]he parties to the dispute shall not oppose nominations suggested by the 
Secretariat under the same provision except for compelling reasons,” thus causing additional delays; and the suppression 
of  the Interim Review Stage (Article 15), which has become redundant with the introduction of  appeal.
35 In December 2015, the General Council adopted a new fee pattern whereby non-governmental panelists now receive 
900 Swiss francs per day, and government panelists 300 francs.
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models. At international courts, judges are mostly full time and are assisted 
by a centralized secretariat and/or by one or two full-time individual clerks. 
Secretarial support is much less in international arbitration, even compared 
to the WTO. Arbitrators are selected among recognized experts in the field 
who are able to research and draft by themselves, possibly with the support of  
personal assistants from universities or their own law offices.36 The support of  
the secretariat of  the institution is limited to procedural matters and formal 
external review of  the decision as autonomously prepared by the arbitrators 
themselves.
At the WTO, such a development – that is, engaging more panelists while 
maintaining the unique role of  the Secretariat – would in turn be facilitated 
by broadening the pool of  potentially available panelists. The first easy change 
is to allow nationals of  third parties to a dispute to be selected as panelists, 
provided they are non-governmental. Currently, nationals both of  the litigating 
parties and of  third parties can be appointed only with the consent of  the main 
parties (Article 8.3). Besides depriving the system of  competent experts who 
could act as panelists37 and relieve the shortage, this restriction leads to the 
panelists being chosen mostly from a small group of  (small, mainly developing) 
countries that are rarely involved in disputes. This means the representative 
character of  the adjudicators is not in line with the geography of  the litigants 
and the issues raised.38
Also, the procedure for selecting panelists, which is currently rather cumbersome 
and entails a delicate interaction between the Secretariat, the parties and the 
prospective panelists, should be streamlined so as to discourage parties from 
dragging their feet (Malacrida, 2015).
Transferred to the WTO, either model would require:
36 The differences between the WTO DSS at the panel level and ISDS, especially as concerns origin, qualification and 
the role of  the adjudicators, has been addressed recently in Pauwelyn (2015). See also my comments to Pauwelyin 
(2015).
37 This means that in practice, potential US, European, Japanese, Canadian, and Chinese panelists are hardly ever 
appointed, since the respective countries almost always participate as third parties to proceedings when they are not 
the main parties.
38 Joost Pauwelyn has noted that by contrast, for investment disputes at ICSID, where most challenges involve 
developing countries, most arbitrators chosen are nationals of  developed countries (Pauwelyn, 2015).
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• more financial resources for the legal Secretariat (Legal Affairs and Rules 
Divisions), also for compensating panelists.39  Adequate additional funding 
cannot be made available by just shifting funds within the budget, so that 
a real increase of  the budget and therefore of  the members’ contribution 
would be required; and
• having recourse to a (probably not so) small group of  recurrent panelists, as 
is already de facto the case,40 who should be able to ensure availability 
and capability of  operating autonomously – they should therefore not be 
engaged currently in governmental work and be remunerated adequately.
Panels could thus operate somewhat like the Appellate Body, their members 
meeting for longer periods in Geneva during proceedings and immediately 
thereafter for the deliberation of  their report. It would be for the Secretariat 
to go on giving support to the panelists in the form of  research, previous case 
law and precedent, while active drafting could be more in the hands of  the 
panelists or, in any case, of  the chairman. The current role of  the Secretariat 
would remain necessary in order to ensure that these ad hoc panels, composed 
of  diverse members, do not endanger with their individual decision-making 
the consistency of  case law (which is, in any case, subject to appellate review).
Such an evolution would not even require changes in the DSU provision. 
It would probably entail a change in the mix of  panelists’ backgrounds. 
There would be fewer active trade diplomats and more retired experts and 
persons with different backgrounds, such as academics and former officials 
from international organizations. Since high-quality reports are a must that 
is advocated by everybody concerned, it is difficult to see how this quality 
can be maintained without changes to the current system. The challenge 
is that the more and more complex disputes and sophisticated arguments 
(increasingly exposed by expert lawyers from specialized resourceful law firms) 
require increasing:
• the legal competence of  the adjudicators;
• the availability of  legal support to them;
• the time they must be able to devote to each case; and
• their remuneration.
39 Governmental panelists currently work for free since they are supposed to act for the WTO during their working 
hours (the WTO pays a small sum to the members that lend them); the others receive a small per diem, which does 
not reflect the engagement that should be required of  them, even after a recent small increase. The issue has been 
recognized and an increase was decided in December 2015, see notes 24 and 35.
40 Pauwelyn (2015) assessed that there are 15 panelist that have been appointed more than six times in recent years, as 
well as a high number of  “single shooters.”
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What this change certainly requires is additional financial resources, whereas 
members appear/like to believe that quick, high-quality and efficient justice 
may be obtained at no cost – an obvious impossibility. The mantra that 
members are not ready to accept increases in the yearly budget (“zero-growth”) 
of  course renders of  course a solution quite difficult.
Hardly anybody has looked at the cost of  the DSS, how it is financed and how it 
is apportioned among those who directly benefit from it. There is no accurate 
breakdown of  the general costs of  the WTO Secretariat and those pertaining to 
dispute settlement, because it appears that a consistent share of  the latter (above 
the official figure of  only 13% of  the total) is charged to general administrative 
costs. Looking at the official data on the WTO website, however, it appears that 
the services of  the organization cost little in absolute terms to the members, 
and even less so the Dispute Settlement System.
The US contribution to the total WTO budget in 2017 is US$22 million, 
China pays $18.8 million, Japan $8.3 million, Brazil $2.6 million, and the 
EU members together $66.6 million (although they contribute individually). 
Without commenting on the incredible imbalances that these figures reveal, 
especially considering the frequency of  recourse to DSS by individual members 
(such as Austria contributing almost as much as Australia, and Singapore 
almost twice as much as of  Brazil), one is on the safe side submitting that just 
the costs of  the lawyers engaged by either parties (including the lawyers of  the 
industry concerned standing behind them) in the cases involving the United 
States are higher than the contribution of  the United States to the whole WTO 
budget (and this is the same for any other country involved in disputes).41 
If  the overall budget devoted to the DSS cannot be increased (some members 
may even consider that this constraint is a way to put pressure on the DSS 
and its components by micro-managing any additional resource and their 
destination), one should reflect on an alternative solution – making the users pay 
for using the system (either through a fee system or having a separate budget 
for the DSS), as is the case in most courts and for the international secretariats 
administrating institutional arbitration, such as the International Centre for 
Settlement of  Investment Disputes (ICSID) or the International Chamber of  
Commerce (ICC).
A final item concerns the demand side. Is it possible to limit the number of  cases 
brought to adjudication?
In this respect, it would be worth studying how to make the pre-adjudication 
phase (the consultations) more effective, possibly providing for the input of  the 
41 By comparison, it has been stated that the legal costs of  an average ICSID case are $4 million.
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Secretariat as legal-economic support (What is involved economically? What 
legal alternatives could be acceptable? What issues are in fact not in dispute?). 
Also, recourse to “good offices, conciliation and mediation” as envisaged in 
Article 5 as voluntary steps at any time during the dispute, for which the 
Director-General is available under Article 5.6, could be reinforced. They 
might be made compulsory as a preliminary stage for certain types of  disputes.
Also related to the demand side is the frequency of  compliance proceedings 
under Article 21.5 DSU.42 These are panel proceedings started by the original 
complainant who challenges the WTO consistency of  the measures that the 
respondent has taken to comply with an unfavorable outcome. This entails the 
obligation to withdraw or amend appropriately the measure found inconsistent 
with the provisions invoked by the claimant (as per Articles 3.7 and 21). These 
disputes are heard by the original panel reconvened for this purpose, whose 
report may in turn be appealed. Article 21.5 claims are upheld most of  the time, 
signaling a lack of  proper follow-up by respondents. At the same time, these 
proceedings consistently absorb resources of  the system, especially considering 
that some of  the most complex disputes have gone through this stage and thus 
appear almost never-ending. Examples are EC-Hormones, the two aircraft 
cases (Boeing/Airbus), US-COOL (concluded after more than four years), 
and US-Tuna II.43 Some kind of  simplified or accelerated proceedings should 
be devised for these cases, which are often the most complex. In these cases, 
the parties involved could be asked to assume the costs, which are currently 
charged to the whole membership.
The Appellate Stage: Improving the Organization of  the Appellate Body and the Selection 
and Reappointment Process
The problems faced by the panel stage and the Secretariat due to the increase 
in the number and complexity of  disputes are now reaching the Appellate 
Body – lengthier panel reports,44 more appeals pending at the same time, more 
complex cases with more issues appealed and more challenges raised.45 Cross 
appeals have also become more frequent. This makes the issuance of  shorter 
reports, as is also often advocated for panels, quite difficult. The issuance of  
42 As mentioned at the DSB meeting of  20 July (see footnote 10) of  the 15 active panels at that date, four involved 
compliance proceedings under Article 21.5 DSU.
43 The reports of  the compliance panels in the two aircraft cases (DSB 316 and DSB 353) were issued almost five years 
after the two panels were composed in 2012. The panel in the Australia Tobacco dispute (DS 381), composed in May 
2014, has not issued its report as of  October 2017. The compliance panel has concluded in its second report issued 
in October 2017 that the US has complied.
44 The number of  pages of  “average” panel reports increased from 49 in 1996-2000 to 183 in 2010-2014, as reported 
in the DG Statement of  26 September 2014 in the Appellate Body report for 2014 (WTO, 2015, p. 88).
45 This evolution has been highlighted by the Appellate Body in a Communication of  30 May 2013 (“The Workload of  
the Appellate Body”). Concerning the issues discussed here, see also Ehlermann (2017).
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reports within the prescribed deadline of  90 days has become an impossible 
task in most cases, also due to the shortage of  competent assisting staff and 
the fact that the Appellate Body has often been working with fewer than seven 
members.
This “wave” may put additional pressure on the ability of  the Appellate Body 
to perform its task in a timely manner while maintaining the high quality of  
its reports, for which it is generally praised and which represents a basis of  the 
trust that the DSS inspires in members and beneficiaries.
The organization of  the Appellate Body under the relevant rules of  the DSU 
(Article 17) leaves it little flexibility to cope with a regular higher number of  
cases; it is made of  only seven members, who decide in randomly composed 
divisions of  three.
As to procedure, the Appellate Body has adopted in recent years several 
practical measures within its competence to establish its “working procedures” 
(Article 17.9). This includes reducing the time framework of  the initial phase 
of  the process in order to have more time to examine the case and decide (in 
2010), and asking the parties to supply summaries of  their arguments, to be 
annexed to the Appellate Body report without need for it and its legal staff to 
perform this task directly (in 2014). In contrast with the increase of  staff at the 
panel level, the legal staff of  the Appellate Body – until recently a relatively 
small group of  just ten lawyers – has only been marginally increased. The 
Appellate Body suggested a limit to the volume of  parties’ submissions in a 
communication circulated in October 2015, in which it gave evidence of  its 
workload and the size and complexity of  the cases, with a view to stimulating 
the debate with interested WTO members and in the hope of  a positive 
response.
Dealing with the case load and the complexity of  appeals is directly related 
to the issue of  respect of  the 90-day deadline. The Appellate Body has tried its 
utmost to respect this deadline, to which members attribute great importance, 
although a delay of  a few days is irrelevant compared to the delays normally 
accumulated in the other phases of  the proceedings (sometimes by decision of  
the parties themselves). Currently this has become impossible for the reasons 
highlighted above, not to mention the Appellate Body operating with a reduced 
membership.
Going beyond this deadline is sometimes caused by the complexity of  the case 
(such as in the aircraft cases), but recently it has more often been caused by 
the overlapping of  appeals that makes it impossible for the members of  the 
Appellate Body to attend to multiple disputes according to the standard time 
schedule. This notwithstanding, a few parties, especially the United States, have 
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insisted that exceeding the 90-days mark should be made only with the consent 
of  the parties to the dispute. The Appellate Body has recognized that involving 
the parties is appropriate and has done so, but does not want its hands tied and 
to subordinate the establishment of  its agenda, as necessary in these formerly 
labeled “exceptional cases,” to the agreement of  the litigants. The debate had 
been ongoing for some time, fueled by criticism from some countries in the 
DSB when a deadline has been missed (although when this does occur, it is 
usually just by a few days). The complaints have not been against extending 
the proceedings in case of  objective impossibility of  respecting the deadline, 
but focus on the lack of  previous agreement with the parties (the United States) 
or the lack of  full information on the reasons thereof  from the Appellate Body 
(Japan).46 Other countries (the European Union, India and Brazil) pushed 
back against Japan’s request, claiming that micro-managing the Appellate 
Body schedule would not help resolve the issue of  delays. An alternative is to 
have a custom-made schedule, agreed with the parties, for any case where the 
90-day deadline does not appear sufficient.
If  the workload remains at the current level, relaxing the 90-day deadline 
by a few days on a case-by-case basis, or even increasing the 90 days to 120 
days, will not resolve the issue. The number of  the Appellate Body members should be 
increased (and their appointment should of  course be timely) taking into account 
that when it was initially created with seven members, the membership of  the 
WTO was more limited and important current players in the DSS, such as 
China and Russia, were not even WTO members. Nine has been suggested as 
a reasonable number of  AB members, reflecting geographically the expanded 
membership, without diminishing the collegiality on which the consistency of  
the Appellate Body case law and its independence rests.
The Appellate Body would benefit from (modest) reforms limiting the risk of  a 
reduction of  the authority of  the Body as a pivot of  the stability and the predictability 
of  the WTO system. First, since the Appellate Body members are de facto 
engaged full time, it would be reasonable for the terms of  their employment 
to reflect this situation. In case of  full-time employment, a fixed monthly 
compensation might even be less onerous for the WTO budget than the current 
per diem arrangement.47
Second, and more importantly, the issue of  the modalities of  the renewal 
of  their tenure after the first four-year term should be streamlined. Until 
46 For example, at the DSB meeting of  28 October 2015.
47 Making the position full time would also make potential candidates more aware of  what the position entails and 
would thus encourage an increase in the pool of  competent candidates available. It is regrettable that an Appellate 
Body member appointed in December 2016 for his first term resigned abruptly after only seven months to accept a 
ministerial position in his country, as mentioned in footnote 12.
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recently, renewal was de facto automatic, and appropriately so, with the DSB 
extending any mandate as a matter of  course if  the Appellate Body member 
concerned had expressed his willingness to renew. Subsequently, under the 
impulse of  the United States, the DSB has asked that the Appellate Body 
members coming up for renewal meet the WTO members and be available for 
questioning. The issue has become sensitive – one could foresee a situation in 
which countries would subtly interfere with pending cases and try to influence 
the judges, making the renewal of  Appellate Body members dependent upon 
their answers.48
The solution was finally found by holding an informal DSB meeting on 12 
November 2015, with this encounter taking place on the understanding that 
questions by delegations would be of  a general and systemic nature only. In the 
subsequent, formal DSB meeting of  25 November, Singh Bathia from India 
and Thomas Graham from the United States were reappointed by consensus.
Then, in 2016, the United States took the unprecedented step of  blocking 
the re-appointment of  an Appellate Body member. The most important and 
worrying issue emerged when the United States denied its consent to the 
renewal of  Seung Wha Chang of  Korea for a second term the day after 
the members had an opportunity to meet him informally on 10 May 2016, 
in accordance with the procedure that had been agreed for renewals in 
2015. At the DSB meeting of  23 May, the United States recalled first that 
reappointments were not automatic under the DSU49 and, as an explanation 
for its denial, stated that it had been “troubled […] about the disregard for 
the proper role of  the Appellate Body” by the Body itself, because in certain 
reports issue by Appellate Body Divisions (including Mr. Chang) in which the 
United States was a party – but also in some others – the “report engaged in 
a lengthy abstract discussion” on non-appealed issues, as well as in obiter dicta. 
The United States raised its “concern with the Appellate Body’s adjudicative 
approach in a number of  appellate proceedings in which Mr. Chang was 
involved”, and in addition criticised “the manner in which he had conducted 
oral hearings”.
48 Such a proposal is reminiscent of  the hearings by the US Congress of  candidates to the US Supreme Court proposed 
by the president, but the setting, the position of  the US Supreme Court and the individual role of  its judges is 
quite different. On the other hand, one should not forget that the Appellate Body, however modest its name and 
institutional setting, is the only international court with compulsory jurisdiction (moreover in respect of  broad 
sensitive matters) over states such as the United States, China and Russia, which usually accept to participate in 
international adjudication, if  at all, only on an ad hoc, mostly ex post facto basis. Hence the keen interest of  large 
economies in the selection of  their future judges.
49 The practice for renewal has consistently been that no selection process for appointment would be launched if  the 
outgoing Appellate Body member had indicated a willingness to be reappointed and the delegations consulted by the 
Selection Committee had not raised objections, as had never been the case. For this de facto practice, see the 2016 
DSB Annual Report 2016, WT/DSB/71 of  24 November 2016, 2.2.
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The decision of  the United States to single out one Appellate Body member 
for the positions he had allegedly taken in appeals in which he had participated 
provoked critical reactions from all the 32 delegations which intervened, 
including WTO members whose voice are rarely heard in the DSB. The 
criticisms were repeated at the DSB meetings of  22 June and 21 July 2016.50 
The fear was articulated that the independence and the impartiality of  the 
Appellate Body members was being put at risk by making them accountable 
individually for the decisions of  the Body, including the reasoning and the 
interpretation of  the covered agreements. It was pointed out that should the 
membership dissent from any such interpretation, the proper avenue for WTO 
members would be to adopt an authoritative interpretation in accordance with 
Article IX.2 of  the WTO Agreement. The situation was resolved politically 
and legally with the appointment of  another Korean, Hyun Chong Kim. As 
mentioned before, however, Mr Kim subsequently resigned from his functions 
seven years later to become the Trade Minister of  Korea, and it is unclear 
when members will be able to agree on filling his position. 
In view of  these developments, a one-time term of, for instance, seven years 
would avoid any inappropriate impression of  pressure and interference in the 
reappointment process by individual WTO members.51 The looming problems 
are even more worrying. The current active engagement of  key WTO members 
in the appointment process appears excessive – it gives the impression that 
some key WTO members are trying to form an Appellate Body composed of  
members who are responsive to their wishes with regards to their approach 
to interpretation and similar issues. The process has recently even entailed 
interviews in Washington and Brussels (a kind of  roadshow to which candidates 
have been submitted lately) and the close scrutiny of  their academic CVs and 
publications.52 This resulted in a notable instance in 2014 when a qualified 
candidate from Kenya, an academic teaching in a US university, who had been 
accepted by all the membership was then vetoed by the United States because 
50 See the Joint Statement at the DSB of  22 June 2016 by Brazil, Canada, the EU, Guatemala, India, Indonesia. Israel, 
Jamaica, Korea, Mexico, Morocco, Sri Lanka, Switzerland, Thailand and Vietnam.
51 There is a widely shared belief  among those familiar with these developments that the unavailability for 
reappointment of  the US AB members Merit Janow (in 2007) and Jennifer Hillman (in 2011) was prompted by the 
negative position towards their reappointment privately aired by the USTR at the time. The reasoning behind a 
country not supporting a member of  its nationality in a body, such as the Appellate Body, that operates by consensus 
and where dissents are rare, anonymous and not capable of  shifting the course of  the case law, is unclear. This 
attitude may even undermine the trust of  his or her colleagues in the independence of  such member. In the case of  a 
smaller country not supporting an outgoing Appellate Body member of  its nationality, it is almost inevitable that the 
successor would be of  a different nationality. This is what happened upon the resignation from the Appellate Body 
of  Oshima from Japan shortly before the expiration of  his term in 2012. His successor was Seung Wha Chang from 
Korea, and as a consequence, Japan “lost its seat,” which it had held since the beginning of  the Appellate Body.
52 Elsing and Pollack (2014) examined this issue through extensive interviews with former candidates.
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of  opinions he had expressed in the past on the role of  developing countries 
at the WTO, leading to the repetition of  the selection process.
The increased tendency for Appellate Body members to come from trade 
diplomacy and national administration, at the expense of  academics and 
national judges (who in the past were also endowed with practical international 
experience, as negotiators, arbitrators or administrators), risks diminishing the 
ability of  the Appellate Body to reason and decide with full independence, 
impartiality and objectivity. This is irrespective of  the personal integrity of  
all Appellate Body members, who have never been criticized from this point 
of  view.53 An appropriate mix of  competences within the Appellate Body is 
key for it to operate at the highest qualitative level, irrespective of  the ability 
of  its dedicated legal staff. It is important that the Appellate Body be able to 
issue well-reasoned reports, based on a full knowledge of  international law, 
that may receive not only the approval of  WTO members but also praise from 
the community of  academics and other experts in the field.54
The current stalemate preventing the launching of  the selection process to 
fill the three vacancies that came up in 2017, discussed above, shows that the 
whole process, which requires consensus up to the approval of  individual 
candidates recommended by the appointing committee, is a weak point in 
respect to the smooth functioning of  the DSS in the interest of  the entire 
membership. The DSB is at risk of  being held hostage by individual members 
pursuing unrelated objectives.55
Reinforcing the Implementation Process
The DSS ultimately pursues a practical objective: maintaining the balance of  
rights and obligations, market access and liberalization commitments agreed 
upon by the members in the various WTO agreements, discouraging breaches 
and redressing them as promptly as possible.
The monitoring role of  the DSB on implementation is one of  the features that 
makes the WTO DSS stand out in comparison to other international dispute 
settlement mechanisms, where implementation is ultimately left to the good 
will of  the party concerned, under threat of  diplomatic pressure or unilateral 
countermeasures.
53 On these issues, see Shaffer et al. (2016)
54 See the piece by former Appellate Body member David Unterhalter of  South Africa (Unterhalter, 2015).
55 On this issue, see Dunnoff and Pollack (2017), specifically Section III “Tougher than the Rest: The Judicial Trilemma 
at the WTO”, page 260 ff. “Accountability” of  the Appellate Body, as is the case of  other international courts, is 
collectively towards the WTO membership; it cannot be towards individual members. Consensus as required by 
Article 2.4 DSU does not imply a veto right by just one WTO member. 
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Surveillance by the DSB should be made more effective, as advocated by 
the Canadian Ambassador Jonathan Fried when he was chairman of  the 
DSB in 2013. It should not be just a formal exercise of  registering statements 
or automatically authorizing countermeasures in the form of  suspension of  
concessions when an adjudicative body has confirmed non-compliance.
Ways and means should be devised, based on 20 years of  experience, to 
exercise collective pressure on a recalcitrant member in order to induce and 
facilitate prompter compliance. One avenue might be to suggest ways to effect 
implementation, which is currently left completely to the party found in breach. 
This option is available to panels and of  the Appellate Body under Article 
19.1 DSU when issuing their reports, but they have generally refrained from 
using it (and wisely so). The reason is that these suggestions risk not being 
followed (they are not binding), thus indirectly diminishing the authority of  
the underlying holdings contained in the panels and Appellate Body report. 
Action by the DSB towards a non-complying party might stimulate more active 
domestic engagement by the competent national authorities to effect timely 
and complete implementation.
The implementation procedure should also be tightened to induce compliance 
by avoiding that the prospective nature of  (future) WTO remedies, which 
already favors non-compliant respondents, rewards even more dragging of  
feet by the losing party in implementing adverse decisions.
Besides resolving the issue of  “sequencing”, as mentioned above, one possible 
way to reinforce the compliance process might involve rethinking the relationship 
between the imposition of  countermeasures and arbitration on their level 
under Article 22.6. Such a dispute turns usually on the proportionality of  the 
level of  concessions that the winning party intends to put in place. Currently, 
the principle stated therein is that “[c]oncessions or other obligations shall 
not be suspended during the course of  the arbitration.” As currently framed, 
this provision favors the party in breach, in that the application of  trade 
sanctions against it is postponed. At the same time, it protects that party from 
being subject to unilaterally determined excessive sanctions by prohibiting 
their application altogether. A more efficient compliance-inducing mechanism 
should be devised. For example, by providing for authorization to apply trade 
sanctions at the initiation of  the Article 22.6 arbitration, subject to restitution 
with interest and possibly a penalty of  sanctions applied in excess of  the 
determination of  the arbitrators.
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Concluding Remarks
Some concluding remarks should address the interplay between the broader 
evolution of  international trade relations and the functioning of  the DSS.
On the one hand, it has been submitted that the existence of  an efficient DSS 
made concluding the Doha Round less pressing, since its smooth functioning 
alleviates the need to address difficult negotiating issues. The most contentious 
issues, so runs the argument, may be left to be resolved by the panels and 
the Appellate Body. Besides the issue concerning the specific Doha Round 
negotiations – the positive conclusion or viable further extension of  which 
appear unachievable – this argument does not stand in my view for the 
following reason. Adjudicating disputes concerning existing agreements cannot 
replace the making of  new agreements, whether within the Doha mandate 
or “post-Doha”, especially if  negotiations are meant to cover “new,” hitherto 
unregulated areas. Nor can dispute settlement “compensate” for the lack of  
further liberalization of  trade, be it in the form of  negotiated reductions of  
tariffs on goods or new concessions on services.
I do not believe that there is any evidence of  the inverse either, namely, that 
the efficiency of  the DSS makes WTO members wary of  concluding new 
agreements. There is no evidence that the level of  detail that characterizes the 
provisions of  the Trade Facilitation Agreements is due to the intent to tie the 
hands of  future adjudicators, rather than the pursuit of  an accurate balance 
of  rights and obligations by the negotiators. Moreover, it would always be 
possible to carve out some agreements from the DSS jurisdiction should this 
be the problem. A precedent in this direction exists: the temporary “peace 
clause” regarding agriculture agreed in the Uruguay Round has been able to 
shield that agreement from litigation for a number of  years.56 The greatest 
challenge to the WTO comes rather from regional trade agreements, since 
difficult issues that are intractable at the global level may be agreed more easily 
between like-minded countries or countries with similar or complementary 
economies. More recently, the challenge comes from those who mistakenly 
believe that bilateral deals can replace, rather than complement, global rules 
and governance.
A collective response might be to resort to plurilateral agreements in which 
the WTO and its DSS maintain a role (Hoekman and Mavroidis, 2015).
56 57 See Article 13 of  the Agreement on Agriculture.
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CHAPTER 7 
“Behind-the-Border” Policies: 
Regulatory Cooperation  
and Trade Agreements
Bernard Hoekman
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Introduction
With the establishment of  the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995, much 
of  the vision of  the drafters of  the 1948 International Trade Organization 
(ITO) Charter was realized, albeit some 50 years later.1 The average level of  
tariffs for OECD member countries has fallen to the 3% range; for major 
emerging economies like China and India as well as many developing countries, 
the average applied tariff is less than 10%. In conjunction with the abolition 
of  most of  the quantitative import restrictions to trade that were prevalent 
through the 1980s, policies to open markets to direct investment – including 
through privatization – and technological changes that greatly reduced the 
costs of  international communications and transport, the result has been major 
changes in the structure of  global production and trade. One illustration of  this 
change is the increasing share of  global value chains (GVCs) in international 
production and the associated trade in intermediate parts, components and 
tasks. 
Policy-induced market access frictions and trade costs today are increasingly 
regulatory in nature. The rapidly changing composition of  trade as a result 
of  technical changes – reflected not only in supply chains that span many 
1 The ITO was supposed to complement the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund in the area of  trade-
related policy, but never entered into force as a result of  a decision by the US government not to submit the treaty for 
approval by Congress.
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countries, but also in the growth in services trade and cross-border data flows 
associated with the servicification and digitization of  products (the “Internet of  
things”) – is moving national regulation to center stage in trade debates. The 
associated agenda is not about deregulation – what is driving concerns in the 
business community are the trade-impeding (cost-raising) effects of  differences 
in applicable domestic health, safety, privacy and data security standards, 
prudential and licensing requirements, and certification and compliance 
assessment procedures for both products and production processes used by 
suppliers of  goods and services.
Since its creation, WTO members have found it very difficult to negotiate new 
rules of  the game. Disagreements among countries regarding the benefits of  
committing to additional trade policy disciplines, most notably between the 
United States and other OECD nations on one side and emerging economies 
such as Brazil and India on the other, have impeded progress on the WTO’s 
traditional market access agenda (mostly tariffs and agricultural support) 
and in turn blocked substantive discussion on the trade effects of  domestic 
regulatory policies. Continued deadlock in the WTO starting in 2008 led to 
the focus of  attention in addressing international regulatory spillovers shifting 
to other fora – notably preferential trade agreements (PTAs). Examples of  
recent initiatives with a significant focus on regulatory matters include the 
negotiations on a Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP) between 12 Pacific countries 
and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) between the 
European Union and the US that were launched in 2013. 
Both the TTIP and TPP initiatives illustrate that such new vintage agreements 
are difficult to conclude. TTIP talks were put on hold by the US at the end 
of  2016, and one of  the first actions of  the Trump administration in early 
2017 was to withdraw from TPP. However, deep PTAs that span regulatory 
matters continue to be pursued by major trading nations. Examples include 
the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) between Canada 
and the EU which entered into force in 2017,2 as well as the agreement 
reached in early November 2017 between the 11 remaining TPP signatories 
to implement most of  the provisions of  the agreement notwithstanding the 
US withdrawal. 
2 See http://international.gc.ca/trade-commerce/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/agr-acc/ceta-aecg/text-
texte/toc-tdm.aspx?lang=eng.  Only two chapters of  CETA deal with reductions in import tariffs and the removal of  
discrimination in government procurement — that is, classic market access issues where there are direct restrictions 
on the ability of  foreign companies to supply products. The majority of  the substantive chapters of  CETA deal 
with product regulation, customs procedures, trade facilitation, policies affecting specific services sectors, mutual 
recognition of  professional qualifications, domestic regulation more generally, procedures for regulatory cooperation 
and dialogue, and sector-specific protocols (e.g. on the mutual acceptance of  the results of  the conformity assessment 
of  good manufacturing practices for pharmaceutical products).
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Pursuit of  regulatory cooperation and related rules of  the road among small 
groups of  countries may be a second-best solution, given that the organization 
of  production and trade into GVCs and international production networks 
means that end products are impacted by many regulatory jurisdictions. PTAs 
almost by definition will not span all the countries involved in many (most) 
GVCs, thus limiting the positive impact that they can have in addressing 
regulatory differences and uncertainty for firms and consumers. At the same 
time, PTA-based initiatives give rise to the possibility of  trade and investment 
diversion. Trade agreements are not the only game in town to address 
regulatory spillovers. Governments may and have pursued different types of  
regulatory cooperation efforts, ranging from sector-specific initiatives such as 
mutual recognition agreements (MRAs) to cross-sectoral, “horizontal” efforts 
that center on “good regulatory practices” and learning from international 
experience including via more formal mechanisms such as the Canada-US 
Regulatory Cooperation Council (Canada, 2014) that operate independently 
of  a prevailing trade agreement (i.e. NAFTA). 
What follows discusses the general challenges confronting international 
regulatory cooperation from the perspective of  reducing trade frictions. The 
next section defines the task confronting policymakers and develops a typology 
of  the approaches that can be used to reduce negative trade spillovers created 
by regulatory differences across countries. This is followed by a discussion of  
the question of  what role a trade agreement might play in addressing regulatory 
spillovers, something that arguably has not been considered seriously enough 
by the trade community. I then briefly review some of  the extant disciplines and 
provisions in the WTO and PTAs that have a bearing on domestic regulatory 
policies. The chapter ends with some proposals that could be pursued under 
WTO auspices or in a plurilateral trade setting. 
Dimensions of regulatory cooperation
Competition between regulatory regimes is the default situation in international 
relations, with different jurisdictions independently applying their own set of  
regulations to products and producers. While competition implies differences in 
applicable standards across countries, over time, as learning occurs, there may 
be incentives to emulate more successful approaches and norms, generating 
convergence.  Competition is a powerful discovery mechanism and a force 
that will help to identify more efficient forms of  regulation to achieve a given 
objective. But competition may also have adverse outcomes. The commonly 
expressed fear of  a “race to the bottom” is one possibility, albeit one for 
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which there is generally little evidence. A much more frequent consequence 
of  competition is excess costs associated with different regulatory regimes 
that have similar objectives. In such cases, there are potential gains from 
cooperation.
International regulatory cooperation is difficult. There have been long-standing 
transatlantic efforts to cooperate on regulatory matters, with only limited 
success (Vogel, 2012). The most progress has been achieved in the EU in 
the context of  creating a single European market for goods and services, as 
this required overcoming the trade-impeding effects of  differences in product 
market regulation. This was pursued through a variety of  approaches, ranging 
from harmonization of  new regulations to mutual recognition (Pelkmans, 
2012).3 The EU is of  course sui generis. The more general challenge 
confronting the trade community is to identify approaches to reducing trade 
costs through regulatory cooperation in the absence of  a political commitment 
to fully integrate markets and without supranational institutions that are tasked 
with reducing the market-segmenting effects of  national policies. 
In principle, addressing this challenge should be facilitated if  regulatory 
objectives are equivalent across countries and economies have similar 
income levels. Approaches may differ towards reducing risk and avoiding 
catastrophic events, but if  goals are very similar, regulatory cooperation may 
reduce compliance costs without undercutting the attainment of  national 
regulatory objectives. The agenda here is not just about reducing compliance 
costs for firms and thus prices for consumers. More important – and, indeed, 
a necessary condition for reducing costs (increasing efficiency) – is that 
cooperation enhances the effectiveness as well as the efficiency of  regulation. 
Cooperation must be a mechanism that improves regulatory outcomes over 
time in all participating jurisdictions (Hoekman, 2015b). A basic question for 
policymakers is how best to design international regulatory cooperation so 
that it does so. This requires knowledge about the potential benefits and the 
political feasibility of  cooperation. 
3 Mutual recognition involves agreement that products legally introduced into the commerce of  one jurisdiction 
may be sold and consumed without additional controls in another jurisdiction. To take the example of  food safety 
standards, mutual recognition between A and B implies that A recognizes that the norms prevailing in B satisfy its own 
safety norms and vice versa. If  the underlying norms in the two jurisdictions differ enough, such an approach is not 
feasible. Even if  A and B harmonize their norms, trade still might be affected by redundant costs if  both continue to 
inspect products before they are allowed to be sold. Only if  A and B mutually recognize (accept) that their respective 
enforcement systems are effective will harmonization eliminate regulatory trade costs.
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Figure 1 distinguishes between the magnitude of  net economic gains from 
regulatory cooperation and the political and technical difficulty (cost) of  
implementing the necessary cooperation. In principle, cooperation should 
center on areas that fall into the bottom-right cell D and on efforts to move 
items from C to D.  As important is to avoid investing resources in regulatory 
areas that fall into box A. Mapping policy areas into these different categories 
cannot simply be based on technical analysis but requires active engagement 
by regulators, business and consumers. Regulators should be interested 
in those activities and initiatives that increase their ability to achieve their 
mandate more effectively and efficiently. Business presumably would like to see 
compliance costs fall, while citizens and consumers may worry that cooperation 
will erode regulatory standards, resulting in a “race to the bottom.” This is 
a major factor underlying the resistance by some civil society groups in the 
EU, Korea and other nations to PTAs that involve “deep integration” (see, for 
example, Cardoso et al., 2013, on fears that a TTIP could do so). The result 
of  these different entry points implies that not all issues will lend themselves 
equally to cooperation. Insofar as the areas of  concern fall into boxes C or D, 
a precondition for cooperation is to address the worries of  either regulators 
and/or consumers that make an issue area politically sensitive. But efforts to 
do so through joint learning and interaction should prioritize areas that offer 
the highest potential economic benefits. In some instances this may not be 
possible; in others it may require a substantial amount of  time to establish 
the needed understanding and trust to allow cooperation to occur. There is 
therefore a dynamic time dimension to this two-by-two matrix. 
Various approaches have been pursued to attenuate international regulatory 
spillovers (OECD, 2013). These include seeking to converge over time on 
the substance of  new regulatory norms (harmonization and international 
standardization), accepting differences in regulation and focusing on putting in 
place processes to address negative spillover effects of  such differences through 
mutual recognition agreements or determinations of  regulatory equivalence, 
and efforts to increase “coherence” across regulatory regimes. The latter 
generally center on identifying good practices and basic principles such as 
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transparency, consultations with stakeholders, use of  impact assessments, and 
so on.4  
Cooperation can be characterized along a spectrum of  “soft” to “hard” 
depending on how binding (enforceable) the commitments are, with 
agreements ranging from “shallow” to “deep” depending on whether they 
entail commitments not to do something or go beyond that to require positive 
action. Efforts to increase coherence across regulatory regimes are an example 
of  “soft” cooperation. They have been a central element of  international 
initiatives on regulation pursued in the OECD and APEC, which focus on 
principles and processes as opposed to the substance of  regulation. 
“Shallow” types of  cooperation may be limited to commitments to enhance the 
transparency and visibility of  extant regulation and new regulatory initiatives, 
or they may go further and involve creation of  processes through which parties 
inform and/or consult each other or commit to providing opportunities for 
comment before adopting new regulations. Some instances of  “shallow” 
regulatory cooperation may be relatively straightforward to apply to a large 
number of  countries, as they are in the nature of  focal points and guidance 
for national policy. Whether or not a country implements the principles or 
good practices will not have a direct effect on the realization of  regulatory 
goals in another nation.
Deeper forms of  regulatory cooperation have implications for the realization 
of  regulatory objectives – they create interdependence between jurisdictions: 
the attainment of  a regulatory goal in country A becomes a function of  actions 
by country B. Deeper forms of  cooperation span a range of  possibilities, from 
harmonization at one extreme – i.e. adopting the same norms – to (mutual) 
recognition agreements or acceptance of  the equivalence of  regulatory regimes. 
Figure 2 illustrates different types of  regulatory cooperation and lists a number 
international institutions and fora that have been created to support their 
implementation. There are many examples of  both “shallow” and “deep” 
regulatory cooperation – those mentioned in Figure 2 are just illustrative.5 
Many (most) of  these do not involve trade agreements, but some do. The 
alternative approaches can all be embedded into trade agreements. There are 
4 There is of  course an extensive literature on the various options and experiences; see for example, Vogel (2012) and 
OECD (2014). Much of  the focus will (have to) be sector specific; see, for example, Arnold (2005), Bismuth (2010) 
and Verdier (2011) for analyses of  services regulation.
5 Major international regulatory/standards-setting bodies include the Codex Alimentarius Commission, the 
International Electrotechnical Commission, the UN Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE), the International 
Organization for Standardization (ISO), the International Air Transport Association (IATA), the International 
Accounting Standards Board (IASB), the International Telecommunications Union (ITU), the Basle Committee on 
Banking Supervision, the Financial Stability Board (FSB), the International Organization of  Securities Commissions 
(IOSCO) and the International Association of  Insurance Supervisors (IAIS).
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several mentions of  the WTO in Figure 2, reflecting the fact that its multilateral 
agreements – GATT, GATS and TRIPS – make references to harmonization 
(international standardization) and/or mutual recognition agreements, even 
if  there is no legal obligation imposed on all WTO members to harmonize 
their norms or to recognize those of  trading partners (the WTO status quo 
is discussed below).
Figure 2: A typology of regulatory cooperation and illustrative examples
Global Plurilateral Bilateral
“Shallow” cooperation
Coherence BCBS, UNCITRAL, ISO; ICN; WTO




Consultation OIE, IOSCO, WHO,     WTO: TBT/SPS EU; G20 RCC (Canada-US)
“Deeper” forms of cooperation
Recognition 
(MRAs) CIPM; ILAC; IAF











FSB, ESMA, EU, ICH RCC (new regulations)
Notes: ANCERTA: Australia-New Zealand Closer Economic Relations Trade Agreement; BCBS: Basle 
Committee for Banking Supervision; BIT: bilateral investment treaty; CIPM: International Committee for 
Weights and Measures; FSB: Financial Stability Board; GPA: WTO Government Procurement Agreement; 
IAF: International Accreditation Forum; ICH: International Conference on Harmonization of Technical 
Requirements for Registration of Pharmaceuticals for Human Use; ICN: International Competition 
Network; ILAC: International Laboratory Accreditation Cooperation; OIE: World Organization for Animal 
Health; RCC: Regulatory Cooperation Council; VSS: voluntary sustainability standards.
Coherence involves efforts among jurisdictions to ensure that the regulatory 
process conforms to what are generally accepted to be good practices (for 
example, ensuring that regulation is transparent, that there is the opportunity 
for stakeholders – including foreign firms and governments – to comment on 
proposed new regulations, or that the process of  regulatory development should 
be informed by an economic impact assessment or a cost/benefit analysis). 
The aim here is not to question or discuss the objectives or the substance of  
regulation. Instead, the focus is on the process through which regulation is 
developed and implemented. Coherence is an important element of  WTO 
disciplines on sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures and technical barriers 
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to trade (TBT) and has been the focus of  work programs in organizations such 
as the OECD, various UN bodies and APEC for many years. 
Consultation goes beyond joint efforts to define and implement good practices 
(coherence) and begins to engage with the substance of  regulation and its 
spillover effects. Examples include the scope that has been created in the 
WTO to raise specific trade concerns (STCs) regarding (proposed) TBT and 
SPS measures (Wijkström, 2015) and the framework that has been established 
for consultations on regulatory matters through the Canada-US Regulatory 
Cooperation Council (RCC).
Deeper forms of  cooperation go further in seeking to reduce the market-
segmenting effects of  differences in regulation across countries. Examples are 
agreements to (mutually) recognize a foreign regulatory process, efforts between 
regulators to determine instances where regulatory regimes are equivalent, 
and efforts to adopt common regulatory standards or conformity assessment 
processes (i.e. harmonization of  norms). Such deeper forms of  regulatory 
cooperation are difficult to achieve for a number of  reasons. There may be 
(i) mandate gaps, in that domestic regulators are not permitted to pursue 
cooperation or have not been given the resources to do so; (ii) coordination 
gaps in instances where international cooperation requires several regulatory 
agencies within a country to work together; or (iii) informational gaps within 
and across countries, such as a lack of  data on how a regulatory regime “works” 
(Hoekman, 2015a). Addressing these gaps requires institutions and processes 
that foster regular communication and repeated interaction. This is needed 
both across agencies within countries – frequently, multiple regulators and 
government bodies are engaged in setting and enforcing product and process 
regulations – and across countries. This is non-trivial, especially in federal 
states, where regulation is applied at the state level (for example, in 13 provinces 
and territories in Canada, 29 states in India and 50 states in the US). In the 
case of  the EU, the 28 member states continue to have significant autonomy 
in the implementation of  regulation in many areas.
Regulators frequently have their own mechanisms through which they interact 
with each other internationally. Governments at different levels (central, sub-
central, municipal), regulators and international businesses are all engaged 
in mechanisms that entail cooperation with counterparts across borders 
(jurisdictions). Lead firms set standards for quality, health and safety for both 
products and processes that occur in their supply chains. They may cooperate 
in private standards-setting activities that have as a goal achievement of  inter-
operability and minimum standards across supply chains. They may work in 
cooperation with non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and governments 
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to do so (an example being the Global Food Safety Initiative). NGOs do the 
same – there is a plethora of  different private standards-setting bodies that 
develop norms and offer certification services to companies that engage in 
international trade. The characterization of  levels of  “regulatory” cooperation 
in Figure 2 also applies to the world of  private standards, as is illustrated by 
the inclusion of  several such initiatives.
What role for trade agreements?
A key question for policymakers is whether, given a presumption that there are 
good reasons for pursuing regulatory cooperation, this should be embedded 
in trade agreements. Given a rationale for regulatory cooperation, what is the 
value added of  tying this to a trade agreement as opposed to simply giving 
regulators a mandate to interact and work together to improve regulatory 
requirements and processes? Assuming a positive answer to the question on 
embedding regulatory cooperation in trade agreements, an ancillary question 
is whether this is best pursued through the multilateral forum (the WTO), 
through PTAs or both. 
Trade agreements are designed to reduce explicit discrimination against foreign 
suppliers of  goods and services. An implication is that traditional sector-specific 
regulation that entails barriers to entry lends itself  to the reciprocal bargaining 
and market access commitments that are the core feature of  trade agreements. 
As such regulation can be “captured” by incumbent firms who use their political 
influence to ensure that they have favorable treatment (Stigler, 1975), a very 
similar dynamic as that underpinning trade negotiations can be used to reform 
such types of  regulation. However, while entry-restricting regulation continues 
to exist for some sectors – especially in some services – regulation changed in 
nature in the 1980s and 1990s. It is no longer dominated by efforts to control 
the behavior of  firms in sectors in which entry is restricted.6 Instead, the focus 
is on ensuring that markets are contestable and on the use of  market conduct 
and liability rules that are (supposed to be) applied equally to domestic and 
foreign goods and services to do so, complemented by mechanisms to elicit 
revelation of  information by firms on their costs (Laffont, 1994; Posner, 2013).
The source of  regulatory trade costs lies in differences in regulations across 
jurisdictions and the need to comply with the requirements of  multiple 
6 A caveat to this is that state-owned or state-controlled enterprises continue to be prevalent in many countries. Insofar 
as this is associated with barriers to entry for investment by foreign-owned companies, trade agreements can be used 
as instruments through which to seek to impose market disciplines on such entities.
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regulatory bodies in different countries.7 As already noted, reducing the 
market-segmenting effects of  differences in regulations is difficult because of  
concerns that it may compromise countries’ regulatory objectives and hinder 
the execution of  regulatory agencies’ legal mandates and obligations. This 
implies that reciprocal commitments to change national policies — the bread 
and butter of  trade agreements — often simply will not be feasible. The nature 
of  regulation is technical and dynamic, involving many actors with different 
degrees of  autonomy and decentralization; moreover, regulators will respond 
to differences in local circumstances and changes in knowledge over time. This 
makes it difficult — indeed, undesirable — to ‘negotiate’ substantive changes 
in regulation or to impose regulatory harmonization or convergence by fiat. 
Instead, regulatory cooperation must be premised on mutual assessments of  
performance of  regulatory regimes to enable regulators to assure principals 
(stakeholders, legislatures) that the other party has effective systems in place. 
In practice, convergence, if  it occurs at all, will most likely be gradual, with 
partner countries over time moving closer to systems that are constructed and 
implemented the same way.
The increasing complexity and interdependence of  modern economies that is 
reflected in the growth in collaborative international production networks (i.e. 
GVCs) has led to forms of  what has been called meta-regulation (Coglianese 
and Mendelson, 2010). Meta-regulation involves the establishment of  
monitoring and learning regimes. Instead of  presuming that regulators should 
define uniform rules based on scientific evidence, the aim of  meta-regulation 
is to create incentives for companies to invest resources in regular collection 
and analysis of  data to identify and mitigate specific risks they either confront 
or may generate. Such approaches are salient in the context of  GVCs. For 
example, ingredients contaminated with pathogens are periodically introduced 
into global food supply chains and widely propagated as the adulterated 
foodstuffs are incorporated into diverse batches of  processed products. The 
inadvertent co-production of  hazards by firms that are part of  international 
networks – often identifiable years after products have entered commerce –
calls for regulatory approaches that recognize such possibilities and that are 
designed to generate and disseminate relevant data to all parties concerned 
on a timely basis. 
As a result of  the type of  uncertainty that accompanies GVC-based production 
and extensive cross-border flows and interdependence, the regulatory problem 
becomes one of  organizing and supervising joint investigation by firms of  
emergent risks and responding to them before they cause harm. This is a 
7 The following paragraphs draw on Hoekman and Sabel (2017).
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problem that calls for approaches that involve data collection, data analysis 
and data sharing. An example is the use of  hazard analysis of  critical control 
points (HACCPs) for pathogens, implemented on both sides of  the Atlantic, 
involving a mix of  administrative action, legislation and private standards 
(Sabel and Simon, 2011; Humphrey, 2012). 
Can trade agreements support this type of  regulatory cooperation? This is 
perhaps less obvious than often seems to be assumed. Trade agreements can 
be characterized as purposeful efforts to align the behaviors of  key players 
(governments in particular, and through them, regulatory agencies) in a top-
down manner. However, insofar as regulation increasingly revolves around 
a decentralized effort at problem solving – i.e. bottom-up mechanisms – a 
potential role for trade agreements to support regulatory cooperation is by 
acting as a device to more credibly commit to pursuing the needed bottom-up 
approach by creating an institutional framework that promotes and supports 
this. Whether trade agreements can be designed to do so is an open question. 
Perhaps the most straightforward case for using trade agreements is that this 
will help ensure that the trade effects of  regulation are considered explicitly. 
Regulators often do not consider the international implications of  what they 
do. To a large extent this is simply because they are not called to do so by 
their authorizing environment. They may be limited in their appreciation 
of  the economic effect and costs associated with implementation of  their 
regime on firms and consumers in other jurisdictions. A necessary condition for 
regulators to consider the (cross-border) economic implications of  their work 
is that they have incentives to do so, which raises issues related not just to their 
legal mandates but also the design of  institutional mechanisms that facilitate 
learning and a better understanding of  the overall impact of  regulatory norms 
on trade and investment incentives. In terms of  the typology of  Figure 1, a 
trade agreement may help in identifying which areas of  regulation fall into 
boxes C and D. 
Trade agreements may also be used as an instrument to generate the political 
oversight needed for implementation of  cooperation. An important feature 
of  trade agreements is that there are a large number of  interests represented. 
This can not only ensure that areas that are priorities from a trade perspective 
are identified and put on the table, but also help overcome political economy 
constraints that preclude movement in a direction that governments perceive 
will enhance aggregate welfare. Regulators may have a vested interest in the 
status quo, or have been captured by a domestic industry. Focusing on such 
problems in a trade agreement context may help mobilize the political support 
needed to push through reforms. Referring back to Figure 1, dealing with 
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regulatory matters in a trade agreement may help move forward over time 
on issues that are in boxes C and D. 
Addressing regulatory issues in a trade agreement also may benefit regulators 
if  it helps to mobilize additional resources to support cooperation. This can 
both support greater attention being given to cooperation – as that will entail 
a resource cost for the agencies involved – and, indirectly but potentially 
importantly, allow for a reallocation of  scarce resources to other areas. That 
is, if  cooperation is successful – for example, it results in acceptance that 
two regimes are equivalent – regulators can allocate less to surveillance of  
that particular issue area and focus more on other concerns. The benefits of  
regulatory cooperation accrue not just to companies and consumers in the 
form of  lower compliance costs; if  it results in reductions in operating costs 
for a regulatory agency, this will release resources for other purposes. 
In practice, capacity constraints may impede even the shallowest forms 
of  cooperation. Basic principles such as transparency, notification and 
allowing for comment from stakeholders on proposed new regulation may 
not be implemented because of  resource constraints. There is a significant 
technical assistance and capacity-building agenda associated with improving 
regulatory systems and governance in developing nations. Including regulatory 
cooperation in a trade agreement can provide a focal point to mobilize aid 
for trade. The 2013 WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA) illustrates one 
approach through which additional resources can be mobilized to improve 
national regulation through international cooperation.8 
The WTO status quo
In principle, the WTO is the global apex institution through which governments 
can seek to address cross-border spillovers created by national trade-related 
policies. The primary focus in the WTO is on trade policies, but the agreement 
also spans disciplines on domestic regulation, motivated by a concern that these 
not be used to discriminate against foreign products and undercut liberalization 
commitments. The national treatment rule is a general obligation for goods, 
whereas it is a specific one in the case of  services – applying only to scheduled 
services/modes of  supply. The WTO does not engage on the substance of  
regulatory measures—all it requires is that foreign products are treated the 
same as domestic ones. The WTO does embody some disciplines that require 
8 This was done by linking implementation of  the TFA to technical and financial assistance from high-income 
countries, under the umbrella of  the Aid for Trade initiative; see Hoekman (2016).
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minimum levels of  regulation – for example, the TRIPS agreement requires 
members to implement minimum standards of  protection for intellectual 
property – but the substance of  the rights and requirements/criteria involved 
are left to governments and/or other international bodies to determine. 
Concerns that product-specific regulatory norms may be used for protectionist 
purposes has motivated the negotiation of  specific disciplines that go further 
than the national treatment rule. The main examples are the Agreement 
on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) and the Agreement on Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary (SPS) Measures. The TBT agreement addresses technical 
requirements (mandatory regulatory norms) imposed by governments for 
goods; the SPS agreement deals with mandatory health and safety-related 
norms for agricultural products (foodstuffs, plant and animal health). The TBT 
agreement goes further than national treatment by requiring that members 
base their product regulation on available international standards (whenever 
appropriate) and adopt the least trade-restrictive measure that is necessary to 
achieve their regulatory objective.9 The SPS agreement makes explicit reference 
to an indicative list of  international bodies that promulgate SPS norms, such as 
the Codex Alimentarius Commission. If  a national product-specific regulatory 
measure is based on an international standard, it is presumed to satisfy the 
least trade-restrictive test in that the norms are considered to be necessary and 
non-discriminatory in effect and in intent.10 Whether this is in fact the case is 
another matter, as in practice the process of  international standardization may 
not devote much attention to trade effects. The presumption is that because 
many countries will be involved in the process of  defining international 
standards, whatever is agreed is regarded as non-discriminatory in intent, no 
matter the actual effect on trade. As argued below, this is one weakness of  the 
current approach in the WTO towards international standardization.
Many of  the standards that confront firms operating internationally address 
management processes and production methods. Systems such as ISO 9000, 
ISO 14000 and ISO 26000 are used by companies as a signal of  quality, a 
demonstration of  a commitment to social responsibility or as requirements that 
must be met by suppliers in a trade relationship with buyers or by companies 
that are part of  international value chains and production networks. Standards 
of  this type are not covered by the WTO as they are not mandatory. 
9 What follows focuses on the TBT agreement; similar considerations apply to the SPS agreement.
10 One reason why there are two product standards agreements is that the health and safety concerns that arise in the 
production, trade and consumption of  food, plant life and animals are considered to be particularly important. In 
effect, many SPS norms can be characterized as measures that are aimed at catastrophe avoidance – the spread of  
diseases, the probability of  serious illness, and so on. Such considerations also arise with technical barriers to trade as 
these may have similar motivations – for example, a ban on the use of  lead paint, radioactive residues, etc. – but they 
often address other types of  issues as well (such as radio frequency interference, interoperability, etc.).
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Conformity assessment procedures for technical product regulations are also 
subject to WTO disciplines, including the non-discrimination rule. Relevant 
guides or recommendations issued by international standardizing bodies are 
to be used if  they exist, except if  inappropriate for national security reasons or 
deemed inadequate to safeguard health and safety. In principle, WTO members 
are free to join and use international systems for conformity assessment. The 
results of  conformity assessment procedures undertaken in exporting countries 
must be accepted if  consultations determine these are equivalent to domestic 
ones. WTO members are encouraged to negotiate MRAs for conformity 
assessment procedures, and not to discriminate between foreign certification 
bodies in their access to such agreements.
The SPS and TBT Committees have been characterized as technical expert-
driven catalysts for multilateral dialogue, providing a forum for the development 
of  guidance (soft law) and peer review of  trade measures (Wijkström, 2015). An 
important dimension of  what the WTO does in the area of  product regulation 
is compiling information on new measures. WTO members are required to 
notify the WTO of  new measures that are not based on international standards. 
Over 45,000 measures have been notified since 1995. The TBT and SPS 
committees have developed procedures that can used by governments to raise 
concerns they have regarding proposed or applicable product standards of  
another WTO member. This has come to be known as the “specific trade 
concerns” (STC) procedure (Horn et al., 2013). Between 1995 and 2015, over 
800 STCs pertaining to SPS or TBT measures were raised in the relevant 
committee, implying that fewer than 2% of  notified measures raised concerns. 
This process is widely regarded as a useful mechanism to address concerns 
raised – about 40% of  STCs in the area of  SPS have reportedly been resolved 
(WTO, 2015). Over time the STC mechanism has evolved – for example, in 
2014 WTO members agreed to a procedure through which they can seek the 
services of  the Chair of  the SPS Committee or another facilitator to help find 
a solution to their concerns.11 
Much prevailing regulation deals with services. The WTO has fewer disciplines 
for domestic regulations affecting services than for goods (product regulation). 
Article VI.4 of  GATS calls on the Council for Trade in Services to develop 
any necessary disciplines to ensure that measures relating to qualification 
requirements and procedures, technical standards and licensing requirements 
11 See https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news14_e/sps_10sep14_e.htm.
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do not constitute unnecessary barriers to trade in services,12 and members 
may not apply regulatory requirements so as to nullify or impair specific 
commitments made for sectors/modes (Article VI.5(a)). The GATS therefore 
embodies a weak “least trade-restrictive” norm, but there is no obligation to 
use international standards – WTO members may use whatever standards 
they wish.
GATS Article VII (Recognition) promotes the establishment of  procedures for 
(mutual) recognition of  licenses, educational diplomas and experience granted 
by a particular member. It permits a member to recognize the standards of  
one or more members, but does not require, or even encourage, members 
to recognize equivalent foreign regulations. Article VII:2 requires a member 
who enters into a mutual recognition agreement (MRA) to afford adequate 
opportunity to other interested members to negotiate their accession to such 
an agreement or to negotiate comparable ones.  Article VII:3 stipulates that 
a member must not grant recognition in a manner which would constitute a 
means of  discrimination between countries. Members must inform the Council 
for Trade in Services about existing MRAs and of  the opening of  negotiations 
on any future ones. Most such notifications pertain to the recognition of  
educational degrees and professional qualifications obtained abroad.
The WTO does little at present to support regulatory cooperation on a 
multilateral basis; the focus has been on national policies. This has included 
deliberations (in the context of  the TBT Committee) on what constitutes good 
regulatory practice and options that governments can use to streamline the 
way regulations are prepared, adopted and applied through the “regulatory 
lifecycle.” An example is the deliberation that commenced in 2012 over 
voluntary guidelines that would reduce the possibility of  product regulation 
having the effect of  unnecessarily restricting trade. However, to date no 
agreement on a set of  good practice guidelines has proved possible in the 
TBT context because of  concerns that the Appellate Body might invoke such 
norms in a dispute, notwithstanding the fact that in any such agreement its 
provisions are non-binding.13
There is much more to be said about the state of  play in the WTO on 
regulatory matters. The foregoing brief  snapshot makes clear that the WTO 
12 A Working Party on Domestic Regulation was mandated to develop disciplines called for by Article VI:4 to ensure 
that licensing and qualification requirements and related standards are not unnecessary barriers to trade in services. 
A precursor to this working party, the Working Party on Professional Services, agreed in 1998 on a set of  principles 
to ensure transparency of  regulations pertaining to licensing of  accountants and accountancy services.
13 A trigger for this concern was a 2000 Appellate Body finding that a 2000 decision by the TBT Committee on 
a set of  (voluntary) principles for the development of  international standards, guides and recommendations was 
a “subsequent agreement” under the Vienna Convention on the Law of  Treaties; see Wijkström and McDaniels 
(2013).
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is more involved than might be expected, but that many areas of  domestic 
regulation are not subject to multilateral rules of  the game – especially service 
sector regulation. The role of  the WTO as a transparency mechanism is much 
better developed for product regulation than it is for other types of  regulation 
that have an impact on trade. The various committees and working parties 
dealing with different dimensions of  economic regulation have acted as foci 
for deliberation and information exchange. More can certainly be done if  
governments are willing to do so, but the experience over the last decade or 
so with attempts to refine and expand disciplines on domestic regulation of  
services and to agree to voluntary principles of  good practice for regulatory 
processes illustrates that achieving a consensus in these areas may not be 
possible. As far as regulatory cooperation is concerned, one shortfall in the 
approach taken in the WTO has been the absence of  a concerted effort by 
WTO members to encourage international standardizing bodies to consider 
the trade effects of  the norms that they develop (Hoekman and Mavroidis, 
2016). 
Regulatory cooperation in PTAs
How do PTAs compare to the WTO? There is of  course huge heterogeneity, 
but most PTAs do not do much more than the WTO, while the one outlier, the 
EU, goes far beyond the WTO in the area of  regulatory cooperation. The only 
other PTA that includes substantial regulatory cooperation in specific areas 
is the Australia-New Zealand Closer Economic Relations Trade Agreement 
(ANZCERTA) (Steger, 2012). The TPP did not go very far beyond the WTO 
– the value added primarily involves language aiming at greater coherence 
of  regulatory regimes of  the signatories (Bollyky, 2012), along with provisions 
calling for consultations (i.e. the shallow forms of  cooperation discussed in 
Section 1).14
The EU has used a mix of  approaches to remove the market-segmenting 
effects of  national product regulation, including harmonization and mutual 
recognition. The latter became a key driver following decisions of  the 
European Court of  Justice, which ruled that, in the absence of  overriding 
concerns that permit an exception, EU members must accept products into 
their markets that have been legally introduced into the commerce of  another 
member state. However, the EU experience illustrates that mutual recognition 
14 However, the TPP did include more detailed and far-reaching provisions on specific areas of  regulation, notably with 
regard to digital trade and data localization. The TPP also incorporated innovative provisions permitting data flows 
that were linked to (conditional on) action by exporting countries to protect privacy and prevent fraud.
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requires some minimum level of  harmonization of  norms (common “essential 
requirements”).15
Recent PTAs involving the EU complement mutual recognition with tentative 
efforts to move towards mutual “equivalence.” This involves agreement that 
the regulatory objectives of  the parties involved are equivalent and acceptance 
that implementation and enforcement mechanisms in the parties’ jurisdictions 
are effective. Under a “standard” mutual recognition approach, A satisfies 
itself  that B achieves its norms through the similar kind of  testing, inspections, 
sampling and so on that A undertakes. Under regulatory equivalence, A simply 
accepts B’s processes and systems – each government agrees that the regulatory 
regime of  the other party is equivalent to its own in terms of  both objectives 
and the effectiveness of  the institutional apparatus through which these 
objectives are pursued. 16 A necessary condition for an equivalence approach 
is trust – there must be a prior process of  “mutual assessment” (Messerlin, 
2014) or evaluation of  the regulatory goals and implementation regime in the 
relevant jurisdictions that results in a judgment that these are “equivalent.” 
CETA — at the time of  writing the most recent of  the new type of  trade 
integration agreements — includes some language on equivalence (Government 
of  Canada, 2017). CETA calls for the establishment of  a regulatory 
cooperation forum to facilitate and promote the realization of  the objectives 
laid out in Chapter 21 on regulatory cooperation. The chapter provides that 
the parties may consult with stakeholders, including the research community, 
NGOs and business and consumer organizations “on matters relating to 
the implementation of ” the regulatory cooperation chapter (Article 21.8). 
Article 21.2 commits both parties to developing their regulatory cooperation 
to prevent and eliminate unnecessary barriers to trade and investment; 
enhancing the climate for competitiveness and innovation, including through 
pursuing regulatory compatibility, recognition of  equivalence and convergence; 
and adopting transparent, efficient and effective regulatory processes that 
better support public policy objectives and fulfil the mandates of  regulatory 
bodies. Article 21.3 mentions such objectives of  regulatory cooperation as 
building trust; deepening mutual understanding of  regulatory governance 
and obtaining from each other the benefit of  expertise and perspective to 
improve regulatory proposals; promoting the transparency, predictability and 
efficacy of  regulations; identifying alternative instruments; recognizing the 
15 See Pelkmans (2012) for an in-depth discussion.
16 A key difference, therefore, is that regulatory equivalence requires a willingness to step back from a focus on technical 
product considerations and to assess systems as a whole. Thus, whereas mutual recognition means assessing country 
B’s meat inspection system on the basis of  a sampling regime and the results of  testing in country A of  a sample of  
products originating in B, an approach based on regulatory equivalence would justify trust in a partner country’s 
products on the basis of  systemic arguments (Hoekman and Sabel, 2017).
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associated effects of  regulations; and improving regulatory implementation 
and compliance. 
Another objective of  CETA is to facilitate bilateral trade and investment by 
reducing unnecessary differences in regulation and identifying new ways of  
cooperating in specific sectors. In a similar vein, the agreement mentions the 
complementary goal of  enhancing the competitiveness of  industry by looking 
for ways to reduce administrative costs and duplicative regulatory requirements, 
and “pursuing compatible regulatory approaches including, if  possible and 
appropriate, through: a) the application of  regulatory approaches which are 
technology-neutral, and b) the recognition of  equivalence or the promotion of  
convergence” (Article 21.3(d)(iii); emphasis added).
Language on — and examples of  — regulatory equivalence embodied in 
CETA include Chapter 5 on SPS measures, which requires each signatory 
to accept the measures of  the exporting party as equivalent to its own if  
the exporting party “objectively demonstrates that its measure achieves the 
importing Party’s appropriate level of  protection” (Article 5.1). Guidelines for 
the determination of  equivalence are set out in Annex 5.D to the SPS chapter, 
while Annex 5.E lists areas where the parties have agreed there is equivalence. 
One function of  the CETA Joint Management Committee for SPS Measures is 
to prepare and maintain a document detailing the state of  discussions between 
the parties on their work on recognizing the equivalence of  specific SPS 
measures. A separate Protocol on the Mutual Recognition of  the Compliance 
and Enforcement Programme regarding Good Manufacturing Practices for 
Pharmaceutical Products provides for the determination of  the equivalence 
of  regulatory authorities that certify compliance with these practices. Annex 
1 (on Medicinal Products or Drugs) of  this protocol lists products for which 
the parties have agreed that their requirements and compliance programs 
are equivalent.17
CETA Chapter 21 (on regulatory cooperation) creates an entry point with 
respect to greater use of  regulatory equivalence among like-minded countries, 
but puts little emphasis on the use of  equivalence as a way to reduce regulatory 
differences and costs. Indeed, the chapter, while laying out a rather long 
illustrative list of  possible cooperation activities, does not mention “equivalence” 
in Articles 21.4, 21.5 or 21.7. Article 21.4(r) does call for identifying 
approaches to reduce the adverse effects of  existing regulatory differences 
17 Some mention of  regulatory equivalence also occurs in the chapter on financial services, a sector where the approach 
has been pursued internationally for some time; see, for example, Verdier (2011). The chapter permits Canadian 
institutions to provide portfolio management services to EU professional clients on a cross-border basis (that is, 
without having to establish in the EU) once the European Commission has adopted the equivalence decision related 
to portfolio management (EU prudential requirements will still apply).
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on trade, including “when appropriate, through greater convergence, mutual 
recognition, minimising the use of  trade distorting regulatory instruments, 
and use of  international standards,” but the activities listed in these articles 
focus on transparency and data and information sharing. 
Even though CETA goes further than the TPP on regulatory cooperation, it 
arguably does too little to reflect the changes in the way international trade is 
organized. More rapid progress in attenuating the trade-cost effects of  different 
regulatory policies might be realized by creating processes and institutional 
mechanisms that take a broader value chain perspective (Hoekman, 2015a). 
Concrete initiatives to reduce the costs of  redundant regulatory requirements 
and processes must be policy specific – that is, they must involve the type of  
cooperation called for in CETA and that is being pursued in the Canada-US 
Regulatory Cooperation Council. But missing from current approaches are 
cross-cutting, supply chain-informed deliberative mechanisms that focus on 
a broad range of  policies that affect trade costs and that provide a framework 
for regulatory cooperation to improve the competitiveness and efficiency of  
industry – two goals that Canada and the EU set for themselves in the CETA 
chapter on regulatory cooperation (CETA Article 21.2(4)(b)).  
Reducing the negative trade effects of behind-the-
border regulation
Regulatory measures generally fulfil a specific social or economic purpose, even 
if  the effect is to restrict trade. Addressing possible trade-reducing (distorting) 
effects of  regulation requires first an understanding of  the effects of  prevailing 
(proposed) policies. Many desirable reforms will not require actions by other 
governments (trading partners), but regulatory cooperation may help in 
identifying what such reforms should seek to do and increase the effectiveness 
and efficiency of  regulation. Trade agreements may help by mobilizing and 
sustaining political attention and thereby address concerns by civil society 
groups opposing cooperation and incentivize regulatory bodies to give more 
of  a priority to actions that reduce the negative trade impacts of  regulation. 
As already discussed, trade agreements are geared towards the negotiation 
of  enforceable policy commitments. Binding disciplines reduce uncertainty 
for traders who know that the dispute settlement mechanism can be used to 
ensure that governments live up to what they sign on to. A precondition for 
agreement on binding international rules is a shared recognition that the 
negative spillovers associated with a policy (or set of  policies) are significant and 
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that a proposed set of  (enforceable) disciplines will result in greater efficiency 
(lower costs).  Such an understanding exists when it comes to tariffs and related 
border barriers, but much less so when it comes to domestic regulatory policies. 
It is important to recognize that trade agreements may not have a “comparative 
advantage” in supporting effective cooperation between regulators, even if  
trade negotiators have the best of  intentions. The public backlash against 
TTIP in the EU was largely driven by concerns that greater integration of  the 
transatlantic marketplace may result in an erosion of  regulatory regimes in 
areas that are of  great importance to significant segments of  the EU population 
– such as the use of  genetically modified organisms (GMOs) and specific food 
standards (Young, 2016). Regulatory cooperation is likely to be more easily 
pursued if  it involves a bottom-up process that is driven by regulatory agencies, 
as opposed to being imposed top down as an element of  a trade agreement. 
A useful prescription in this regard is to apply the principle “first, do no 
harm” and to concentrate on incorporating measures in trade agreements 
that can be defended as improving the ability of  regulators to do their job 
better. That is, the aim should be empowerment of  regulatory bodies rather 
than imposing restrictions on them (or being seen to be doing so even if  that 
is not the intention). 
From a trade perspective, international cooperation on regulation arguably 
should center on improving the transparency of  applied policies, supporting 
analysis of  the trade (and investment) effects of  specific types of  regulation, 
giving regulators a mandate that encourages (permits) them to design 
regulations that do not unnecessarily restrict trade, and doing more to ensure 
that the process of  international standards-setting and norms-setting occurs 
with greater attention given to the potential trade impacts. Measures taken by 
the trade community to achieve these objectives should not affect the ability 
of  regulators to achieve their mandates. 
Transparency. This is a core feature and function of  the WTO. The 
regular work of  the TBT and SPS Committees, including notifications and 
the opportunity to raise specific concerns, can be emulated in other areas 
of  regulation. Here, an obvious area to prioritize is services and regulations 
that impact on the ability of  firms to supply and consumers to buy products 
that are connected to/use “the cloud” (data localization requirements, etc.) 
The relevant GATS bodies have not ignored issues of  domestic regulation 
(see above), but much more could be done to map out the policies that WTO 
members are pursuing. The recent joint venture with the World Bank to 
maintain and update a database on services trade policies – the Services Trade 
Restrictiveness Indicators (STRI) – is a good first step, but this is mostly limited 
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to policies that are discriminatory and does not cover domestic regulation. It 
is unlikely that this can rely only on notifications – it will require a pro-active 
effort by the WTO Secretariat, working with other international organizations.
Much greater transparency is also needed as regards the operation and effects 
of  PTAs. Insofar as PTAs give rise to innovative approaches to attenuate the 
market-segmenting effects of  differences in regulatory policies, they can help 
all countries identify approaches that can usefully be emulated. All WTO 
members have a strong interest in understanding what PTAs end up doing 
and achieving, including their implementation, utilization and enforcement. 
Documenting and analyzing the approaches that are used in PTAs to reduce 
costs of  regulatory heterogeneity would not only improve transparency per 
se, but can also inform a process of  learning about what works and what does 
not and perhaps identify specific features of  cooperation in PTAs that might 
be multilateralized. There have been some moves in this direction on an ad 
hoc basis; for example, the GATS Working Party on Domestic Regulation 
conducted a dedicated discussion on domestic regulation in regional trade 
agreements in 2014. 
Learning: analysis and deliberation.  As noted previously, there is often 
relatively little, if  any, effort by national regulators and international standards-
setting bodies to consider the trade impacts of  regulatory requirements and 
alternative approaches that might have less negative effects while not impacting 
on the probability that regulatory objectives will be realized. There is also 
arguably more that can be done to understand how the universe of  regulatory 
measures maps into the categories defined in Figure 1 and the potential efficacy 
of  the different types of  international regulatory cooperation summarized in 
Figure 2. There would appear to be significant scope to use the WTO bodies 
that already have a mandate to discuss regulatory policies (TBT, SPS, services, 
trade facilitation) to commission analysis of  trade effects and to engage more 
regularly with the business community in discussions aimed at identifying 
where greater effort to pursue regulatory cooperation – which need not occur 
through the WTO – could have a significant impact on trade costs. Currently 
there is too little scope for engagement with the business community within 
WTO bodies. There is more attention to this in recent PTAs like CETA, but 
even there the extent to which business is part of  regulatory deliberation 
arguably is too limited (Hoekman, 2015b). 
Give regulators a mandate to consider trade effects. A simple, yet 
powerful change that WTO and PTA members could seek to achieve is to agree 
that regulatory processes include an assessment of  trade effects – perhaps as part 
of  broader regulatory impact assessments that are generally considered to be 
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an element of  good practice. This is already “on the table” in the deliberations 
on a voluntary code of  good practice in the WTO TBT Committee. If  no 
consensus can be achieved there – and given that in other areas of  regulation, 
this agenda is being pursued – one way proponents could consider moving 
forward is through plurilateral approaches (see below). In order to increase the 
prospects that trade impact assessments are made, regulatory agencies should 
be provided with the necessary (financial) resources so that such an effort would 
not crowd out (or be seen to crowd out) other activities. Incorporation of  “trade 
effects assessment” language in trade agreements is in itself  an instrument 
through which regulatory agencies can lay claim on additional resources from 
the government that are needed to fulfil the commitment.
Engaging with international standards-setting bodies. There is also 
a clear case for more regular interaction with international regulatory bodies. 
Again this is something that already occurs on an ad hoc basis. For example, 
representatives of  the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, the Financial 
Stability Board, the International Association of  Insurance Supervisors and 
the International Organizations of  Securities Commissions have been invited 
periodically by the GATS Committee on Trade and Financial Services to 
present recent developments in the area of  international regulatory norms 
and initiatives in the financial sector and discuss possible implications for trade 
in financial services. However, this is largely limited to one-way information 
transmission. What would arguably make a difference is a greater effort by 
WTO members – who are all represented in international standards-setting 
bodies – to include a focus on the trade effects of  new international norms 
and standards. 
Club formation under the umbrella of the WTO?
Going beyond greater transparency, analysis and interacting with international 
standards-setting bodies, at the level of  the WTO consideration should be given 
to facilitating more small-group cooperation on regulatory policies. Abstracting 
from informal discussion or working groups, there are two main alternative 
mechanisms for groups of  WTO members to collaborate on an issue-specific 
agenda of  common interest: conclusion of  a Plurilateral Agreement (PA) under 
Article II.3 WTO, and so-called critical mass agreements (CMAs). CMAs are 
agreements in which negotiated disciplines apply to only a subset of  countries, 
but benefits are extended on a most-favored nation (MFN) basis. Examples 
of  CMAs include the Information Technology Agreement (ITA) and other 
“zero-for-zero” agreements in which a group of  countries agree to eliminate 
tariffs for a specific set of  products and inscribe these commitments into their 
WTO schedules. CMAs have also been concluded to facilitate trade in services. 
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Examples are agreements on basic telecommunications and on financial 
services that have been concluded under the General Agreement on Trade 
in Services and that apply only to signatories.  PAs differ from CMAs in that 
they may be applied on a discriminatory basis – that is, benefits need not be 
extended to non-signatories. There are currently two PAs incorporated into the 
WTO: the Agreement on Civil Aircraft and the Agreement on Government 
Procurement.
PAs and CMAs differ from PTAs in important respects. WTO rules require 
that PTAs cover substantially all trade in goods and/or have substantial sectoral 
coverage of  services. In contrast, CMAs and PAs can be issue specific. PTAs 
tend to be closed clubs – most PTAs do not include an accession clause. 
Those PTAs that do allow for accession often restrict it to countries in a 
specific geographic region. This helps explain the proliferation of  PTAs – a 
new agreement often tends to be negotiated between members of  any given 
PTA and a non-member, because it is not possible for a non-member to join 
an existing regional trade agreement. CMAs and PAs, in contrast, are open 
in the sense that in principle any WTO member can join if  it wants to and is 
able to satisfy whatever disciplines are embodied in the agreement.
There are good reasons for WTO members to attempt to do more via CMAs 
and PAs (Lawrence, 2006). As discussed by Hoekman and Mavroidis (2015), 
CMAs and PAs cannot reduce the welfare of  any country, including those 
that decide not to join, because CMAs apply on an MFN basis and PAs must 
be approved by the WTO membership as a whole. PTAs are reviewed by 
the WTO, but there is no sanctioning of  their content; the process is limited 
to the supply of  information. CMAs and PAs are more transparent as they 
involve formal scheduling of  commitments by signatories and, in the case of  
PAs, regular reporting on activities to the WTO membership as a whole. They 
imply less dispersion in rules and approaches – and thus transactions costs 
and trade diversion – than PTAs. Indeed, they offer a way to multilateralize 
elements of  what may be covered in PTAs. Multiple PTAs dealing with the 
same subject matter often do so in ways that imply that the rules of  the game 
for firms differ depending on the PTA that applies for a given trade flow. 
There is no formal constraint on the ability of  a club of  WTO members 
to pursue CMAs that involve deepening of  disciplines on policies that are 
already subject to WTO rules, as long as they are willing to apply these on 
an MFN basis (Hoekman and Mavroidis, 2017). There is, however, a major 
constraint that impedes the feasibility of  pursuing new PAs under WTO 
auspices: incorporation of  a PA into the WTO requires unanimity “exclusively 
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by consensus.”18 This is a major disincentive for countries to pursue this type 
of  cooperation. Hoekman and Mavroidis (2015) suggest that WTO members 
set up a task force on a code of  conduct for new plurilateral agreements that 
apply to and benefit only signatories and consider replicating a GATS provision 
permitting WTO members to make additional commitments in the GATT, so 
as to facilitate the negotiation of  new CMAs that deal with regulatory policies 
that affect trade in goods. Such codes would establish the basic principles that 
new club-based agreements should satisfy to be consistent with the principles of  
the multilateral trading system, as well as substantive criteria for the rejection 
of  proposals to pursue such cooperation under WTO auspices. 
Concluding remarks
The gradual reduction of  tariffs as part of  a more general process to open 
economies to international trade and investment flows, in conjunction with 
technological changes that are permitting the digitization of  products and 
increasing the share of  services in global production, have greatly increased 
the impacts of  differences in domestic regulation of  products and production 
processes. The future international trade agenda is likely to become largely 
a regulatory agenda, the challenge being to devise mechanisms to reduce the 
costs of  differences in regulatory regimes while at the same time ensuring that 
this does not erode the likelihood of  attaining the regulatory objectives that 
have been established by the polities of  countries that engage in trade.  
In principle, regulatory cooperation may bolster the ability of  regulators to 
attain regulatory objectives if  it is designed with that objective in mind. Indeed, 
in practice this is likely to be a necessary condition for cooperation to be feasible. 
A key question for governments is whether trade agreements are a useful 
instrument to guide regulatory cooperation and if  so, how regulatory matters 
should be addressed in trade agreements. In some areas, such as technical 
regulation of  products, there are now well-established and reasonably effective 
mechanisms in the WTO through which the potential negative externalities 
of  differences in standards can be identified, discussed and attenuated. In 
many other areas of  regulation – such as prudential regulation of  services, 
“private standards” systems that apply to international production processes, 
or standards of  protection of  worker rights and the environment – WTO 
members have yet to put in place such mechanisms. The same is largely true of  
18 See Article X.9 of  the Agreement Establishing the WTO.
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PTAs – while there is much discussion of  new vintage PTAs as instruments for 
regulatory convergence, to date steps to address such matters have been limited. 
Neither PTAs nor the WTO engage on the substance of  regulatory norms – the 
focus is on the trade-impeding effects of  differences in regulatory standards. 
Cooperation on substantive norms – international standardization – is left 
to specialized bodies in which regulators interact. These bodies tend to be 
technical and focused on defining the means to achieve specific regulatory 
objectives (health, safety, etc.). They generally do not consider the potential 
impacts on trade. One role that the WTO could play looking forward is doing 
more to ensure that international regulatory efforts consider trade effects when 
developing new international norms. More generally, the WTO (and PTAs) 
could be used as a focal point for encouraging regulators to interact with each 
other and to consider cooperation that enhances their joint ability to attain 
regulatory objectives at lower cost. The suggestions made above regarding the 
form this could take illustrate the potential positive role that trade agreements 
can play. Whether they will be pursued depends importantly on the stance 
taken by international business. A necessary condition is strong advocacy by 
international business for greater engagement by governments in the WTO 
to address negative regulatory spillovers.
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CHAPTER 8
The WTO’s Next Work Program –  
As if the Global Economic Crisis 
Really Mattered
Simon J. Evenett and Johannes Fritz1
University of St. Gallen, Switzerland
Introduction
Typing the words “WTO stress test protectionism” into Google reveals that 
many in the official community claim that the WTO succeeded in preventing 
the widespread resort to protectionism since the onset of  the global economic 
crisis. If, indeed, the multilateral trading system has done so well, then let’s 
open a bottle of  champagne and the future work program of  the WTO can 
address other matters.
Of  course, there are reasons why certain officials find it convenient to downplay 
the significance of  crisis-era distortions to global commerce. Some may have 
been persuaded by the findings of  the limited WTO monitoring exercise 
on protectionism. This is not the place to detail the flaws in such official 
monitoring (see the relevant chapters in the 16th and 18th reports of  the Global 
Trade Alert). Others may suspect that beggar-thy-neighbor activity is far 
greater than officially admitted, but fear that public recognition of  this fact 
could trigger a wave of  retaliation. What such fears say about the robustness 
of  the current WTO system is worth pondering.
1 The authors of  this paper are associated with the Global Trade Alert (GTA) initiative, the independent trade policy 
monitoring initiative that is run under the auspices of  the Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR). The reports 
of  the GTA, which provide far more data than is presented here, can be accessed at http://www.globaltradealert.
org/reports. Comments received at a session of  the Evian Group in December 2015 were much appreciated. This 
is a revised version of  a document first prepared in March 2016. We thank Piotr Lukaszuk for helping in assembling 
the data for this version.
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With the election of  President Donald J. Trump, however, the notion that 
all is well in trade policy is no longer possible to sustain. The threat posed to 
the world trading system by the implementation of  potentially far-reaching 
“America First” policies has been widely commented upon, even by officials 
that in the past have asserted that multilateral trade rules work. Confidence 
that those rules will restrain the present incumbent of  the White House appears 
thin on the ground. The silver lining to the election of  President Trump is 
that it may induce hitherto complacent officials to revisit their assumptions 
about just how well multilateral trading system has performed in recent years.
Some business associations – such as the International Chamber of  Commerce 
and the B20 – have spoken out against crisis-era protectionism and, if  their 
reports are anything to go by, are less sanguine than official assessments. In 
recent years particular attention has been given to significant export restrictions 
(recall the Chinese Rare Earth case), to state-owned and state-controlled firms, 
and to the spread of  “localization” measures, the latter not just relating to trade 
in goods but also cross-border data flows. That many business associations have 
supported the negotiation of  disciplines in mega-trade deals that go beyond 
those found in WTO rules says something about the contemporary commercial 
relevance of  the latter. After all, the last major update of  the WTO rulebook 
was negotiated almost a quarter of  a century ago and many business models 
have changed markedly since then.
For the most part, when it comes to crisis-era protectionism, academics have 
been sorely behind the curve. In an age when data are downloaded rather than 
collected, most academic studies have confined themselves to datasets that were 
available before the crisis. In effect, this has meant that many studies examine 
only the impact of  tariff increases and trade defense and safeguard measures. 
Other distortions to 21st century commerce tend not to be considered. Given 
that trade defense measures are the minnows of  international trade policy, 
it is not terribly surprising that these measures have been shown to have cut 
trade by little during the crisis era.2 Much theoretical analysis of  the WTO 
makes little reference to actual policy choice – indeed, it is almost as if  the 
crisis never happened. If  much academic writing is anything to go by, there 
is little to learn from the crisis era for the next work program of  the WTO.
If, indeed, policymakers conclude that the crisis era has few implications 
for the future development of  the multilateral trading system, then this 
will represent a departure from the pattern observed after previous global 
economic contractions. The formation of  the GATT was said to have been 
2 In this chapter, we will confirm that the trade covered by trade defence and safeguard measures is a tiny percentage 
of  world trade. No disagreement on this particular matter.
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influenced by the beggar-thy-neighbor activity witnessed during the Great 
Depression. Similarly, the pervasive use of  voluntary export restraints during 
the sharp global downturn of  the early 1980s led to their banning as part of  the 
Uruguay Round agreements. In both instances, there were enough analysts and 
policymakers that recognized the deficiencies in existing multilateral trading 
arrangements. Will this time be different?
In this chapter, we make the case that discrimination is rife in international 
trade relations and that the notion should be set aside that the spirit or the 
letter of  multilateral trade rules held the line against government resort to trade 
distortions since the onset of  the global economic crisis. That world trade flows 
did not collapse like the 1930s does not imply that all is well – contemporary 
trade distortions have done much to reshuffle world trade flows (Evenett and 
Fritz, 2017a). The best that can be said about existing WTO rules is that they 
have channeled protectionist pressure into policy instruments subject to weaker 
or no multilateral disciplines.
We support our case with evidence on the resort to discrimination against 
foreign commercial interests that has been collected by the Global Trade Alert 
(GTA) initiative, with which we are associated. Furthermore, in preparing this 
chapter we have computed the share of  the G20’s exports that face different 
types of  discriminatory policies. We discuss the evolution of  these trade 
coverage ratios since 2009 and identify policies that affect relatively more of  
global commerce. 
What does this mean for the WTO going forward? It is said that, in two 
speeches in 1959 and 1960, President Kennedy noted that in Chinese the 
word “crisis” is represented by two symbols, one for danger and another for 
opportunity. Having spelt out the former, we conclude our chapter with the 
latter – describing how a future WTO work program could be influenced by 
what has been learnt about government policy choice since 2008.
We should be clear about what this chapter is not about. It does not provide 
an explanation to account for the timing and form of  crisis-era discrimination 
against foreign commercial interests. Readers interested in this matter are 
referred to Evenett (2015). Nor does this chapter estimate the impact of  crisis-
era protectionism. For an analysis of  the impact of  such protectionism on 
the exports of  the Least Developed Countries, see Evenett and Fritz (2015). 
Estimates of  the extent to which the growth of  the European Union’s exports 
has been held back by trade distortions imposed since the crisis began can be 
found in Evenett and Fritz (2017a). For more information on national resort 
to protectionism and liberalisation during the crisis era, readers are referred 
to the reports of  the Global Trade Alert.
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Monitoring discrimination
Several considerations need to be borne in mind when monitoring the resort 
to discrimination against foreign commercial interests by governments during 
a systemic economic crisis. First, governments have many policy instruments 
available to them, including those not subject to WTO rules. Second, the 
rationale for crisis-era policy initiatives may on paper have nothing to do with 
seeking commercial advantage yet, inadvertently or by design, these initiatives 
may discriminate against foreign commercial interests. 
Third, governments can obscure, hide, or delay the publication of  the details 
of  discriminatory measures, not least to avoid being labelled “protectionist.” 
Fourth, in the 21st century, there are many more forms of  cross-border 
commerce than traditional trade in goods, widening the range of  policies of  
relevance to any monitoring exercise. Fifth, the financial origins of  the most 
recent global economic crisis raises the possibility that the allocation of  finance 
became another tool for state discrimination against foreign commercial 
interests.
For of  all of  these reasons, when monitoring discrimination by governments it 
makes sense to focus on changes in the relative treatment of  domestic versus 
foreign rivals rather than confine information collection to a pre-specified 
set of  policy instruments. History shows that the most prominent form of  
discrimination changes with each global economic crisis (tariff increases and 
competitive devaluations in the 1930s, voluntary export restraints in the 1980s). 
So best to keep an open mind as to what form discrimination may take. 
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Note: *implies annualized total. 
Another implication of  the foregoing considerations is that much information 
about the incidence and extent of  discrimination against foreign commercial 
interests is available with a lag. Consequently, although the Global Trade 
Alert team looks for current instances of  discrimination (and, for that matter, 
liberalization), when information about government initiatives from earlier 
years becomes available then this is added to our database. At this writing, a 
total of  13,002 government policy interventions that have been announced or 
implemented since November 2008 have been documented by the GTA team.3 
In the past three years, over 2,200 measures have been documented per annum, 
substantially expanding the database. The GTA’s coverage is global.4 In its 
October 2016 World Economic Outlook, the International Monetary Fund stated: 
“The Global Trade Alert database has the most comprehensive coverage of  
all types of  trade-discriminatory and trade-liberalizing measures, although it 
only begins in 2008” (IMF, 2016: 79).
Taken together, Figures 1 and 2 highlight the perils of  ignoring publication 
lags. Figure 1 is based on the data available as of  the end of  11 October 
2017. Consequently, the GTA team has had over eight years to document 
discrimination undertaken in 2009 and only ten months to document policies 
undertaken during 2017. Without knowing this, one might erroneously 
conclude that resort to beggar-thy-neighbor activity has fallen after its 2013 
3 In comparison, the WTO’s Trade Monitoring Database has at present 4,177 entries. That database can be accessed 
at http://tmdb.wto.org.
4 Further details on the approach used by the GTA team to identify, investigate, and document crisis-era policy change 
can be found on pages 17-19 of  Evenett and Fritz (2015).
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surge. In fact, if  our experience is anything to go by, the first published totals 
for a particular year are revised upward significantly over time.
Figure 2: Correcting for publication lags matters – since 2012 there has been a 
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Source:  Global Trade Alert. 11 October 2017.
In addition to tracking the annual totals, it is also helpful to report the 
total number of  measures documented for each year at the same point in 
the reporting cycle. Figure 2 reports the total number of  liberalizing and 
discriminatory measures implemented in a given year that were documented 
by 11 October of  that year.5 
The worrying finding in Figure 2 is that there has been a surge in the number of  
discriminatory measures implemented and documented from 2012 on. Some 
observers have wondered if  that surge is the result of  better monitoring on the 
part of  the GTA team. Flattering as that may be, it is unlikely that the team 
has improved its productivity by over 150% since 2012. The implication being 
that the uptick in resort to discrimination since 2012 is real. While the number 
of  liberalizing measures has grown too in recent years, the gap between the 
totals for discriminatory measures and liberalizing measures has grown. Any 
notion that beggar-thy-neighbor action has been tamed or was confined to 
earlier in the crisis should be set aside. Best not put that champagne on ice.
5 The findings in Figure 2 do not depend on the choice of  cut-off date of  11 October. That date was chosen given the 
timetable for the preparation of  this chapter.
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Figure 3: No sign that harm to commercial interests is abating


















































Source:  Global Trade Alert. 11 October 2017.
It is probably too soon to draw too many conclusions concerning the data for 
2017. As Figure 2 shows, the total has fallen somewhat (but is still above the 
2014 level). In light of  President Trump’s frequent accusations of  protectionism 
by trading partners, could this fall reflect foreign governments resorting less 
to protectionism that harms US interests? Our July 2017 report examined 
this matter in some detail and, to our surprise, found evidence in favor of  this 
proposition. As we put it then, it would seem that “awe” rather than “rules” 
may have, for the time being at least, slowed down the resort to protectionism 
(Evenett and Fritz, 2017b).
Using a conservative methodology for each measure, the GTA team identifies 
the trading partners affected, should the measure in question be implemented. 
It is then possible to track over time how frequently a jurisdiction’s commercial 
interests have been harmed by the discriminatory measures implemented by 
its trading partners. These totals have been plotted in Figure 3 for China, the 
28 members of  the European Union, the United States, India, and the Least 
Developed Countries (LDCs). With the exception of  the latter, in every other 
case the cumulative number of  hits to their commercial interests keeps rising. 
Ministers may want to bear this in mind should they receive advice from 
officials and international organizations to discount crisis-era protectionism. 
These hits to commercial interests harm firms, employees, shareholders, 
owners of  intellectual property, and (where relevant) nationals working abroad.
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Having reported the frequency of  harm to commercial interests and, contrary 
to some, having shown that discrimination against foreign commercial interests 
wasn’t a spasm at the beginning of  the crisis that was successfully contained, we 
now turn to identifying the most prevalent forms of  crisis-era protectionism.
The most prevalent forms of protectionism used since 
the beginning of the global economic crisis
Before the recent global economic crisis, the stylized fact was that trade defense 
and safeguard measures were the principal form of  discrimination used by 
governments (mainly in industrialized countries) to manage pressures for relief  
from global competition. Also, many developing countries still had plenty of  
leeway to raise tariffs without breaching WTO bindings. 
As a result of  the frequent use of  these particular policy instruments, datasets 
on their use were collected and analyzed. In the light of  this, perhaps 
unsurprisingly, when the crisis hit the initial instinct of  many analysts was 
to check if  resort to these relatively more transparent and traditional policy 
instruments increased.
It turns out, however, that at least half  of  the discrimination against foreign 
commercial interests undertaken by governments during the crisis era did not 
involve resort to trade defense or tariffs (see Figure 4 and Table 1). Therefore, 
a full understanding of  protectionism since the onset of  the global economic 
crisis is not possible without recognizing the murkier – that is, less transparent 
or lower-profile –forms of  discrimination against foreign commercial interests. 
Table 1 groups the discriminatory policy instruments into the chapters proposed 
by the Multi-Agency Support Team (MAST), which comprises experts from 
several international organizations. This MAST classification is likely to define 
the new standard for recording non-tariff measures and consequently we have 
aligned our reporting of  crisis-era discrimination with this approach. On this 
classification, different forms of  subsidy (other than export subsidies which 
are covered in the “export measures” chapter) are the most frequent form of  
trade distortion imposed since November 2008. Coupled with the wide range 
of  state-provided export incentives, the total number of  state subventions 
granted since the onset of  the global economic crisis exceeds 3,500.6 This 
total exceeds the sum of  the number of  tariff increases and duties associated 
6 Let us quickly dismiss one red herring typically raised at this point in the argument, namely, that the subsidies and 
bailouts are in the financial sector and, therefore, of  limited interest to international trade in goods. In fact, only 177 
of  the 2,226 subsidies recorded in the GTA database relate to firms in the financial sector. 
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with trade defense. Another 542 government procurement-related measures, 
such as the Buy American provisions enacted in 2009, round out the top five 
most frequently used measures. 
Figure 4: Murkier forms of protectionism accounted for half of crisis-era trade 
distortions 
































































Source:  Global Trade Alert, 11 October 2017.
The mix of  contemporary protectionism implies that it is a mistake to focus 
only on tariff increases, trade defense actions, and safeguards. Fewer than half  
of  the 8,600 or so harmful measures imposed by governments since November 
2008 involved resort to such duties. Therefore, it would be premature to declare 
victory just because this time around no government imposed across-the-board 
Smoot Hawley-like tariffs. 
As the final three columns of  Table 1 indicate, there is variation across the G20 
in the resort to different forms of  trade distortion. G7 nations are responsible 
for implementing just under half  of  the (non-export) subsidies worldwide, 
whereas the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) are 
together responsible for implementing a third of  the export incentives, half  
of  the restrictive trade-related investment measures worldwide, and a quarter 
of  the import tariff increases. The BRICS and G7 nations are responsible 
for each implementing 30% of  the worldwide totals of  trade defense duties 
and safeguards. Non-G20 countries are responsible for half  of  tariff increases 
worldwide. 
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These statistics give a sense of  the different protectionist mixes adopted 
by governments, suggesting there is no single template for contemporary 
protectionism. Moreover, this is not the protectionism that our fathers or 
grandfathers would recognize – it is a mistake to look at the current era solely 
through the lens of  the 1930s. As Mark Twain noted, “history doesn’t repeat 
itself  but it often rhymes.” The rhyme here is the resort to discrimination, not 
the form of  such discrimination.
Since the next work program for the WTO could involve revising existing 
multilateral rules, then it is appropriate to ask what these statistics imply 
about the current WTO rule book. The extensive resort to subsidies calls 
into question the “discipline” provided by the Agreement on Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures. If  the 2,226 subsidies implemented since November 
2008 were consistent with this Agreement, then one wonders what “bite” this 
accord has. If  these subsidies were illegal, then why are so few subsidy cases 
brought to WTO Dispute Settlement?
Similar questions might be asked about the import tariff increases. In this 
regard, it is worth noting that when the global economic crisis hit, no fewer 
than 85 WTO members could have raised their average tariff rate by the 
Smoot-Hawley increase without violating their WTO disciplines. Even for 
those policy instruments for which the WTO has rules, there are legitimate 
questions about the extent to which they really restrained government action 
during the crisis.
It is worth recalling that the WTO rulebook is incomplete, that is, it does 
not cover every form of  discrimination against foreign commercial interests. 
As a result, the failure to observe outright violations of  WTO rules does not 
settle the debate about the effectiveness of  those rules. Another possibility 
worth considering is whether the incomplete rulebook channeled protectionist 
pressures to allowed loopholes, to policy intervention where the existing 
rulebook is ambiguous, or to government measures for which there are no 
WTO rules in the first place.   
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The extent of G20 exports facing crisis-era 
protectionism
One reaction to the evidence in the previous two sections has been to dismiss it 
as merely referring to counts of  measures. What about the scale of  commerce 
potentially affected? As noted earlier, it is well known that the amounts of  
trade subject to trade defense investigations are typically small (although the 
2012-3 dispute between the European Union and China over solar panels was 
a notable, €20 billion exception). In the absence of  any Smoot-Hawley tariff 
increases by any of  the major trading powers, so the argument goes, surely 
the amount of  trade affected is trivial?
In preparing this chapter, we calculated the share of  G20 exports that face 
either a discriminatory policy instrument in a foreign market, compete with a 
subsidized foreign rival that is based in that third market, or compete with a 
foreign rival that has received state incentives to export to that third market. We 
only considered measures that have been implemented since November 2008. 
In 2016, the G20 nations exported just under $9.3 trillion of  goods, covering 
a substantial share of  world trade. In gauging the results that follow, while a 
2% trade coverage ratio may look small, it does imply that $185 billion of  
trade was potentially affected in 2016. Of  course, the G20 is not the world and 
trade in goods is only one form of  cross-border commerce. Both limitations 
imply that the scale of  trade affected by crisis-era protectionism presented 
here will be underestimates.
We used product-level (technically, six-digit HS codes) data on trade flows in 
preparing these calculations. For every discriminatory measure, we took account 
of  the products implicated by that measure, the government responsible for 
that measure, and the known trading partners for the product in question. As 
trade flows tend to react to discriminatory measures, we used pre-crisis trade 
data (for 2005-7) to weight each trade flow once the crisis began. We also took 
account of  when measures were enacted in a year. For example, if  a measure 
lasted for only two months during a year, we discounted the annual trade flow 
affected by 10/12ths to reflect the fact that for ten months the measure was 
not in force.
Figure 5 reports the percentage of  G20 exports that faced import tariff 
increases, trade defense and safeguard actions, localization requirements, and 
discriminatory public procurement measures during the years 2009 to 2017. In 
addition, the figure shows the percentage of  G20 exports that had to compete 
in the home market of  a foreign firm that had been bailed out. 
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Figure 5: The shares of G20 exports facing tariff increases and having to 




















































Source:  Global Trade Alert, 11 October 2017.
The initial crisis response witnessed in 2009 resulted in over 5% of  G20 exports 
competing against a bailed-out firm in its home market. Smaller percentages 
of  G20 exports faced higher tariffs in 2009. These totals were to rise, however. 
By 2017, over 17% of  G20 exports, an amount that exceeds $1.4 trillion in 
trade, competed with firms that have been bailed out during the crisis or whose 
domestic operations have been subsidized. Furthermore, more than 8% of  
G-0 exports faced a tariff increase, covering at least $740 billion of  exports. In 
line with the WTO monitoring reports,7 we find the amount of  trade covered 
by trade defense and safeguard measures to be small, relatively speaking. We 
estimate that localization requirements affected $213 billion of  trade in 2017, 
7 The “headline” trade coverage ratios that are found in the WTO’s monitoring reports cover only a narrow range of  
import restrictions. The WTO computes these ratios for the new measures in each reporting period implemented by 
G20 countries and does not present cumulative totals of  the trade affected by all measures still in effect at a point in 
time, as we do.
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a sizeable amount for a measure that in the eyes of  many analysts had been 
banned by the Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMs).
The amount of  trade covered by the trade restrictions identified in Figure 5 
and that competes in the home markets of  bailed-out firms, however, pales 
in significance to that covered by state-provided export incentives. As Table 
1 shows, the BRICS nations made frequent use of  export incentives. Most of  
these incentives operate through national tax systems (some of  the most far-
reaching are related to value added taxes, but some are not.) Such incentives 
can force rivals to lower prices, shrinking profit margins and diminishing the 
incentive to export in the first place. Moreover, uncertainty over the size of  
such export incentives can deter foreign rivals.
The full extent of  G20 exports facing subsidized competitors is revealed 
in Figure 6. As nations have progressively expanded the range of  products 
eligible for export incentives, the percentage of  G20 exports competing against 
subsidized rivals in third markets has expanded to 80% in 2017, rising 42 
percentage points in eight years. 
Figure 6: The percentage of G20 exports that face competition from subsidized 
















































Export incentive (third market effects)
All except export incentives
Source:  Global Trade Alert, 11 October 2017.
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In sum, in terms of  scale, crisis-era discrimination against foreign commercial 
interests is more about export expansion than import contraction. Having said 
that, even if  export incentives are excluded, 29% of  G20 exports currently 
face some type of  trade distortion introduced since the crisis began. The long-
held principle of  non-discrimination has taken a battering during the crisis 
era, and the latest data available suggest that there is no end in sight (Evenett 
and Fritz, 2015).
In recent years, more evidence has come to light of  the importance of  state 
competition in the provision of  export incentives. The prolonged haggling in 
the US Congress concerning the reauthorization of  the US Export-Import 
Bank is well known. It should not be forgotten too that France and the United 
Kingdom took advantage of  this situation to lure production and jobs by US 
multinational General Electric. The then-CEO of  General Electric, Mr. Jeff 
Immelt, went on record with the following statement:8
“In today’s competitive environment, countries that have a functional 
Export Credit Agency (ECA) will attract investment...Export finance 
is a critical tool we use to support our customers. Without it, we can’t 
compete against foreign competitors who enjoy ECA financing from 
their governments. We are fortunate to have the support of  UK Export 
Finance (UKEF), one of  the most flexible ECAs in the world. The UK 
is pro-export and pro-manufacturing.” 
The expansion in recent years in various forms of  support for exporters has 
been documented in a report in the Financial Times.9 Given the range of  support 
documented in that article, the assumption that export finance merely corrects 
for market failures ought to be revisited.
In the interest of  balance, it should be noted that certain developing countries 
have not just been expanding their export incentives, but also “improving” the 
implementation of  existing schemes so as to pay exporters more. A leading 
example comes from China. At a press conference at the State Council on 17 
July 2015, Mr. Wang Shouwen, Vice-Minister of  Commerce for China, stated:
“During January to June, China’s volume of  export tax rebates has 
increased 12.4 percent over the same period last year, which is far higher 
than the growth of  export volumes and has greatly boosted the growth 
of  foreign trade exports.”10 
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Practitioners and analysts of  the world trading system who are committed 
to the principle of  non-discrimination ought to be critical of  every deviation 
from this norm. It is unfortunate that the term “protectionism” has long 
been associated with reducing imports. This may well have created a blind 
spot towards measures that artificially favor domestic firms when they export 
products to third markets. 
Ironically, this evidence comes to the fore after WTO members at their 
Ministerial Conference in December 2015 agreed to eliminate, once and for 
all, agricultural export subsidies. If  one accepts the argument that subsidy 
wars in agriculture are wasteful, then what makes rivalry over other export 
incentives different? Having written this, it would be wrong to infer that revising 
the WTO’s subsidy code is the only trade policy-related lesson from the global 
economic crisis. 
Implications for the future work program of the WTO
Coming on top of  the decade-and-a-half  long struggle over the Doha Round, 
the global economic crisis has exposed further deficiencies in the operation 
of  the WTO. Since this is a member-driven organization, it would not be 
appropriate for the WTO Secretariat to shoulder all of  the blame. The latter 
is not immune, however, from criticism. Its weak monitoring of  protectionism 
has provided cover for those diplomats and government officials who ultimately 
are not committed to upholding the principle of  non-discrimination in 
international commerce. From the point of  view of  global governance, if  the 
WTO Secretariat is unable to effectively monitor its member governments, 
then consideration should be given to assigning this role to another official 
institution.
Moreover, the mismatch between the extensive resort to discrimination against 
foreign commercial interests and the limited number of  disputes brought to 
the WTO for settlement begs further questions. If  the discrimination is legal, 
then do existing WTO rules provide for such little constraint on government 
behavior? If  the discrimination is illegal, why are so few cases brought? Could 
a “glass houses syndrome” exist whereby “people who live in glass houses don’t 
throw stones”? Is the counterpart to the mutual indiscipline over protectionism 
mutual restraint in bringing dispute settlement cases? If  so, a key weakness 
of  the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding – namely, that only WTO 
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members can bring cases – needs to be addressed.11 Otherwise, even with the 
best possible rulebook, WTO obligations could be effectively suspended when 
a systemic crisis motivates major trading powers to simultaneously introduce 
discrimination against foreign commercial interests.12
The finding that another global economic crisis has brought to the fore 
prominent forms of  protectionism not seen much in previous crises reflects the 
incentives created by an incomplete WTO rulebook. Tighter rules on subsidies, 
localization requirements, and trade finance are needed. An ambitious WTO 
work program would also include negotiating new rules on export taxes and 
expanding the reach of  the Agreement on Government Procurement. The 
considerable leeway many governments have to raise tariffs without breaking 
their WTO obligations is another matter that could be addressed as part of  
a package of  reforms.
Of  course, it is always possible to put together a wish list of  items for the 
WTO membership to work on. However, the purpose of  this exercise was to 
demonstrate that the recent global economic crisis has revealed significant 
deficiencies in the edifice of  WTO rules. Making an effort to remedy their 
weaknesses – and bearing in mind the different types of  cross-border commerce 
witnessed in the first quarter of  the 21st century – ought to be a priority for 
the WTO membership. There is plenty to be getting on with.13
In sum, once one accepts that there has been considerable resort to 
discrimination against foreign commercial interests during the crisis era, 
then a series of  awkward questions arise concerning the effectiveness of  the 
multilateral trading system. These questions relate to the full range of  the 
WTO’s functions – going well beyond a minor tidying up exercise. Many 
national and international institutions have been thoroughly overhauled after 
their deficiencies were exposed during the global economic crisis – the World 
Trade Organization should be no exception.  
11 In the European Union, for example, the European Commission – acting in its role as “guardian of  the treaties” – 
can bring legal cases against member states before the European Court of  Justice.
12 This may be the most significant lesson from the global economic crisis for the governance of  world trade. There are 
strong complementarities between fixing the WTO rulebook and strengthening its dispute settlement function. Put 
differently, the benefits from improving one are conditional in part on improving the other.
13 Of  course, it must be conceded that incremental improvements in the WTO rule set that result in an incomplete 
set of  rules will still offer opportunities for circumvention whenever the next global economic crisis hits. Practically 
speaking the process of  filling in the WTO rule set will take decades, if  it ever comes to pass. These observations 
may qualify expectations about what a rules-based trading system could ever accomplish in taming the resort to 
protectionism during global economic crises.
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Regional trade agreements (RTAs) are negotiated modalities for trade between 
two or more customs territories,2 to the exclusion of  others.3 By their nature, 
members of  RTAs seek to grant trade preferences to each other, usually in 
the form of  access to their markets, thus discriminating against non-members. 
Members of  RTAs need not be geographically contiguous, or even close to each 
other; all that is needed is that they agree on arrangements for trade between 
themselves. RTAs have always dealt with reciprocal tariff reductions, but they 
are now increasingly complex, often with provisions for, inter alia, customs 
administration, standards, safeguards, services regulations, intellectual property 
and dispute settlement; some extend to competition, investment, labor and 
environment policies.
RTAs are a sub-set of  preferential trade agreements (PTAs). These also include 
arrangements under which countries or customs territories unilaterally grant non-
reciprocal trade preferences to other trading partners. Chief  amongst these is 
the Generalized System of  Preferences (GSP), under which (mainly developed) 
countries grant preferential tariff access for imports from developing countries, 
1  I thank staff of  the RTA Section at the WTO, led by Rohini Acharya; their advice was invaluable but the mistakes 
are mine
2 Normally these are countries, but I have used the phrase “customs territories” to include entities such as Hong Kong, 
China, and Macao, China – which are separate customs areas from China, each with their own trade policies – and 
to include a set of  nations that collectively have a single trading identity, such as the European Union.
3 The term “regional trade agreement” is a bit of  a misnomer, in that they are often not regional; traditionally, the 
WTO uses the term for such arrangements.
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with each GSP “donor” maintaining its own list of  preferences and conditions 
under which the “recipients” are eligible for the more favorable treatment 
of  their exports to the territory of  the GSP provider. Other non-reciprocal 
preference-granting initiatives include i) the European Union’s Everything But 
Arms (EBA) initiative, under which all imports – except armaments – from all 
Least Developed Countries (LDCs) to the European Union are tariff-free and 
quota-free; and ii) the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), under 
which imports of  certain goods – mainly textiles and clothing – to the Unites 
States from eligible African countries are duty-free and quota-free.
This chapter deals essentially with RTAs and their status in the World Trade 
Organization (WTO), referring only in passing to the WTO coverage of  
unilateral, non-reciprocal initiatives.
RTAs have proliferated since the early 1990s, with just under 360 now in 
force compared to fewer than 100 in 1994, the year before the formation of  
the WTO. They also have their own terminology, with terms such as “free 
trade area”, “customs union”, the more prosaic “spaghetti bowl” and, more 
recently, “mega-RTAs.” The next section will deal with the present landscape 
and definitional framework of  RTAs, including their coverage. Following this 
the chapter will turn, in the third section, to the possible reasons for negotiating 
RTAs and the rapid growth in their number. The fourth section in a sense gets 
to the heart of  the matter, examining the provisions under which members 
of  RTAs are authorized under WTO rules to provide preferential treatment 
in their trade relations with each other, thus departing from the cornerstone 
principle of  the WTO of  non-discrimination. The intent, or economic rationale, 
of  these provisions is to ensure that an RTA strengthens – or at least does not 
weaken – the multilateral trading system, but it is not always an easy matter 
to know whether this is indeed the case. The section therefore also looks at 
the relatively recent RTA Transparency Mechanism, which is a peer review 
exercise to improve the understanding of  individual RTAs and, it is hoped, their 
abidance of  WTO disciplines. The chapter then goes on to question, in the 
fifth section, whether RTAs, through their departure from non-discrimination, 
undermine the role of  the WTO as the guardian of  the multilateral trading 
system, particularly in light of  the putative move towards very large RTAs 
such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and the Transatlantic Trade and 
Investment Partnership (TTIP), which, although they may now not come to 
fruition, nevertheless merit some mention. The final section briefly concludes.
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The RTA Landscape
RTAs come in many shapes and forms, but generically they are either free trade 
agreements (FTAs) or customs unions (CUs). The two or more members of  an 
FTA reduce the barriers to trade between themselves but retain independent 
trade policies; thus, for example, tariffs on imports from FTA partners will be 
lowered (normally to zero), but each member of  the FTA will maintain its own 
tariffs vis-à-vis imports from non-members. Such an FTA may cover both goods 
and services, though technically a services FTA is known as an “economic 
integration agreement.” An FTA may also cover less than substantially all 
of  the trade in goods between partners, and is then called a “partial scope” 
agreement.
As members of  an FTA retain their own tariffs for trade with non-members, 
rules of  origin are needed to identify products from members that are eligible 
for the lower duties and restrictions that apply to trade between members. In 
the absence of  such rules of  origin, non-members could divert their product 
to the member of  the FTA with the lowest duty on that product and then 
tranship it to the final destination in the FTA. For example, if  FTA members 
A and B, with zero duties on trade between themselves, imposed duties on 
imports of  motor vehicles from non-members of  10% and 5%, respectively, 
then a non-member exporting motor vehicles to B could initially ship them 
to A and then tranship duty-free to B, thus saving 5%; rules of  origin prevent 
such diversion.
One of  the largest FTAs is the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA). With Canada, Mexico and the United States as members, NAFTA 
accounts for some 14% of  world exports. It provides duty-free treatment 
for virtually all goods originating in the members, has an extensive services 
component, deals also with non-tariff barriers, standards, competition, 
investment, intellectual property and trade disputes between members, and 
has supplemental agreements to handle labor and environmental issues. 
In trade parlance, it is known as a deep agreement, as opposed to a shallow 
agreement that would cover border measures but little else. Other large FTAs 
include the agreement between the Association of  Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN)4 and Japan, which applies only to goods and is thus a “true” FTA as 
compared to one – like NAFTA – that also has a services component, with this 
component then being known as an “economic integration agreement” (see 
above); the ASEAN Free Trade Agreement (AFTA), which applies to goods 
4 The members of  ASEAN are Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, 
Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam; Papua New Guinea is an observer.
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and is relatively unusual in that its members are all developing countries, a 
self-designation in the WTO; agreements between ASEAN and, respectively, 
China, India and the Republic of  Korea, all of  which are goods and services 
agreements; and the European Free Trade Association (EFTA),5 which is also a 
goods and services agreement. These FTAs were to be joined by a mega-FTA, 
the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), which was signed in February 2016 but 
from which the United States has now withdrawn and which has not come 
into force; its membership would have accounted for around 40% of  the 
global economy.6 Eventually, although it is also starting to look unlikely, the 
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) which is currently 
being negotiated between the European Union and the United States may also 
join the ranks of  FTAs. In addition, negotiations are underway for the Regional 
Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) between the 10 members of  
ASEAN, Australia, China, India, Korea and New Zealand.
Examples of  smaller FTAs include agreements between Georgia and Armenia 
(goods); Guatemala and Chinese Taipei (goods and services); Hong Kong, 
China and Chile (goods and services); and India and Nepal (goods), which has 
rather limited coverage and is thus also known as a “partial scope agreement.” 
To date, some 250 FTAs with substantial goods coverage have been notified 
to the WTO.7 In addition, the WTO Secretariat is aware of  about 70 such 
agreements that have not (yet) been notified.8 Over 150 FTAs with a services 
(“economic integration agreement”) component have been notified to the 
WTO, although a limited number of  these are part of  customs unions (see 
below); there are probably about five such agreements that remain un-notified. 
Finally, there are in the order of  23 partial scope agreements.
The second generic category of  RTAs is customs unions, of  which some 30 
have been notified to the WTO. The defining feature of  a CU is that its 
members have a common external tariff. There is therefore no need for rules 
of  origin between the members; once products are in the territory of  the CU, 
they are technically free to move to any part of  the CU, albeit subject to the 
regulatory, non-tariff provisions of  each member of  the CU. 
The largest CU is the European Union, with a share of  some 16.7% of  
the world’s exports of  goods and services (not including intra-EU trade). 
Intra-EU trade, underpinned by the free flow of  goods and services within 
the European Union, is very significant and accounts for some 50% of  the 
5 EFTA members are Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland.
6 The 12 members of  TPP are Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, 
Peru, Singapore, the United States and Vietnam.
7 Source: https://rtais.wto.org/UI/publicsummarytable.aspx.
8 Source: WTO document WT/REG/W/119, 12 September 2017.
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exports of  almost each of  the members. As an indication, in 2015 total EU 
merchandise exports accounted for 33.7% of  world exports, whereas extra-
EU exports accounted for just 15.2%.9 This rather remarkable degree of  
integration reflects10 the comprehensiveness of  the agreement, which has 
provisions on not just tariffs but virtually all aspects of  trade in goods and 
services between the members, including competition, domestic regulation, 
environment, government procurement, intellectual property, labor, mutual 
recognition (services), standards and subsidies. Indeed, the EU has a single 
trade policy and, unlike all other RTAs, speaks with one voice at the WTO.
The EU is also an example of  an open RTA. If  a country is able to accept and 
implement the acquis communautaire (EU law) and the existing members agree, 
it can apply and/or be invited to accede to the EU. Since the Treaty of  Rome 
of  March 1957, the original six members (Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, 
the Netherlands and West Germany) have increased to 28.11  
Other examples of  CUs include the Central American Common Market 
(CACM),12 which is for goods only; the East African Community (EAC),13 
which is for both goods and services; EU–Turkey, which is for goods only (and 
is emblematic of  the fact that the EU has RTAs with each of  its neighbors 
among its total of  37 RTAs, making it the WTO member with the largest 
number of  RTAs);14 the Southern African Customs Union (SACU),15 which 
is for goods and is arguably the oldest CU, having been founded in 1910; and 
the Southern Common Market (MERCUSOR),16 for both goods and services.
In all, as noted, 30 CUs have been notified to the WTO.17 The question arises 
as to why there are so few CUs compared to FTAs. The answer is reasonably 
straight- forward: there is a larger cession of  sovereignty in adopting a common 
external tariff (as in a CU) than in retaining national tariffs vis-à-vis third 
countries (as in FTAs).
The lexicon of  RTAs contains some cute terms, which nevertheless point to real 
phenomena. Most prominent among these is the phrase “spaghetti bowl.”18 
9 Source: https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/statis_e/wts2016_e/wts2016_e.pdf.
10 I use the word “reflects” advisably because causation is not clear.
11 The members are Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, 
Romania, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom.
12 The members are Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua.
13 The EAC’s members are Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda.
14 Alone among RTAs, the European Union is a WTO member in its own right, as are each of  the Union’s 28 members.
15 SACU’s membership consists of  Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa and Swaziland
16 Its original members were Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay.
17 Source: https://rtais.wto.org/UI/publicsummarytable.aspx.
18 The term was first used by Jagdish Bhagwati in his 1995 paper “U.S. Trade Policy: The Infatuation with Free Trade 
Agreements” (Bhagwati, 1995).
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This refers to a complex network of  RTAs (Annex 1) and the complications 
that may then arise. For example, through various arrangements, a country 
may be party to more than one RTA with another trading partner, as is the 
case for Singapore, which at present has three separate RTA links with New 
Zealand19 and would have had a fourth had TPP come into force. The same 
Singapore product may thus be subject to three different rules of  origin to 
qualify for preferential tariff access to New Zealand; similarly, as RTAs are 
normally phased in such that the preferential tariff may not be zero, the same 
product may face three different tariffs into New Zealand. This could certainly 
increase “search costs,” although in the case of  Singapore the authorities 
have put in place a superb website to keep its exporters fully informed and 
to facilitate decisions. Moreover, if  the producer seeks preferential access for 
the product elsewhere under another FTA, the rules of  origin may again be 
different. This might require a number of  distinct production processes for 
the same product, potentially reducing the benefits of  economies of  scale. 
When referred specifically to trade among Asian countries, the spaghetti bowl 
becomes the “noodle bowl.” Note that these spaghetti/noodle bowl effects 
could apply not just to tariffs and/or rules of  origin, but also to all other 
arrangements between the members of  an RTA (the regulatory environment, 
intellectual property rights protection, etc.).
An associated word is “lasagnas,” which refers to a consolidation among RTAs 
such that the spaghetti/noodle bowl becomes less complex. An example of  
this is the Mexico–Central America agreement, which replaced bilateral 
agreements between Mexico and Central American countries. 
Figure 1, compiled by the WTO Secretariat, shows the evolution and stock 
of  RTAs notified to the WTO up to late 2017. In all, there were 284 RTAs in 
force; in addition, as noted above, the Secretariat knew of  at least 70 RTAs 
that had not been notified.
The cumulative total of  notifications of  RTAs in the period from 1948 to late 
2017 is over 650, of  which over 450 were notifications of  RTAs still in force. 
The reason why the number of  notifications exceeds the physical number 
of  RTAs in force is that, under WTO procedures, the goods and the services 
components of  RTAs are notified separately, as are accessions to existing RTAs.
Total notifications include both notifications of  RTAs currently in force and 
past notifications of  RTAs that are now no longer active or in place, mainly 
reflecting both the evolution of  agreements as they are superseded by “deeper 
19 These are the ASAEN—Australia/New Zealand FTA, the Agreement between New Zealand and Singapore on a 
Closer Economic Partnership (ANZSCEP) and the Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership (TPFTA) between 
Brunei Darussalam, Chile, New Zealand and Singapore.
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integration” agreements among the same members20 and the “lasagna” 
effect, sometimes as a result of  EU enlargement. Thus there is a spike in the 
deactivation of  RTAs in 2004, when 12 new members acceded to the European 
Union. Prior to accession, each new member had an RTA with at least one 
other new member and also with the European Union, all of  which were then 
replaced by membership of  the European Union.
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Source: WTO Secretariat.
In summary, in force in late 2017 were 141 RTAs in goods only, 142 RTAs 
in goods and services and one RTA in services only (the latter being the 
European Economic Area, or EEA, with the 28 EU and four EFTA countries 
as its members). Three other points are worth noting: i) the prevalence of  
RTAs is such that all WTO members are now party to at least one RTA, with 
Mongolia, for a long time the only member without RTA links, entering into 
an agreement with Japan in June 2016; (ii) the vast majority of  the RTAs are 
bilateral, essentially because they are easier to negotiate; and iii) the “deeper” 
agreements are invariably between the more developed economies. Indeed, 
there are as yet few RTAs between developed countries and LDCs, an aspect 
that is dealt with in more detail below
20 For example, bilateral agreements between the European Economic Communities (EEC) –the forerunner of  the 
European Union – and a number of  Mediterranean countries were later replaced by “deeper” agreements among 
the same parties to include, for instance, competition, investment and intellectual property.
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Figure 1 also shows the growth in the number of  RTAs. Following some 40 
years of  relative calm after 1948, the number of  RTAs has grown almost 
exponentially since the early 1990s. This has made the trading system 
more complicated, probably reducing transparency and predictability, and 
introducing considerable discrimination among trading partners. These factors 
could contribute to making it more difficult for individual traders to arrive 
at decisions, thus possibly increasing contract-costs and prices. The obvious 
question, and the subject of  the next section, is: “Why so many RTAs?” 
The “Whys?” and “Why Nots?” of RTAs
Governments are not confused about the gains from trade; by and large, they 
agree on the possibility of  such gains. National administrations understand 
that a more liberal trade regime is likely to result in less bias in the transmission 
of  international price signals, thus fostering more efficient resource allocation 
and improving a country’s consumer, and even, production potential. The 
composition of  output is likely to shift towards internationally competitive 
sectors, increasing the exports, employment and wages in those sectors, and 
away from import- competing activities, which will shed employment. Thus, 
while the price of, say, a t-shirt may decline – due to t-shirts now being sourced 
from competitive external producers – there could be noisy protests from the 
unemployed in the shrinking sectors. Although (and this is well established in 
economic theory) the “winners” could compensate the “losers,” resulting in 
a net overall gain, this could require changes in social and fiscal policy that 
may be politically difficult to achieve. In short, if  economies are to reap the 
benefits of  a more liberal trading regime, there needs to be adjustment, and 
this can be painful.
Governments seeking to liberalize their external trade regimes would often 
prefer to do so in the context of  comprehensive multilateral negotiations, such 
as the WTO’s Doha Development Agenda (DDA). This would strengthen – or 
at least not weaken – the non-discrimination, transparency and predictability 
characteristics of  the WTO-led multilateral trading system, which is widely 
regarded economically as the first-best option for achieving the gains from 
trade. Also, and very importantly, it would offer significant trade-offs that, from 
a political point of  view, would allow the export sectors in a country to “buy 
off” the import-competing producers (“yes we may be opening our markets to 
import competition, but our export opportunities will increase substantially, 
making us better off”). Note that this is a purely mercantilist argument (“exports 
are good, imports are bad”), whereas in fact it can be shown, as above, that 
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liberalization can be its own reward.21 Unfortunately, or otherwise, the politics 
of  liberalization work in this manner – trade agreements are treaties and they 
need to be ratified!
The ideal is difficult to achieve. The Uruguay Round was launched in 1986 and 
was concluded successfully in 1994. Since then success has been much more 
difficult to find. The DDA was initiated in 2001, but to date progress has been 
extremely sluggish at best, with few results except for the notable exceptions 
of  the Trade Facilitation Agreement, the RTA Transparency Mechanism 
(which is being provisionally applied), and decisions related to food security 
and export competition. The reasons are clear – the WTO has 164 members 
(as of  end-November 2015), each with its own agenda and red-lines, which can 
and do change over time. It is therefore extremely difficult to find consensus, 
which is the way the WTO makes decisions,22 especially since an agreement 
establishes obligations that are legally binding. Given this reality, and the fact 
that governments will continue to seek the benefits that trade can bring, they 
are likely to look elsewhere for partners. This also brings the advantage that 
they can extend their potential agreements into areas not covered by the 
multilateral trade negotiations, such as competition and investment.23 These 
factors were certainly influential when TPP and TTIP were mooted. And 
indeed Figure 1 shows that there has been a bit of  an acceleration in the 
number of  RTAs notified and brought into force since 2008, when it became 
evident that the already slow progress on the DDA, which arguably had already 
contributed to the growth in the number of  RTAs, was going to falter even 
more, perhaps leading to the agreement’s demise.
There are many other reasons, both economic and/or political, for entering 
into a particular RTA. Important among these is better access to a large market 
than that provided under that country’s membership of  the WTO. This was 
certainly a consideration for New Zealand when it entered into China’s first 
country-to-country, bilateral RTA in October 2008.24 The agreement was 
procedurally important for China also, because New Zealand denoted China as 
21 As a corollary, and from the consumer perspective (and we are all consumers), imports are good because they improve 
consumer choice, and exports are bad because they reduce domestic consumption possibilities, with their role then 
being to pay for imports.
22 There is provision for voting, but it has not been used.
23 At the outset of  the DDA, the negotiating mandate included competition, investment, government procurement 
and trade facilitation, known as the “Singapore issues” because they were first brought onto the WTO agenda at the 
1st WTO Ministerial Conference in December 1996. All but trade facilitation were subsequently dropped, not least 
because many developing countries were not comfortable with their inclusion and it was thought that this might be 
slowing progress on the DDA.
24 At that point China was already part of  the Asia Pacific Trade Agreement (APTA), a partial scope RTA to which it 
acceded in 2002, and had goods and services FTAs with ASEAN (2005) and with Hong Kong, China and Macao, 
China (both 2003).
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a “market economy,” which is a status that provides somewhat more favorable 
treatment in the application of  the WTO’s trade remedy provisions.
Countries have sensitive sectors – ones they would like to protect – such 
as agriculture in many countries (both developed and developing), textiles 
and clothing, and steel (mainly in developed countries). This could facilitate 
negotiations with like-minded partners for RTAs, or at least those that are less 
likely to pressure them on the sensitive sectors. Thus, for example, EU bilateral 
RTAs are generally very light on agriculture (indeed, the European Union’s 
customs union with Turkey excludes agriculture), those of  Japan and Korea 
tend to avoid rice, and those of  the United States are careful to retain special 
provisions for clothing, usually through the retention of  high tariffs and rules 
of  origin that may in fact be “fiber forward” (the raw material needing to be 
grown in the exporting country). “Like-minded” can also apply, of  course, 
to those who seek partners to agreements that go beyond the normal WTO 
disciplines, such as the US–Australia RTA (2005), which includes provisions 
on competition, environment and labor and is WTO-plus on matters such as 
trade-related intellectual property rights.
RTAs are also used to lock in reforms. A telling example of  this is Chile, 
which since its first RTA (with Mexico in 1991) has used an RTA strategy 
to systematically lower its applied tariffs, with a view, inter alia, to improving 
domestic resource allocation. It also serves as an example of  using RTAs 
for learning by doing. When first setting out to enter into the trading system, a 
country’s traders need to learn how to do so, and this is perhaps best done 
by encouraging contracts with those with a similar culture, language, and 
so on. Such RTAs can be instrumental in informing how to negotiate and 
can subsequently lead to deeper RTAs, as was the case for both Chile and 
Mexico. A more recent example of  this is the Japan–Mongolia Economic 
Partnership Agreement, signed in February 2015. This agreement also serves as 
an example of  the “defensive” or, closely related, “bandwagon” and “domino” 
reasons behind RTAs. If  A negotiates an RTA with B, a close trading partner 
C is likely to be close behind in seeking RTAs with both A and B; thus the 
Chile–Korea Agreement was relatively closely followed by the Chile–Japan 
Agreement. More generally, when the United States joined the European 
Union in adopting “regionalism,” side by side with “multilateralism”, as a 
trade policy track (with US–Israel, US–Canada and then NAFTA), it became 
clearer, indeed indisputable, that RTAs were a permanent feature of  the trade 
landscape. Others quickly sought to follow the trend – not least Japan and 
Korea, which had hitherto been adherents of  “multilateralism” only – and 
began to consider/request RTAs either with major traders or with each other 
as a defensive action.
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Politics also plays an important role. In fact, trade policy is integral to the foreign 
policy of  many countries, with RTAs a possible element for strengthening 
diplomatic ties. The Treaty of  Rome, establishing the EEC, was not without 
a certain political motive, with the idea in the background that “those who 
trade with each other do not go to war with each other.” Equally, the recent 
enlargements of  the European Union to include Central and Eastern European 
countries was motivated at least in part by the notion that integration into 
a democratic, market-oriented system would provide those countries with a 
stable platform for their reforms. Also, it is difficult to credit that the United 
States’ agreements with Israel and Jordan were motivated only by economic 
factors, nor indeed its agreement with Panama. There are many more such 
examples, probably including TPP. In fact a look at Figure 1 shows that the 
surge in RTAs coincided roughly with the dissolution of  the USSR. Many of  
the newly emerged countries, and those previously in the sphere of  influence 
of  the former USSR, sought RTAs as a step or “building block” towards their 
fuller integration into the multilateral trading system. Indeed, as with any 
country entering into an RTA, they may have acquired valuable technical 
and negotiating skills, as well as important allies, for their role in the WTO 
system. Also, on a slightly cynical note, trade ministers are politicians and need 
to demonstrate achievements to retain their portfolios; the signing of  an RTA 
is a marvelous photo opportunity!
But RTAs have downsides. These include, as already noted, the beclouding of  
the trading environment with discrimination and complexity – the “spaghetti 
bowl” is real. Also important among the negative aspects of  RTAs is that they 
tend to divert trade – imports are sourced from preferential partners rather 
than from the world’s low-cost suppliers, resulting in losses in efficiency and 
to consumers. Moreover, RTAs have holes that reduce their benefits. It is, for 
example, very difficult (if  not impossible) to agree bilaterally, or even in a larger 
grouping, on effective measures to limit trade-distorting domestic support for 
agriculture; this can probably only be done in a multilateral setting. However, 
RTAs also can and do create trade – this is in fact their purpose – although 
this benefit can be reduced, inter alia, by exclusions from the coverage of  an 
RTA. The trade-off between trade creation and diversion is central to WTO 
provisions on RTAs, and its discussion leads in the next section.
An RTA entails costs for traders. The additional search costs have already 
been noted. Compliance with the rules of  origin, and the paper work involved, 
can also be expensive, sometimes to the point of  eliminating an RTA’s margin 
of  preference for the product. This can be exacerbated by the fact that the 
production process might need to be changed to meet the rules of  origin. 
Anecdotal evidence suggests that a margin of  preference of  up to six percentage 
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points may at times not be enough to compensate for the additional costs; 
traders may then choose to access the market using the “most favored nation” 
(MFN) tariff, applicable to imports from non-preferential sources.
RTAs can attract attention and resources of  even the largest national 
administrations away from the multilateral trading system. They then become a 
stumbling block to improvements in the acknowledged “first best” for the conduct 
of  trade. And this can happen in other ways. A country with preferential 
access to an important market for its main exports may block a multilateral 
tariff deal to prevent its preference margin being reduced; in effect, it would 
seek to limit competition.
As a final point in this section, RTAs can marginalize smaller trading nations, 
including LDCs. The fostering of  freer trade through RTAs may help accustom 
countries to competitive pressures and to sophisticated regulatory regimes, and 
thus may promote wider agreement on – i.e. be a building block towards – a 
stronger, more liberal multilateral trading system. But the smaller traders, 
and African LDCs in particular, are rarely partners to an RTA with major, 
competitive traders, which may place them at a disadvantage in the constantly 
changing trading environment. These countries invariably do have access to 
the preference schemes of  their partners, but these are unilateral and can be 
changed or withdrawn – there is more than one example of  foreign direct 
investment leaving a country as the latter’s preferences into a particular market 
(or markets) are altered.
RTAs now pervade the trading environment and, as noted, there are arguments 
both for and against their continued presence and growth. The question is 
urgent, therefore, as to how they are accommodated in the WTO, as the anchor 
and guardian and of  the multilateral trading system. 
RTAs in the WTO
The WTO is an economic organization encased in law. The rights and 
obligations of  members are designed to help them reap the gains from 
trade, but they are written in legally binding form, with a legal contract then 
underpinning economic intent. So too with RTAs: the economic concept 
of  net trade creation provides a possible rationale for the WTO to allow 
the discrimination of  RTAs as an exception to its cornerstone tenet of  non- 
discrimination.
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Table 1 may help to explain the concept. Consider three separate cases:
1. Home produces a good at 35, Partner at 25, and the Rest of  the World 
(RoW) at 20. Home maintains a zero tariff on imports. Home will then 
import the product from RoW for the maximum gain for consumers – it 
is the optimal outcome.
2. Home has a tariff of  100%, raising the prices of  Partner’s and RoW’s 
products to 50 and 40, respectively. It buys the Home product; there is no 
trade. Then it enters into an RTA with Partner, such that there is a zero 
tariff on Partner’s product. It imports from Partner at 25, which is better 
than the Home price of  35; this is trade creation.
Table 1: Trade creation/diversion
Home Partner Rest of world
Price 35 25 20
Tariff of 100% 35 50 40
Tariff of 50% 35 37.5 30
3. Home has a tariff of  50%, raising the price of  the good from Partner 
and RoW to 37.5 and 30, respectively. Home imports from RoW at 30 
and it collects 10 in tariff revenue – the net cost to Home is actually 20. It 
then enters into an RTA with Partner. It switches (“diverts”) its source of  
imports from RoW to its RTA – imports now cost 25 rather than 30, but 
the tariff revenue of  10 is no longer collected, for a net cost of  5. Thus, 
trade diversion is costly.
The economic position that follows from this is that if  an RTA is net trade 
creating, the system as a whole will benefit. But this is what economists call a 
“comparative–static” result as nothing else has changed; the dynamics of  a 
situation, such as changing tastes, could alter the outcome. That is, it is very 
difficult to know whether an RTA is or will be net trade creating, or otherwise.
The WTO’s disciplines on RTAs reflect this difficulty. Article XXIV of  the 
WTO’s General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), complemented 
by its Understanding as agreed in the Uruguay Round, provides the legal 
framework for RTAs in trade in goods. Article V of  the WTO’s General 
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) does the same for RTAs in trade 
in services. The 1979 Enabling Clause provides for the mutual, preferential 
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reduction of  tariffs and non-tariff measures among developing countries.25 
These provisions represent the “permission” for WTO members to enter into 
RTAs. But there are conditions.
GATT Article XXIV requires, inter alia, that in forming an RTA, the duties 
and other restrictive regulations of  commerce, except those permitted under 
WTO rules, be eliminated with respect to substantially all the trade between the 
parties. GATS Article V requires substantial sectoral coverage and the absence 
or elimination of  substantially all discrimination. The Enabling Clause does not 
have such requirements. Article XXIV also stipulates that the duties and 
other regulations of  commerce (note the absence of  the word “restrictive” in 
comparison to the earlier language) applied by the parties to an RTA shall not 
be higher or more restrictive with respect to third parties than those prior to 
the formation of  the RTA – the so-called “general incidence” clause, in the 
case of  customs unions.26 In the case of  the Enabling Clause, members to an 
RTA are admonished not to raise barriers to, or to create undue difficulties for, 
the trade of  other WTO members. That is, RTAs are expected to be at least 
neutral with respect to their trade with third parties. Nor is there agreement 
in the WTO on important lacunae, such as preferential rules of  origin, which 
could bring uniformity to how such measures are to be evaluated.
The intention of  the above phrases is clear: an RTA should be to the benefit 
of  the system – it should be net trade-creating. The problem is also clear: 
how is any of  this to be measured? These are normative matters that defy 
obvious quantification. And what is the difference between “other restrictive 
regulations” and “other regulations”? Some have suggested that 95% would 
be a “good” measure for “substantially all the trade,” but even at 100% there 
could be net diversion, for example, as a result of  preferential investment rules 
or WTO-plus trade in intellectual property requirements. The point is that 
conditions evolve – a non-restrictive regulation may be changed to become 
restrictive for non-preferential partners, as could be the case for the recognition 
of  professional standards. In short, it is very difficult for members to assess 
whether an RTA complies with WTO rules. It is not surprising then that only 
one RTA has ever been found to be compliant, namely the customs union 
between the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic, which was established 
when Czechoslovakia became the two republics and which “disappeared” when 
both states acceded to the EU in 2004. Nor does WTO Dispute Settlement 
25 Its full name is the 1979 Decision on Differential and More Favourable Treatment, Reciprocity and Fuller Participation 
of  Developing Countries. The Enabling Clause also provides the necessary waiver from non-discrimination for GSP 
schemes; programmes such as AGOA require a separate waiver from the members, and such a waiver is usually time-
bound whereas the Enabling Clause is permanent.
26 The Understanding brought some clarity to this in the case of  tariffs, but it remains an awkward, point-in-time 
calculation.
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provide precedents. No RTA in its own right been has been subject to a legal 
complaint at the WTO;27 indeed, given the uncertainty about compliance, that 
would be almost like “people in glass houses throwing stones.”
Members have not been idle on the matter, being very aware that it is of  systemic 
importance to the WTO. The Committee on Regional Trade Agreements 
(CRTA) was established in 1996 to oversee RTAs, but no reports have been 
issued on the compliance of  an RTA. Besides the difficulty in determining 
compliance, no party will normally agree that its RTA is non-compliant, if  
only for fear of  being drawn into dispute settlement, with the result that the 
compliance exercise has essentially fallen by the wayside.28
In 2001, the clarification and improvement of  RTA disciplines was entrusted to 
negotiators in the DDA. However, agreement has escaped them in the matter 
of  rules, including guidance on the term “substantially”, coverage (whether, 
for example, all goods RTAs should include agriculture) and uniformity of  
rules or origin. Nevertheless, there has been considerable progress in the area 
of  transparency.
Members decided at an early stage of  the negotiations that they needed to 
know more about the facts and figures of  the RTAs in force. This could lead to 
a better appreciation of  the impact of  RTAs on the multilateral system, could 
bring understanding to elusive concepts such as “substantially,” and, under 
peer review, might lead to an improvement in the nature and structure of  
RTAs, to the benefit of  the system. This led, in December 2006, to the WTO 
General Council’s decision to apply, on a provisional basis, the Transparency 
Mechanism for Regional Trade Agreements.29  
The Mechanism provides for the early notification of  RTAs. They are 
subsequently considered by the WTO membership on the basis of  a factual 
presentation prepared by the WTO Secretariat under its own responsibility but 
in close consultation with the parties involved.30 The factual presentations, 
minutes and questions and answers are published, but no report is issued. 
To date somewhat over 250 factual presentations have been distributed, 
providing a wealth of  verified data. This information feeds into an RTA 
database, mandated by the Mechanism, maintained by the Secretariat and 
made available to the public and, hence, for purposes of  research. 
27 In two disputes RTAs have been an issue, essentially concerning whether they can be used as a legal defence for 
perceived discrepancies between some of  their provisions and existing WTO rules.
28 Prior to the CRTA, individual Working Parties examined RTAs.
29 See WTO document WT/L/671 (18 December 2006) for the text of  the decision. The Mechanism is also described 
in some detail on the WTO’s website at https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/trans_mecha_e.htm.
30 The consideration in the CRTA if  the agreement is notified under GATT Article XXIV or under GATS Article V; if  
it is notified under the Enabling Clause, the discussion takes place in WTO’s Committee on Trade and Development.
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The consideration of  an RTA under the Mechanism does not include an 
assessment of  its consistency with WTO provisions, and it is precluded from 
being used for purposes of  dispute settlement. This is intentional, obviating 
a discussion of  normative issues and encouraging a frank exchange on the 
facts of  the RTA.
The Mechanism has certainly improved transparency with respect to RTAs. 
However, there is no escaping the fact that the WTO’s legal provisions on 
RTAs remain very difficult – essentially impossible – to enforce. Thus, it is 
up to members to ensure that their RTAs meet the spirit of  the WTO’s legal 
provisions – to benefit, or at least complement, the system, supporting the 
WTO.
RTAs: Do They Help or Hurt?
The question is seemingly of  some importance. After 16 years of  negotiations 
the DDA has yielded few results, appears moribund, and is unlikely to be 
completed, at least as a single package. This leaves many with the perception 
that the WTO has lost some credibility as the mainstay of  the multilateral 
trading system, with an agenda that may not reflect the realities of  the trading 
environment, particularly the very significant sway of  China and the maturing 
of  “new” technologies such as the Internet. The continued growth in the 
number of  RTAs adds to – and is perhaps influenced by – the notion of  a 
WTO on the wane, with RTAs then arguably more in tune with the trading 
needs of  their parties.
A rebuttal could come in two intertwined parts: i) the WTO is about a great 
deal more than just the DDA; and ii) it is not clear that RTAs have seriously 
undermined the WTO, although the jury might still be out on the possible 
new mega-RTAs, which after all are not yet in place.
The WTO remains a valuable global public good. The important day-to-
day work will continue in the WTO Committees that implement its various 
agreements such as that on agriculture, contributing to freer, more predictable 
trade flows. So too will its significant work on transparency, including the trade 
policy reviews of  member countries, the monitoring reports on protectionism 
that feed into the G20, and the discussion of  RTAs; these functions fruitfully 
inform both members and the public. And the dispute settlement mechanism 
continues to provide sterling service in ruling on disagreements between 
members in their use of  trade measures, fostering abidance by the rule-of-
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law between parties. The WTO also curbed protectionism31 and kept markets 
open during the recent financial crisis, thus helping to contain contagion and 
perhaps a global depression.
Moreover, despite the DDA and intense RTA activity, the WTO remains an 
impressive negotiating forum for global trade rules, as evidenced by the recent 
Trade Facilitation Agreement. And, as noted, it is probably only in the WTO 
that disciplines in areas such as agricultural support could be agreed. Nor 
is it clearly the case that the WTO’s ability to negotiate on market access 
has been impaired by RTAs, where the gains and trade-offs might already 
have been made. For example, the Information Technology Agreement 
(ITA), which eliminates tariffs on a large number of  high-tech goods, has 
grown to 82 members, compared to fewer than 30 when it was first signed in 
December 1996, and covers some 97% of  trade in the products concerned, 
with the liberalization applied also on a non-discriminatory, MFN basis to 
non-members.
In a like manner, precisely during the time when RTAs were showing 
spectacular growth in numbers, the number of  WTO members also grew 
rapidly. The WTO now has 164 members, compared to the 128 members of  
the GATT, the WTO’s predecessor. And, in fact, when the WTO was founded 
on January 1st, 1995, its 100 members accepted a considerably higher level 
of  multilateral obligations than they had under the GATT. Those agreeing 
and acceding to the WTO clearly sought to ground their trade policies in a 
non-discriminatory, stable environment. By this interpretation, the WTO has 
remained a firm anchor of  the system.
The anchor could be firmer still if  there were multilateral trade agreements 
in areas like competition and investment, and if  progress could be made in 
services and preferential rules of  origin. For their part, RTA parties might think 
about steps such as cumulating origin across their various agreements – as in 
the Pan-Euro-Mediterranean preferential rules of  origin – and the mutual 
recognition of  standards; these could certainly promote deeper integration 
within the RTAs but, as always with discriminatory measures, the net benefit is 
uncertain. Parties to RTAs might also consider extending their tariff preferences 
on a non-discriminatory basis in the case of  products where the MFN rates 
are already low, say at a “nuisance” level, thus both obviating the need for 
rules of  origin on these products and enhancing competition. 
31 This point is not beyond debate. In their chapter in this volume, Simon Evenett and Johannes Fritz argue rather 
persuasively that there was a surge in protectionism early in the financial crisis, although not in the main through 
resort to “traditional” measures, such as tariffs and trade defense.
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The question remains as to whether the situation could be significantly changed 
by the emergence of  new potential mega-RTAs, such as the once possible 
TPP (with the United States as a member), the unlikely but still possible TTIP 
(with the U.S. Secretary of  Commerce indicating openness to resuming talks) 
and also RCEP. It should be noted that this would not be the system’s first 
experience with mega-RTAs, with the European Union and NAFTA (see 
below) already forming part of  the landscape. Both have often played positive 
leadership roles in the WTO; indeed, critical work and compromises by the 
European Union and the United States led to the founding of  the WTO, 
significantly strengthening the multilateral trading order.
In this context, the US withdrawal from TTP in January 2017 has the touch of  
a lost opportunity for the system, particularly if  TTIP comes to fruition. One 
might envisage a situation in which TPP and TTIP shared the same template 
for their RTAs, granted each other cumulation in origin, agreed on the mutual 
recognition of  standards and applied each other’s dispute settlement rulings. 
This would create, de facto, a new trade regime for some 50% of  world output, 
possibly providing momentum for progress in the multilateral arena – with 
others not wanting to be left behind – including frameworks, for example, in 
investment and e-commerce, for updating the WTO. 
However, such an arrangement would exclude major traders such as Brazil, 
China and India. In this context, the decision to negotiate RCEP might well 
have been defensive, at least in part. Moreover, the economic impact of  these 
agreements might have been less than overwhelming, with zero MFN rates 
already in place – due to the Uruguay Round and ITA – on a wide range of  
products (particularly manufactures) and most other rates low. Also, they might 
have led to significant diversion in some areas, particularly agriculture in TPP, 
and perhaps regulations and investment. Thus, as is often the case with RTAs, 
it would have been difficult to gauge the actual impact of  the agreements 
on the multilateral system. Nevertheless, there can be no doubt that the US 
withdrawal from TPP helped to feed concerns about the commitment of  the 
United States to the trading system.
Such concerns are augmented by the ongoing renegotiations of  NAFTA. 
Reciprocity, as noted above, has always been a negotiating tool. The present 
suspicion that the United States is seeking to equilibrate, completely or in 
part, bilateral imbalances with its partners in these negotiations would raise 
reciprocity to a policy objective, essentially then viewing trade as a zero-sum 
game rather than one with net benefits. This is the road to market sharing, 
undermining the very market mechanisms that have facilitated the considerable 
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benefits that the trading system has brought to its participants. In short, the 
United States is playing a dangerous game.
Conclusion
RTAs certainly have complicated the trading environment but it is not clear 
that they have undermined the WTO; they may have supported integration 
into the multilateral system. This system has provided significant benefits, 
including – and perhaps in particular – for the major traders. It is in their 
self-interest to safeguard the integrity of  this global public good. Given the 
past record, hiccups and the DDA notwithstanding, it is to be hoped that they 
will continue doing precisely that.
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Addressing the Networked 
Economy in Trade Policy
Nick Ashton-Hart
When most people think of  the Internet, they think of  the services they use 
online in daily life – search engines, social media, streamed video and audio 
services, and email. That’s not a good definition for the digital economy – in 
fact, it is a particularly poor one, yet policymakers frequently work on that 
flawed assumption.
The best definition for the Internet – or digital – economy actually goes back 
to the 2008 OECD Ministerial: it is “… the full range of  our economic, social 
and cultural activities supported by the Internet and related information and 
communications technologies” (OECD, 2008).
Let’s unpack the elements for viewing through the trade lens – starting with 
services.
First, and perhaps most fundamentally, the “business-to-consumer” (B2C) 
services like those we use daily are only about 10% of  the economic value 
proposition of  services with a digital dimension. The other 90%1 is business-to-
business services (B2B), such as “cloud” and supply chain management systems 
and “industrial Internet”2 applications. UNCTAD estimates that cross-border 
B2C e-commerce was worth about $189 billion in 2015 (UNCTAD, 2017).
The Internet has made many services exportable in a way that was previously 
impossible. While outsourcing may be controversial, it is a good example 
of  this phenomenon, as technology has made distance and geography 
irrelevant to the competitiveness of  payroll services, legal discovery services 
and customer relationship management, including, famously, call centers. This 
has contributed to making services the largest segment of  the world economy 
1 There are various sources for this figure, but perhaps the most useful reference is the UN Conference on Trade and 
Development’s Information Economy Report 2015 (UNCTAD, 2015).
2 For a good overview that is layman friendly, see Bruner (2013).
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in GDP terms (Lanz and Maurer, 2015) and the largest employer even in 
developing countries since the turn of  this century, 20 years after it became 
true for OECD countries.3 The ICT services component, while small as a 
proportion of  all services, is the fastest growing: up 40% between 2010 and 
2015 (UNCTAD, 2017).
Beyond services, 75% of  the economic value of  the digital economy benefits 
traditional bricks and mortar businesses of  all kinds (McKinsey Global Institute, 
2011a,b). Think for a moment about the economic consequences of  that fact, 
given that the size of  the digital economy is estimated at up to 4.3% of  GDP 
worldwide (UNCTAD, 2017).4
At the same time, the latest studies we have show that while flows of  non- 
digital goods and services have actually declined relative to GDP, data flows 
have expanded 45-fold, with an estimated positive contribution to GDP of  
10% (McKinsey Global Institute, 2016).
Figure 1: After 20 years of rapid growth, traditional flows of goods, services and 
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Source: Exhibit E1 from McKinsey Global Institute (2016); IMF Balance of Payments; World Bank; 
McKinsey Global Institute analysis.
A key objective of  “offline” trade policy is to progressively reduce tariffs and 
other barriers to trade between countries, with an ideal objective of  “free” 
and fair, frictionless trade worldwide. The Internet is by nature friction- and 
barrier-free – it makes any company that uses it a global business from the 
3 See the supporting datasets for the International Labour Organization’s Global Employment Trends 2014, at http:// 
www.ilo.org/global/research/global-reports/global-employment-trends/2014/WCMS_234879/lang--en/index.
htm.
4 See table II.1 and Figure II.7 at page 23.
Addressing the Networked Economy in Trade Policy   217
moment it goes online. That remarkable facility is at the heart of  why research 
has repeatedly found that for each 10% increase in broadband penetration, 
GDP rises by between 0.25% and 1.38% (ITU, 2012: 17).
You will notice considerable variability in these statistics; that’s because 
measuring the digital economy holistically is famously difficult. Perhaps the 
best approach from an economist’s perspective is that of  the OECD (2013: 
7), which divides the Gordian knot into three elements:
1. The “direct impact”: the value added generated by Internet-related 
activities
2. The “dynamic impact”: net GDP growth generated by all activities related 
to Internet-related activities
3. The “indirect impact”: consumer surplus and welfare gains generated by 
Internet-related activities.
Rather than presenting an economic theory view of  the networked economy, 
this chapter will relate it to how networks actually work and explain how world 
trade rules relate to that “real world” paradigm; this also corresponds to the 
way trade rules are structured. The hope is that this will aid both trade policy 
practitioners and those more familiar with the Internet in forging a common 
understanding.
Finally, the networked economy is important for all countries, not just for a 
few; it is at the heart of  economic activity. Despite that fact, countries are 
increasingly implementing measures that add friction in online trade – this 
chapter will explore several. Understanding these measures is a key and pressing 
challenge for trade policymakers.5 The chapter ends with some ideas of  policy 
options that can help trade and non-trade specialists understand the subject 
better and explore some trade policy options that would facilitate commercial 
activity, but also create more trust in digitally enabled trade, acknowledging 
that in several areas there are significant complexities and political sensitivities.
5 There have been many efforts to quantify the elements that prepare a country to take maximum advantage of  
networked technologies for economic benefit; perhaps one of  the more interesting is the Digital Evolution Index 
developed by the Fletcher School at Tufts University, with participation by many private- and public-sector 
stakeholders (see http://insights.mastercard.com/digitalevolution/).
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The Network and the Data It Carries: Two Different 
Things
To understand the Internet in a trade context is a challenge. This is partly 
because trade specialists are confronting a subject that is new to them, but also 
because those who advocate for networked economy provisions in trade often 
don’t explain the fundamentals so that policymakers can relate the unfamiliar 
to the existing trading system they know.
The starting place is that the Internet from a trade perspective is really two 
different things:
1. The network that makes communications between any connected 
devices possible (in this chapter, the “network as a platform”). This most 
closely corresponds to ‘basic telecommunications services’ in the General 
Agreement on Trade in Services (“GATS”).
2. The data and associated services that use that network as a communications 
platform (or “everything else”). From a GATS perspective again, these 
would be value-added telecommunications services but also many others 
where the service delivered electronically is functionally the same as an 
offline service.
It is important to look more closely at these though; where to draw the line 
between them is crucial, so let’s use the “digital holiday” scenario to illustrate 
that boundary.
Let’s say every person who uses the Internet took a “digital holiday” on the 
same day, and every single online application service provider (search engines, 
video services, email providers, etc.) did the same thing. The network itself  
would still continue exchanging addresses and related information. The next 
morning when people go online, everything would work as normal.
The data that the network carries are the applications and services that people 
use and the data that those applications and services create. The network is 
the hardware, interconnections and essential communications between them.6
6 For the technically minded, the network as a platform corresponds to the lowest four layers of  the OSI model and the 
lowest three of  the TCP/IP (RFC 1122) model.
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The Network
The network is an interrelated web of  hardware and software that utilize 
common standards to ensure each component is interchangeable with 
others performing the same function. This concept – “interoperability”7 – is 
important because it allows maximum flexibility in designing networks and 
related systems. It is a close functional cousin to the concept of  technology 
neutrality that is so fundamental to trade policy.
The grouping of  standards that make communications in the network possible 
are known as the “Internet protocol (IP) stack.” IP-based networks are designed 
to operate with maximum efficiency, and a continuous process of  evolution of  
these standards responds to the need for greater performance, interoperability, 
resilience, trust and security over time.
What we call the public Internet is actually a “network of  networks.” The large 
majority are privately owned and managed by corporations, whether for the 
use of  their employees or, in the case of  Internet service providers (ISPs), for 
the public to connect to the rest of  the Internet.
Keeping things simple, there are three types of  entity that collectively make 
basic connectivity, and therefore the public Internet, possible:
• Internet service providers (ISPs): entities that provide connectivity for end- 
users (ranging from single mobile devices to the largest corporations), of  
which most countries have from several to dozens;
• Backbone providers: entities that connect ISPs to one another but that do 
not have end-users as customers. These entities are often responsible for 
making connections between countries and continents possible.
• The processes and institutions that manage allocation of  unique identifiers, 
such as IP addressing and the domain name system (DNS). These are 
analogous to telephone numbers or postal addresses in that they allow 
any “node” on the network to be identified and reached from any other 
node, and ensure that worldwide every single unique address is used only 
once. If  you’re wondering what a ‘node’ is, your mobile phone and your 
PC or laptop are examples.
7 For a user-friendly overview of  the Internet and the “network of  networks” that it is comprised of, the Internet Society’s 
“An Introduction to Internet Interconnection Concepts and Actors” (Internet Society, 2012) is recommended (see 
www.Internetsociety.org/sites/default/files/bp-interconnection.pdf).
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Each ISP or backbone provider must do two things aside from connecting to 
its customers:
• Connect to other ISPs so their respective customers may exchange data 
and connect to backbone providers (either directly or indirectly) to allow 
international traffic exchange. Without these agreements (often known as 
“peering” or “interconnection” agreements), the Internet would cease to 
be a global platform and would exist solely as ISP-specific “islands” that 
would only allow users to connect to the other customers of  their own ISP.
• Acquire the various types of  technical addresses necessary for its equipment 
and that of  its customers to connect to others, and implement the related 
services (like DNS servers) that allow every single device on the public 
Internet to have a unique address.
The result? Networks (if  left to themselves and the web of  stakeholders who 
operate and maintain them) can:
• Automatically find the optimal (which is not necessarily the most 
direct) route between any two points at any given time.8 The route 
between any two points may traverse third countries, and that route may 
pass through different third countries at different times of  the same day. 
This is especially common in border areas where two countries have dense 
populations in close proximity to a shared border.
• Create a communications connection between any two points 
in a way that optimizes performance in the networks through 
which that communication passes. This can result in communications 
taking a route that is geographically complex to ensure the communication 
“performs” better.
• Ensure that anyone may extend the public Internet simply by 
connecting a device called a router9 to the “edge” of  the network and 
applying for a unique address for it. Acquiring that address is often 
8 Throughout this chapter illustrations refer to connections between two points (“point to point”) in order to make key 
points easy to follow. There certainly are communications where a single origin is connecting to multiple endpoints 
simultaneously and each of  these endpoints may be in different countries from one another.
9 A router is a device that “talks” to other such devices to figure out how to forward requests from any device connected 
to it to any other part of  the network. The standards used ensure that this can happen automatically, and as the 
network topology changes in real time these changes are “learnt” by those devices that need to know about them. 
Pretty much every business and residence has a router, in the latter case generally provided by the Internet service 
provider.
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automatic, though public Internet addresses are ultimately assigned by 
regional Internet registries (RIRs)10 to ensure every single device on the 
public Internet has a unique address.
The public Internet as a platform is inherently blind to geography in a way 
that the “offline” world is not. Goods trade, for example, would generally be 
biased against shipping via third countries to deliver a package sent from, and 
bound for, destinations in the same country to avoid the potential “friction” 
of  border measures such as customs, tax compliance and other formalities. 
The digital world by design doesn’t care about borders.
The Objectives of  Trade Agreements Related to the Network as a Platform
Looking at the network as a platform suggests several policy objectives to 
pursue in trade agreements (and public policy in general):
• Avoid actions that impede or distort basic functions such as 
addressing and traffic routing. Where a country needs to prevent 
some communication from taking place, or prevent access to certain 
information that the network carries for whatever reason (such as to block 
child pornography), it must do so in a way that does not affect the operation 
of  the network that carries those communications.
• Avoid actions that might impact upon “transit traffic.” As we have 
seen, traffic often – for very good reasons – transits a country for which 
it is neither the destination nor the source. This argues strongly for such 
transit traffic to remain untouched and unhindered – after all, failing to 
respect transit traffic of  others could lead to reciprocal lack of  respect for 
your own. More about transit traffic later.
• Avoid obligations that distort private-sector choices about how 
equipment or services integral to the functioning of  the network 
as a platform are made. Measures of  this type – often called “local 
hosting” obligations – can refer to elements of  the network as a platform 
(like submarine cables, routers or related equipment), but they are most 
often intended to influence where applications, data, and related services 
are hosted. Obligations that distort investment choices that would otherwise 
seek to optimize performance, resilience, and cost in the network everyone 
uses could be trade-distorting (a “non-tariff measure”, or NTM, in trade 
10 These organizations are responsible for managing the key forms of  addressing on the Internet, which are akin to the 
various types of  addresses in the worldwide postal system in the functions they perform. All of  them are ultimately 
linked to the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA), managed by the Internet Corporation for Assigned 
Names and Numbers (ICANN). IANA and the RIRs work together (more information is available at http://www. 
iana.org/numbers).
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parlance). An example from the offline world is roads: we want roads to 
be well maintained and with enough lanes to handle peak traffic, and 
ideally to have multiple connections between locations so that when traffic 
congestion affects one road we have alternative routes to take.
How Existing Trade Agreements Relate to the Network as a Platform
Thanks to the principle of  technology neutrality in trade agreements like 
GATS the network as a platform has been subject to extensive coverage in 
WTO members’ commitments (as ‘basic telecommunications services’) since 
GATS entered into force. International commitments in this area are anchored 
to the WTO Agreement on Basic Telecommunications Services.11 Part of  the 
problem is that this agreement is an annex of  GATS, and GATS is a “positive 
list”12 agreement – meaning that the only obligations countries have are those 
they specifically commit to.13
There are 108 WTO member countries with commitments in 
telecommunications, though the commitments are worded differently14 so the 
only way to determine what common commitments exist is through laborious 
searching and comparison of  the wording of  each commitment. What the 
Internet really needs is not a “positive list” approach to commitments but the 
opposite – a “negative list” approach coupled with the political will to agree 
upon robust framing of  the obligations themselves.
The concepts in the WTO Agreements are sound and have been improved 
upon by bilateral and regional free trade agreements in the intervening 
decades,15 the most comprehensive treatment being that of  the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership finalized in 2015, now in the process of  being amended and 
renamed the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific 
Partnership.16
11 https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/serv_e/12-tel_e.htm.
12 For those unfamiliar with some of  the trade terms used in this chapter a good glossary, provided by the Organization 
of  American States’ SICE project, may be found at http://www.sice.oas.org/dictionary/SV_e.asp.
13 A layman-friendly description of  the flavor of  existing commitments may be found at https://www.wto.org/english/ 
tratop_e/serv_e/telecom_e/telecom_highlights_commit_exempt_e.htm#country.
14 Commitments may be found by searching the WTO’s ‘i-Tip’ database at http://i-tip.wto.org/.
15 For a good history of  GATS and international services negotiations at the WTO and in regional trade agreements, 
see Adlung and Mamdouh (2013).
16 For the relevant provisions, see Chapter 13 of  the Trans-Pacific Partnership (inter alia, Articles 13.4.3 and 13.4.5.6) 
at http://tpp.mfat.govt.nz/text. While the TPP is being amended due to the withdrawal of  the United States, the 
provisions referenced in this chapter have not been changed as of  the time of  writing.
Addressing the Networked Economy in Trade Policy   223
Data Flows (or “Everything Else”)
The term “data flows” or the “free flow of  data” in a trade context refers 
to the exchange of  any and all information in electronic form unrelated to 
maintenance of  the network connectivity that makes those data exchanges 
possible.17
Data flows, not surprisingly, are where everything becomes complicated as 
data can and does relate to any activity that can be conducted electronically 
at distance.
In order to understand the flow of  data, one must start by understanding two 
key facts about the fundamentals of  IP-based networks:
• Each and every communication is broken into little pieces called 
“packets” and sent to its destination independently, and then 
reassembled on reception; if  (and this often happens) a packet goes 
“missing” along the way, the receiver asks the sender to send it again.
• The result of  this “packetizing” of  data is that only the sender and 
receiver of  any online communication know what is being 
communicated.18
These two facts are critical, as they show that data flows operate pretty 
much opposite to offline trade, where transactions require a package bound 
for international destinations to clearly indicate what it contains; packages 
may be opened to verify that the contents are as stated. The Internet’s 
fundamental approach cannot really change; there are hundreds of  billions 
of  communications taking place simultaneously 24x7. To make the contents of  
all communications transparent would not only require a complete redesign of  
the network, it would create such overheads throughout the transmission path 
of  every communication as to render the network unusable or unaffordable, 
or both.
Keeping this in mind, there are ways to break the monolith of  “data flows” 
down in a rules-based trading context and below is a résumé of  the principles 
that should apply:
17 Again for the technical, this essentially corresponds to the application layers of  both the OSI and TCP/IP models.
18 This is a slight simplification – it is possible to “inspect” packets to divine information about what each contains to 
a certain degree, but doing this is technically burdensome and necessarily imperfect, and where a communication is 
encrypted (as an increasing number of  communications are) inspection is rendered useless.
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1. The principle of  technology neutrality of  trade agreements means that 
any online activity should be treated the same as its offline 
equivalent. This principle actually provides substantial coverage today as 
regards many economically significant activities online, from the purchase 
of  goods of  every variety via online storefronts to services of  many kinds. 
The data associated with these activities are covered to the same extent as 
the activity that produces them, as they are integral to covered activities.
2. Entirely Internet-based services should receive the benefit of  
national treatment and market access commitments related to 
their offline equivalents. In practical application, this has been disputed 
when it is inconvenient for WTO members in certain circumstances. For 
example, countries have alleged foreign search services to be purveyors 
of  pornography even where domestic equivalent services allow users to 
legally link to similar adult content (Elegant, 2009). Numerous other 
foreign Internet-based services, including social networks, blogging and 
photo sharing sites, have over time been blocked for varying lengths of  
time or severely restricted by government action while domestic versions 
of  the same services are permitted to operate.19 There is also very little 
transparency about what material is removed from online services, when, 
for what purpose, and at whose instruction. Even where companies would 
like to release details of  these requests, they are routinely legally prevented 
from doing so in many jurisdictions. Companies have increasingly begun 
unilaterally publishing information about this.20 In the trade context, 
voluntary measures that must accommodate unharmonized, nationally 
specific legal restrictions on disclosure do not produce the certainty or 
transparency that a rules-based international regime can.
3. As a corollary to national treatment, competing equivalent lawful 
economic activities online should be treated the same by the 
network wherever any part of  an economic transaction is in 
another country. In national and regional debates this is often referred 
to as “network neutrality” and is hotly debated. Net neutrality is discussed 
in more detail below.
19 The OpenNet Initiative compiles information on the types of  blocking, monitoring, and filtering that countries 
engage in (see http://map.opennet.net/). A layman-friendly explanation of  the different types of  interference that 
exist is at https://opennet.net/about-filtering.
20 Transparency reporting has greatly increased globally in the wake of  the Snowden disclosures; the Global Network 
Initiative is an example of  an Internet industry initiative to promote disclosure of  such requests (see http://www. 
globalnetworkinitiative.org/).
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4. Any data not bound for, or coming from, the territory they are 
passing through shall not be subject to any impediment. This is a 
corollary to the rule on the network as a platform and for the same reasons.
Existing Protection of  Data Flows
The level and scope of  existing coverage of  data flows per se is a subject of  
considerable debate.
At least 60 countries have undertaken commitments on “data processing” and 
76 on “on-line information and/or data processing” (Berry and Reisman, 2012) 
under the WTO agreements. Given the latitude that countries have in the 
wording of  their commitments, of  course there is considerable variation. More 
definitively, a moratorium on customs duties on “electronic transmissions” 
covers all WTO members and while it is not permanent, it has been renewed 
at each WTO Ministerial, and many countries have included it as a permanent 
feature of  bilateral and plurilateral agreements. 
With respect to services themselves, where there is little functional difference 
between their online and offline versions the market access and national 
treatment obligations should apply. Again, commitments may be read in 
different ways depending upon the interests of  the reader – or more to the 
point, the country the reader represents if  he or she is a trade negotiator.
Many books have been written about the extent to which existing CPC 
classifications cover the digital equivalents of  offline activities and the problems 
associated with the trading system’s dependence upon classifications last revised 
in 1991.21 Because commitments often refer to these classifications, given their 
generality it can make commitments even more subject to interpretation 
depending upon how they’re worded.
This does argue for straightforward commitments on data flows as a policy 
object and the TPP is the most substantive step in this direction of  any trade 
agreement to date.22 
ICT Hardware: The Common Thread
The focus of  this chapter is the networked economy as a wider phenomenon 
rather than its specific impacts on the ICT sector. Of  course, the Internet exists 
21 The “current” classification list for services trade is online at https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/serv_e/mtn_
gns_w_120_e.doc.
22 See the Electronic Commerce Chapter of  the TPP (inter alia Article 14.11) at http://tpp.mfat.govt.nz/text.
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in physical form not just as wireless signals. The data the platform carries are 
generated by people using the multitude of  network enabled devices, from 
cloud services’ server farms to your smartphone.
Goods trade in these forms of  ICT-related hardware is economically significant 
– reaching US$4 trillion in 2014. One of  the crown jewels of  the WTO system 
relates to ICT hardware like this – the Information Technology Agreement 
(ITA), concluded as a plurilateral agreement in 1996, removed all tariffs on 
the products it covers.
The rapid advance of  technology increasingly made revision of  the agreement 
a priority (as the original agreement covered only items specifically listed, rather 
than product families), and this was agreed in December 2015 at the 10th 
Nairobi WTO Ministerial. It is at least arguable that the ITA is the greatest 
achievement of  the WTO in normative terms after the WTO agreements 
themselves, and it is understood to be profoundly beneficial to developed and 
developing countries alike.23 It is estimated that the expansion alone may add 
$1 trillion in annual global trade benefits in covered goods and increase global 
GDP by $190 billion.24
Digital Issues and their Trade Dimensions
It has always been the case that public policy issues that arise in a non-trade 
context can have profound trade implications, and the networked economy is 
not exempt from this reality. Here are several of  the most topical.
Network Neutrality
“Network neutrality” has been debated for a decade in a few advanced 
economies, but is now being discussed by regulators in many countries as the 
Internet’s impact spreads.
The debate about net neutrality is a struggle that is both economic and political 
and has enormous consequences in three respects:
• Who gets to decide how the value generated by product and service 
providers is apportioned – application providers themselves, or ISPs?
23 There are many studies of  the application of  the ITA to developing countries, but a particularly good one is Ezell 
(2012).
24 See, inter alia, United States Trade Representative, Supporting Economic Growth at Home and Abroad by Eliminating 
Trade Barriers on Information Technology Products, July 2015, at https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/
fact-sheets/2014/November/Supporting-Economic-Growth-Home-Abroad-Eliminating-Trade-Barriers-on-IT- 
Products.
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• How much control should each part of  the value chain of  digital commerce 
have over the public Internet in each country?
• Who controls the power position of  each part of  that chain – shareholders 
and markets, or regulators?
Boiled down to the essentials (there are considerable nuances, especially in 
markets where competition between ISPs is impaired), the main question is this:
• If  network neutrality is obligatory, then ISPs must treat all applications 
or services the same as any other that is functionally similar. In other words, 
YouTube could not pay ISPs in order to make it perform better for the 
user than a similar startup video service.
• If  network neutrality is not obligatory, then ISPs can charge service 
and application providers fees to prioritize paying services over those of  
competitors.
An additional dimension relates to peering and whether these agreements are 
entirely private or regulated by the same kinds of  rules.
The trade policy community has yet to engage with this discussion much. 
Aside from the European Union (where a Regulation for the Union as a 
whole was finalized in 2015 but with important definitional elements left to 
the member states), net neutrality debates have focused on how they will apply 
within countries.
These national debates miss the impacts these decisions have on the Internet 
as a globalized trading platform. Since the private sector owns and controls 
the international links between countries, net neutrality rules that impact 
international peering arrangements could have profound impacts.
This is magnified when you realize that a few backbone providers handle the 
vast majority of  international Internet traffic. Many of  these so-called “Tier 
1” (Zmijeuski, 2016) providers are actively lobbying on network neutrality in 
key economies.25
In addition, all countries are not created equal with respect to the flow of  
data – just like offline trade, some generate far more data than they take 
in. As a consequence, national decisions about net neutrality may well have 
consequences far beyond their borders.
Figure 2: Submarine cable map
25 With respect to lobbying spend in the United States on its net neutrality decision, three of  the biggest backbone 
providers were active: Verizon and AT&T opposed, and Level3 was in favor (Furmas and Drutman, 2014). European- 
headquartered Tier 1 providers are active participants in the net neutrality debate at the European Union as well.




Local hosting obligations are widely discussed in the trade community, in part 
because they are easy to relate to offline trade. There are few measures more 
disruptive to the networked economy – that’s a broad statement, but justifiably 
so since we know that the largest beneficiary of  the networked economy is 
traditional businesses.
We know that all commercial activity depends upon access to a wide variety 
of  products and services available at competitive prices as inputs. If  your 
competitor is allowed to choose the inputs he or she wants based solely upon 
price and suitability for the purpose at hand and you are not, you are at a 
disadvantage. This is just as true for inputs related to the Internet.
For example, let’s say you manufacture hats and sell them online as well as 
in shops. If  you’re obliged to host all records of  customers in your country 
on local servers, that will limit the services that you can choose to take credit 
cards for payment to those willing to follow your local data localization rules. 
If  you are from a smaller or developing country and you have data localization 
requirements, the major online marketplaces may not make their service 
available to you or your countrymen. If  that happens, you lose incredibly 
valuable opportunities for marketing and selling your goods to a global market 
of  buyers.
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One of  the most authoritative studies of  data localization (Bauer et al., 2014) 
found that the impact of  rules being planned or implemented in several 
countries (Brazil, China, the European Union, India, Indonesia, Korea, and 
Vietnam) were expected to reduce GDP from 0.1% to 1.7% depending upon 
the country.
Given all this, you might ask: why are countries considering these rules in 
the first place? They are suggested as being the answer to all manner of  ills, 
from protecting access to nationals’ personal information by foreign national 
security agencies, to providing greater protection of  personal information in 
commerce, to creating jobs by incentivizing the development of  more data-
hosting centers. Data localization is at best a poor instrument, and at worst 
entirely ineffective, in pursuit of  these policy objectives. In the first two cases, 
the perception that geography has anything to do with data access is a holdover 
from the analogue world. In reality, it is the measures taken to protect data, 
and not the location where it is stored that matters.26 With respect to access by 
foreign powers’ national security services, these organizations are not known 
for respecting borders and localizing data may simply make it easier for the 
country creating these obligations to surveil its own citizens under the guise of  
protecting them from others. Finally, there are few jobs in data centers – even 
very large ones are automated and require only a literal handful of  people 
to run them, and those are largely lower-wage jobs to manage the physical 
security of  the buildings.
In a trade context, presence requirements generally relate to business 
presence (i.e. registration) and other “offline world” requirements. The most 
comprehensive local hosting provisions relating to the digital economy are 
to be found in the TPP – and they prevent TPP parties from creating these 
obligations:
“No Party shall require a covered person to use or locate computing 
facilities in that Party’s territory as a condition for conducting business 
in that territory.”27
The Industrial Internet of  Things
The industrial Internet of  things (IIoT) is fascinating for many reasons, 
one being that it relates to solely machine-to-machine communications in 
26 For those interested, the standard reference for best practices in securing information is the ISF’s Standard of  
Good Practice for Information Security; more information is available at https://www.securityforum.org/tool/the- 
standard-of-good-practice-for-information-security/.
27 See the Electronic Commerce Chapter (Article 14.13.2) and the Telecommunications Services Chapter (inter alia 
Articles 13.4.3 and 13.4.5.6) of  the TPP at http://tpp.mfat.govt.nz/text.
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manufacturing, agriculture, and many other market segments. Since these are 
communications between machines about their activities, the IIoT is largely 
devoid of  personal information of  individuals.
As an example of  the IIoT in application, imagine if  every machine associated 
with a car factory were networked and reported on everything that it does. 
This would allow operators to know when any aspect of  manufacturing was 
deviating from design tolerances – or even if  a specific part being installed 
in a specific car was damaged during the installation process or couldn’t be 
installed because it deviated from design tolerances. Clearly, this would greatly 
increase both the value of  automation and also the quality of  finished goods.
Major manufacturers have banded together to create standards for how devices 
and processes can interoperate with one another. A report by Accenture 
suggests that the GDP value that the industrial Internet may unlock is in the 
trillions of  adjusted US dollars just for the G20 countries by 2020, and up to
$14 trillion by 2030 (Purdy and Davarzani, 2015).
There are of  course profound trade dimensions to the industrial Internet, 
such as:
• How can trade policy ensure that standards impacting such massive 
economic effects remain open and not subject to capture by a few powerful 
interests? The Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) process has been successful 
in ensuring that standards are not used for trade-distorting objectives, but 
will evolutions of  that process be necessary to deal with the transformative 
impact of  IIoT standards? Certainly, the list of  international standards 
bodies recognized by the TBT should be revised.
• How will small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) that are part of  
global value chains be impacted by, for example, the much lower tolerance 
to deviation from design specifications that IIoT manufacturing and 
assembly processes will likely require of  them?
Data Protection and Privacy
Trade agreements provide for exceptions so that signatories may deviate from 
normal treaty obligations in order to deal with key policy priorities.28 The 
general exceptions of  GATS are the de facto standard by which data protection 
and privacy are handled in trade agreements – directly and by transposition 
into bilateral and regional trade agreements. That said, the increasing political 
28 Contained in Article XIV and available at https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/26-gats_01_e. 
htm#articleXIV
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importance of  data protection in key economies is straining continued reliance 
on exceptions-based privacy regimes. At a practical level, measures related to 
personal information are a key consideration since we know that online data 
routinely crosses borders. The simple act of  tracking visits to a website29 can 
reveal who that visitor is, at least to the level of  an IP address.30 This differs 
from the offline world where the commercial use of  personal information 
across borders is less routine and often far less detailed.31
It is also the case that measures taken to protect national security in the 
online environment can create barriers to efficient network operation and 
introduce legal uncertainty that is damaging to commerce.32 An early example 
of  this from the “pre-Snowden” period is the US Patriot Act.33 Provisions 
of  this act have resulted in reluctance by other countries to allow storage of  
their nationals’ data in the United States.34 The Snowden disclosures greatly 
aggravated this situation to the point where several heads of  state announced 
national plans to build submarine links to other continents specifically to 
avoid their traffic entering the United States’ territory.35 More recently, the 
US government is pursuing Microsoft in US courts to force it to hand over 
personal data of  a non-US-based customer that are held in Ireland simply 
because Microsoft is headquartered in the United States. This despite the fact 
that should the government prevail, it will instantly make all US-headquartered 
technology firms lose competitiveness to the tune of  billions in annual revenue 
and undermine international law.36 The case is of  such significance that the 
European Union itself  has filed an amicus brief  asking the US government 
to drop it. Microsoft has taken the extraordinary step of  designing a cloud 
service offering through Deutsche Telecom that both companies believe will 
withstand any attempt by US authorities to force Microsoft to hand over data 
held in those data centers – despite Microsoft being a US-headquartered 
company (Ribeiro, 2015).
29 Website usage tracking tools (“web analytics”) are used by many, if  not most, public websites as, amongst other uses, 
they help web designers understand how sites are used and when.
30 As an example of  how fundamental the differences are in what constitutes “personally identifying information” (PII), 
IP addresses are considered PII in some countries but not in others.
31 While the volume of  literature on the subject is considerable, for those in the trade community we recommend the 
February 2013 WEF report, Unlocking the Value of  Personal Data: From Collection to Usage, available at https://www.
weforum.org/reports/unlocking-value-personal-data-collection-usage (WEF, 2013).
32 Cloud services are particularly susceptible to this; for an example of  the harms, see “Dutch government to ban 
U.S. providers over Patriot Act concerns,” Zdnet, 19 September 2011 (at http://www.zdnet.com/blog/btl/dutch- 
government-to-ban-u-s-providers-over-patriot-act-concerns/58342). This decision was subsequently reversed.
33 An accessible summary of  the Act and subsequent amendments may be found on Wikipedia at http://en.wikipedia. 
org/wiki/Section_summary_of_the_Patriot_Act,_Title_II.
34 Perhaps the most well-known being Canada (Clement and Obar, 2013).
35 Just one of  the many examples is Brazil and the European Union (Emmott, 2014).
36 For an accessible resume of  the case, see Endler (2014).
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The US is far from alone – China has promulgated rules which went into 
(partial) effect in 201637 that create obligations on foreign businesses related 
to personal information that have very clear trade impacts, arguing that to 
do otherwise risks Chinese nationals’ exposure to foreign secret services and 
privacy violations by foreign companies (McDougall, 2015).
At a macro level, there is increasing evidence of  filtering of  content available 
online driven by governmental action (World Bank, 2016),38 and while there 
is frequent attention paid to this from a human rights perspective (Freedom 
House, 2017), the economic impact needs further analysis. 
The debate about privacy and trade generally focuses heavily on business- 
to-consumer (B2C) services, as by their nature these generate and use large 
amounts of  personal information. Since we know that these services are only 
a small fraction of  the total economic value proposition even of  networked 
economy services, it is easy to argue that the debate we are having is deeply 
unbalanced. This is not to suggest that data privacy is not important – put 
simply, people count – but having a debate almost exclusively focused on that 
isn’t balanced or sensible.
However, given that there is personal information in many sectors, there is a 
need for developing countries in particular to invest the time and energy to 
better understand how data protection law in advanced economies will impact 
their services exports and to consider both its potential to inhibit services 
exports but also how a strong data protection regime might make them a 
more competitive destination for certain kinds of  foreign inward investment 
by personal data-intensive multinationals (Yakovleva & Irion, 2016). 
If  you are a policymaker (especially one concerned with economic affairs) in 
one of  the more than 100 countries that have no data protection legislation 
at all (UNCTAD, 2016), these are not minor issues. Until you have a data 
protection regime, your citizens must rely upon the protections of  the services 
they use – and your services firms may find they are effectively unable to offer 
services in many developed markets.
Who Owns User Data?
There are other economic questions about data generated by (and about) 
individuals in one country that are aggregated by companies in other countries 
and then used to generate further income. Does the user (and generator) of  
37 For a good discussion of  the law and issues discussed in this paragraph see https://qz.com/999613/a-key-question-
at-the-heart-of-chinas-cybersecurity-law-where-should-data-live/ 
38 See in particular “Map 4.1 Evidence of  internet content filtering” at page 222.
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personal information “own” the information about them and generated by 
their use of  a service, or is the question of  ownership to be left to private 
contract law – specifically, the service provider’s end-user license agreement 
(EULA) users agree to when beginning to use a service? Does the value that 
services that are free at the point of  use provide their users fairly compensate 
them for the use of  the service and de facto ownership of  the data about them 
which are generated as the service is used?
The trade community is beginning to look more closely at these issues in part 
because the debate is easily exploited by populists claiming that “Western” 
services are exploiting developing country users and generating profits which 
do not leave economic benefits in the countries those individuals live in and 
are from. The debate is also topical because some end-user services are 
spectacularly successful financially,39 yet maintain a physical presence in a 
minority of  the world’s countries even though users in any country can and 
do use them. 
The imminent widespread advent of  the “Internet of  things” (IoT), where 
devices as mundane as refrigerators and home fire alarms are connected to 
the Internet and report on use of  these devices, will further complicate such 
concerns; there are additional issues with respect to product safety.40
These issues will trouble trade negotiators, partly because they are complex – 
especially jurisdictionally – and also because many countries are in the throes 
of  national debates about interrelated questions that impact the networked 
economy, such as:
• What is the balance between the privacy of  individuals in the networked 
environment and the commercial or government use of  information about 
them?
• How does each country ensure that key information needed for regulators
• – such as that related to financial transactions and institutions – is protected 
and remains accessible to them when it leaves national boundaries?
• How can we create rules to protect users against online fraud and abuse and 
use of  public networks for criminal activity without undue consequences 
to fundamental freedoms (or commercial activity)?
• Where is the dividing line between national security issues and everyday 
commercial and end-user security?
39 See https://www.statista.com/statistics/277483/market-value-of-the-largest-internet-companies-worldwide/.
40 A good overview for the non-specialist may be found in Wiesman (2015).
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Ideas for Future Work
It is certainly true that the WTO’s normative processes are currently under 
stress. That said, there are many things that WTO members can do, short 
of  negotiations related to the networked economy, which would help them 
collectively understand the state of  their current economic dependence upon 
it and the competitive advantages (and disadvantages) they have. In order to 
have a successful negotiation, you need negotiators with sufficient knowledge 
of  the subject matter to be confident of  the choices they make as well as a 
shared base of  understanding of  the objects they’re discussing.
Given that the capital of  the trade community is Geneva, the WTO community 
is a good forum to begin discussing issues in a low-risk way and the flexibility 
in the Electronic Commerce Work Programme means that any country can 
propose relevant discussions and make contributions – and if  the membership 
as a whole doesn’t choose to take them up, those who are willing can always do 
that in smaller groups. After all, that’s how the Trade in Services Agreement 
(TISA) negotiations on services began. More recently, the grouping of  14 WTO 
members known as the Friends of  Ecommerce for Development (FEDs)41 have 
added greatly to the discussion of  electronic commerce over the last biennium, 
not least by helping developing country members see the value proposition 
the digital economy has for them.
A Development Agenda for Digital Trade?
In October 2017, one of  the countries of  the FEDs grouping, Costa Rica, 
proposed to WTO members that the outcome of  the WTO’s 11th Ministerial 
(MC11) in Buenos Aires in December 2017 should include a discussion on 
how trade could help to achieve several existing public policy objectives across 
six areas (WTO, 2017). This is the first time a WTO member has explicitly 
proposed a development-centric agenda on how trade policy can help to achieve 
the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). In early November, Bangladesh 
became the first LDC to make a similar proposal, broadly congruent with 
that of  Costa Rica.
Whether or not these proposals are reflected in the MC11 outcome, it is a 
watershed as it frames the discussion of  networked economy trade in the form 
of  questions that will be hard for other WTO members to resist for long on 
political grounds alone. Several of  the six areas are very high-priority policy 
objectives in the majority of  developing economies, especially those who have 
41 As of  the time of  writing the FEDs membership is Argentina, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Kazakhstan, 
Kenya, Mexico, Moldova, Montenegro, Nigeria, Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Uruguay.
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been most resistant to increasing the activity level on digital trade discussions 
at the WTO. 
For example, the first item, a focus on how trade policy can accelerate reducing 
the digital divide, ties directly to SDG 9(c). It also ties directly to India’s Digital 
India initiative, which is a legacy objective of  Prime Minister Narendra Modi 
with financial commitments from the Government of  India and private-sector 
partners in the trillions of  US dollars.42 Others tie to digital financial inclusion 
– something even most LDCs have set a high priority on – and SME trade 
export financing.
If  the traditional opponents of  a greater focus of  WTO work on “e-commerce” 
oppose such an obviously development-focused trade agenda, it will increase 
calls to begin negotiations on a plurilateral basis – and give political cover 
to developing countries interested in normative work in this area that have 
national priorities related to the subjects Costa Rica has raised. The argument 
against a focus on electronic commerce that countries like South Africa and 
India have made in the past – that unfinished work from the Doha Round 
should be the WTO’s overriding priority – will not be seen as credible if  used 
to try to prevent even a discussion of  how digital technology’s trade dimensions 
can foster delivery on the SDGs. There has to be room to discuss – and 
ultimately to reach agreement – on both.
Better Understanding of How ICT Services Act as a Multiplier, or 
Facilitator, of the Traditional Economy
Below are just a few areas where WTO members could ask the Geneva- 
based institutions with trade or statistical gathering activities to collaborate 
on reporting or symposia organization or both.
• There is a great deal we don’t know about how traditional 
services leverage the digital environment to compete, innovate 
and export, and the role ICT services play in making this happen. 
To illustrate the stakes, European services overall account for 73% of  
the Eurozone economy (ECB, 2016), while those related to ICT-specific 
services represent just over 3%. In a trading context understanding these 
interrelationships is not optional, it’s essential – for both developed and 
developing countries.
42 “Industry hails 'Digital India' move, top CEOs commit to invest Rs 4.5 trillion”, India Times, 2 July 2015 (https://
economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/company/corporate-trends/industry-hails-digital-india-move-top-ceos-
commit-to-invest-rs-4-5-trillion/articleshow/47901803.cms).
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• Understanding how traditional non-services industries leverage 
the digital economy to compete and the trade rules that apply 
needs more research. Just one aspect of  this is how after-market 
services that leverage networked technologies impact the competitiveness 
of  manufactured goods. An example of  this is Volvo, the world’s largest 
manufacturer of  commercial diesel engines. Volvo offers a 100% uptime 
guarantee for their commercial vehicles made possible by networking 
technology reporting when parts need servicing before they fail.43 What 
trade rules apply in these circumstances – and what barriers apply too – 
and how can developing economies compete in the value chain of  products 
such as these? 
• Understanding how so-called Mode 5 services interrelate with, 
and depend on, the digital economy in their multiplier of  goods 
trade. Estimates suggest that global GDP gains from liberalizing Mode 
5 services multilaterally could reach €300 billion by 2025 (Cernat & 
Antimiani, 2017). Given that even in developing countries services are, 
on average, the largest sector of  the economy, all members should want 
to participate in benefits from this – and should better understand how 
they relate to their economies.
• Analyzing the extent of  trade-related data flows and what they 
consist of. If  digitally connected commerce between businesses is ten 
times that between businesses and consumers, it is logical that much of  that 
data flowing across borders do not consist of  personal information. You 
would think that this a question about which we have a lot of  information, 
but sadly the opposite is true. Remedying this deficiency will require a 
concerted effort across public and private organizations, as much of  the 
base data needed for analysis are in private-sector hands.
Improving the Quality of Statistical Information on Networked 
Economy Transactions
Measuring the economic impact of  the networked economy, as well 
as ICTs more generally, is notoriously difficult.44 It is equally true that 
acquiring better data is widely accepted as desirable and necessary – and 
the trade community should be at the forefront of  that effort given the trade 
impacts of  these technologies. The WTO has recently convened various public-
sector institutions – from UN agencies to multilateral and regional development 
43 See http://www.volvotrucks.com/trucks/uk-market/en-gb/parts_service/Genuine-Volvo-Service/service-
contracts/volvo-gold-contract/Pages/gold-contract.aspx.
44 For an excellent tour d’horizon of  the issues with measurement accessible to non-specialists, see OECD (2013).
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banks – along with the private sector to see what data exists and where. At the 
same time, the first session of  UNCTAD’s Intergovernmental Expert Group 
on Ecommerce and the Digital Economy has recognized the need for greater 
action in this area (UNCTAD, 2017). Finally, the United Nations as a whole 
has acknowledged that better information about the impact of  technology is 
a priority.45 It is important that the trade dimension of  technology’s impacts 
are seen as central to the implementation of  the Sustainable Development 
Goals, to ensure that the link between development and the economic impact 
of  technology on development are better understood. The trade community 
should take a leading role in ensuring that both these processes are informed 
by the community’s needs – doing so will pay dividends for decades to come.
Data Protection and Privacy in International Trade
Data protection and privacy issues are already a thorny subject in trade 
negotiations – the controversies around the TPP negotiations were evidence 
of  this.46 The reality is that the global nature of  data flows in the networked 
economy raises issues that will be the subject of  debate at the national level 
for some time, and laws made nationally in response will continue to evolve. 
Trade negotiators will be wary of  agreeing to binding international obligations 
where national discussions are not mature.
A first step would be for a group of  interested WTO members to 
convene a few meetings of  their data protection and trade officials 
to compare notes on how different countries’ legal systems handle 
personally identifying information. That conversation could also ask 
experts to consider how interoperable (or otherwise) different 
approaches are in a trading context.
An informal discussion like this regularly in Geneva would allow these charged 
issues to be discussed outside of  negotiations but still involve negotiators – 
removing political risk from an already fraught subject. It is hoped that over 
time, meetings could at least periodically include other stakeholders to build 
understanding. 
At the same time, the WTO, UNCTAD and the ITC should collaborate on 
the extent to which data protection legislation enables – and lack 
45 There are many examples, but the most significant is to be found in the Addis Ababa Action Agenda for financing 
of  the Sustainable Development Goals, where an entire chapter is dedicated to measures on how data and data 
analysis are integral to the achievement of  the goals (see the “Addis Ababa Action Agenda of  the Third International 
Conference on Financing for Development” (Addis Ababa Action Agenda), adopted by the United Nations General 
Assembly on July 27th, 2015, (A/RES/69/313, Section III, page 35, at http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_ 
doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/69/313).
46 There are literally thousands of  articles discussing different views on this subject.
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of  such legislation limits – market access to developed economies. 
There are many dimensions to data protection, and while human rights are 
absolutely key, that doesn’t mean looking at the trade-related aspects of  data 
protection should be avoided due to reluctance to provoke criticism from those 
more concerned with the human rights aspects. We may find that the economic 
arguments, far from creating arguments against robust data protection, actually 
end up making a compelling argument for it.
Creating Greater Certainty for the Network as a Platform
While it is true that issues with data and their use in sectoral trade applications 
can rapidly become very complex, that should not be true with the network 
as a platform.
A group of  WTO members could make unilateral most-favored 
nation (MFN) commitments to some of  the principles articulated 
above without any “free-riding” problem. A commitment that traffic that is 
only transiting a member’s territory would not be subject to interruption or 
delay would make a political and practically important statement without a 
downside, since it is not practical to know what the contents of  transit traffic 
is in any case.47
Second, a group of  WTO members could commit to making the 
moratorium on customs duties on electronic transmissions 
permanent on an MFN basis. This is now a commitment in enough 
bilateral and regional agreements48 that, for many countries, it would be 
difficult to derogate from in any case – and it would send a very strong signal, 
especially if  the group were large enough and cross-regional.
Finally, this discussion could have very positive ancillary effects beyond the 
trade community – too little is known about the economic impacts 
of  content filtering, site blocking, and large-scale blocking of  the 
Internet at the country level. As with data protection, we may find that 
the economic consequences from these actions, if  better known, would help 
to argue against the behaviours justified by national public policy priorities 
yet so objectionable to civil society non-governmental organizations (NGOs) 
and human rights advocates.
47 For textual inspiration, see the Telecommunications Chapter of  the Trans-Pacific Partnership (Articles 13.4.3 and 
13.4.6.5) at http://tpp.mfat.govt.nz/text.
48 Including all TPP Parties; see the Electronic Commerce Chapter of  the Trans-Pacific Partnership (inter alia Articles 
14.15 and 14.8.5) at http://tpp.mfat.govt.nz/text.
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Creating Better Clarity on Existing Commitments for the Platform 
and the Data It Carries
There are existing commitments across a large proportion of  WTO members 
on key aspects of  the networked economy, but no authoritative comparison 
of  how different commitments interoperate with one another. Surfacing this 
information in a neutral way that simply compares how commitments are 
worded and how congruent those are with others is essential information. 
The meaning would then be argued by some, but at least the argument would 
be taking place based upon a reasonable foundation. A group of  WTO 
members should jointly ask the WTO Secretariat for such a report 
– if  the sensitivity were seen to be too great for this to be published as an 
official WTO Secretariat product, it could be commissioned as part of  the 
WTO Working Papers series.49
Exploring Issues like Network Neutrality in a Global Trading Context
As outlined above, the debate about network neutrality being confined 
to national (or inter-regional) dynamics is far from optimal. A dialogue 
between trade officials, backbone operators and ISPs, and other 
stakeholders in Geneva to explore the international dimensions 
would be valuable. It would expose very different views on the subject, but 
it would also help create a shared understanding of  the impacts of  different 
policy choices that are being made. It would also help expose any analysis that 
is needed to better understand the market landscape. These conversations 
could (and should) be held at least partly in public, and other Geneva-based 
institutions’ stakeholders invited to participate, given that the impacts of  these 
choices have profound implications beyond trade.
Discussing, and Creating, a Disclosure Process for Digital Information 
Blocking, Filtering, and Removals
While undoubtedly controversial, countries are increasingly blocking and 
filtering content and monitoring what their citizens do online. These activities 
have an inherent risk – and in some cases the certainty – of  trade-distorting 
effects. A disclosure process that would ensure a basic minimum of  
information on when content online may be blocked by a member 
would be of  great benefit. The WTO notifications process in other areas 
of  trade law has been very successful, and future agreements that incorporate 
digital issues should build upon this legacy.
49 WTO Working Papers that presently exist are to be found at https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/reser_e/wpaps_e. 
htm.
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The starting place is a conversation amongst willing WTO members to 
compare experiences and practices. Far more studies on the economic impacts 
of  measures for blocking connectivity or reducing access to online resources 
are needed to complement the many that exist on how such measures can 
impact on freedom of  expression.
Governance and Inclusion Challenges
Historically, trade agreements have been negotiated almost entirely behind 
closed doors. This has been challenged by civil society groups, and even 
industry, in direct proportion to the extent that agreements have broadened 
to include more and more areas of  regulatory harmonization.
Given that the Internet is a general purpose technology (Jovanovich and 
Rousseau, 2005) – only a handful of  which have existed in human history – it 
is no surprise that the networked economy that leverages it impacts horizontally 
across the entire economy. The principle of  network effects (and in this context, 
Metcalfe’s Law and its corollaries)50 ensures that its impact grows with each 
person connecting for the first time not additively but as a multiplier, just as we 
saw with the advent of  the telephone – each person getting their own phone 
made the network as a whole more useful for everyone already connected. 
The Internet poses a real challenge for policymaking generally (Ashton-Hart, 
2015) and this is particularly so for trade, given the historical model of  trade 
negotiations being limited to a very small group of  policymakers, advised in 
general by a small subset of  almost exclusively private-sector stakeholders. 
That may have made sense in political economy terms in the 20th century, 
but increasingly it looks like a mistake; by limiting those with a voice to such 
an extent, you make negotiations easier to conduct but you make the case for 
the benefits of  the agreements harder to sell – and leave the results vulnerable 
to populist claims about the negative externalities. 
Continuing with this historical model of  closed negotiations with few advisors 
able to meaningfully affect the outcome would be a strategic mistake; in the 
age of  transparency, ironically made possible by the Internet, it cannot be 
politically justified. Aside from that, the advice and expertise required to 
make good policy on the broad areas of  regulatory interoperability (if  not 
harmonization) requires broader engagement – the trade ministry alone simply 
50 For a description of  Metcalfe’s Law on Wikipedia, see https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Metcalfe%27s_law; for a 
discussion of  its shortcomings and corollaries, see https://www.spectrum.ieee.org/tech-talk/semiconductors/
devices/was_metcalfe_wrong. 
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won’t have the expertise, and other government departments will have the 
leading roles in the execution of  outcomes. They are hardly likely to consent to 
binding norms they had no role in formulating, and their stakeholders, used to 
much more open consultation processes, will demand a role in the results, too. 
The European Union has recently announced that it will considerably increase 
the consultation processes and stakeholders involved in its trade negotiation 
processes (European Commission 2017), but the extent to which the reality 
will match the narrative remains to be seen. That said, this is the direction 
that all democratic societies should endorse. 
In Conclusion
The networked economy presently only connects about half  of  humanity. We are 
only at the beginning of  its transformation of  society and of  our economies. Its 
inherent nature is frictionless to an extent that the “bricks and mortar” trade 
community can only dream of  for the traditional economy.
If  for no other reason, it is long past time for the international trade community 
to make a priority of  better understanding the networked economy. The 
Internet as a globalized medium really needs basic “rules of  the road.” Trade 
rules related to the network and its functions that facilitate all sectoral-trade-
related activities should move beyond those of  basic telecommunications 
commitments to create a foundation from which all economies can “branch 
out” to tailor their national economic policy, while being able to rely on the 
foundation to provide interoperability with their trading partners. 
For global rules to evolve, leadership from WTO members will be required. If  
they are unable to muster the political will to overcome the political stalemate 
that affects so many other areas of  multilateral trade policy, the discussion 
will still happen, but it will happen in a fragmented way via bilateral and 
plurilateral negotiations, and the foundational rules will be made by a subset 
of  economies. Almost certainly, that subset will be those with the greatest stakes 
in the present digital economy. Ultimately, these agreements would need to be 
“stitched together” or at least be interoperable somehow, and given the time 
frames involved, such an approach would be far from ideal. 
All countries need to be a part of  the conversation, as trade agreements will 
inevitably incorporate more and more provisions related to the networked 
economy. Trade negotiators of  all countries – including those from developed 
countries – will need to understand the impacts and opportunities better to 
negotiate the future agreements that will bind them.
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Introduction
International trade and competition policy are closely related and mutually 
complementary in nature. However, it has long been recognized that 
competition enforcement issues can hinder international trade, whether 
through anticompetitive practices committed by companies or through 
different mechanisms of  competition enforcement or a lack of  coordination 
between competition agencies. This problem has led to a variety of  efforts and 
initiatives to set disciplines on competition enforcement via international trade 
instruments, aiming to ensure that such issues would not harm commerce.
In the international trade system, efforts to regulate competition first took place 
on a multilateral basis, going back to the earliest predecessors of  the World 
Trade Organization (WTO). On a bilateral and regional basis, such attempts 
materialized in the form of  competition provisions in free trade agreements 
(FTAs) and in further forms of  integration. 
At the same time, relevant initiatives have been taking place outside the 
international trade system, in forums such as the OECD, UNCTAD and 
the International Competition Network (ICN). These institutions, while not 
specifically focused on the intersection between trade and competition but in 
competition policy and enforcement per se, have nevertheless had a positive 
indirect impact on the dynamics of  international trade. Through extensive 
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development of  best competition practices, the effects of  the ICN on trade 
may probably be the furthest reaching.
The relationship between trade and competition is without doubt complex, but 
it has traditionally been analysed in one sense: how trade rules can influence 
competition enforcement to prevent competition problems from undermining 
trade. This chapter aims to further contribute to this discussion and, perhaps 
more importantly, to put forth an innovative approach to analysing such 
relationship, asking in what ways competition policy can positively influence 
trade. 
What follows aims to provide a portrait of  the current state of  the interface 
between trade and competition, as well as a series of  proposals and ideas 
for further reflection on possible ways forward. These ideas will flow in 
two directions, exploring how the international trade system can influence 
competition enforcement on the one hand, and how the competition system 
and principles can influence trade policy on the other.
A Glance at the Interface between Trade and 
Competition
Trade liberalization and competition law and policy are complementary 
since they pursue similar objectives. They both aim to foster a more efficient 
allocation of  resources in the economy and to promote market efficiency and 
economic growth, which ultimately lead to an increase in total welfare. 
In an ideal world, trade liberalization would be the most powerful tool of  
competition policy. Free trade intensifies competition by opening markets 
to foreign competitors. By increasing the size of  relevant markets, trade 
liberalization reduces market concentration. This in turn reduces the 
probability of  abuse of  dominance, although space for cartelization remains. 
At the same time, trade liberalization gives companies access to a wider range 
of  goods and services and the possibility to harness economies of  scale. In sum, 
free trade exerts competitive pressure and simultaneously renders businesses 
better suited to competing. Moreover, consumers and the economy in general 
benefit from healthy competition driving businesses to innovate to offer better 
products and services at the best possible prices.
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Anticompetitive Practices Can Frustrate the Gains from Trade 
Liberalization
However, efforts to liberalize trade through lowering or eliminating tariff and 
non-tariff barriers can be defeated by anticompetitive practices, especially 
cartels.
For example, in 2016 the Antitrust Division of  the US Department of  Justice 
fined Nishikawa Rubber Co. (a Japanese automotive parts company with 
manufacturing plants in the United States) for participating in bid-rigging 
conspiracies with other suppliers of  car body sealing products. Nishikawa and 
its co-conspirators sold overpriced products (made in the United States) for 
installation in Honda, Toyota, and Subaru vehicles manufactured throughout 
the United States, Canada, and Mexico. Many of  those vehicles were then 
exported to the United States and sold there.1,2 Therefore, savings that 
consumers should have benefited from, thanks to free trade in auto parts under 
NAFTA and the Mexico–Japan FTA, were canceled out by the incorporation 
of  components at collusive prices. 
The auto parts industry has been under rigorous antitrust investigations over 
the last several years across multiple jurisdictions (including in the United 
States, the European Union, Germany, France, Brazil, and South Korea). 
More than 46 companies have been investigated in the United States alone. 
While this is only one example in a particular industry, international cartels 
are a pervasive problem: more than 1,300 international cartels were discovered 
worldwide between 1990-2015 (Connor, 2016).
The Need for Mutually Reinforcing Implementation of Trade and 
Competition Policy
In an increasingly globalized economy, cases of  conduct having cross-border 
effects as well as mergers being reviewed in several jurisdictions are becoming 
more and more common. However, there are additional circumstances that 
accentuate the need for a complementary implementation of  trade and 
competition policy. Today, almost ten years after the start of  the 2008 financial 
crisis and global recession, some economies have yet to recover their pre-crisis 
dynamism and growth momentum. In particular, global trade growth has not 
fully bounced back (Prasad and Foda, 2017; WTO, 2017).
1 https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/nishikawa-agrees-plead-guilty-and-pay-130-million-criminal-fine-fixing-prices-
automotive 
2 http://lib.law.virginia.edu/Garrett/corporate-prosecution-registry/agreements/Nishikawa.pdf  
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Furthermore, we have witnessed a backlash against free trade and globalization 
in some countries through the rise of  nationalist and populist forces that call 
for protectionist policies. Some of  those countries, like the United States and 
some EU member states, have traditionally played an important role in the 
globalization process. This puts stable policymaking at stake and plagues the 
international system with uncertainty. In this context, there are latent risks 
to the future of  free trade and competitive markets, and consequently, to 
economic efficiency. This makes the interface between trade and competition 
even more relevant today than when it was first incorporated into the WTO 
agenda. 
Evolution of the Interface Between Trade and 
Competition
Discussions about the interface between trade and competition policy have 
taken place in the international arena for decades. There have been several 
attempts to develop competition-related trade rules at the multilateral level 
as well as at the bilateral and regional levels. While earlier efforts aimed to 
combat international anticompetitive business practices, they later expanded to 
address impacts on the competitive process caused by competition authorities’ 
enforcement of  competition legislation, state engagement in commercial 
activities, and states’ exercise of  their regulatory attributions. 
The Multilateral Approach
League of  Nations
Perhaps one of  the earliest accounts of  international discussions around trade 
and competition can be traced back to the League of  Nations, which in May 
1927 celebrated a World Economic Conference in Geneva (League of  Nations, 
1927). Representatives from 50 countries attended the conference with the 
main purpose of  identifying and eliminating obstacles to international trade. 
At the time, there was a recently raised awareness about the need to address 
international cartelization, a phenomenon that had become widespread 
following the First World War. 
This issue was debated among much controversy, and adopting ambitious 
recommendations regarding cartels proved too difficult. The official report 
of  the conference acknowledged that it was impossible to establish a common 
international regime against cartels at the time because countries had divergent 
views about them (Hollman and Kovacic, 2011).
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Shortly after, the Great Depression and Second World War interrupted 
international efforts to find a solution to cartels and to build an international 
competition law. During the War, the United States and its allies envisioned 
the Bretton Woods system with the objective of  setting a new framework for 
the global economy. The system provided for the establishment of  institutions 
including the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the 
International Trade Organization (ITO). 
Havana Charter
In the late 1940s, liberalizing and revamping trade was considered fundamental 
for global economic recovery. Similarly, in order to combat international cartels 
hampering trade, the United States aimed to include competition principles as 
part of  a new international trade order. In this vein, United Nations member 
states negotiated the Havana Charter, which proposed the creation of  the 
ITO and intended to establish common rules on trade and competition. At 
that time, only ten of  the parties had national competition laws, all of  them 
developed countries. 
The Havana Charter covered a broad array of  disciplines, including subsidies, 
export taxes, and tariff reduction. A chapter on “Restrictive Business Practices” 
was specifically dedicated to measures against anticompetitive practices. 
However, the Havana Charter was never ratified by the US Congress. Although 
the ITO failed to come into existence, the Charter did establish a precedent 
for the inclusion of  competition principles in international trade agreements. 
GATT-WTO
Parallel to the Havana Charter discussions, the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was negotiated and entered into force in 1948, 
containing most of  the commercial policy clauses of  the Havana Charter. 
Several multilateral negotiation rounds followed under GATT auspices, 
focusing on the progressive reduction of  tariffs and other trade barriers. Even 
though international competition law was at a very early stage at that time 
and competition policy was not included in the GATT texts, it did figure in 
its deliberations.
Singapore Issues
With the conclusion of  the Uruguay Round, the WTO superseded GATT 
in 1995. At its first Ministerial Conference, celebrated in Singapore in 1996, 
four topics were included for further discussion. These topics, known as 
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the “Singapore issues”, were competition policy, government procurement, 
investment, and trade facilitation. Accordingly, a Working Group on the 
Interaction between Trade and Competition Policy (WGITC) was created 
with the mandate of  studying the topic and identifying areas that required 
further consideration.
The Doha Declaration of  2001 formally incorporated the interaction between 
trade and competition policy into the negotiating round with the objective of  
concluding a multilateral agreement by 2015. Points to be addressed included 
core principles, due process, and capacity building for developing countries, 
among others. However, negotiations quickly stalled due to incompatible 
positions between developed and developing countries. 
Soon after, at the Cancun Ministerial Meeting of  2003, talks broke down 
because of  strong disagreements between members on diverse issues of  the 
agenda, including the Singapore issues. The following year, the General 
Council decided to erase the interaction between trade and competition policy 
from the Doha agenda. Following that decision, the WGITC became inactive 
and remains so to date.
The bilateral and regional approach
In addition to the multilateral initiatives described above, trade and competition 
have been addressed on a bilateral and regional basis through FTAs and 
further forms of  integration. Competition policy has increasingly figured as 
one of  the non-tariff disciplines contained in trade agreements. The purpose 
of  including competition enforcement principles and cooperation provisions 
in trade agreements is to ensure that parties have in place laws to sanction 
anticompetitive practices that may distort trade, and to improve coordination 
mechanisms between competition agencies.
There are also cooperation agreements between competition agencies, some of  
which derive from competition commitments or chapters in FTAs. Although 
specifically addressing the interface between trade and competition is not the 
central purpose of  FTAs or of  further integration schemes, they are useful 
instruments thereto, as they aim to establish the grounds for the functioning 
of  progressively integrated markets. A brief  overview of  existing mechanisms 
at the bilateral and regional levels is provided below.
Free Trade Agreements
FTAs have proliferated in recent years, and an increasing number of  FTAs 
include a competition chapter. An extensive screening exercise of  232 FTAs 
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contained in the WTO database, conducted in 2015, found that 88% had 
competition provisions. While some had only a few provisions, others had 
chapters specifically dedicated to competition with varying degrees of  ambition. 
In contrast, of  the FTAs concluded before 1990, only about 60% contained 
competition provisions.3
The competition content of  FTAs ranges from vague obligations to deep 
commitments. At one end of  the spectrum, there are provisions that lay out 
basic or ambiguous obligations, such as promoting competition in the parties’ 
markets. As we move to the other end of  the spectrum, FTA obligations are 
more clearly defined and involve adopting or maintaining competition laws, 
addressing anticompetitive practices, establishing mechanisms to facilitate 
and promote competition policy, considering the impact of  regulation on 
competition, ensuring some sort of  competitive neutrality regarding state-
owned enterprises, and promoting a competition culture. At the lower-to-
middle end of  the spectrum are FTAs such as EFTA–Canada, NAFTA, and 
EU–Chile.
Although less common, provisions can go further and define the design 
of  competition regimes to be maintained by the parties or the types of  
anticompetitive practices they should address, and may even commit to 
abolishing trade remedies (mostly antidumping measures) between them, 
opting to address such practices through the implementation of  competition 
legislation. At the top end of  the spectrum we find Australia–New Zealand, 
as well as the European Union, both of  which merit further elaboration.
Australia-New Zealand 
The Australia–New Zealand Closer Economic Relations Trade Agreement 
(ANZCERTA, or the CER Agreement) warrants special mention because it 
is one of  the most comprehensive bilateral FTAs. Moreover, it is an umbrella 
for a series of  agreements and initiatives in other areas of  policy and business 
law, as both countries progress towards a single economic market. In the 
field of  competition, they have developed an exemplary cooperative relation 
among their respective authorities (the Australian Competition and Consumer 
Commission, or ACCC, and the New Zealand Commerce Commission, or 
NZCC). 
The ACCC and the NZCC have in place various instruments on 
competition issues, including a broad cooperation agreement that provides 
for the development of  subsidiary protocols in areas where they may wish to 
3 This exercise was performed in the framework of  the E15Initiative, a project conducted under the auspices of  the 
International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development and the World Economic Forum. For further details, 
see Laprévote et al. (2015). 
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undertake further cooperation and establish more detailed provisions. In this 
vein, the ACCC and the NZCC have a Cooperation Protocol for Merger 
Review, as well as a cooperation arrangement in relation to the provision of  
compulsorily acquired information and investigative assistance.4 The latter is 
a highly advanced form of  cooperation that allows the sharing of  confidential 
information, often referred to as second generation agreements.
European Union
It can be argued that the highest level of  cooperation and convergence in 
competition law and policy is found in the European Union, thanks to its sui 
generis nature as an economic and political union. In the field of  competition, the 
European Union has in place a sophisticated system of  parallel competences 
across the European Commission, the European Court of  Justice, and the 
member states’ national competition authorities and tribunals.5  
This system, established by Council Regulation 1/2003 and related regulations, 
provides that all enforcers have the power to apply the European Community 
law on competition.6 The system’s purpose is to enhance enforcement efficiency 
by allowing the best placed agency to manage the case in question.7 In order 
to achieve this, the European Competition Network was created as a platform 
for close coordination and cooperation among the Commission and national 
competition authorities. 
In general terms, the system works by competition authorities informing each 
other about their intentions for dealing with a case so that they can decide on 
the optimal way to allocate resources. Although the rules are flexible rather 
than rigid, national authorities most frequently deal with cases that are relevant 
to their national market, while the Commission deals with the most important, 
largest cases or those affecting more than three member states (Bonnecarrere, 
2016).
4 See http://www.comcom.govt.nz/the-commission/about-us/international-relations/agreements-with-australia/ 
5 COUNCIL REGULATION (EC) No 1/2003. http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/
PDF/?uri=CELEX:32003R0001&from=ES 
6 Articles 81 and 82 of  the Treaty Establishing the European Community
7 An authority is well placed to deal with a case if  three conditions are fulfilled: (1) the behavior of  the parties has 
substantial effects for the territory in which the authority is based, (2) the authority can effectively gather all relevant 
information, and (3) the authority can effectively bring the infringement to an end. 
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Other Developments in Competition Policy and 
Enforcement
As explained above, the interface between trade and competition was eliminated 
from the WTO agenda while parallel work continued at the bilateral and 
regional levels. Within the international trade system, initiatives had focused 
on establishing basic rules on competition enforcement principles, aiming to 
prevent anticompetitive practices from hindering trade. On another note, and 
independently from trade-driven initiatives, enormous progress has been made 
in forums such as the OECD, ICN and UNCTAD. 
Recognizing the international dimension of  competition issues, these bodies 
have advanced the development of  best practices, criterion, and methodologies; 
fostered inter-agency cooperation; provided technical assistance, and so on. 
Even though international trade is not their primary objective, they still exert an 
effect over it. By promoting convergence in competition enforcement principles 
that have proved successful, fair, and effective, institutions like the OECD, 
ICN and UNCTAD help prevent jurisdictions from enforcing competition 
legislation in discriminatory and trade-distorting ways.
Given this background, a brief  description of  these institutions’ essential 
features and most important contributions to the world of  competition is 
provided below.
OECD
Competition law and policy have been an important part of  the OECD’s work 
since its establishment in 1961. The OECD Competition Committee gathers 
representatives of  the members’ and observers’ competition authorities, 
holding in-depth technical discussions on different areas of  competition law 
and policy. Non-OECD members, as well as international organizations 
like the World Bank and the WTO, can also participate in the Competition 
Committee and the Global Forum on Competition. Additionally, there is a 
specialized Competition Division within the OECD’s Secretariat which assists 
the work of  the Competition Committee. 
The OECD Council has adopted various recommendations on competition law 
and policy covering a wide range of  topics, such as merger control, competition 
assessment, bid rigging, and hard-core cartels. Of  particular relevance to 
the interface between trade and competition is the 2014 “Recommendation 
concerning International Co-operation on Competition Investigations and 
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Proceedings”,8 which replaced the 1995 “Recommendation on Cooperation 
between Member Countries on Anti-Competitive Practices affecting 
International Trade”. The 2014 recommendation establishes a cooperation 
framework for OECD members and adhering countries on the notification 
of  investigations and consultation regarding competition law enforcement. 
Accordingly, it has inspired cooperation provisions for competition chapters 
in recently negotiated FTAs. 
Furthermore, since 1998 the OECD Secretariat has conducted peer reviews 
of  several member and non-member states’ competition regimes, a relevant 
tool for fostering public dialogue and convergence. 
UNCTAD 
UNCTAD developed the “Set of  Multilaterally Agreed Equitable Principles 
and Rules for the Control of  the Restrictive Business Practices on International 
Trade” (commonly known as the UN Set), with the objective of  enhancing 
economic policy in developing countries. The UN Set, adopted by consensus 
in 1980, recognized that restrictive business practices limit market access and 
undermine international trade. Despite its non-binding nature, the UN Set 
promoted further international cooperation on competition issues. Every five 
years, it is reviewed by several experts from different counties, with its most 
recent revision taking place in July of  2015.
Another contribution of  UNCTAD is its Model Competition Law, which 
has guided some developing countries in their drafting and adoption of  
national competition laws. The Model Law encourages convergence on 
general principles and best practices and provides for cooperation on the 
implementation of  legislation against transnational restrictive business 
practices. The Model Law is also periodically revised. 
UNCTAD also hosts an annual Intergovernmental Group of  Experts on 
Competition Law and Policy for consultations on competition issues and 
informal exchange of  experiences and best practices, including a voluntary 
peer review of  competition law and policy. Overall, UNCTAD is remarkable at 
providing technical assistance and capacity-building, helping create sustainable 
competition regimes at the national level. 
8 “Recommendation of  the OECD Council concerning International Co-operation on Competition Investigations 
and Proceedings” as approved by Council on 16 September 2014 [C(2014)108], https://www.oecd.org/daf/
competition/2014-rec-internat-coop-competition.pdf  
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International Competition Network
Founded by 15 agencies in 2001,9 when trade and competition was treated 
within the WTO, the ICN is a network of  competition authorities with the 
objective of  addressing cross-border issues of  competition law and policy. It is 
currently composed of  135 national and regional competition agencies from 
122 jurisdictions spanning all continents. The ICN’s work is guided by its 
Steering Group, which is composed of  18 representatives of  member agencies 
working as the network’s driving force.
Although the ICN hosts an annual conference as well as other face-to-face 
events such as workshops, most of  its work is carried out via teleconferences 
or other electronic means. The ICN does not have headquarters or any 
permanent staff, which is why it is often described as a virtual network.
The ICN further distinguishes itself  in two aspects: it is the only international 
body devoted exclusively to competition law and policy, and, unlike in most 
international bodies, its members participate in their individual capacity as 
competition authorities, as opposed to representing their governments.
The ICN has developed a series of  recommended practices which are 
consensus driven, non-binding policy recommendations created by and for 
the ICN members to inspire greater global convergence of  the most effective 
practices. Recommendations cover areas such as merger notification and 
review procedures, merger analysis, assessment of  dominance, and state-
created monopolies, among others.  It has also produced an Anti-Cartel 
Enforcement Manual, which compiles the diverse investigative approaches 
used by member agencies with varying experience levels. The manual serves 
as a reference tool for agencies to use according to their respective jurisdiction’s 
enforcement regime. In this sense, while the ICN is not a forum for case-
specific cooperation, it does explore mechanisms for agency cooperation and 
interoperability to make competition systems more compatible.
The standards and recommended practices developed through the ICN 
platform have had a great impact on the development of  national competition 
regimes. It has been estimated that approximately 25% of  ICN members have 
undertaken a major legislative overhaul according to ICN recommendations. 
In fact, countries including Mexico, Brazil, Italy, Germany, and South Africa 
have undertaken reforms inspired by the ICN’s recommended practices.
Thanks to its broad membership and guidance on several areas of  competition 
law and policy, the ICN has influenced the practice and performance of  
9 Australia, Canada, European Union, France, Germany, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, Mexico, South Africa, United 
Kingdom, United States (with two competition authorities), and Zambia.
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competition agencies in cases with indirect impacts on trade, thereby helping 
to bridge the gap between the worlds of  trade and competition.
Intersection between Trade and Competition: Possible 
Ways Forward
When properly implemented, trade and competition policy are mutually 
reinforcing in the pursuit of  market efficiency, the promotion of  economic 
growth, and increases in welfare.  However, appropriate implementation 
cannot be taken for granted. Despite the progress made via the mechanisms 
discussed above, international trade, and hence competition, can be restricted 
through the misuse of  existing flexibilities in trade rules. This potential misuse 
includes the imposition of  quotas, arbitrary or unnecessary technical standards 
or sanitary and phytosanitary measures, market-distorting subsidies, unjustified 
resort to trade remedies, as well as in discriminatory government procurement 
practices.
Although an open trade policy is meant to remove government barriers to 
trade and investment, it is sometimes used as a tool to open foreign markets 
for exports while protecting domestic companies (national champions) from 
imports, by maintaining or establishing selective obstacles to the entry of  
potential foreign competitors. Such obstacles are found both in the form of  
tariffs and non-tariff measures (NTMs), with the latter having an increasingly 
important impact in the context of  tariff-binding processes both multilaterally 
and through FTAs (Abbott and Singham, 2013). Against this background, obstacles 
to trade and restraints to international competition are both understood as 
harmful.
Consequently, and particularly in a context of  rising protectionism, special 
attention to the complementary implementation of  trade and competition 
policies is required in order to prevent their strategic implementation to the 
detriment of  economic efficiency. 
Given this background, it is worth reflecting on two questions. How can the 
legal framework of  trade agreements be leveraged to influence competition 
enforcement in a way that promotes seamless trade and market efficiency? And 
how can competition principles be effectively embedded into trade policy and 
decisions? What follows is a series of  proposals and ideas for further reflection. 
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How can the legal framework of trade agreements be leveraged to 
influence competition enforcement in way that promotes seamless 
trade and market efficiency?
Using FTAs to foster convergence towards best practices in competition enforcement. 
FTAs have the potential to drive jurisdictions to adapt their national competition 
regimes to best practices, thereby contributing to increase convergence. FTAs 
can foster the political will and private-sector support that might be necessary 
to undertake reforms when doing so is perceived as a prerequisite to a trade 
relationship from which important benefits are expected. 
As discussed above, there is a wide spectrum of  approaches to competition 
policy in FTAs, from those containing basic or ambiguous provisions to those 
containing specific competition chapters with disciplines of  varying scope 
and degree. While competition provisions in their simplest form (such as 
requiring parties to promote market competition or to adopt or maintain 
a competition law and authority) may not provide much added value to 
countries with developed competition regimes, they have been a crucial first 
step for countries previously lacking any form of  competition regime. This 
was the case for Mexico, which adopted its first competition law in 1992, in 
the context of  the NAFTA negotiations, where parties committed to adopting 
or maintaining measures to proscribe anticompetitive business practices and 
proceeded accordingly.10
Nevertheless, there is a trend towards FTAs including competition chapters 
with more ambitious, further-reaching provisions, which is how they can 
help jurisdictions move progressively closer to best practices on competition 
enforcement. For example, despite TPP’s uncertain future, its competition 
chapter was relevant because parties not only committed to applying their 
respective national competition law, but also to ensuring that their regime (law 
and regulations, procedures, tribunals, etc.) would comply with high standards 
of  transparency and due process. This is critical for ensuring that competition 
law is not implemented discriminatorily or with protectionist purposes.
With a view to expanding and deepening convergence through FTAs, the 
development of  a model competition chapter would be very beneficial. The 
model chapter could be achieved through work in the ICN, harnessing the 
OECD’s expertise. While a model chapter would evidently be subject to 
adaptations, it should encompass provisions in areas like enforcement principles 
10 Subsequently, Mexico underwent competition reforms in 2006, 2011, 2013 and 2014, leading to a legal and 
institutional framework comparable to the most advanced jurisdictions in the field and turning its experience into a 
point of  reference for young competition agencies in Central America.
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and due process, cartels, abuse of  market power, and mergers, as well as the 
treatment of  state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and designated monopolies under 
the principles of  non-discrimination and transparency.
Using FTAs to establish comprehensive international cooperation and coordination mechanisms 
for effective competition enforcement.
Whether through FTAs or through cooperation agreements between 
competition authorities, establishing the grounds for international cooperation 
on competition enforcement means contributing to the well-functioning of  
markets and to the attainment of  the benefits of  trade liberalization. 
Trade agreements have become important platforms for cooperation in 
competition enforcement. Similarly, including cooperation provisions may 
result in greater resources available to enforcers to support cooperative efforts. 
Common forms of  cooperation provided for in FTAs include the reciprocal 
notification of  relevant investigations, exchange of  typically non-confidential 
information, provision of  technical assistance, coordination of  enforcement 
activities, consultations, as well as negative and positive comity. 
Positive and Negative Comity
Comity is a principle in international public law whereby a country should take 
into consideration the important interests of  other countries when enforcing its 
laws, in return for reciprocity. Negative comity (also known as traditional comity) 
means that a country will consider how to prevent its laws and law-enforcement 
activities from harming another country’s important interests. Positive comity, 
on the other hand, means that a country may carry out enforcement actions 
against a practice taking place on its territory, upon request (case referral) from 
another country whose interests are also being affected by such practice.11 In 
this sense, while the same conduct may harm both jurisdictions’ markets, one 
agency would take enforcement action and apply a remedy that serves both. 
The effectiveness of  positive comity is determined by several factors, such as 
the type of  conduct taking place, the competition authorities’ priorities and 
constraints, as well as the trust between them. 
Some competition agencies have signed cooperation agreements establishing 
positive comity commitments, such as the “Agreement between the Government 
of  the USA and the European Communities on the Application of  Positive 
Comity Principles in the Enforcement of  their Competition Laws”, which 
was signed in 1991 and further clarified in 1998. The first formal referral 
11 See the OECD’s Inventory of  Cooperation Agreements at http://www.oecd.org/officialdocuments/
publicdisplaydocumentpdf/?cote=daf/comp/wp3(2015)12/rev1&docLanguage=En
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under this Agreement occurred in 1998, and involved computerised airline 
reservation systems. Upon request by the US antitrust authorities, the European 
Commission investigated specific discrimination allegations regarding the 
system’s operation by European airlines within its jurisdiction. However, in 
many cases this type of  cooperation takes place without a positive comity 
agreement being formally invoked.12
The OECD Competition Committee has concluded that positive comity’s 
potential appears to be greatest in cases where anticompetitive actions in 
the requested country injure the requesting country’s exporters but not its 
consumers. These types of  cases would actively concern the requested country’s 
competition authority because of  the harm caused to consumers in their 
jurisdiction. From the point of  view of  the requesting country’s competition 
authority, these cases would be understood as “export restraint cases”; and from 
the point of  view of  trade officials, as “market access cases” (OECD, 1999). 
Positive comity offers important potential benefits both in terms of  efficiency 
and avoidance of  jurisdiction conflicts; therefore, it is desirable for authorities 
to engage more actively in this kind of  cooperation. 
Information Exchange
Information exchange has been at the core of  competition authorities’ 
discussions of  enforcement cooperation. It is common practice when 
information is non-confidential in nature. In contrast, the exchange of  
confidential information – including evidence compulsorily obtained through 
antitrust investigative powers – is a more advanced form of  cooperation. Of  
course, strong mutual trust between parties is a prerequisite.
Confidential information can be exchanged according to confidentiality 
waivers or through “information gateways”. While the former involves an 
explicit consent from the source that provided the information in question, the 
latter allows its exchange without such prior consent, as long as the exchanging 
authorities respect certain safeguards. Information gateways delimit the types 
of  information that authorities can exchange, establish conditions on its usage, 
or further disclosure, among other terms of  protection.
Cooperation agreements providing for the exchange of  confidential 
information are commonly referred to as “second generation agreements”, 
and are currently in place between Australia and New Zealand, Australia 
and the US, Australia and Japan, the European Union and Switzerland, and 
12 “United States and European Communities Sign Agreement on ‘Positive Comity’ in Antitrust Enforcement”, Federal 
Trade Commission press release, 4 June 1998 (https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/1998/06/united-
states-and-european-communities-sign-agreement-positive). 
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in the Nordic Cooperation Agreement between Denmark, Sweden, Norway 
and Iceland.13 
Since some jurisdictions may face legal constraints to engaging in this scheme 
of  cooperation, not every competition authority would be able to put it in place. 
However, when applicable, second generation agreements do offer important 
potential benefits – namely, more efficient proceedings, avoiding unnecessary 
work duplication, and reducing the burdens and costs for parties involved. 
In this regard, FTAs could leverage the experience learned from interagency 
cooperation agreements and, when suitable, serve as mechanism to promote 
the exchange of  confidential information
Abolishing Antidumping Measures in FTAs
The elimination of  antidumping measures in FTAs and other regional trade 
agreements (RTAs) should be a relevant prospect for enhancing competition 
enforcement. At present, antidumping measures have been abolished in only 
11 trade agreements of  diverse nature (some between countries, others between 
trade blocks, such as free trade areas and customs unions). In some of  these 
agreements, the elimination of  antidumping measures is explicitly linked to 
competition law (see Table 1).
In trade agreements that eliminate antidumping measures, the underlying 
rationale is that the effective enforcement of  competition rules may adequately 
address the economic causes leading to trade defences. Specifically, dumping 
may result from the abuse of  market power by protected firms that use their 
monopoly profits from home to dump products abroad. Trade agreements 
that facilitate cross-border cooperation for competition enforcement pave 
the way for combatting such practices through the application of  predatory-
pricing or anti-discrimination rules (National Board of  Trade, 2013). In this vein, 
one could assume that eliminating antidumping measures between parties of  
an FTA would provide a strong incentive to improve coordination among their 
competition authorities, through mechanisms like positive comity or exchange 
of  confidential information, among others.
Regarding the legal basis for the elimination of  antidumping measures, it is 
worth observing that GATT Article XXIV, in its eighth paragraph, establishes 
that customs unions and free-trade areas shall be respectively understood as 
“the substitution of  a single customs territory for two or more customs territories”, and “a 
group of  two or more customs territories” where “duties and other restrictive regulations of  
13  See the OECD’s Inventory of  Cooperation Agreements at http://www.oecd.org/officialdocuments/
publicdisplaydocumentpdf/?cote=daf/comp/wp3(2015)12/rev1&docLanguage=En
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commerce (except, where necessary, those permitted under Articles XI, XII, XIII, XIV, XV 
and XX) are eliminated on substantially all the trade between the constituent territories in 
products originating in such territories”. 
Special attention is warranted to the fact that GATT Article VI on Antidumping 
and Countervailing Duties is not included in the list of  trade restrictions that 
can be maintained in customs unions and free trade areas. Some analysts have 
argued that if  the drafters intended to allow for the adoption of  antidumping 
measures in RTAs, this would have been explicitly mentioned in Article 
XXIV, and that its absence should therefore be understood as implying that 
antidumping measures are incompatible with RTAs. Nevertheless, it has 
never been clarified whether that list is exhaustive or illustrative, as there is 
no consensus nor dispute settlement understanding on the matter. 
It could be argued that eliminating antidumping measures in RTAs is not 
feasible for various reasons. First, from a political perspective, governments 
may find it difficult to obtain enough support from domestic industries to sign 
RTAs if  antidumping measures were not included therein. Second, one could 
point out that so far, a majority of  the RTAs that have eliminated antidumping 
measures have been signed by jurisdictions that do not use the antidumping 
system at all (such as the EFTA states), or between jurisdictions that rarely 
used it against each other (for example, Canada–Chile). 
In agreements abolishing antidumping measures between countries that did 
have more intense trade flows (and hence a higher probability of  resorting to 
antidumping), high degrees of  economic integration and harmonization of  
standards and other conditions are also in place. The European Union and 
ANZCERTA are clear examples of  this. Consequently, it may appear that 
high levels of  integration and harmonization are a prerequisite to abolishing 
antidumping measures between trade partners, so as to ensure that such 
partnership develops on a level playing field. Despite these complexities, 
replacing antidumping measures with the application of  competition legislation 
should be explored as a possible way forward for the promotion of  market 
efficiency, especially between close trade partners.
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Including Binding Dispute Settlement Mechanisms in Competition Chapters of  FTAs
Notwithstanding the potential benefits of  including competition provisions in 
FTAs, it could be argued that they are inherently limited by the fact that they 
are often not subject to dispute settlement mechanisms. The majority of  FTAs 
exclude their competition provisions or competition chapter from the coverage 
of  their general dispute settlement mechanism. The screening exercise referred 
to above found that 59% of  the FTAs examined explicitly excluded competition 
issues from the dispute settlement mechanism. At the same time, 47% of  FTAs 
reviewed established ad hoc dispute settlement mechanisms for competition 
matters, such as consultations or negotiations between authorities (Laprévote et 
al., 2015). However, these ad hoc procedures lack the binding force of  the general 
dispute settlement mechanism. 
Consequently, exploring the possibility of  including a binding dispute settlement 
mechanism in competition chapters would be an interesting prospect for 
further harnessing the strength of  FTAs, or of  the WTO if  a competition 
agreement were to be established therein. Two types of  mechanisms could 
be explored: (1) a state-to-state mechanism which would allow parties to 
challenge discriminatory provisions in the other party’s law, guidelines, or 
consistent practices; and (2) an investor– or business–state mechanism allowing 
private companies concerned by an individual decision to seek redress at the 
international level. This is a complex topic, and would require governments 
to refrain from getting involved on behalf  of  a particular company, as the risk 
of  politicizing competition enforcement should be avoided at all costs.
Of  course, a binding dispute settlement mechanism for competition issues has 
never before been put in place within a trade agreement, and reluctance could 
be expected both at the level of  competition agencies and central governments.
Striving for a Plurilateral Agreement under the WTO
As discussed above, efforts to develop a multilateral framework for trade and 
competition have failed to produce a binding agreement. This has occurred 
for several reasons, including a low prevalence of  national competition regimes 
at times when negotiations were taking place, incompatible positions between 
developed and developing countries, resistance to reducing policy space, 
concerns about domestic capabilities and costs of  implementation, and so on.
Despite past unfruitful attempts, the objective of  achieving an agreement on 
trade and competition rules should not be dismissed. The relevance of  the 
intersection between international trade and competition has been magnified 
by globalization and the increase of  operations across national borders and of  
266    Future of the Global Trade Order
international mergers, trends that are likely to continue. Therefore, we should 
seek ways to advance towards the aforementioned goal.
While some experts have suggested the creation of  an independent multilateral 
competition system with a supranational authority, others have envisioned a 
plurilateral competition agreement within the WTO system (Hufbauer and 
Kim, 2008; Nakatomi , 2013). Given the complexity and multitude of  factors 
involved, the latter is perhaps a better alternative, considering that the WTO is 
an already solid institution on which to build, as well as the natural framework 
in which to treat trade-related issues. 
Nevertheless, it would not be a simple task by any means. The interaction 
between trade and competition policy was removed from the current WTO 
agenda. The Doha Round, under negotiation since 2001, has been extended in 
time due to the difficulty of  successfully concluding its mandate on topics such 
as agriculture, non-agricultural market access, and antidumping and subsidies 
rules, among others. Despite these potentially discouraging facts, one should 
not lose hope in the potential of  the WTO to produce meaningful results. 
The Trade Facilitation Agreement, which entered into force on February of  
2017, offers an example of  why the WTO is still relevant. Even if  at a slow 
pace, things can still move forward, and some progress is preferable to no 
progress at all. In this context, a plurilateral agreement among like-minded 
countries might be a desirable option for the future, with a view to broadening 
its membership progressively.
Moreover, the enormous advances that have been achieved through ICN, 
OECD and UNCTAD should be leveraged as a cornerstone on which to build 
a plurilateral agreement under the WTO. Concretely, ICN could provide the 
strongest platform to harness international support on the issue, thanks to its 
broad membership and to the fact that its recommended practices have been 
effectively adopted and implemented by many of  its member jurisdictions. For 
this initiative to flourish, a comprehensive advocacy strategy to raise awareness 
about its increasing relevance and inherent benefits is warranted. 
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How can Competition Principles be Effectively Embedded into Trade 
Policy and Trade Decisions?
The other side of  the discussion about the trade and competition intersection 
ought to be how trade policy implementation can be positively influenced by 
competition policy and its core principles. Stronger embodiment of  competition 
principles in trade policy can make globalization more inclusive. Moving 
towards a more inclusive globalization – where competitive markets extend 
the benefits among all stakeholders in developed and developing economies 
alike (Pérez Motta , 2016) – would help dissipate popular doubts or mistrust over 
market-oriented policies, as well as the appeal of  populist forces that threaten 
the stability of  the international trade system and of  sound policymaking. 
Competition principles can essentially be summed up as market efficiency, 
consumer welfare, and competitive neutrality – or a level playing field for 
all. These principles are designed to reach the full potential of  a globalized 
economy by contributing to the realization of  trade liberalization’s goals of  
promoting lower prices to consumers in a better, broader range of  products 
available thanks to increased competition, as well as stimulating innovation and 
economic growth. Therefore, exploring ways to proactively embed competition 
principles and advocacy by competition agencies into trade policy decision-
making at the national level, so that such decisions foster market efficiency 
more effectively, should be a top priority.
In order to achieve this, the involvement of  national competition authorities 
(NCAs) in trade decision-making is desirable. NCAs could positively influence 
decision-making regarding the application of  trade rules and flexibilities by 
analysing the measures on the basis of  competition merits, evaluating their 
potential impacts, and issuing recommendations accordingly. Of  course, 
for this proposal to be feasible and successful, NCAs should be effectively 
independent from political pressure and economic interests.
National Competition Authorities Issuing Recommendations About Trade Measures
In the mechanism envisaged here, the NCA’s recommendations would ideally 
be mandatory. If  the government opposed the proposal, the trade minister 
or equivalent would be able to veto it, but would be required to disclose the 
criteria and arguments motivating the veto. In a similar vein, the competition 
authority’s recommendation would be public and include its supporting 
reasoning. 
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The role of  NCAs would involve the following:
1. Tariff modification: NCAs would make a comprehensive evaluation of  the 
full cost-benefit analysis from the standpoint of  domestic market efficiency 
of  a proposed tariff increase.
2. Government procurement: NCAs should work closely with procurement officials 
to ensure tenders are designed and carried out in a pro-competitive manner, 
and to combat bid rigging by suppliers. NCAs should also work to raise 
awareness of  the advantages of  having open, competitive procurement 
processes in terms of  getting the most value for the public resources put 
out. When applicable, they should also exhort their government to adhere 
to the WTO Agreement on Public Procurement.
3. Services and investment regulation: NCAs should evaluate proposed regulations 
which would have effects on trade and investment, to assess their impact 
over market efficiency and consumer welfare. Additionally, NCAs should 
make recommendations on areas where further liberalization would 
be beneficial. Ideally, those recommendations should be discussed and 
coordinated with sectorial regulators, with NCAs’ recommendations 
and arguments made public even if  disagreements between them and 
regulators persist.
4. TBT and SPS measures: While NCAs are in no way meant to substitute for 
the technical expertise of  specialized regulators in the establishment of  
science-based regulations, they could provide a balanced, independent 
analysis of  the broader market impact of  a proposed measure, by taking 
into consideration both consumer and producer interests. This would 
be consistent with the principles enshrined in the WTO Agreements on 
Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) and on the Application of  Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary Measures (SPS), which establish that technical regulations 
shall not be more trade-restrictive than necessary to fulfil a legitimate 
objective,14 and that members should take into account the objective of  
minimizing negative trade effects when determining the appropriate level 
of  SPS protection.15
5. Trade defense instruments: NCAs might be the best-placed agencies to assess 
the transversal market impact of  measures such as antidumping duties. The 
competition authority should weigh their potential effects over consumers 
and intermediate users, in order to provide a view that is not limited to the 
14 Article 2.2 of  the WTO Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade.
15 Article 5.4 of  the WTO Agreement on the Application of  Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures.
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interests of  national producers, but encompasses wider economic efficiency 
and welfare.16 Accordingly, NCAs would issue recommendations regarding 
the imposition of  antidumping duties, advocating for the use of  the lesser 
duty rule when appropriate.17
Advantages of  Empowering NCAs in Trade Decision Making
The proposed scheme whereby NCAs would make recommendations to 
national commercial authorities before trade decisions were made would 
have significant advantages. First, it would not be perceived as a foreign 
imposition, which was one of  the reasons why previous discussions on trade 
and competition stalled. Second, it could be implemented as a national strategy 
in favor of  market efficiency, seeking to reinforce the trade agenda. Third, by 
offering an a priori analysis, negative effects of  unjustified trade barriers would 
be prevented, rather than remedied through an ex post intervention. Fourth, 
the scheme would foster transparency while still preserving trade authorities’ 
ability to apply the proposed decisions, albeit at a higher political cost if  
anticompetitive consequences are known beforehand. Finally, the proposed 
mechanism could be implemented on a very wide scale, since more than 130 
jurisdictions currently have an NCA.
National Competition Authorities Issuing Recommendations about the SOEs and Designated 
Monopolies Regime
Another relevant trade-related field where competition authorities could exert 
a positive influence is that of  state-owned enterprises. SOEs have gained 
presence in the global marketplace. According to a report published by the 
OECD in December of  2016, approximately 22 of  the world’s biggest 100 
firms are SOEs or are otherwise under state control (OECD, 2016). This is the 
highest level of  state-ownership in decades, which raises concerns regarding 
the impact of  SOEs in international trade and investment, and challenges 
16 This consideration, often referred to as “public interest test”, is not explicitly contained in the WTO Antidumping 
Agreement, but it is desirable for a balanced approach to the use of  such trade defence instrument.
17 This would be consistent with the Antidumping Agreement, which in its Article 9.1 recognizes that imposing an 
antidumping measure is optional even when the required conditions are fulfilled, and that it is desirable to apply a 
duty below the dumping margin when that is sufficient to remove the injury to the domestic industry.
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governments to guarantee competitive neutrality if  unfair market distortions 
are to be avoided.
On Competitive Neutrality
Recognizing that SOEs have become global competitors with the potential to 
have effects on trade and investment across borders and beyond the mandate 
for which they were established, it is critical to ensure fair and competitive 
regulatory environments. In this sense, NCAs should analyze their country’s 
national regulatory framework for SOEs and issue recommendations as 
necessary to guarantee that SOEs do not unjustly benefit from preferential 
treatment when performing commercial activities. Such preferential treatment 
(whether through subsidies, privileged regulatory, fiscal or financial regimes, 
etc.) would confer SOEs artificial advantages over their private counterparts, 
potentially deterring the latter from investing in a jurisdiction where they lack 
the certainty of  a level playing field.
Mergers and Acquisitions involving SOEs
On a similar note, merger and acquisition (M&A) activity by SOEs has also 
increased, especially by enterprises owned by developing countries’ governments 
(OECD, 2016). This is a source of  concerns in some jurisdictions as takeovers 
by foreign companies tend to be perceived as potential threats to national 
sovereignty or security. This is especially the case when M&A transactions 
involve areas like high technology, infrastructure, satellite navigation, or sectors 
otherwise regarded as strategic. Hence, it is necessary to ensure that M&A 
analysis and approval respond to strict economic and legal facts, and that they 
are not deviated by political interests. A special responsibility falls on NCAs 
to guarantee this. 
Conclusions
There is a naturally occurring intersection between international trade 
and competition, since both pursue similar objectives. Nevertheless, while 
international trade and competition are in essence complementary, the 
implementation of  trade and competition policies in a truly reinforcing manner 
cannot be taken for granted. With worrying waves of  protectionism in some 
countries threatening the stability and foundations of  the global trade order, 
special attention is required to the implementation of  such policies. 
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When it comes to the potential impact of  competition issues over trade, it has 
been acknowledged that distortions to trade and investment can be generated 
by anticompetitive practices committed by private companies or SOEs, by a 
lack of  coordination among NCAs, by competition enforcement decisions 
reached through methodologies that do not conform to best international 
practices, and by competition legislation or decisions responding to objectives 
other than economic efficiency. Due to the long-existing recognition of  the fact 
that these issues can negate the benefits of  trade, the international community 
has aimed to influence competition enforcement through international trade 
instances such as the WTO, and instruments such as bilateral and regional 
trade agreements. This chapter has analyzed possible steps for further progress 
in this sense.
However, while competition issues can undermine trade, trade policy and 
decisions can also deviate from its ultimate objectives to serve narrow 
interests, thereby hindering the competitive process. Better harnessing of  the 
complementarity of  trade and competition therefore requires observing this 
relationship in the opposite direction – namely, how to embed competition 
principles into trade policy and decisions. A series of  innovative ideas aimed 
at achieving this has been put forth in this chapter. Further reflection and 
discussions should ensue in the hope of  making trade and competition policy 
work together for the global economy.
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The world economy is going through major economic and geopolitical 
shifts, fostering tensions in the global economic governance structure 
centered on the IMF, World Bank and the WTO. The impacts of 
globalization are being questioned while disruptive technologies continue 
to change the economic landscape. Populist politicians advocating for 
greater sovereignty and policy autonomy are attracting increasing shares 
of the vote in many OECD countries. The election of Donald Trump on 
a protectionist platform and the UK referendum in favor of Brexit may 
signal that the peak of globalization has been reached. 
This collection of papers focuses on one of the pillars of global governance: 
the multilateral trade system, anchored by the WTO. Membership of 
the WTO is now close to universal, with the accession of China in 2001 
representing a landmark achievement. While the organization plays a 
major role in enhancing the transparency of trade policies and enforcing 
the rules of the game that have been agreed by members, it has not been 
successful at negotiating new rules. The private sector is frustrated with 
the WTO, as are civil society groups seeking to address issues of interest 
to them. There is a general perception that WTO disciplines and modus 
operandi are outdated and have not kept pace with globalization. 
The chapters in this volume focus on key critical issues that confront 
the WTO membership. They review developments in trade policy and 
technology and regulation. They make clear there is an important global 
governance gap. The “internet of things”, e-commerce, cross-border 
services, digital trade and data flows all call for global rules of the road. 
They also make clear that pressures for old-fashioned protectionism are 
rising in some parts of the world. The future of the WTO is under serious 
threat. Safeguarding and bolstering the rules-based trading system is 
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